Author name: war

A barrister practising mainly in Australian patents, trade marks, copyright and other IP law; lecturer and contributing author to LexisNexis' Copyright & Designs and Patents looseleaf services

iiNet and the movie studios

Some points worth pondering arising from the recent pleadings fight

Both the movie studios and iiNet brought motions for summary judgment and/or to strike parts of the other side’s pleadings relating to the claims that (1) iiNet authorised infringement, (2) iiNet was liable as a primary infringer for actually reproducing the allegedly copied films and (3) whether or not iiNet was also liable in conversion.

The movie companies are obviously suing iiNet for authorising the (alleged) infringing activities of iiNet’s subscribers on a theory similar to the successful theories in Cooper v Universal.

Part of iiNet’s defence is that the notice it received of the claimed infringements were ‘mere allegations of copyright infringement’. The judge considered this sufficient to make iiNet’s point:

56.   The Court has no difficulty in understanding such pleading as being a statement that the AFACT notifications did no more than bring to iiNet’s attention an allegation of copyright infringement. Whether the notifications from DtecNet of alleged infringement are sufficient to prove infringement by iiNet’s users or might be used as evidence that iiNet was aware of the infringement of its users is necessarily a matter requiring evidence and thus is a matter for determination at the hearing. So considered, there is nothing further which needs to be added to the pleading. The Court rejects Roadshow’s assertion that such statement is inadequate.

 That is, iiNet appears to be defending the allegation of authorising copyright infringement in part by contending it did not have sufficient knowledge of what was going on to have the necessary control. As the quote shows, however, whether or not iiNet’s position will be good enough to win the day remains to be seen.

The other fights which are of potentially more general interest relate to the movie companies’ allegations that iiNet is itself a direct or primary infringer (not just an authoriser) or liable in conversion under s 116.

In relation to conversion, the judge considered it wasn’t clear whether the movie companies were alleging that the ‘infringing copies’ alleged to be converted were the data electronically transmitted across iiNet’s network (facilities) as temporary or transient copies stored in iiNet’s switches and servers or in some other way.

43.   It does not follow from the fact that the Court may find that the iiNet users have ‘electronically transmitted’ the films that the Court will necessarily have to find that the data so transmitted constitutes an ‘infringing copy.’ For example, the Court could find as a fact that the users have ‘electronically transmitted’ the whole or substantial part of the films by reference only to the conduct of the users without the Court having to consider the involvement of the technical process by which that transmission occurs. In such instance, the Court’s finding in relation to the conduct of the iiNet users may have no bearing on whether it finds that the data transmitted is, while in transmission, a copy of the film as defined, meaning an article or thing in which the visual images or sounds comprising the film are embodied. The data would need to be a copy for it to constitute an infringing copy, and there would have to be an infringing copy for there to be conversion.

The judge described the movie companies’ claims as novel but, at this stage of the proceedings, refused summary judgment and required them

47.   … to specify exactly what the ‘infringing copies’ are; how they are created; and at least one instance of them, as is required by O 58 r 16 of the Rules

Thirdly, it does appear that the movie companies contend that iiNet directly infringes because any temporary/transient copies of infringing material stored in its network or on its servers as users download or transmit them are infringing reproductions. Unlike the conversion claim, the judge considered this adequately pleaded:

50.   The issues the Court has raised regarding the definition of ‘infringing copy’, and whether that could apply on the facts pleaded, do not arise in relation to this claim. If it is found that there was transient storage of the whole or substantial part of the films, this may give rise to there being a ‘copy’ for the purposes of s 86(c) of the Copyright Act, and consequently the problems discussed above in relation to ‘electronic transmission’ do not apply.

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2009] FCA 332

Earlier background on the case here and here.

iiNet and the movie studios Read More »

Should genes be patented?

Should genes be patented? Read More »

World IP Court? 2

World IP Court? 2 Read More »

World IP Court by 2012?

World IP Court by 2012? Read More »

Embedding rights management information in photos

Embedding rights management information in photos Read More »

Use of Software and those computer defences again

You’ll recall that SAG licensed its database software to RWWA. RWWA engaged KAZ to provide disaster recovery services and installed a copy of the software on KAZ’ off-site servers. Meckerracher J dismissed SAG’s claim that this was unlicensed and therefore infringement of its copyright. (link via my attempt to summarise here).

The Full Court has substantially dismissed the appeal, but found the judge was wrong to the extent his Honour considered s 47F of the Copyright Act 1968 would have provided a defence also.

On the question of licence construction, their Honours found that the proposed use fell within the terms of the licensed use “for … emergency restart purposes“:

34 The phrase “for … emergency restart purposes” is more ample than, for example, “in order to restart the System in an emergency”. A penumbra surrounds “emergency restart”. It is a natural reading of the composite phrase to include within its coverage testing whether the copied System will restart should an emergency occur.

