- explaining why they succeeded and
- offering some useful tips on how to stop such sign becoming generic.
Last month, Dallas Buyers Club LLC was reported to have started that process. It has commenced proceedings against various telcos and ISPs seeking preliminary discovery from them of the identities of their customers who were using IP (as in Internet Protocol) addresses at times Dallas Buyers Club LLC says illegal copies of the film were being downloaded from those addresses.
Last Monday, Perram J rejected an application by some journalists and others for access under FCR r 2.29 to most of the documents on the court file. His Honour noted the usual rule that affidavits are not “public” until they have been used in court and the potential privacy sensitivities or releasing, amongst other things, subscriber identification information at this very early stage of the proceeding.
Apparently, Dallas Buyers Club LLC’s application for preliminary discovery will be heard all the way off on 17 – 18 February 2015.
For cases where the record companies successfully obtained preliminary discovery from the Universities of some student details alleged to be engaging in infringing activities, see Sony v University of Tasmania here, here, here and here.
On a slightly different tack, it was reported on 19 November that some Universities have been suspending staff and student access to the internet, and in at least the case of UNSW, issuing fines where “internet piracy” has been discovered.
Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v iiNet Limited (No 1)  FCA 1232
The High Court has dismissed Alphapharm’s appeal from the Full Federal Court’s ruling granting Lundbeck an extension of time to apply to extend the term of the escitalopram patent. It was close though: 3 to 2.
You will recall that Lundbeck applied 10 years late to extend the term of its pharmaceutical patent. So, not only was Lundbeck applying to extend the term of its patent (under s70), it was applying for an extension of time in which to make that application. In granting special leave, the High Court accepted that, if the power were available, the circumstances justified the 10 year extension. The question was a matter of statutory interpretation: was there power to extend.
Section 71(2) specifies when an application to extend the term of a pharmaceutical patent must be made:
(2) An application for an extension of the term of a standard patent must be made during the term of the patent and within 6 months after the latest of the following dates:
(a) the date the patent was granted;
(b) the date of commencement of the first inclusion in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods of goods that contain, or consist of, any of the pharmaceutical substances referred to in subsection 70(3);
(c) the date of commencement of this section.
Lundbeck’s application was made within the term of the standard patent (with 1 day to spare), but well outside the dates specified in paragraphs (a) – (c).
Section 223 confers a general power to extend the time for making an application. Under s 223(11), however, the power cannot be used to extend time in relation to “prescribed actions”. One of those prescribed actions related to s 71(2):
(b) filing, during the term of a standard patent under subsection 71(2) of the Act, an application under subsection 70(1) of the Act for an extension of the term of the patent; ….
Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ, after noting the long history in patents legislation of the power to apply for an extension of time, even after the time had expired, as an important safety valve in the system, ruled that s 71(2) specified 2 requirements. The first time requirement is that the application must be filed within the term of the standard patent. The second time requirement was that the application must also satisfy at least one of the requirements set out in paragraphs (a) – (c).
Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ held, however, that reg. 22.11 applied only to the first requirement: that the application was made within the term of the standard patent. Their Honours considered this was important otherwise a “gap” could arise between when a patent expired but was then restored. That would be highly undesirable. In contrast, there was no policy reason why reg. 22.11 should apply to the second time requirement. At :
There is nothing in any of the extrinsic materials, or in the long policy debates on simplifying extensions of term, which would suggest any rationale for excluding the second time requirement from the remedial power to extend time under s 223(2)(a). Alphapharm’s senior counsel conceded, correctly, that if Alphapharm’s construction of reg 22.11(4)(b) were correct, the remedial power in s 223(2)(a) could never apply to extend time in relation to the second time requirement, no matter what the quality or provenance of any “error or omission” made in respect of that time. Alphapharm’s construction would introduce an inexplicable asymmetry between a patentee and a competitor opposing a s 70(1) application. An opponent can access the general remedial power to extend times cast upon it in mandatory terms. Had it been the legislature’s intention to exclude the second time requirement in s 71(2) from the general remedial power in s 223(2)(a), that would have been simple to accomplish.
Accordingly, s 223 could be invoked as Lundbeck had satisfied the first time requirement (and so did not need it to be extended) but needed an extension in relation to the second time requirement – which reg.22.11 did not apply to.
In dissent, Kiefel and Keane JJ rather tersely said at :
s 71(2) cannot reasonably be read as referring to two actions. There is but one action referred to in s 71(2) – making an application for extension of the term of a patent. That one action is to be done on a date that satisfies the two requirements as to time set out in s 71(2). It is that action to which s 223(2) would apply, were it not for reg 22.11(4)(b).
Their Honours did explain why they considered policy and historical considerations did not lead to a different conclusion. Of potentially more general interest, however, their Honours took a different stand on the role of statutory interpretation at :
In any event, as was said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of statutory text; nor is their examination an end in itself. (footnote omitted)
A big bill coming? After the standard term of the patent expired but before the expiry of the extended term, Alphapharm and other generics commenced marketing their own versions of the drug.
Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S  HCA 42
The Full Federal Court has upheld the Commissioner’s refusal to grant Research Affiliates’ patent for a computer implemented method for constructing a portfolio management index.
The central claim reads:
A computer-implemented method for generating an index, the method including steps of:
(a) accessing data relating to a plurality of assets;
(b) processing the data thereby to identify a selection of the assets for inclusion in the index based on an objective measure of scale other than share price, market capitalization and any combination thereof;
(c) accessing a weighting function configured to weight the selected assets;
(d) applying the weighting function, thereby to assign to each of the selected assets a respective weighting, wherein the weighting:
(i) is based on an objective measure of scale other than share price, market capitalization and any combination thereof; and
(ii) is not based on market capitalization weighting, equal weighting, share price weighting and any combination thereof;
thereby to generate the index.
The Court posed the issue before it as being:
whether computer implementation of an otherwise unpatentable business scheme is sufficient to make the claimed method properly the subject of letters patent.
One might think, put that way, there is only one answer. May be. It makes it very important, however, how one determines whether the “scheme” is itself unpatentable.
Another intriguing aspect of the decision is that, before it embarked on analysing whether this was indeed a “manner of manufacture, the Court engaged in a very extensive review of how this issue is approached in other jurisdictions, including the USA and UK.
Time pressures don’t permit extended analysis at this stage. In the meantime:
and no doubt others. It will be interesting to see what happens to the RPL Central appeal.
Research Affiliates LLC v Commissioner of Patents  FCAFC 150 (Kenny, Bennett and Nicholas JJ)