The Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP) has released an options paper for arising from its Review of the (Registered) Designs System.
The Options Paper identifies 3 potential routes for further development of designs law in Australia.
Option 1 would involve addressing a few specific issues in how the 2003 Act works without revisiting the policy settings. This could involve:
making the identity of Convention applicants consistent with the rules on entitlement;
expanding the rules on priority claiming so that differing formal requirements between jurisdictions do not disadvantage Convention applicants;
bringing the rules on entitlement into line with the Patents Act;
expanding the prior art base so that it is not just limited to the product the subject of the application;
expanding the situations where fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation can be invoked for revocation purposes;
allowing exclusive licensees to sue for infringement;
making it clearer that a registered, but uncertified, design does not confer enforceable rights until certification;
removing the option to publish a design instead of registering it;
reducing the fees for multiple designs included in a single application; and
addressing anomalies that have arisen in the copyright-design overlap, especially in relation to 2D and 3D ‘embodiments’.
Option 2 would include the changes identified under Option 1, but going further to bring Australian law more into line with “major trading partners and international treaties”. That could involve amending the Act to allow accession to the Hague Agreement. Changes could involve:
extending the term of protection from 10 years to 15 including introducing a require to obtain certification on renewal after the first 5 years and a system of opposition following certification
introducing a grace period of 6 months
deferring publication to registration
introducing customs seizure provisions
Option 3 is summarised in the Executive Summary as:
a wholesale revision of the role of the designs system in Australia’s IP law, including consideration, in particular, of the need for unregistered design protection, and the scope of design protection (including the scope of secondary liability) in the context of technological developments such as 3D scanning and printing. This would also involve consideration of whether protection should be extended to partial designs and whether virtual or non-physical designs (such as screen displays and icons) should themselves be treated as products.
ACIP appears to consider Option 3 would be appropriate if the policies reflected in the 2003 Act no longer make sense or have been superseded. Examples where this might be the case include unregistered design right, full copyright proection regardless of industrial application or broader rights such as allowing registration for parts of products, such as handles, rather than for products as a whole.
The impending availability of 3D-printing, or at least its more widespread take up, is raised as a potential basis for pursuing option 2 or option 3.
ACIP does note that going down the path of Option 3 (at least) would involve costs as well as benefits and concludes:
ACIP does not presently have evidence sufficient to suggest that wholesale change would be in the national interest. ACIP envisages that Option 3 would involve consideration, not only of the designs system per se, but how it interacts with other systems: most obviously the copyright system, but also standard and innovation patents and other systems such as protection for confidential information. Ideally, such a review would also involve gathering more detailed evidence on Australia’s industrial and economic strengths, and developing strategies for industry development in the field of design, as well as more information on the operation of systems, such as those in operation in some European countries, which do not exclude industrial design from the copyright system. Such a review ought to be undertaken by specialist intellectual property economic, business and legal analysts.
In formulating these proposals, ACIP has taken into account responses to a survey it conducted as well as submissions.
ACIP would like to receive your submissions on these submissions on their return from the Christmas/Summer holidays: i.e. 23 January 2015.
The Full Court has dismissed both Bluescope’s appeal and Gram’s cross-appeal from the ruling that Bluescope infringed Gram’s registered design for the Smartascreen fencing panel.
This is an “old Act” case. At first instance, Jacobson J held that Bluescope’s product was an obvious imitation of Gram’s registered design. However, his Honour rejected the allegation that it was also a fraudulent imitation.
Bluescope (then Lysaghts, part of BHP) had long been the market leader for fencing made from metal sheeting. There was a problem, however: one side of the fence was less desirable because the posts and rails supporting the cladding were visible. Gram came up with its Gramline solution which was symmetrical, looking the same from both sides. It quickly usurped Bluescope’s position as the market leader. Bluescope then spent (roughly) 6 years trying to come up with a competing design. In the course of doing so, it rejected a number of alternatives in favour of one that so closely resembled Gram’s product that the two could be stacked one on top of the other.
