IPwars.com

Mainly intellectual property (IP) issues Down Under

$3 million!

Last year, we looked at the ACCC’s successful prosecution of Valve (provider of the online gaming platform, Steam) for breach of the consumer guarantees in the ACL. Valve’s contracts for example provided that all fees were payable in advance and not refundable. Valve’s main line of defence was that it was in the US state of Washington and so not bound by the ACL.

On 23 December 2016, the Court fined Valve $3 million for its breaches: $2.2 million for the contraventions involving the Steam Subscriber Agreement and $800,000 for the contraventions involving the Steam Refund Policy.

This was in a context where, while,the number of accounts developed over the 3 year period of the misconduct, Valve had some 2.2 million Australian accounts (I.e, about $1.36 per account) and had received communications about refunds from over 21,000 accounts. What is more, despite its no refunds policy wording, it had actually paid refunds to some 15,000 accounts. Another factor was Valve’s high-handed approach to its legal position in Australia; apparently deciding it had no liability as a matter of policy without reference to Australian legal advice.

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 7) [2016] FCA 1553 (Edelman J)

Productivity Commission’s Final Report

Updated to fix some broken links

The Productivity Commissions’s final report into “Intellectual Property Arrangements” has been published.

An overview and  recommendations is here.

The full report is here.

The key points sign off with a stirring call to action – or harbinger of what’s to come:

Steely resolve will be needed to pursue better balanced IP arrangements.

The Government has announced it is undertaking further consultations with us about the Commission’s recommendations and wants to hear your views by 14 February 2017. I wonder how many bunches of roses they will receive?

 

Third party website blocking – down under

Nicholas J has published his reasons granting the film companies injunctions against the ISPs ordering them to block access to third party offshore “solarmovie”, pirate bay, torrenz, torrenthound and isotorrent sites.

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Limited [2016] FCA 1503

Apportionment of liability for IP infringement

Beach J has ordered that Lucky Homes (the builder) and Mr Mistry (the owner) pay Henley Arch $34,400 by way of compensatory damages and, respectively, $25,000 and $10,000 additional damages. There was no apportionment of liability under the Wrongs Act. Instead, Beach J also ordered that the builder pay to Mr Mistry however much he pays of the compensatory damages and half of the additional damages he pays.

Time and space mean that this post will look at the apportionment issue. Issues arising from the damages findings may get covered in a later post.

Some facts

In 2010/2011, the Mistrys had Henley Arch build them a home. In 2013, they started negotiating with Henley Arch for it to build another home, their dream home, based on another Henley plan, the Amalfi. They requested, and Henley arranged for, a number of modifications to the basic plan. Their preferred facade would have cost $10,000 more than the “basic” facade.

In October 2013, just before they were to sign the final contracts with Henley, they were introduced to Lucky Homes. Lucky Homes was prepared to build the home with their preferred facade and “some” changes for pretty much the same price as the “basic” facade that Henley would build. The Mistrys got Lucky Homes to build the house for them instead.

Apportionment

Perhaps the point of most general application to all IP statutes is Beach J’s ruling that the state law provisions allowing liability to be apportioned between wrongdoers under s 24AI of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) had no application to copyright infringement.

As is often the case in these types of cases, the builder – Lucky Homes – says the owners – the Mistrys – told me they owned the copyright and, of course, the Mistrys claim Lucky Homes the builder said he would make sufficient changes that there would not be any copyright issue.

While not impressed with the witnesses for either camp, Beach J accepted the Mistrys’ version of events this time.

The Mistrys had provided Lucky Homes with a copy of Henley’s pro forma plan for the Amalfi rather than the customised version Henley had modified to meet their particular requirements. The pro forma plan had Henley’s copyright notice clearly marked on it. Mr Shafiq, for Lucky Homes, had annotated the pro forma plan with the various changes the Mistrys wished to make, such as converting a powder room to a prayer room. According to the Mistrys, Mr Shafiq told them he would make 15 or 20 changes so that the redesign would not infringe Henley’s copyright. Mr Shafiq had also tried to persuade the drafting service Lucky Homes used to lie about which drawings had been used as the starting point for the building plans.

Following the findings of infringement and how much damages would be, the first question was whether there was power to apportion liability.

