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Pham Global 3: Did Insight have enough reputation?

This third post looks at the Full Court’s rejection of Pham Global’s arguments that its use of its trade mark in NSW and Tasmania was not caught by s 60 because (Pham Global claimed) Insight Clinical did not have a reputation outside WA.

To recap, Pham Global was appealing Insight Clinical’s successful opposition to the registration of Pham Global’s mark (below on the right) on the basis of its own trade mark (below on the left) and the subsequent finding of infringement.[1]

As Insight Clinical had not registered its trade mark before Mr Pham had applied to register the Pham Global trade mark, one of its grounds of opposition was its reputation under s 60.

As you no doubt recall, s 60 now provides:

The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:

(a) another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first?mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and

(b) because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first?mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.

It was not in dispute between the parties that Insight Clinical had a reputation in its mark in Perth, Western Australia. Pham Global contended, however, that reputation was not enough to succeed under s 60 when Pham Global was operating 3,000+km away in NSW and Tasmania where, it contended, Insight Clinical’s reputation did not extend.

The Full Court first pointed out that s 60(a) required only a reputation in Australia. It did not require a reputation throughout Australia. Accordingly, the first requirement under s 60 was satisfied, and s 60 was engaged.

Immediately following that conclusion, however, the Full Court appeared to accept the basic thrust of Pham Global’s argument, recognising that there had to be a causal link between the proven reputation and the potential for deception or confusion.

The Full Court recognised that what and how much reputation might be required to give rise to sufficient risk of deception or confusion would depend on the relevant field of activity. Much of the Full Court’s consideration concentrates on affirming the trial Judge’s findings that Insight Clinical had a reputation with relevant sections of the public outside WA through its attendance and advertising at national conferences, evidence of some interstate referrals and advertising for staff on national websites and Google search “hits”. In that connection, the trial Judge had recorded evidence of one referral to Insight Clinical from Victoria, two from NSW, four from Queensland and one each from South Australia and the Northern Territory. Her Honour also identified Insight Clinical as having provided services to 237 interstate patients.[2]

At [81], their Honours emphasised the national nature of much commercial activity today:

Conagra was decided 25 years ago. In 1992 the World Wide Web was in its infancy. There were no publicly available internet browsers. There was no Google, no Seek, no web browsing or the like. With the internet and travel both overseas and within Australia now ubiquitous in the lives of Australian people, the essential conceptual underpinning of IR’s case is unsound. IR accepted that, before IR conceived of the IR composite mark, ICI had acquired a substantial reputation in its marks in Western Australia. IR’s case depended on the proposition that ICI’s reputation in its marks did not extend outside Western Australia and IR would accept any condition or limitation not to use its marks in Western Australia. We accept that the Act permits a condition or limitation to this effect to be imposed (discussed below). But the reality of modern life, with widespread use of the internet for advertising, job seeking, news gathering, entertainment, and social discourse and free and frequent movement of people across Australia for work, leisure, family and other purposes, necessarily impacts on both the acquisition of a reputation in a mark and the likelihood of the use of another mark being likely to deceive or confuse because of that reputation. Given current modes of communication and discourse and free and unfettered rights of travel within Australia, a substantial reputation in Western Australia in this national industry constituted a sufficient reputation in and across Australia for s 60(b) to be engaged. IR’s attempts to subdivide the nation into its component States and Territories, in the present context at least, could not succeed. Its approach resonates with sentimental notions of pre or early Federation train track gauge differences. (emphasis supplied)

In similar vein, Pham Global’s offer to accept a voluntary disclaimer that its registration did not extend to WA was rejected. The proposed disclaimer read:

Registration of this trade mark gives no exclusive right to use or authorise the use of the words INSIGHT RADIOLOGY in the State of Western Australia

While s 74 did not provide a statutory basis for the proposed disclaimer as the proposal was not limited to a part of the mark only, s 33 and s 55 did. The Full Court said at [89]:

The national nature of the market and the fact of free and unfettered movement around Australia cannot be ignored. Despite IR’s express willingness not to use the IR composite mark at all in Western Australia, there is one national specialist market for radiological services of which Western Australia forms a substantial part. Given the facts set out above, use of the IR composite mark outside Western Australia will not ameliorate the likelihood of a substantial number of people in the relevant class around Australia being deceived or confused. As a result, the use of the IR composite mark in Australia is a use which would be likely to deceive and cause confusion. Moreover, enforcement of any such condition would be problematic. The prospect that IR’s behaviour could be disciplined by infringement or other proceedings at the suit of ICI if IR used its mark in Western Australia contrary to the condition may not be a satisfactory answer to the deception or confusion that might be caused in the interim. IR’s submissions did not satisfactorily confront any of these matters.

Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83


  1. For previous posts on the ruling that the trade mark was invalid because Mr Pham was not the proper applicant see here and the trade mark was substantially identical to Insight Clinical’s see here.  ?
  2. At [78] and [79] respectively. The Full Court referred to 440 patients. The national conferences were directed to the relevant professions: radiographer and radiologists, both of which were registered to practice nationally and regulated and organised on a national basis: [65] – [66].  ?

Pham Global 2: the new law of substantial identity

Having ruled that Pham Global’s trade mark was invalidly registered because Mr Pham was not the owner of the trade mark when he filed the application, the Full Court also indicated a substantially expanded role for the test of substantial identity in stating that Pham Global’s trade mark was substantially identical with Insight Clinical’s.

To recap, Insight Clinical’s trade mark is on the left below while Pham Global’s is on the right:

The trial Judge had applied the well-known ‘side by side’ test explained by Windeyer J:[1]

In considering whether marks are substantially identical they should, I think, be compared side by side, their similarities and differences noted and the importance of these assessed having regard to the essential features of the registered mark and the total impression of resemblance or dissimilarity that emerges from the comparison. “The identification of an essential feature depends”, it has been said, “partly on the Court’s own judgment and partly on the burden of the evidence that is placed before it”: de Cordova v. Vick Chemical Co. (1951) 68 R.P.C. 103, at p 106. Whether there is substantial identity is a question of fact ….[2]

capped with Gummow J’s summation in Carnival Cruise:

Thus, if a total impression of similarity emerges from a comparison between the two marks, the marks are “substantially identical”: Carnival Cruise Lines Inc v Sitmar Cruises Limited [1994] FCA 936; (1994) 120 ALR 495 at [62].

Generally, courts have found that the two trade marks must be virtually identical before a finding of substantial identity will be made.

The trial Judge had applied what many would consider to be a conventional analysis in rejecting substantial identity. At [18], her Honour held:

…. Whilst both composite marks use the word “insight”, there are clear visual differences in presentation. The appearance of the words “insight” and “radiology” in the IR composite mark run into each other, are equally prominent (the same font and size) and appear all in lower case. This is quite distinct from the words in the ICI composite mark where the letter “S” is capitalised in “inSight” and the words “Clinical Imaging” are secondary and beneath “inSight” in smaller and unbolded font. The capitalisation of the word “Sight” in “inSight” has the effect of emphasising the word “Sight”. There are also distinct visual differences in the appearance and positioning of the device. The ICI composite mark has a complete inner circle and is all in green with clear lines whereas the IR composite mark does not have a complete inner circle, the outside circle is in black and the lines are different. There is not a “total impression of resemblance”. The visual differences combined with the different wording, albeit that “imaging” and “radiology” may be interchangeable in relation to the services to which the marks relate, make the marks sufficiently different on a side by side comparison.

The Full Court held that the trial Judge had erred by failing to identify the essential features in the trade marks and make the comparison based on them. At [52], the Full Court stated:

…. The required exercise of side-by-side comparison is not carried out in a factual and legislative vacuum. The purpose of the exercise is to decide if two trade marks are substantially identical, where a trade mark is “a sign used, or intended to be used, to distinguish goods or services dealt with or provided in the course of trade by a person from goods or services so dealt with or provided by any other person” (s 17). Given this context, it is unlikely that the essential elements of a mark or its dominant cognitive clues are to be found in mere descriptive elements, which are not apt to perform this distinguishing role in respect of the relevant goods or services. While this does not mean that differences, including descriptive differences, may be ignored, it does mean that the side-by-side comparison is to be carried out cognisant of the essential elements of the mark. (emphasis supplied)

The Full Court held that the essential features of the two trade marks were the words “insight” and, to a lesser extent, the circular “eye” image. The words “radiology” and “clinical imaging” were merely descriptive and the differences in the circular devices were relatively minor. At [56]:

The essential elements are the words “Insight” and the device. The word is the same in both marks. The device appears to the left of the word in both marks. While the differences which her Honour noted do exist, the dominant cognitive clues in both marks is a device which is circular in shape evoking an eye to the left of the word “Insight”, in circumstances where the other words “clinical imaging” and “radiology” are descriptive of the services offered. The importance of the visual differences which her Honour noted, and which we accept exist, must be assessed having regard to these essential elements of the marks. Once this necessary exercise is undertaken, we consider that not only is there a total impression of resemblance between the marks, but also that the differences between the marks are slight having regard to their essential elements or the dominant cognitive clues which they present.