Construction of the design
Besanko and Middleton JJ endorsed the trial judge’s principles for construing the design, summarising them at :
(a) a design is the mental picture of a shape, configuration, pattern or ornamentation of the article to which it is to be applied;
(b) construction is a question of fact for the Court to determine by the eye alone;
(c) expert evidence may be led to assist the Court;
(d) the Court is to apply an ‘instructed eye’ to the design – that is the Court must be made aware of the characteristics of the article to which the design is applied, and the manner in which such articles would normally be found in trade, commerce and in use; and
(e) however, considerations of utility have no relevance to the proper construction of a design.
In applying those principles, the trial judge found
“the primary feature was the sawtooth pattern consisting of six identical repeating pans, oriented vertically. The sawtooth pattern was the product of the unique proportions of the wavelength, amplitude and angles of each sawtooth module”.
It was this combination of features, which contributed to the symmetricality of the product, that ultimately conferred the design with novelty and which were taken by Bluescope, leading to the finding of obvious imitation. Three points of note on these parts of the case.
First, at  Besanko and Middleton JJ rejected Bluescope’s challenge to the trial judge’s reliance on Gram’s design being viewed vertically as an in-fill sheet between posts so that the saw-tooth ran top to bottom:
While considerations of utility are not relevant, designs cannot be construed without context. It is often the case that features of the article to which the design applies, will serve both visual and functional purposes. Where this is the case, the implication of BlueScope’s submission is that the feature’s appearance and utility must be divorced. However, a design without context is a meaningless drawing. As Lockhart J observed in Dart Industries 15 IPR 403 at 408, the design is ‘the mental picture of the shape, configuration, pattern, or ornament of the article to which it has been applied’ (emphasis added). It is inescapable that the Design is for sheet metal fencing and the construction of the Design must reflect this.
That is, because the design was for a sheet metal fencing panel which “worked” in one way, it should be interpreted in the way (presumably) those who would use it for that would understand it.
Secondly, the trial judge had not impermissibly referred to the fact that the Bluescope product could be “nested” with the Gram product (embodying the design). But, it was not the fact of “nestability” as such that was important. Rather, it was relevant because it was helpful in forming a view about the similarity of the sawtooth profile. Besanko and Middleton JJ explained at :
the nesting qualities are instructive. As has been discussed at length, the combination of amplitudes, wavelengths and angles create the sawtooth profile. For the GramLine and Smartascreen sheets to nest, albeit imperfectly, they must by logical extension, have similar amplitudes, wavelengths and angles. This is clearly helpful in deciding if Smartascreen is an obvious imitation of GramLine, and it was entirely open for the primary judge to be assisted by the nesting properties of the two articles. It is further relevant because as noted above, an obvious imitation is not one which is the same as the design, but one that is an imitation apparent to the eye notwithstanding slight differences.
Care definitely needs to be taken with this as the physical embodiment of the registered design is not always the same as the design and the comparison must be between the accused product and the registered design. It is important to note, therefore, that the Full Court treated this as confirming or reinforcing the view based on comparison of the appearance of the infringing article to the registered design.
Thirdly, the Full Court considered the trial judge had impermissibly taken into account Bluescope’s commercial objectives – to introduce a product to compete with the Gramline product – in deciding whether or not the Smartascreen was an obvious imitation. With respect that must be right as the test of obvious imitation is an objective test based on visual resemblance. Yates J, however, was prepared to accept at  to  evidence such as that Bluescope was attracted to the design because “it had a similar appearance to the GramLine sawtooth profile and would gain ready market acceptance” as a kind of expert evidence about the similarity of Bluescope’s product to Gram’s design.
In Polyaire, the High Court rejected the interpretation of fraudulent imitation which had required the alleged infringer to have attempted to disguise its copying. Instead, the High Court had said at :
the application of a “fraudulent imitation” requires that the application of the design be with knowledge of the existence of the registration and of the absence of consent to its use, or with reason to suspect those matters, and that the use of the design produces what is an “imitation” within the meaning of par (a). This, to apply the general principle recently exemplified in Macleod v The Queen, is the knowledge, belief or intent which renders the conduct fraudulent.