The Copyright Act, like the other Commonwealth intellectual property statutes – the Patents Act 1990, the Trade Marks Act 1995, the Designs Act 2003, the Plant Breeders Rights Act 1994, does not include provisions to apportion liability.[1] So, the Mistrys invoked the Victorian Wrongs Act.

Section 24AF provides that an apportionable claim is:[2]

(a) a claim for economic loss or damage to property in an action for damages (whether in tort, in contract, under statute or otherwise) arising from a failure to take reasonable care; and

(b) a claim for damages for a contravention of section 18 of the Australian Consumer Law (Victoria).

Beach J said neither of these requirements were satisfied. In particular, at [266] a claim for copyright infringement is not a claim for failure to take reasonable care.[3] And at [267], the Mistry’s attempt to invoke s 87CD of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 was “misconceived”. Moreover, his Honour at [267] considered that the Copyright Act provides a complete scheme for a copyright owner to recover damages from both the primary infringer and an authoriser. Therefore, it “overrode” the provisions of the (State enacted) Wrongs Act.[4] Accordingly, apportionment was not possible. However, the respondents could (and did) cross-claim against each other.[5]

The cross-claims

Lucky Homes cross-claimed against the Mistrys on the basis that the building contract included a warranty and indemnity that the Mistrys owned the copyright in the plans they provided.

That didn’t get up in view of the copyright notice on the pro forma plans and the Judge’s acceptance of the Mistrys’ case that Lucky Homes through Mr Shafiq had claimed it could change the plans sufficiently to avoid infringement.

Conversely, those findings meant that the Mistrys’ cross-claim for misleading or deceptive conductive succeeded. Therefore, Beach J ruled that Lucky Homes should pay the Mistrys all of the moneys they paid to Henley on the compensatory damages.

Beach J also ordered Lucky Homes to pay Mr Mistry half the additional damages he pays. Mr Mistry was entitled only to damages for loss (i.e., here the additional damages he was ordered to pay to Henley) to the extent the loss was causally connected to Lucky Homes’ misleading or deceptive conduct. His Honour considered that much of Mr Mistry’s conduct that warranted the award of additional damages against Mr Mistry was not causally connected to Lucky Homes’ misleading or deceptive conduct. So, on a “rough and ready assessment … given the modest amounts involved” his Honour arrived at 50%.

Henley Arch Pty Ltd v Lucky Homes Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 1217


  1. Unlike s 236 of the Australian Consumer Law through s 87CD of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  ?
  2. Disregarding irrelevant exceptions.  ?
  3. Don’t rush off to add negligence claims to your pleadings now. Although not referred to by Beach J (as it wasn’t in issue), s 24AF(3) says that the fact that a claim is an apportionable claim under s 24AF(1) does not limit liability under any other law. That appears to mean that liability for infringement would stand even if the negligence claim could be apportioned.  ?
  4. Presumably on the basis of s 109.  ?
  5. A practical consequence of this is that the copyright owner can get its money from either or both sets of respondents. That is, vis a vis Henley, both Lucky Homes and the Mistrys are on the hook for all the compensatory damages awarded. If only one has the money to pay the award, Henley could be paid the full amount by that party and the “paying” party would be left to try to recover a proportion from the impecunious respondent.  ?

The patent was not infringed

Thank you to all those readers who expressed a view in last Tuesday’s poll. The good news is that better than 80% of you answered correctly. According to the traditional view, recently applied by Rares J, there would be no infringement in Australia in the circumstances outlined.

On the traditional view, a patent (like any other intellectual property right in Australia) is a territorial right. A patent, of course, confers the exclusive right to exploit the claimed invention in the patent area. Exploit in this context meaning:

(a) where the invention is a product–make, hire, sell or otherwise dispose of the product, offer to make, sell, hire or otherwise dispose of it, use or import it, or keep it for the purpose of doing any of those things; or

(b) where the invention is a method or process–use the method or process or do any act mentioned in paragraph (a) in respect of a product resulting from such use.