35 If one were to regard the phrase “for … emergency restart purposes” as open to two constructions, SAG’s construction, in our view, results in a meaning that would be unreasonable or inconvenient. The purpose behind clause 12.3 is to protect RWWA from serious loss in an emergency, whether caused by a breakdown of its mainframe or some external event putting it out of action. It would be an unreasonable and inconvenient result if RWWA were to be unable to take sensible steps to make it more likely that the purpose behind clause 12.3 would be achieved, by testing the copied system in order to maximise the chance of the restart occurring in the event of an emergency arising.

36 Further, we agree with the primary judge’s observation quoted at [28] that SAG’s interpretation would make clause 12.3 a pointless exception to the other prohibitive or restrictive provisions of the agreement, and that such a construction would provide very little scope for achieving the purpose of clause 12.3 described above.

The expert evidence was also consistent with this.

While the Licence Agreement did (by clause 1.4) expressly prohibit the software being installed at any location other than the “designated location”, the clause had to be read in context and clause 12.3, as SAG acknowledged, did permit RWWA to use the software “for archival or emergency restart purposes”. Clause 1.2,which prohibited “use” on anything other than the designated hardware, similarly had to be read down.

If the terms of the licence had not been capable of construction to permit this (fairly typical) type of disaster recovery strategy, however, s 47F would not have protected RWWA. S 47F provides a limited defence for “security testing”. However:

55 What s 47F(1) permits is the reproduction of the original copy for the purpose of testing the security of that copy. The original copy is the copy RWWA is licensed to use. The permitted testing is of the security of that copy. The passages from the primary judge’s reasons quoted at [49] appear to us to be saying that the testing of the functionality of the DR Copy at the DR Site is the testing of the security of the original copy at Osborne Park. That, in our view, is not what s 47F(1) authorises. On the facts of this case, what it permits is the making of a copy of the installed copy at Osborne Park for the purpose of testing the security of the installed copy. As it seems to us, the primary judge’s construction of the provision enables the DR Copy at the DR Site to be tested so as to determine its efficacy should the installed copy at Osborne Park for some reason be no longer available.

and, given the unchallenged expert evidence on the issue:

68 For the above reasons we are unable to accept RWWA’s contention, which the primary judge appears to have adopted, that “testing … the security of the original copy” extends to what was done at the DR Site, namely testing of the DR Copy to ensure that the System would be capable of being restarted and operated without the loss of data. In our view, “testing … the security of the original copy” should be confined to testing the original to ascertain its security from unauthorised access or against electronic or other invasion.

The Court noted, but did not need to consider the correctness, of his Honour’s conclusion that s 47C would also have protected RWWA.

So, an appellate level illustration providing some confirmation of how strictly the the Courts will approach the gobbledygook enacted in the special computer program defences. Make sure you draft your software licences to provide the protection actually needed – especially if the software needs to be used in a “disaster recovery” situation.

Software AG (Australia) Pty Ltd v Racing & Wagering Western Australia [2009] FCAFC 36 (Spender, Sundberg and Siopis JJ)

Use of Software and those computer defences again Read More »

Bushfires and IP Australia

Bushfires and IP Australia Read More »

Crown use

No, it’s not the long awaited response to the CLRC’s report; instead, IP Australia and the Attorney-General’s Department have published an information sheet about Crown Use of intellectual property (in Australia).

As you will already know all about this, it could be a useful starter for your clients.

Read the glossy (pdf) here.

Crown use Read More »

Beery barefeet on appeal

Curiouser and Curiouser!

The Full Court has affirmed the trial judge’s finding that Gallo’s registration of the trade mark BAREFOOT for wine should be removed for non-use. However, the Full Court has overturned his Honour’s finding that Lion Nathan’s use of Barefoot Radler for beer did not infringe that registration (before it was removed). Consequently, the Full Court has found that Lion Nathan did infringe the registration up until the date the registration was removed from the Register.

Gallo acquired the trade mark by assignment. Neither it nor the assignor had ever consciously used it in Australia.  However, some wine bearing the trade mark had made their way into Australia for resale via, presumably, a parallel importer. (More detailed summary of the facts from the decision at 1st instance here and here – the internal links are broken I’m afraid.)

On the question of whether or not Gallo (or its predecessor) had used the trade mark as a trade mark, the Full Court said:

34 In our opinion, the conclusion of the primary judge was correct. The contention of Gallo that an owner of a registered trademark uses the mark in Australia simply because goods to which the owner (or an authorised user) has affixed the mark are traded in the ordinary course of trade in Australia should be rejected.

and

38 …. The essence of Gallo’s case in this matter is this is all that is necessary to establish use in Australia by the manufacturer or producer. However, that is not what the Full Court said. Projection by the manufacturer of goods bearing its mark into the course of trade in Australia was the other factor which, together with the display, sale or offering for sale, led to the conclusion that there had been use of the mark in Australia by the manufacturer and its owner. We think fairly plainly what the Full Court was saying was that for there to be use in Australia of the mark by the owner, the owner of the mark must have engaged in conduct of some type which the owner might reasonably contemplate would result in dealings with its goods marked with its mark in Australia while the goods were in the course of trade.