Accordingly, the Full Court considered that Insight Clinical’s opposition to registration of the trade mark should also have succeed on the grounds that Pham Global was not the owner of the trade mark based on Insight Clinical’s prior use of its trade mark.

The Full Court’s analysis, with respect, has all the hallmarks of a deceptive similarity analysis. Given their earlier ruling that the trade mark was invalid because Mr Pham as not the owner when he applied to register it, this part of the Full Court’s decision is obiter.

For most purposes, it does not make much difference as most cases involving a comparison of marks ultimately turn on deceptive similarity.

It is (if followed), however, particularly significant in the context of ownership disputes. As Janice Luck (here and here) has noted, the Full Court’s approach gives much wider scope for the operation of s 58. It blurs the operation of the test for substantial identity with the test for deceptive similarity in ways arguably previously thought outside the scope of an ‘ownershp’ objection. In Carnival Cruise under the 1955 Act, for example, Gummow J had continued after the summation of principle quoted above:

…. The phrase “substantially identical” as it appears in s. 62 (which is concerned with infringement) was discussed by Windeyer J in The Shell Company of Australia Limited v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Limited (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 414. It requires a total impression of similarity to emerge from a comparison between the two marks. In a real sense a claim to proprietorship of the one extends to the other. But to go beyond this is, in my view, not possible. There is, as Mr Shanahan points out in his work, p. 158, real difficulty in assessing the broader notion of deceptive similarity in the absence of some notional user in Australia of the prior mark (something postulated by s. 33) or prior public recognition built up by user (para. 28 (a)). [3] (emphasis supplied)

It means that we won’t be able to concede, or skip over, the “substantially identical with” limb of trade mark comparisons in future.

The Full Court’s explanation of the operation of s 60 will have to await a future post.

Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83 (Greenwood, Jagot and Beach JJ)


  1. The Shell Co. of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 414; [1963] HCA 66.  ?
  2. Notwithstanding the high authority of Windeyer J’s statement, it is worth noting that Lord Radcliffe appears to have been referring to identification of essential features in the context of assessing whether or not a trade mark was likely to cause confusion or deception – the test for deceptive similarity. Thus, Lord Radcliffe rejected the appeal against the finding of infringement because “The likelihood of confusion or deception in such cases is not disproved by placing the two marks side by side and demonstrating how small is the chance of error in any customer who places his order for goods with both the marks clearly before him, for orders are not placed, or are often not placed, under such conditions. It is more useful to observe that in most persons the eye is not an accurate recorder of visual detail, and that marks are remembered rather by general impressions or by some significant detail than by any photographic recollection of the whole.” Compare de Cordova to s 10.  ?
  3. Note also the questions his Honour posed at 58.  ?

Don’t file in the wrong applicant’s name

Because, if you do, the Full Court has definitively ruled that the error cannot be rectified and any resulting registration will be irredeemably invalid.

This is the first of at least two rulings departing from the trial judge’s reasons which the Full Court made in the course of dismissing Pham Global’s appeal from the decision to revoke its trade mark registrations and find it infringed Insight Clinical Imaging’s trade marks. So Pham Global still lost, but with ramifications for us all.

Some background

Since 2008, Insight Clinical Imaging has been using the name INSIGHT and its composite mark for its radiology services largely in Perth, WA.[1]

Mr Pham is a radiologist and the sole director of the company through which a radiology business is conducted in NSW. Originally, the company was called AKP Radiology Consultants Pty Ltd. In December 2011, however, Mr Pham applied to register the Insight Radiology mark as a trade mark for radiology services.

Insight Clinical’s trade mark is below on the left. On the right below is the trade mark applied for by Mr Pham.

In March 2012, AKP Radiology Services first started using the Insight Radiology mark for its business.[2]

On 6 June 2013, Insight Clinical lodged its opposition to Mr Pham’s application.

On 17 June 2013, Mr Pham’s company changed its name from AKP Radiology Services to Insight Radiology Pty Ltd.[3] Then, on 1 July 2013, Mr Pham sought to assign the trade mark application to his company.