Under the old form of the patent grant, the patentee was granted the exclusive right to make, use, exercise and vend the invention. In BASF v Hickson, the House of Lords ruled that a defendant in England, who entered into a contract with another party to make some goods for that third party in Switzerland and deliver them to that third party in Switzerland, did not infringe even though the third party subsequently imported the goods into England.[1] Lord Davey said:[2]

It must be such a vending as will be in a sense a working or use and exercise of the invention in this country or an appropriation by the vendor of some advantage which the patentee can derive from such use and exercise. A contract to deliver the goods abroad does not in any way interfere with the patentee’s rights to work and utilize his invention in this country. It is a contract to do a perfectly lawful act, and whether the contract be made in this country or abroad does not in itself affect the patentee’s monopoly of working his invention. Nor is it material to consider whether or when the property in the goods passed to the purchaser. It is lawful to be the owner of the goods if made and situate abroad, and neither the vendor nor the purchaser in my opinion thereby infringes the patent. The goods may or may not be afterwards brought into this country, and a different question will then arise, but that is no concern of the vendor after he has parted with them. I am of opinion that “vending the invention” in the common form of patent is confined to selling goods made or brought into this country ….

Load and Move has a patent in Australia for spreaders and tipplers, which are apparently used in the loading and tipping of shipping containers. CTS, another Australian company, entered into a contract with a mine in Eritrea to supply the mine with spreaders and tipplers which Load and Move considered would infringe its patent. However, CTS agreed to have the spreaders and tipplers made in China and delivered to the port in China FOB or ex works for delivery directly to the mine in Eritrea. The spreaders and tipplers would never come into Australia.

Load and Move was seeking preliminary discovery from CTS to establish whether payments for the contract with the Eritrean mine were received in Australia.

Rares J has refused preliminary discovery.

One of the conditions that must be established to obtain preliminary discovery is that the applicant reasonably believes it has a right to obtain relief against a prospective respondent.[3]

Rares J began by pointing out that a subjective belief that one’s right was being infringed was not enough; the belief had to be reasonably held. That required the existence of facts from which a reasonable person could form the required belief. That is, the belief was tested objectively.

Here, the question was whether there were facts from which a reasonable person could conclude that Load and Move’s patent was being infringed in Australia. In light of BASF v Hickson, however, Rares J held that a reasonable person could not hold such a view.

Load and Move Pty Ltd v Container Rotation Systems Pty Ltd
[2016] FCA 843

ps Sorry no post on Friday: let’s just say there was a synchronisation glitch.


  1. The third party would infringe by importing.  ?
  2. Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v Hickson [1906] AC 419 at 422 – 423 cited by Rares J in Load and Move at [26].  ?
  3. FCR r 7.23.  ?

Court of Appeal orders ISPs to block access to trade mark infringing websites

The Court of Appeal[1] has confirmed that the court’s general power to grant injunctions can be invoked by trade mark owners to get orders against ISPs to block internet access to website that have infringing content.

The interesting point (for Australians) is that, like Australia, UK law has a specific statutory power authorising injunctions against ISPs to block access only to websites that infringe copyright. There is no corresponding provision in the Trade Marks Act 1994 (UK). Instead, section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (previously the Supreme Court Act 1981) provides:

The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction … in all cases in which it appears to be just and convenient to do so.

The IPKat has a preliminary summary here.

The main question the Court of Appeal’s decision raises for us is whether an Australian court might be persuaded to make similar orders against ISPs to block access to website which infringe trade marks (or other IP). Australian courts have powers to grant injunctions corresponding to s 37 of the Superior Courts Act.[2]

On the other hand, Parliament has also only recently introduced the specific statutory provision in the context of copyright infringement and that provision is tightly focused for policy reasons against overseas websites which have infringement as their primary focus.

And, it appears that the Court of Appeal was heavily influenced by the obligations imposed on national law by art. 11 of the EU’s Enforcement Directive to require ISPs to take steps to stop infringing activity. That specific legislated obligation does not apply here. That there may be different philosophies at play may also be seen in what appears to be the different approach in the EU to the liability of market operators for infringing conduct by stall holders.[3]

A second point emerging from a very quick skim of the 214 paragraphs is that Kitchin and Jackson LJJ held that the ISPs should be liable for the costs of implementing and maintaining the blocks. Briggs LJ dissented on this point insofar as it required the ISPs to bear the costs of complying (apart from designing and installing the software). As Jackson LJ pithily put it in agreeing with Kitchin LJ, that is “part of the price which the ISPs must pay for the immunities which they enjoy”. This may point up another difference in the legal environment: ISPs in the EU have assumed obligations to block access to websites such as those dealing in paedophilia. In addition, the safe harbours regime for ISPs applies generally, not just for copyright infringement as in Australia.

