Shades of green – 2

Last week’s post looked at the substantive reasons for the rejection of Frucor’s attempt to register a shade of green as a trade mark for energy drinks. There were also a couple of points about grounds of opposition and amendment of applications on appeal worth noting.

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You will remember that Frucor’s application included a green swatch, copied from its New Zealand trade mark application, which was for a different colour than the colour identified by the written description under reg. 4.3(7), Pantone 367c.

What’s a ground of rejection (for opposition purposes)

In addition to the grounds of opposition provided by sections 58 to 62A, as you will know s 57 provides that an application may be opposed on any of the grounds on which the application could have been rejected during examination.

Coca-Cola argued that the inconsistency between the graphic representation of the mark and the written description was itself a ground of rejection.

The basis for this argument was that s 33 required the Registrar to reject an application where the application had not been made in accordance with the Act. It argued the Registrar should have rejected the application because the inconsistency meant that Frucor’s application had not been made in accordance with the Regulations as required by s 27(2)(a).

Yates J rejected this argument at [136]ff. The grounds of rejection contemplated by s 57 were, relevantly, those provided by s 39s 44. (They even appear under a heading “Grounds for rejecting an application”.)

The power to amend

Frucor had not sought to amend its application to substitute a swatch of the correct colour before the Registrar during the examination process. It did apply to amend, however, during the appeal to the Federal Court.

Yates J, citing the approach taken by Heerey J under the Patents Act in Genetics Institute,[1] held that the Court had power to consider the amendment application under s 197 even though there had not been an application to amend before the Registrar. At [195], his Honour explained:[2]

…. I do not see how an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Registrar in opposition to registration proceedings under the Trade Marks Act differs materially from an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Commissioner in opposition to grant proceedings under the Patents Act. Whilst I acknowledge that, in the present case, an application under s 63 of the Trade Marks Act was not before the Registrar, the registrability of the mark the subject of the application was in contest. In the proceedings below, the Registrar had the power to permit the application to be amended subject to the constraints placed upon the exercise of that power by the Act. Given the nature of the “appeal” to this Court, the Court’s power to quell the controversy as to the registrability of the mark—the subject matter of the appeal—cannot be more limited than the Registrar’s power. Further, it cannot matter that the Registrar was not asked to exercise the power of amendment, just as it cannot matter that an opponent might seek to raise additional or new grounds of opposition, or that the parties might seek to adduce different evidence to the evidence that was before the Registrar or raise new or different arguments. The opposition proceeds afresh before the Court on the subject matter that was before the Registrar and is adjudicated upon accordingly.

This practical approach is, with respect, to be welcomed in the interests of efficiency and, if followed, would obviate the need to introduce into the Trade Marks Act a counterpart to s 105(1A) of the Patents Act which, in turn, arose because Courts applying NEB had ruled a Court hearing an appeal from an opposition before the Commissioner had no power to deal with an amendment application.

Even though the power existed, Yates J at [206] denied Frucor’s application to amend. The substitution of “a markedly different green-coloured swatch” for the existing swatch would substantially affect the identity of the trade mark and so was prohibited by s 65(2).

Frucor also made a very late application to the Court to amend the application on the basis of s 65A.

The very late stage of the application and the lack of any utility (as the application would fail the distinctiveness requirement in any event) were fatal.

In contrast to his Honour’s practical approach to allowing consideration of an amendment under s 65 through s 197, however, Yates J considered allowing a party to bring an application under s 65A for the first time in the Court would subvert the statutory process for the consideration of such amendments by the Registrar prescribed by s 65A. Section 65A contemplated publication of the amendment application in the Official Journal and opposition proceedings before the Registrar.

In further contrast to Yates J’s views about s 65A, it may be noted that Courts dealing with amendment applications under s 105(1A) have directed the amendment applicant to publish the application in the Official Journal so that the Commissioner and any potential opponents may intervene.[3] The difference is of course that the Patents Act through s105(1A) expressly tells the Court to deal with the request to amend because of the inefficiencies and delays which had resulted.

As previously noted, it does not appear that Frucor has appealed.

Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company [2018] FCA 993


  1. Which Yates J noted was apparently endorsed by the Full Court in New England Biolabs at [50].  ?
  2. See also at [200] – [201] and [204].  ?
  3. A recent example is Electronic Tax-Free Shopping Ltd v Fexco Merchant Services (No 3) [2017] FCA 569 at [2] – [3].  ?

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