Insight Clinical Imaging’s opposition was successful before the Office and Mr Pham’s company appealed unsuccessfully. In accordance with the trial judge’s orders, Mr Pham’s company then changed its name to Pham Global Pty Ltd and sought leave to appeal.

While leave was granted, the appeal was dismissed.

Who is the applicant

The trial judge found that the Insight Radiology mark was designed for, and used by, Mr Pham’s company. It even paid the designer.

Mr Pham, however, maintained that it had not been a mistake that the application was made in his name rather than the company’s. There was no evidence that Mr Pham ever actually licensed his company to use the trade mark. Moreover, Mr Pham’s explanation for why he decided to assign the application to his company – “I just did it” – was not accepted. He explicitly rejected the proposition that he made the assignment in response to Insight Clinical’s opposition to registration of the trade mark or that it was a result of a mistake.

Accordingly, her Honour held that Mr Pham was not the owner of the application when it was made, his company was. In line with the decisions in Mobileworld and Crazy Ron’s, however, her Honour found that the assignment of the application to the company before the trade mark was actually registered rectified the error.

On appeal, the Full Court noted that Mobileworld and Crazy Ron’s were both obiter on this point.

The Full Court then noted that longstanding precedent required that grounds of opposition were assessed at the date the application was filed. That meant that, where the ground of opposition was under s 58 that the applicant was not the owner of the trade mark,[4] the applicant when the application was filed had to be the owner of the trade mark. At [32], the Full Court said:

Once it is understood that the legislative scheme operates in the context of established principle that the alternative sources of ownership of a trade mark are authorship and use before filing an application for registration or the combination of authorship, filing of an application for registration and an intention to use or authorise use, the relationship between s 27 and ss 58 and 59 of the 1995 Act becomes apparent. The grounds of opposition in ss 58 and 59 reflect the requirements of s 27. Only a person claiming to be an owner may apply for registration. That claim may be justified at the time the application is made based on either alternative source of ownership. But if the claim is not justified at that time, ss 58 and/or 59 are available grounds of opposition. Moreover, if the applicant is not the owner of the mark at the time of the filing of the application, the assignment provisions in ss 106 – 111 do not assist because they authorise the assignment of the mark and thus pre-suppose, consistent with established principle, that the applicant owns the mark.

Well, it’s a nice simple rule; should be pretty straightforward to apply in practice shouldn’t it? Of course, it does mean that the law for trade marks is way out of step with the law for patents and registered designs, sections 22A and 138(3)(4).[5]

When time permits, I shall try to do a post on the new law of substantial identity.

Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd [2017] FCAFC 83 (Greenwood, Jagot and Beach JJ)


  1. It did not apply to register its trade mark until October 2012.  ?
  2. On 17 June 2013, Mr Pham caused AKP Radiology Consultants to change its name to Insight Radiology Pty Ltd. As a consequence of the first instance decision, however, the name of the company was changed again – to Pham Global Pty Ltd.  ?
  3. Mr Pham’s company also made a further application to register the words INSIGHT RADIOLOGY alone. Insight Clinical has also opposed it, but it appears to be stayed pending the outcome of the court case. (There was also an earlier application in 2008, TM Application No 1236945 for INSIGHT IMAGING / INSIGHT RADIOLOGY. This application was made by a Daniel Moses and a Jason Wenderoth, but lapsed after acceptance without ever becoming registered.)  ?
  4. The same principle applies under s 59, which was also in play.  ?
  5. Foster’s Australia Limited v Cash’s (Australia) Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 527.  ?

The Australian Bar Association “gets” Australian Barristers Chambers

The Australian Bar Association[1] (the ABA) has obtained declarations that Australian Barristers Chambers Pty Ltd[2] and associates (the Chambers entities) have infringed the ABA’s registered trade marks:

  • No 1587902 – AUSTRALIAN BAR ASSOCIATION; and
  • No 1558252 – for the ABA “logo”:

by using the names:

  • Australian Barrister Chambers;
  • AustBar Chambers; and
  • Australian Barrister,

in close proximity to an image of the scales of justice. For example:

The ABA has also obtained declarations that the Chambers entities have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 18 etc. of the Australian Consumer Law by using those names and also by using:

  • the URL ?www.austbar.com.au?;
  • the name AustBar Chambers;
  • the name AustBar ADR;
  • the tweet identifier ?Australian Barrister@AustBar?;
  • and all of the above in in proximity to, the scales of justice.