Finally, so far, there haven’t been any orders in the site blocking cases brought under s 115A yet.

If you have a comment or a question, please feel free to post it in the comments section. Or, if you would prefer, email me.

Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2016] EWCA Civ 658


  1. For England and Wales, not New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland or ….  ?
  2. Australian courts have corresponding powers: for example, s 23 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1977 provides “The Court has power, in relation to matters in which it has jurisdiction, to make orders of such kinds, including interlocutory orders, and to issue, or direct the issue of, writs of such kinds, as the Court thinks appropriate.” There are, of course, counterpart provisions in the Federal Circuit Court Act and the State Supreme Court Acts: see Victoria and NSW.  ?
  3. Compare this CJEU decision to Dowsett J’s decision at first instance.  ?

The Consumer Guarantees in the ACL apply to computer games downloaded from overseas’ vendors

The ACCC – the consumer watchdog – has successfully sued Valve for misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to its Steam gaming platform. The representations were along the lines of statements made in the terms and conditions like:

“ALL STEAM FEES ARE PAYABLE IN ADVANCE AND ARE NOT REFUNDABLE IN WHOLE OR IN PART”.

The ACCC’s case was that such statements were misleading because they were inconsistent with a consumer’s rights to return defective goods and receive a refund. These rights arose (in the case of defective goods) since s 54 of the Australian Consumer Law incorporates into all supplies of goods in trade or commerce to consumers in Australia a guarantee that the goods are of acceptable quality. If they are not, s 259, amongst other things, confers a right of action for compensation where the deficiency in quality could not be remedied or was a major failure and s 263 provides an entitlement to a refund.

Valve is based in Washington State, USA. It argued its arrangements with Australians were not subject to the Australian Consumer Law. There were 3 reasons:

  1. Valve’s conduct did not occur in Australia and it did not carry on business in Australia;
  2. The Steam Subscriber Agreement was governed by the law of Washington State in the USA and so the Australian Consumer Law did not apply; and
  3. The software games were not “goods”.

Conflicts of law rules did not exclude Australian Consumer Law

In (very) broad terms, section 67 of the Australian Consumer Law says that the consumer guarantee provisions of the Australian Consumer Law continue to apply where the proper law of the contract would be Australia (but for the terms of the contract which provide otherwise) or the terms of the contract provide that the laws of some other country govern the contract.

As noted above, Valve’s contract with subscribers (i.e., someone who “buys” a game through Steam to download or play) provided that the governing law of the contract was the law of the state of Washington in the USA and its courts had exclusive jurisdiction.

The parties accepted that this clause could not be relied on in face of s 67. However, Valve argued that nonetheless the “proper law” of the contract was the law of the state of Washington and not somewhere in Australia.

Edelman J noted that at common law, the proper law of a contract was that which had the closest and most real connection with the transaction. This was determined by consideration of:

matters including (i) the places of residence or business of the parties, (ii) the place of contracting, (iii) the place of performance, and (iv) the nature and subject matter of the contract (437). Each of these is considered in turn.

Valve’s customers, at least those who gave evidence for the ACCC, were resident in NSW, Victoria and Tasmania. Valve, however, had its offices in Washington State, USA and did not have offices in Australia. Edeleman J acknowledged also that it was seeking to enter into contracts with people from all over the world and was aiming to do so on consistent terms.

His Honour next considered that the place of contracting was Washington State as that was the place where the electronic communication from the customer was received to form the contract. That is, presumably, the transaction was one where the customer made an offer to “buy” the game and the contract was formed when Valve accepted the transaction in Washington State.[1]

So, while the proper law of the contract was Washington State, USA, s 67 of the ACL applied.

Valve was carrying on business in Australia

Even though his Honour found that the proper law of the contract was Washington State in the USA, Edelman J nonetheless found that Valve both engaged in conduct in Australia and was carrying on business in Australia and so subject to the Australian Consumer Law.