At , the High Court approved Lehane J’s formulation of the test for fraudulent imitation in the following terms:
[T]he essential questions are, first, whether the allegedly infringing design is based on or derived from the registered design and, then, whether the differences are so substantial that the result is not to be described as an imitation. ….
In this case, the trial judge considered that fraudulent imitation required a finding that the infringing product was deliberately based on the registered design. The Besanko and Middleton JJ endorsed that test at :
In our opinion, it must be shown that there was deliberate, in the sense of conscious, copying for there to be fraudulent imitation. If imitation imports the notion of making use of the registered design, there must be at least a conscious use of the registered design before it could be concluded there was fraudulent imitation.
The trial judge had found that:
Bluescope knew the Gramline design was registered;
Bluescope knew that Gram had achieved runaway commercial success with its product;
Bluescope was trying to design a “Gram lookalike”;
Bluescope had come up with a number of different symmetrical designs to Gram’s design, but rejected those in favour of the Smartascreen design; and
Bluescope had adopted a panel size of 762mm which was the same as Gram’s but different to the standard 820mm panel prevailing in the industry at the time.
His Honour was also “sceptical” of Bluescope’s claim that the resemblance to Gram’s design was coincidental. Gram argued that, given these findings, what other conclusion could there be but deliberate copying.
The Full Court upheld the trial judge’s refusal to find the Smartascreen was deliberately based on the Gramline design. Two factors seem to have played an important role here.
First, the Full Court accepted at  that an allegation of fraudulent imitation was a serious matter and the level of proofs needed to reflect the gravity of that.
Secondly, the evidence showed that the Bluescope employees who came up with the final design from 2000 onwards were influenced by, or at least referred to, design work done by a Mr Field in 1996.
Mr Field did not give evidence so it was not clear on the evidence what influences or references he made use of. Now, in many cases, the unexplained failure of a key player in the design process to give evidence (especially when there are inferences (at least) suggestive of copying available) might be sufficient to give rise to a Jones v Dunkel that the witness could not say anything helpful to the defendant’s case. Here, however, Mr Field’s absence was explained: he was old and in very poor health. His design work had taken place in 1996 very early in the picture. Moreover, Bluescope’s product had been introduced in 2002. Gram had of course known about it pretty much straightaway, but had delayed until 2010 before taking action. One may speculate, therefore, that the Court was not willing to allow Gram the benefit of negative inferences when its own delay had contributed to the witness being unavailable.
Given the transitional provisions, there are potentially almost 6 more years for designs for designs under the old Act to still be in force. Design applications that were pending on 17 June 2004, when the 2003 Act came into force, continue to be governed by the old Act’s provisions for validity and infringement unless they were “converted” to “new” Act designs. ?
Full Court at ,  –  (Besanko and Middleton JJ),  –  (Yates J). ?
Full Court at  – , with a useful summary of the key principles at  (Besanko and Middleton JJ). There were differences between the Smartascreen’s appearance and the registered design, but these were treated as insubstantial:  (Besanko and Middleton JJ) and ff (Yates J). ?
Seafolly is in the news again: this time as the winner. In her last decision before retiring, Dodds-Streeton J has ordered that City Beach pay Seafolly $250,333.06 by way of damages for infringing copyright in 3 Seafolly designs: the English Rose artwork, the Covent Garden artwork and the Senorita artwork.
The English Rose artwork and the Covent Garden artwork were both patterns or ornamentation printed on the fabric. The Senorita artwork, however, was in effect stitched on to the garment using shirring and smocking. Dodds-Streeton J, however, rejected City Beach’s defence based on sections 74 and 77 of the Copyright Act. Apart from all the other issues, her Honour’s application of the Full Court’s decision in the Polo/Lauren case struck me as particularly important.
Seafolly’s Senorita artwork:
City Beach’s Richelle embroidery:
The subsistence point
As you can see, the Senorita design is pretty simple in appearance. City Beach’s argument was that this simple design was the more or less inevitable outcome of using the type of industrial sewing machine used to produce it. According to the evidence, however, it involved significant trial and error to produce because smocking fabric was very difficult to work with, smocking did not always involve using triangles or diagonals and City Beach’s expert conceded “there was a huge array of different ‘cams’ which could produce an almost indefinite variety of patterns.” Her Honour rejected City Beach’s attack, therefore:
416 …. the Senorita embroidery was not the inevitable outcome of the operation of an industrial sewing machine. Nor was the work so rudimentary and simple as to be unprotectable because, in essence, there was no meaningful distinction between the subject matter and the form of expression.