The NSW Bar Association[3] has also obtained declarations that its trade marks for BARADR have been infringed, and s 18 of the ACL contravened, by the Chambers entities by the use of BARADR and the domain names ?www.baradr.com.au? and ?www.austbaradr.com.au?.

As James McDougall points out, the decision is 360 paragraphs long and so will no doubt require further, careful consideration. A few points caught my eye skimming through:

One point which should be noted (as clients often raise it) is Greenwood J’s orthodox rejection of the claim that Chambers’ name(s) were defensible because the business name registration or domain name registration system permitted them. Greenwood J pointed out at [175]:

The circumstance that a domain name registration might or might not meet the eligibility criteria for registration is no answer to the question of whether use of such a domain name is either confusing or misleading or constitutes infringement of a registered trade mark, in Australia. Prior to the introduction of the dispute resolution protocols governing domain name registrations, it had become something of an art form for registrants to register, as domain names, the names of traders who had developed a reputation for a name or mark within a jurisdiction and often internationally. Processes were adopted as a result of that practice to try and address that conduct. Whatever the perceived “validity” might be of the domain name registration ?www.austbar.com.au? within the confines of that system and its protocols, austbar and AustBar are terms, names or indicia associated, particularly electronically, with the ABA.

The signpost point

Greenwood J was prepared to find that AUSTRALASIAN BARRISTERS CHAMBERS by itself, or even in the logo form:

by itself for a virtual chambers of barristers would not have infringed the ABA’s rights. However, traffic to the website was directed by the “signpost” <www.austbar.com.au> and that conduct was infringing:

[181] As to the use of the name Australasian Barrister Chambers, I do not regard the use of that name as being either substantially identical with or deceptively similar to either TM 902 or TM 252. However, traffic is directed to a website for and on behalf of that company (and later Austbar PL) by use of the domain name ?www.austbar.com.au?. Use of that domain name involves use of a mark or sign in the course of that company’s trade in services for which TM 902 is registered. I regard the use of austbar in this context as a use of a mark or sign deceptively similar to TM 902. Once a person engages with austbar as the conduit to the website operated by Australasian Barrister Chambers, the sense of confusion or wonderment about whether the person is engaging with the ABA or a provider connected with the ABA remains.

[182] However, by itself, the name Australasian Barrister Chambers might be thought to suggest a set of chambers occupied by barristers “virtually” (and in this case only a virtual presence is relevant), engaged or seeking to be engaged, in work in the Australian and Asian markets for legal services, by seeking direct electronic access to those who engage barristers in that work. In this case, of course, the key electronic point of connection is a domain name using austbar. Barristers might seek greater direct access to the legal profession in this way but it is also important to remember that the website addresses clients and the community directly through the website. Mr Minus, entities controlled by him (or over which he has influence) and other barristers would be entitled, plainly enough, to engage in an undertaking of establishing an online virtual presence for barristers associated together in some way, shape or form. The difficulty is the use of sign, mark or signpost which directs traffic to the site under or by reference to the dominant domain name descriptor austbar associated with the Australian Bar Association. The use of austbar as a mark signposting the electronic route to the site operator is the vice and the infringing conduct.

It will be very interesting to see what form of injunction is fashioned in response to these findings.

Unincorporated associations and ownership trade marks

Greenwood J rejected various attacks on the ABA’s title to its registered trade marks. When the applications for the ABA’s registered trade marks were filed in 2013, “it” was still an unincorporated association, so the 12 members of “its” executive council were the applicants, each described “as trustee for the Australian Bar Association”. Subsequently, three of the original applicants retired from the executive council and assigned their interests to the remaining members. Greenwood J held:

[222] I accept that as a matter of construction of the TM Act, a joint owner may assign his or her “share” or “interest” in the trade mark to another with or without an assignment by any other joint owner. Mr Colbran QC, Mr Traves SC and Mr Walker were joint owners (with the other nine AB Council members) and joint applicants as trustees for the ABA for each trade mark. When they assigned their interest in each trade mark, the incoming assignees took, between them, that aliquot share of the three assignors impressed with the same trust upon which that interest had been held by them. The interest of each of the remaining nine applicant owners as trustees remained entirely as it was.

[223] There is no defect in title in the sequence of transfers as discussed.

Chambers’ disclaimer did not help

Chambers’ website seems to have various forms of disclaimer appearing at different times – his Honour considered the evidence was not fully clear about all the forms or timings.