You can see where this is going at [4]:

…. There are some difficult issues involved in determining whether “conduct” is in Australia, but even if Valve’s conduct was not conduct in Australia, the Australian Consumer Law would apply if Valve carried on business in Australia. Valve said that it does not carry on business in Australia despite Valve (i) having more than 2 million user accounts in Australia, (ii) generating potentially millions of dollars in revenue from Australia, (iii) owning, and using, servers in Australia, with original retail value of US $1.2 million, (iv) having relationships with businesses in Australia, and (v) paying tens of thousands of dollars monthly to Australian companies in expenses for running its business in Australia.

conduct in Australia

Despite the difficulties in determining where conduct takes place, Edelman J was able to find that Valve engaged in conduct in Australia. The conduct in question was the making of representations. The representations were made in the place(s) where they were received (otherwise, if no-one saw or heard the representation, there would be no conduct). Here, however, representations about “no refunds” were made directly to customers in Australia in “chat” sessions and when they signed up for accounts and “bought” games to download: [2]

…. The purchase of a game also required a consumer to click on a box that agreed to the terms of the SSA. The consumer provided Valve with his or her location as Australia at the time of purchase. Indeed, Valve priced some games differently in Australia (ts 120–121). The consumer might be told by Valve that “This item is currently unavailable in your region” (Court Book 347).

carrying on business in Australia

Accepting that “carrying on business” could have different meanings depending on the context, Edelman J accepted the approach advanced earlier by Merkel J in Bray:

… the ordinary meaning of “carrying on business” usually involves (by the words “carrying on”) a series or repetition of acts. Those acts will commonly involve “activities undertaken as a commercial enterprise in the nature of a going concern, that is, activities engaged in for the purpose of profit on a continuous and repetitive basis” ….

That was undoubtedly the case here. See the matters referred to in paragraph 4 above.[3]

Software downloads are “goods”

Computer programs are specifically included in the definition of “goods” for the purposes of the ACL. Valve argued, however, that what it was really supplying were services including the motion picures and audio which portrayed the images and sounds which the gamer interacted with.

Edelman J agreed that the film and audio files were not a computer program for these purposes, adopting the definition of a computer program as a set of instructions from the Copyright Act.

Under the ACL, however, it is not a question whether the supply is substantially a supply of services. Rather, the question is whether or not it involves a supply of goods. If so, the way the definitions are written, it doesn’t matter whether there is also a supply of services.

Valve further contended that it did not supply goods as all the subscriber had was a licence to use the software and, citing Cowell, a bare licence is purely a contractual right; not the supply of any property. One problem with this argument was that s2 of the ACL defined supply to include lease, hire or hire-purchase; terms sufficiently wide to encompass a licence. Another problem was that the argument did not take into account that subscribers could download games to play offline. They “physically” had the goods.

Valve therefore breached the consumer warranties implied by the ACL into each arrangement.

Interesting question whether foreighn companies systematically supplying goods or services over the internet to Australia will need to be registrered as a foreign company carrying on business in Australia under s 601CD of the Corporations Act? One may wonder about the practical ramifications flowing from that.

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No 3) [2016] FCA 196 (Edelman J)


  1. OK, that is an old-fashioned characterisation of the contractual formation, but Edelman J relied more specifically on UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996 with additional article 5bis as adopted in 1998 and the electronic transaction provisions in Australian laws such as Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) s 14B.  ?
  2. Ward Group v Brodie & Stone was distinguishable, at least because in Valve, there were (2.2 million) real purchasers. Gutnick was also distinguished as directed to different issues.  ?
  3. Catalogued again at [199] – [204].  ?

Commonwealth can still sue on the undertaking as to damages

The High Court has refused Sanofi and Wyeth special leave to appeal the Commonwealth’s claims on the clopidogrel undertaking as to damages.

You may recall that, when Sanofi and Wyeth got interlocutory injunctions to stop Apotex entering the market with a clopidogrel product, Sanofi had to give the “usual undertaking as to damages“. The patents, however, were held invalid.