The use of the sewing machines, therefore, appears to involve use of the machine to implement the human idea more in the vein of Coogi or a wordprocessor to record the text than as an automatically generated entity like the phone books in PDC. The second point made by her Honour seems to pick up the High Court’s point that the ordering of title and time of television program in chronological order did not involve sufficient creativity (or intellectual effort) to qualify as original.
The copyright/design overlap
City Beach’s defence based on the copyright/design overlap provisions failed also, because the Senorita design when sewn on to the bikinis was not a corresponding design.
When the Designs (Consequential Amendments) Act 2003 introduced the current form of s 74 and s 77, it was hoped that the old problems about whether something constituted a “design” and whether it had been “applied to” an article had been sidestepped. All that was necessary, was to identify an artistic work which had been embodied in the features of shape or configuration of the product. Rares J, at first instance in the Polo case adopted that too simplistic (as we now know) approach to find that the 700 or so stitches used to embroider the Polo logo on to a shirt qualified. This was set right by the Full Court on appeal.
Dodds-Streeton J acknowledged that the Full Court’s observations were obiter. Her Honour also acknowledged that the Full Court’s reasoning “is not consistently explicit, but must be inferred”. Her Honour considered that the Full Court’s reasons:
470 …. in substance indicate that it is the features of shape or configuration of an artwork (not a label on which the artwork is reproduced) that must be relevantly embodied in a product, which will occur when the product (in the present case, a garment) is made in the shape or configuration of the artwork.
Thus, the diamond pattern was not a corresponding design because, when stitched on to Seafolly’s bikinis, it did not define the shape or configuration of the bikini as a garment.
In reaching this conclusion, Dodds-Streeton J had to interpret the Full Court’s declaration at  that a design must be conceptually distinct from the product in which it was embodied to qualify as ‘embodied’ for the purposes of s 74. That created a problem in the present case as Dodds-Streeton J considered the stitching, or smocking, could not have existed independently of the garment:
473 It is true that, in contrast to the logo in Polo/Lauren itself, the reproduction of the Senorita artwork sewn on to the relevant garment may not retain a separate existence, as probably, it could not survive removal and is not conceptually distinct from the garment. Accordingly, if the Full Court’s observations in  represent the correct and comprehensive test, the Senorita artwork could be embodied within the meaning of s 74(1). As stated above, however, the comment at  does not comprehensively reflect the reasoning of the Full Court’s judgment.
I am not sure, with respect, why the Senorita design was any the less capable of independent existence than the Polo logo. I think the design could not have an independent existence because it was created by attaching the stitching to the shirring framestrings and there was presumably no drawing.
Dodds-Streeton J identified a further problem. It seems difficult, with respect, to reconcile the Full Court’s interpretation of s 74 with the clear legislative intent to capture woven tapestries, bas relief and “textured” carpets within the concept of corresponding design by the inclusion in s 74(2) of:
“embodied in , ” in relation to a product, includes woven into, impressed on or worked into the product.
According to Dodds-Streeton J:
480 Following the insertion of the words “woven into”, “impressed on” or “worked into” in s 74(2), it seems clear that features of shape or configuration of an artwork can be embodied in an article which is itself a piece of embroidery, a carpet, bas?relief or similar, by being woven or worked in. This was the qualification to the maintenance of the tradition [sic] position to which the Full Court referred at . The amendment to s 74(2) did not, however, apply to the circumstances of Polo/Lauren itself as the relevant product was a garment rather than a carpet, bas?relief or embroidery (although the design was applied or attached by means of embroidery or “weaving in”).
481 In the light of the Full Court’s emphasis that the position was otherwise unchanged, it would seem that it rejected Rares J’s analysis not simply or principally because the logo remained conceptually distinct from the garment, but because the garment was not made in the shape or configuration of the artistic work, irrespective of whether it was three dimensional.