Greenwood J considered that none of the forms sufficiently proved were sufficient. His Honour explained at [237] that to be effective the disclaimer had to satisfy the following test:

the critical matter in relation to the efficacy of the disclaimer is whether the respondents have discharged the onus of demonstrating that the disclaimer is likely to be seen and understood by all those reasonable fair minded members of the various cohorts engaging with the website (leaving aside extreme and fanciful reactions and isolated exceptions), who would otherwise be misled. In order to be effective, the disclaimer must be such as to leave the fair minded reasonable member of the class in no doubt about the source or origin of the services provided under and by reference to the website; in no doubt about whether the ABA is associated or affiliated with the site operator or the services offered by the operator; and in no doubt about whether the ABA is in some way, shape or form standing behind the website operated by the respondents.

Chambers’ disclaimer did not achieve that. By the time the reader had reached the website, there had already been infringement and misleading or deceptive conduct:

[240]: First, by the time a person engages with the website, they have already been taken there by a sign, the use of which involves an infringement of TM 902 and taken there by reason of conduct in contravention of s 18(1), s 29(1)(g) and s 29(1)(h) of the ACL. The user is already drawn to the site. He or she is already attracted and engaged by the conduct. At that point, the disclaimer needs to operate in such a causative way that it cures an existing problem (if able to do so at all which is likely to be difficult and rare), by making it absolutely clear to the reader who is looking at the site electronically for particular information that this site is not a website operated by the ABA and nor are the services provided by the website the services of the ABA or services associated with or approved by the ABA. One imagines that the disclaimer would need to capture the eyes of the viewer with significant text with appropriate emphasis. Small text located two thirds of the way down the page is never likely to be sufficient and in the facts of this case, it is not sufficient. It is a classic example of the message being “in the small print”.

[241] Second, in the facts of this case, the truth of the matter is that the unlawful conduct was complete once the trade mark infringement had occurred and once the misleading conduct had taken the person to the site. At that point, the disclaimer had to be powerful enough to undo the harm.

Thirdly, some of the public who would land on the website would be consumers looking to access the views of a national body like the ABA, but misdirected there by Chambers’ cues.

One might also question the relevance of any disclaimer to infringement under s 120(1) as opposed to s 120(2) or s 120(3).[4]

Selth v Australasian Barrister Chambers Pty Ltd (No 3) [2017] FCA 649


  1. Now a company limited by guarantee but, from 1963 until 20 May 2015, an unincorporated association of, you guessed it, Australian barristers.  ?
  2. now in liquidation, and various associated entities including its principals Mr Minus and Ms Minasian.  ?
  3. which was incorporated as long ago as 1936.  ?
  4. See e.g. Optical 88 Limited v Optical 88 Pty Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 1380 at [99]  ?

Another get-up case gets up

The get-up for Homart’s CHÉRI ovine bio-placenta product has been held to misrepresent an association with Careline’s CHANTELLE product.

Chantelle

 

Chéri

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Now, you might be thinking that CHÉRI marks out Homart’s product from CHANTELLE rather plainly. But the dreaded Red Bull and Peter Bodum cases reared their heads again.

Sales of Careline’s CHANTELLE product had exploded after it adopted its current get-up: from between $25,000 to $60,000 per year to over $2 million in between June 2014 and early 2016 when Homart introduced its competing product.

Homart’s get-up was nothing like the other products in its CHÉRI range. Its get-up was much closer than any other competing product to Careline’s. The boxes of the products were often displayed in stores stacked, with the lid of the top box open so that customers could see the contents.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Accordingly, the branding on Homart’s product was often not visible, at least initially. CHÉRI itself was not thought to be a particularly distinctive mark, especially as both CHANTELLE and CHÉRI began with the same “shhh” pronunciation. Burley J could not accept the explanation for the adoption of the get-up advanced by Homart’s designer.

After a very careful consideration of the evidence, his Honour summarised:

194 The unique combination of features making up the get-up of the CHANTELLE bio-placenta product are eye-catching. They extend to the packaging in open or closed configuration and provide strong visual cues by which a consumer would note and remember the product. From this combination, quite separately to the name, the consumer is informed of the origin, quality and type of goods being purchased. Homart has taken all of those cues.