As a matter of interpretation, the Full Court concluded, contrary to Lion Nathan, that the trade mark could be expunged only from the date the Court made the order under s 101.

This was particularly significant because the Full Court, as noted above, found that Lion Nathan’s use infringed the trade mark while it was registered.

First, the Full Court rejected the trial judge’s finding that beer and wine were not goods of the same description:

72 The primary judge accepted that there were a number of factors which supported the view that Lion Nathan’s beer and wine were goods at the same description. They were both alcoholic beverages and generally distributed by this same major wholesale distributors. The beer was intended to be an appealing alternative to wine and in developing the product, Lion Nathan deliberately set out to attract people who did not drink beer. Indeed it was developed with the deliberate objective of enticing consumers who previously drank wine but not beer. Producers of alcoholic beverages are no longer confined to the production of beer, as opposed to wine, and large producers of alcoholic beverages now produce a range of products and market themselves as doing so. Companies which were once brewers now market and distribute a range of products including beer, wine, spirits, cider and non-alcoholic drinks. Wine and beer are now frequently distributed by the same retailers. We agree that these matters point, and in our opinion point convincingly, to Lion Nathan’s beer and wine being goods of the same description.

73 The considerations which led his Honour to reach the opposite conclusion are, in our opinion, of materially less significance. The first, which concerned the origin of the goods, focused on the manner of manufacture of beer on the one hand and wine on the other. While this clearly establishes that they are not the same goods, it is unlikely that this difference would be significant to the consuming public if, as his Honour found, large producers of alcoholic beverages produce a range of products. Additionally it is important to bear in mind that this issue is being considered in the more general context of whether consumers might see the goods as having the same trade origin: Southern Cross at 606. The same can be said of the next consideration relied on by his Honour, namely the specific manner of sale in restaurants on the one hand and retail outlets on the other. If large producers of alcoholic beverages are producing a range of products then the fact that the wine might be sold in a slightly different way would not be a difference of significance to the consuming public who may come to consider the trade origins of Lion Nathan’s beer. The next consideration was the manner in which beer is consumed, that is drunk for its refreshing qualities, and not, like wine, consumed in a “sipping fashion”. For our part, we doubt this is a relevant consideration. Nor do we think the last consideration, the detailed corporate structure of Lion Nathan, is of any real significance.

Then, the Full Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that Lion Nathan’s BAREFOOT RADLER trade mark was deceptively similar to Gallo’s trade mark.

Finally, the Full Court rejected Lion Nathan’s attempt to rely on the (rarely used) proviso to s 120(2)(b) which provides:

However, the person is not taken to have infringed the trade mark if the person establishes that using the sign as the person did is not likely to deceive or cause confusion.

The Full Court foreshadowed that this was a tough requirement to hurdle:

76 …. However, any conclusion about deceptive similarity would usually inform consideration of whether the actual use was likely to deceive or cause confusion. In a sense, an affirmative answer to the question of whether the alleged infringing mark was deceptively similar would be the starting point. If it was, then it would, in many instances, render it more likely (though not inevitable) that the actual use of the allegedly infringing mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion. Also relevant, in our opinion, would be the matters considered in determining whether the alleged infringer’s goods are of the same description as the goods in respect of which the registered mark is registered.

Lion Nathan had not satisfied this requirement here. The facts that the usage was on beer, the beer was packaged in six packs and in retail stores from the “beer” section did not help:

77 …. The use of the image of a bare foot with the words “BAREFOOT RADLER” would be more likely to reinforce the significance or prominence of the word “BAREFOOT”. The fact that the allegedly infringing mark was on beer packaged in the way described does not, in our opinion, tell against the likelihood that a person looking at beer packaged in this way would think that the beer originated from Gallo. If, in a retail liquor outlet, there was beer bearing the trade mark “BAREFOOT RADLER” where the word “RADLER” was the description of a type of beer and also wine with the trade mark “BAREFOOT” immediately followed by a description of the type of wine (by reference to grape type), then there is, in our opinion, little room to doubt that it is likely many would view the former as originating from the producer of the latter.

The matter will be remitted to the trial judge to deal with remedies. Wonder what the damages will be?

So, it would seem you should bring and conclude your non-use action before you launch the product. That will require a client with a very long term commitment to the brand!

E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2009] FCAFC 27 (Moore, Edmonds and Gilmour JJ)

Beery barefeet on appeal Read More »

A tool bar for detecting hosts etc.

A tool bar for detecting hosts etc. Read More »