It’s not clear why garments should be treated any differently to tapestries, carpets etc. I suppose a carpet could for example be woven in the shape of a (stylised) polo player or teddy bear or some other novelty shape thought to be appealing to someone out there in the wide world, but a tapesty? One might have thought (if one didn’t have the Full Court’sobiter dicta hanging over one) the legislature intended to catch all such woven, stitched or otherwise ‘applied’ artistic works from its intention to ensure that carpets, tapestries and the like be “clearly” brought in.
This is not to say that the alternative, literal approach to interpreting s 74 is not without its challenges. Dodds-Streeton J went on in dicta to consider that the Full Court really also disagreed with Rares J’s view that the embroidered stitching was sufficiently three-dimensional to qualify as features of shape or configuration.In any event:
486 … the surface of the garment onto which the smocking is sewn is not flat because the fabric is shirred. Any protrusion of the smocking from the surface is minimal and probably significantly less than that in Polo/Lauren itself, which on a fair reading of its judgment, the Full Court nevertheless thought insufficient.
So, there may well be questions of degree in how much three dimensional appearance is required before something qualifies as shape or configuration. That is, however, a problem which long challenged designs law.
Putting to one side, of course, all the fun and games of what may be a work of artistic craftsmanship for the purposes of s 77(1)(a) or the difference between “shape or configuration” and “pattern or ornamentation”. ?
Schedules 1 and 2 aim to implement the TRIPS Protocol:
According to the EM:
Under the new scheme, Australian laboratories will be able to apply to the Federal Court for a compulsory licence to manufacture generic versions of patented medicines under specific conditions, and export these medicines to developing countries. Adequate compensation for the patent holder will be negotiated, to ensure that they are not disadvantaged by the arrangements.
Schedule 1 introduces provisions to implement the “interim waiver” agreed in the Doha Declaration 2001; Schedule 2 implements the TRIPS Protocol regime agreed in 2003 (or, I think, 2005).
According to the EM, only one licence has been issued under these regimes – Canada in 2007. Apparently, Canadian generics would like to engage in further licensing, but the procedures are too complicated. Also, Least Developed Countries do not need to provide patent protection until 2016 and there is said to be a lack of awareness of the regime.
Schedule 3 confers jurisdiction over plant breeder’s rights matters on the Federal Circuit Court (in addition to the Federal Court)
introduces the “single examination” model for patent applications in Australia and New Zealand;
the single regulatory regime for patent attorneys and trade mark attorneys in both countries – the so-called trans-Tasman regulatory regime; and
provides for a single address for service in either Australia or New Zealand to be used under the patents, trade marks, registered designs and plant breeder’s rights legislation.
Schedule 5 is headed “Technical Amendments” which include repealing “unnecessary document retention provisions” and addressing “minor oversights in the drafting of” the Raising the Bar Act. These include:
amending s 29A so that an international applicant under the PCT cannot require anything to be done in Australia until the application enters the national phase;
amending s 29B so that only the prescribed period under s 38(1A) applies to Paris Convention applications;
amending ss 41 and 43 in relation to disclosure requirements for micro-organism inventions
amending s 43 to permit reference to the combination of prescribed documents, not just to individual prescribed documents alone
the defence in s 119(3)(b) will be amended to bring it into line with the amended form of s 24(1)(a)
amending s 191A so that the requirement for the Commissioner to hear both parties prescribed in s 191A(4) applies only in entitlement disputes.
The Regulatory Impact Statement included in the EM estimates that 63 in-house legal professionals and 128 patent attorneys in external firms will need to familiarise themselves with these changes for a total start up cost to business of $13,782.60 and an ongoing annual cost of $105. These costs include allowance for savings in legal costs because it will be possible to bring proceedings for infringement of plant breeder’s rights in the Federal Circuit Court, rather than the Federal Court. Perhaps confusing costs with earnings, the Regulatory Impact Statement relies on the ABS Employee Earnings and Hours Survey to estimate the average cost of patent and trade mark attorneys as $50 per hour (junior solicitors $60 per hour, IP attorneys $74.10 per hour and barristers $92.70 per hour, after including a 50% loading for overheads). The Statement does recognise that charge out rates “for lega”for legal professionals can range from $120 per hour to $800 per hour or more, viewed on 4 December 2013 at http://www.legallawyers.com.au/legal-topics/law-firm-sydney/solicitor-prices/. These costs do not reflect the opportunity cost of labour.” You may also be interested to know that the Regulatory Impact Statement estimates the costs of an application to the Federal Court for a licence at around $21,650 for the applicant. ?