Sanofi and Apotex settled the latter’s claim for damages. However, the Commonwealth also brought a claim against Sanofi and Wyeth under the undertakings as to damages, in broad terms claiming as damages the difference between the (higher) price it paid under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme while the injunctions were in force and the lower price that would have applied if the interlocutory injunctions had not kept Apotex out of the market.

Last year, the Full Federal Court rejected Sanofi’s and Wyeth’s arguments that the Commonwealth could not bring a claim under the undertakings. Lauren John, an associate at Allens, reports that the High Court refused Sanofi’s application for special leave last week.

Links to the High Court dispositions here (Sanofi) and here (Wyeth). Ms John provides more detail here.

If you have a question or wish to make a comment, feel free to post it in the comments box or send me an email.

Now for the PLAYGO word mark

Moshinsky J has now extended the declarations and injunctions in the Playgro v Playgo proceedings to include the PLAYGO word mark, but refused orders to recall infringing products and for delivery up.

The previous decision concerned the use of the PLAYGO device. This device appeared prominently on the top and the four sides of the product packaging. In small print (6 point or 8 point) on the bottom of the packaging, the following legend was printed:

Screen Shot 2016-05-11 at 12.28.21 PM

Moshinsky J has now ruled that PLAYGO in the first line of that “notice” also infringed, but not the other occurrences of PLAYGO in the company names.

The respondents argued that the PLAYGO device placed prominently on the top and sides of the packaging was clearly the trade mark and would be understood by the consumers to be the trade mark. This “notice” was just a legend referring to that device. Consumers would never even see it, unless they picked the package up and looked at its underside. His Honour said at [17]:

In the present case, the word, ‘PLAYGO’ was immediately followed by the letters, ‘TM’ in superscript and the words “is a trademark of”. These are strong indicators that the word, ‘PLAYGO’ is being used as a trade mark, that is, as a ‘badge of origin’ to distinguish the respondents’ playthings from playthings made by others. While the nature and purpose of the use of the word must be considered in the context of the packaging as a whole, which includes the Playgo Device Mark on the front and sides of the box, the fact that the Playgo Device Mark is used as a trade mark does not diminish the fact, in this case, that the word, ‘PLAYGO’ in the small print is also being used as a trade mark. This case may be contrasted with cases where a word which is arguably descriptive is used in small print on the packaging and it is concluded that, in the context of the packaging as a whole, including the use of a prominent brand elsewhere on the packet, the word is not being used as a trade mark: compare, for example, Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd v Nestle Australia Ltd (2010) 86 IPR 1 at [22], [37]-[40] per Sundberg J; Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd v Nestlé Australia Ltd (2010) 87 IPR 464 at [42], [48] per Stone, Gordon and McKerracher JJ. In the present case, the word, ‘PLAYGO’ is not descriptive and the presence of the superscript letters, ‘TM’ and the words “is a trademark of” indicate use as a trade mark.

Even if the word PLAYGO in the first line of the “notice” could be seen as a legend, it would be sufficient that one of the impressions a consumer could take away from the use was that it was used as a trade mark and that was the case here.

Bearing in mind that Playgo was outside Australia (in China) and supplied its products there to retailers who imported them into Australia for sale, the injunctions Moshinsky J ordered were against supplying for sale in Australia playthings under or by reference to the PLAYGO device or in packaging bearing both the PLAYGO device and the word PLAYGO in small print on the packaging (other than as part of a company name).

The words “under or by reference to” were preferred to “use as a trade mark” as, while the latter expression is the term used in the Act, it was liable to debate and uncertainty about its scope. The use of PLAYGO in the company names was not enjoined as it was not trade mark use. In addition, his Honour was not prepared to enjoin wider uses of PLAYGO where the trial had concerned only the limited use in small print on the bottom of the packaging.

Moshinsky J refused to order Playgo to recall all unsold goods. Playgo had stopped supplying goods with the trade mark in November 2014. His Honour considered it unlikely that stocks would still be held by retailers. Even if there were, there was no evidence that Playgo had any right to require the retailers to return the products. (That of course does not mean that retailers who sell would not infringe.)

The order for delivery up was also refused. This was because any goods in Playgo’s possession or control were in China – where it was located and operated – and could be sold to places other than Australia where there might not be an infringement.

Playgro Pty Ltd v Playgo Art & Craft Manufactory Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 478