195 The suggestion conveyed by the get-up is not, in my view, dispelled sufficiently by the use of the CHÉRI Australia brand name. The name CHÉRI Australia is a relatively weak mark for distinguishing otherwise identical products because:

(a) such reputation as Homart has in the mark CHÉRI is weak and has been significantly dissipated by reason of Homart’s choice to use it in packaging distinctly different to the products in the balance of the CHÉRI range (see section 9 above);

(b) the phonetic and visual similarities between the first letters of both the CHÉRI and CHANTELLE marks diminish the effect of the use of different words (see [85] above). In this context both Chantelle and Chéri are French sounding names. Both commence with “Ch…”. To persons not familiar with French, they are likely to be weak means of distinguishing otherwise identical products (unlike “Andronicus” and “Moccona” in Stuart Alexander). They are likely to be perceived as words that convey little or no meaning (I make this observation without particular regard to the level of English literacy of the target market and assuming it to be roughly on par within native English speakers); and

(c) the addition of the reference to “Australia” has a similar local geographical connotation to “Sydney” as used in the CHANTELLE bio-placenta product.

….

 

198 Further, the trade circumstances to which I have referred in section 5 above demonstrate that often the display of the bio-placenta products in stores may not clearly show the trade mark, for instance, when the products are stacked one on top of the other. In those circumstances consumers are likely to use the visual cues provided by the get-up of the packaging to indicate the product which they seek rather than the names.

199 In my view, it is likely that a not insubstantial number of persons within the relevant class, who are aware of the CHANTELLE bio-placenta product, would be diverted from a search for that product by the get-up of the Homart product. They may note that something seems different about the brand name, but be convinced by the other similarities in the get-up that her or his recollection as to the brand name was mistaken. A consumer familiar with the CHANTELLE bio-placenta product may well recall its get-up, but have no or an imperfect recollection of its name and acquire the CHÉRI bio-placenta product believing it to be the CHANTELLE bio-placenta product. This would be especially likely in circumstances where the store does not stock both brands. The rapier of suggestion caused by the similarity in get-up will in those circumstances result in a sale for Homart.

200 Further, the findings that I have expressed in section 8 above (Development of the CHÉRI bio-placenta product) as to Homart’s intention, lead to the application of Australian Woollen Mills. That authority was applied by the Full Court in RedBull at [117] (Weinberg and Dowsett JJ, Branson J agreeing) who said:

Without wishing to labour the point unduly, we again point out that where a trader, having knowledge of a particular market, borrows aspects of a competitor’s get-up, it is a reasonable inference that he or she believes that there will be a market benefit in so doing. Often, the obvious benefit will be the attraction of custom which would otherwise have gone to the competitor. It is an available inference from those propositions that the trader, with knowledge of the market, considered that such borrowing was “fitted for the purpose and therefore likely to deceive or confuse…”. Of course, the trader may explain his or her conduct in such a way as to undermine the availability of that inference. Obviously, this reasoning will only apply where there are similarities in get-up which suggest borrowing.

201 In the present case, I am satisfied that this was the intention of Homart. As noted in Red Bull at first instance (Conti J) at [64], the difference between the brand names is not necessarily decisive of an absence of the requisite intention. Nor, as I have noted above by reference to the Full Court decision in Peter Bodum, is the presence of a brand name determinative of an absence of misleading conduct. In the present case, in any action under s 18 of the ACL, one must look at the totality of conduct of the alleged deceiver.

202 I have found that Homart intentionally adopted a get-up for its product for the purpose of appropriating part of the trade or reputation of Careline. The choice of the CHÉRI Australia brand name was not, in the particular circumstances of this case, sufficient.

In the context of the findings at [198] above, his Honour had earlier noted at [29] – [30] that the cause of action could be made out even if the customer’s mistaken impression was dispelled by the time they had reached, or at, the sales counter. Burley J did discount Careline’s argument that the largely Chinese speaking customer base would not appreciate the different wording in Roman characters.

Does this mean Parkdale v Puxu is dead?

Homart Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Careline Australia Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 403

WIPO Overview 3.0

WIPO has released the third edition of its WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Decisions Views on Selected UDRP Questions.

Since the second edition, there have apparently been about 17,000 cases processed by WIPO under the UDRP.

If you have a potential domain name dispute problem, this is an excellent place to start and even more help if you are preparing, or defending, a Complaint under the UDRP.

Print outs of third party websites ruled inadmissible

Mortimer J has ruled that print outs of third party websites are inadmissible as hearsay and, if not, excluded under s 135 of the Evidence Act as unduly prejudicial.