The substance of the two countries’ respective patent laws is not being harmonised (yet). ?
The transitional period to register any securities (charges, mortgages etc.) you may have taken out over IP ( registered trade marks, patents, designs etc.) on the Personal Property Securities Register expires on 31 January 2014.
The Personal Properties Security Register is a national register of claims to security interests over personal property (which includes our imaginary subject matters) in essence to provide a one stop shop for notice about such claims.
If you (or your client) has taken out a security over someone else’ intellectual property or where the other person’s intellectual property is being used as collateral for repayment, the security should be registered on the Personal Property Securities Register. In very broad terms: if the security isn’t registered in the Personal Property Securities Register, its claim to priority over any later security or even enforceability could be lost.
IP Australia’s warning points out that it is not enough to have registered the security interest in a register of IP such as the Trade Marks Register, the Patents Register, the Register of Designs or the Register of PBR. These registrations will not be transferred automatically to the Personal Property Securities Register. Morever, registration of the security interest on one or more of those IP Registers will not take priority over a later registration on the Personal Property Securities Register.
So, if you or your client have taken out such a security and haven’t registered it in the Personal Property Securities Register yet, ‘hurry, hurry, hurry; quick, quick, quick’ (with apologies to Alexis Jordan).
Although IP Australia’s warning relates specifically to the registered IP it administers, the legislation also applies to unregistered IP such as copyright.
Well, a patents and designs case, but really it’s a case about entitlement: Kenny J has upheld the validity of patents and registered designs for “beer taps” which one company in the Fosters group – Foster’s Group Ltd – applied for “most likely [by] mistake” as one of its subsidiaries, Fosters Australia, was the owner.
Fosters Australia commissioned another party to design some new beer taps for it, on terms that it would own the resulting IP.
When the applicatins for the patents and designs were filed, however, they were filed in the name of Fosters Group Ltd, Fosters Australia’s parent and the holding company of the group.
When the mistake was discovered, Fosters Group assigned everything to Fosters Australia. By then, however, the designs had been registered in Fosters Group’s name, although innovation patent applications were still pending.
Fosters Australia has sued Cash’s for infringing its patents and designs. Cash’s defences asserted invalidity on the basis, amongst other things, that Fosters Group was not an entitled person or the grant was obtained by fraud, false suggestion or misrepresentation.
Kenny J rejected the attack on the patents on the basis that s 29 did not require an applicant for the patent to be the entitled person or someone claiming through him or her; it was necessary only that the patent was granted to someone who qualified under s 15. Kenny J further held that Fosters Group could assign the benefit of its applications to Fosters Australia.
Similar reasoning would apply to the designs s 21 and s 13, but the designs were already registered before Fosters Group assigned its rights to Fosters Australia. However, Kenny J found in circumstances that Fosters Group held the applications and registrations on constructive trust for Fosters Australia.
Patentology makes the point that, while all’s well that ends well, care needs to be taken in deciding who should make the application before it is filed.
Jacobson J has found that Bluescope’s “Smartascreen” metal fencing panel infringed Gram Engineering’s Registered Design No. AU 121344 for a fencing panel as an obvious imitation. Perhaps the most interesting finding, however, is why the Smartascreen was not a fraudulent imitation.
Gram’s design was registered in 1994, so this is an “old Act” case (invalidity here and infringement here).  At the time, it was the first fence panel to feature a symmetrical design: looking the same no matter which side of the fence it was viewed from and, as a result, it was a roaring success capturing some 40% of the market. One interesting aspect of the case is that Bluescope’s Smartascreen product was introduced in 2002. Although Gram Engineering knew about it from around its introduction, it did not commence infringement proceedings until 2011 – after the registered design had expired in 2010.
