The Full Court has dismissed both Bluescope’s appeal and Gram’s cross-appeal from the ruling that Bluescope infringed Gram’s registered design for the Smartascreen fencing panel.
This is an “old Act” case. At first instance, Jacobson J held that Bluescope’s product was an obvious imitation of Gram’s registered design. However, his Honour rejected the allegation that it was also a fraudulent imitation.
Bluescope (then Lysaghts, part of BHP) had long been the market leader for fencing made from metal sheeting. There was a problem, however: one side of the fence was less desirable because the posts and rails supporting the cladding were visible. Gram came up with its Gramline solution which was symmetrical, looking the same from both sides. It quickly usurped Bluescope’s position as the market leader. Bluescope then spent (roughly) 6 years trying to come up with a competing design. In the course of doing so, it rejected a number of alternatives in favour of one that so closely resembled Gram’s product that the two could be stacked one on top of the other.
Construction of the design
Besanko and Middleton JJ endorsed the trial judge’s principles for construing the design, summarising them at :
(a) a design is the mental picture of a shape, configuration, pattern or ornamentation of the article to which it is to be applied;
(b) construction is a question of fact for the Court to determine by the eye alone;
(c) expert evidence may be led to assist the Court;
(d) the Court is to apply an ‘instructed eye’ to the design – that is the Court must be made aware of the characteristics of the article to which the design is applied, and the manner in which such articles would normally be found in trade, commerce and in use; and
(e) however, considerations of utility have no relevance to the proper construction of a design.
In applying those principles, the trial judge found
“the primary feature was the sawtooth pattern consisting of six identical repeating pans, oriented vertically. The sawtooth pattern was the product of the unique proportions of the wavelength, amplitude and angles of each sawtooth module”.
It was this combination of features, which contributed to the symmetricality of the product, that ultimately conferred the design with novelty and which were taken by Bluescope, leading to the finding of obvious imitation. Three points of note on these parts of the case.
First, at  Besanko and Middleton JJ rejected Bluescope’s challenge to the trial judge’s reliance on Gram’s design being viewed vertically as an in-fill sheet between posts so that the saw-tooth ran top to bottom:
While considerations of utility are not relevant, designs cannot be construed without context. It is often the case that features of the article to which the design applies, will serve both visual and functional purposes. Where this is the case, the implication of BlueScope’s submission is that the feature’s appearance and utility must be divorced. However, a design without context is a meaningless drawing. As Lockhart J observed in Dart Industries 15 IPR 403 at 408, the design is ‘the mental picture of the shape, configuration, pattern, or ornament of the article to which it has been applied’ (emphasis added). It is inescapable that the Design is for sheet metal fencing and the construction of the Design must reflect this.
That is, because the design was for a sheet metal fencing panel which “worked” in one way, it should be interpreted in the way (presumably) those who would use it for that would understand it.
Secondly, the trial judge had not impermissibly referred to the fact that the Bluescope product could be “nested” with the Gram product (embodying the design). But, it was not the fact of “nestability” as such that was important. Rather, it was relevant because it was helpful in forming a view about the similarity of the sawtooth profile. Besanko and Middleton JJ explained at :
the nesting qualities are instructive. As has been discussed at length, the combination of amplitudes, wavelengths and angles create the sawtooth profile. For the GramLine and Smartascreen sheets to nest, albeit imperfectly, they must by logical extension, have similar amplitudes, wavelengths and angles. This is clearly helpful in deciding if Smartascreen is an obvious imitation of GramLine, and it was entirely open for the primary judge to be assisted by the nesting properties of the two articles. It is further relevant because as noted above, an obvious imitation is not one which is the same as the design, but one that is an imitation apparent to the eye notwithstanding slight differences.
Care definitely needs to be taken with this as the physical embodiment of the registered design is not always the same as the design and the comparison must be between the accused product and the registered design. It is important to note, therefore, that the Full Court treated this as confirming or reinforcing the view based on comparison of the appearance of the infringing article to the registered design.
Thirdly, the Full Court considered the trial judge had impermissibly taken into account Bluescope’s commercial objectives – to introduce a product to compete with the Gramline product – in deciding whether or not the Smartascreen was an obvious imitation. With respect that must be right as the test of obvious imitation is an objective test based on visual resemblance. Yates J, however, was prepared to accept at  to  evidence such as that Bluescope was attracted to the design because “it had a similar appearance to the GramLine sawtooth profile and would gain ready market acceptance” as a kind of expert evidence about the similarity of Bluescope’s product to Gram’s design.
In Polyaire, the High Court rejected the interpretation of fraudulent imitation which had required the alleged infringer to have attempted to disguise its copying. Instead, the High Court had said at :
the application of a “fraudulent imitation” requires that the application of the design be with knowledge of the existence of the registration and of the absence of consent to its use, or with reason to suspect those matters, and that the use of the design produces what is an “imitation” within the meaning of par (a). This, to apply the general principle recently exemplified in Macleod v The Queen, is the knowledge, belief or intent which renders the conduct fraudulent.
At , the High Court approved Lehane J’s formulation of the test for fraudulent imitation in the following terms:
[T]he essential questions are, first, whether the allegedly infringing design is based on or derived from the registered design and, then, whether the differences are so substantial that the result is not to be described as an imitation. ….
In this case, the trial judge considered that fraudulent imitation required a finding that the infringing product was deliberately based on the registered design. The Besanko and Middleton JJ endorsed that test at :
In our opinion, it must be shown that there was deliberate, in the sense of conscious, copying for there to be fraudulent imitation. If imitation imports the notion of making use of the registered design, there must be at least a conscious use of the registered design before it could be concluded there was fraudulent imitation.
The trial judge had found that:
- Bluescope knew the Gramline design was registered;
- Bluescope knew that Gram had achieved runaway commercial success with its product;
- Bluescope was trying to design a “Gram lookalike”;
- Bluescope had come up with a number of different symmetrical designs to Gram’s design, but rejected those in favour of the Smartascreen design; and
- Bluescope had adopted a panel size of 762mm which was the same as Gram’s but different to the standard 820mm panel prevailing in the industry at the time.
His Honour was also “sceptical” of Bluescope’s claim that the resemblance to Gram’s design was coincidental. Gram argued that, given these findings, what other conclusion could there be but deliberate copying.
The Full Court upheld the trial judge’s refusal to find the Smartascreen was deliberately based on the Gramline design. Two factors seem to have played an important role here.
First, the Full Court accepted at  that an allegation of fraudulent imitation was a serious matter and the level of proofs needed to reflect the gravity of that.
Secondly, the evidence showed that the Bluescope employees who came up with the final design from 2000 onwards were influenced by, or at least referred to, design work done by a Mr Field in 1996.
Mr Field did not give evidence so it was not clear on the evidence what influences or references he made use of. Now, in many cases, the unexplained failure of a key player in the design process to give evidence (especially when there are inferences (at least) suggestive of copying available) might be sufficient to give rise to a Jones v Dunkel that the witness could not say anything helpful to the defendant’s case. Here, however, Mr Field’s absence was explained: he was old and in very poor health. His design work had taken place in 1996 very early in the picture. Moreover, Bluescope’s product had been introduced in 2002. Gram had of course known about it pretty much straightaway, but had delayed until 2010 before taking action. One may speculate, therefore, that the Court was not willing to allow Gram the benefit of negative inferences when its own delay had contributed to the witness being unavailable.
BlueScope Steel Limited v Gram Engineering Pty Ltd  FCAFC 107