Bluescope’s attack on validity failed.  First, the prior art on which Bluescope relied were for roofing or siding panels, not fence panels, and so not relevant articles. Moreover, the prior art and the registered design had the same general “z-shape”, but were intended to be used horizontally (“weatherboarding) rather than vertically and none had the same combination of 6 panels with the same proportions and angles as the registered design. Hence, while some features may have been present in some of the prior art, none of the prior art included all the features and the registered design looked distinctively different.
Jacobson J then found that the Smartascreen was an obvious imitation: the dominant feature was the same sawtooth look with the (unique) 6 panel frame in the same proportions and with the same angle.
On this question, Jacobson J found that Bluescope:
knew that the design was registered;
knew that Gram had achieved runaway commercial success
was trying to design a “Gram lookalike”
had come up with a number of different symmetrical designs which were different to Gram’s design
and had adopted a standard panel size of 762mm (which matched Gram’s physical embodiement) instead of the more typical 820mm panel size.
In these circumstances and given his Honour’s finding of striking similarity, Gram Engineering argued it was inconceivable Bluescope had not copied Gram’s design and so a finding of fraudulent imitation should follow.
However, Jacobson J considered that fraudulent imitation required a finding that Bluescope’s design had been deliberately copied from the registered design. This may prove to be a considerable narrowing of the requirement in Polyaire that the accused product (at ) be based on or derived from the registered design or (at ) make use of the registered design. It was, however, decisive. His Honour was not prepared to find that either of the key designers who came forward did deliberately copy. It was here that Gram Engineering’s delay in bringing proceedings came back to haunt it. As his Honour explained at :
It is a conclusion which I have reached with some reservation because the striking similarities to which I referred above were not satisfactorily explained in Bluescope’s evidence. I have no doubt that the drawing of 17 November 2000 was designed to look something like the Gram product. It was, as Gram submitted, designed with an eye to the GramLine sheet. However, it is plain that Mr Field was involved in the process. This appears from the concluding remarks of his memo of 15 November 2000. Ultimately, it is his absence from the witness box which precludes me from reaching the view that the process of designing a Gram lookalike was one which entailed copying the Gram design.
The Mr Field in question was unable to give evidence at this stage in view of his advanced age (being retired) and illness.
If his Honour had been prepared otherwise to find fraudulent imitation, however, the fact that it had obtained advice that its product did not infringe the registered design would not have saved it.
“…. The kind of fraud that the Act seeks to remedy is closer in kind to, but is still not entirely analogous with, equitable fraud, which, for its establishment, does not require that an actual intention to cheat must always be proved; proof of misconception of the extent of a person’s obligation, to act or to refrain from acting in a particular way, may suffice”. ?
Following the conclusion of consultations about the draft Intellectual Property Legislation Amendment Regulations (the regulations to implement the “Raising the Bar” amendments), IP Australia has published a document outlining the outcomes of the consultation process.
The document outlines what IP Australia is proposing to do/implement in relation to:
applicants for patents will have 2 months to respond to a direction to request examination after examination has been deferred
acceptance period after 1st report on patent application has been issued will be reduced to 12 months
“IP Australia will not require a statement of entitlement at filing for standard patents (or at national phase entry for PCT applications). Instead, the statement will be required when the applicant requests examination, as part of the approved form.” Applicants for an innovation patent will still need to provide the statement when filing the application
The Commissioner / Registrar will retain discretion to decide whether hearings should be decided on the papers without oral presentation
Apparently, there are technical corrections that will be implemented to
6 of the judges, Heydon J dissenting, ruled that s 51(xxxi) did not apply because there was no “acquisition” of the tobacco companies’ intellectual property rights. It was true that the ability, or rights, of the tobacco companies to use their intellectual property rights was severely curtailed, if not extinguished. That was insufficient to constitute an acquisition in itself. But, the Tobacco Plain Packaging legislation did not appropriate those rights for use by the Commonwealth.
As a result, it was unnecessary to consider the Commonwealth’s further argument that, if there were an acquisition, it was justified and reasonable in the circumstances.