Shape Shopfitters is suing Shape Australia for infringement of several registered trade marks which, it says, include SHAPE as the essential feature and the usual passing off-type actions.[1] Both are in the commercial construction business. Shape Australia used to be called ISIS Group Australia, but changed its name in October 2015, as her Honour said “for reasons that are immediately obvious.”

Shape Shopfitters is contending that the use of “Shape” in Shape Australia’s name is likely to lead people to think that Shape Shopfitters is the “shopfitting” arm of Shape Australia, which it is not.

As part of its defence Shape Australia sought to lead evidence of ASIC and Australian Business Register records of other companies and businesses with the word SHAPE in their name. Shape Australia also sought to introduce print outs of the websites of various businesses resulting from Google searches such as “shape building”.[2] Some, but not all, of the print outs were from the Wayback Machine. The print outs purported to be of businesses called Shape Consulting, Shape Builders Pty Ltd, Shape Joinery & Design Pty Ltd, Shape Fitouts Pty Ltd and Shape Finance (Aust) Pty Ltd. You will immediately appreciate that Shape Australia was hoping to show that “shape” itself was not distinctive or to rely on the well-known proposition from the Hornsby Building Information case.[3]

Mortimer J noted that no objection was taken to the ASIC or Australian Business Register print out – presumably, because they were official records.[4]

However, the print outs of the websites of the businesses themselves were hearsay. They were being advanced to show that there were other businesses out there claiming to have and use the names appearing in the print outs. At [24], her Honour ruled:[5]

the evidence sought to be adduced by the respondent is clearly hearsay within the meaning of s 59 of the Evidence Act. The statements made on various internet sites of other corporations or business entities (including the archived material to which Mr Henry deposes in [24] of his affidavit)[6] constitute a previous representation made by the person or persons who constructed the website, wrote the text and inserted the graphics. The purpose of adducing evidence of those statements of text and graphics is to prove the existence of a fact it can reasonably be supposed was intended by the drafter of the text and the person who constructed the graphics. The fact is that there were business entities trading on the dates specified (between August and October 2016) in the industries and markets set out on the pages exhibited by Mr Henry, in the locations those webpages identified using the names those webpages identified. It is the actual existence of those business entities, the names they were using, the industries and markets in which they were trading, the services they were offering and the locations in which they were offering those services which the respondent in my opinion seeks to use as part of its case to prove that there was no confusion in the marketplace generated by its use of the word “shape” in SHAPE Australia.

Even if the print outs were not hearsay, Mortimer J would have excluded them under s 135 if the Evidence Act on the basis that their probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice to Shape Shopfitting.

the evidence … constitutes no more than a snapshot of what was available through a series of internet searches on a particular date, without any context being available to be tested about the nature of the businesses these searches have turned up. The probative value of such searches is limited on any view. The applicant’s case is a very specific one about what participants in the commercial construction industry may or may not be led to believe concerning the relationship between the applicant and the respondent, and whether the applicant might be seen as no more than a “specialist shop fitting arm” of the respondent. To have evidence in the nature of single date extracts of internet searches showing businesses using the word “shape”, without calling evidence from witnesses who operate or control those businesses, and allowing the applicant to test the similarities or differences between those businesses and its own, between the customer base(s) of those business and its own, and in turn between those businesses and the respondents, is in my opinion to create a danger of unfair prejudice to the applicant. Snapshots of internet searches on particular dates, all of which are between just under and just over a year after the respondent adopted the name “SHAPE Australia” contribute little by way of proof as to what participants in the commercial construction industry were likely to believe about the commercial relationship between the applicant and the respondent since 26 October 2015, but it is not the kind of evidence the applicant can test as it should be able to.

What Shape Australia should have done was get affidavits, or subpoena, from (1) witnesses from the companies it wished to prove existed and (2) consumers who might be searching for the relevant services.

Now, depending on which side of the case you find yourself, you will be cheering or in tears. But, at the very least one might wonder if that correct approach is really conducting litigation “as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible”? It will be very interesting to see how her Honour deals with Shape Australia’s substantive arguments whether it’s name is too similar to Shape Shopfittings’? Meanwhile, the Registrar can treat the Wayback Machine as valid evidence.

Shape Shopfitters Pty Ltd v Shape Australia Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 474


  1. In which I include the usual misleading or deceptive conduct actions under the Australian Consumer Law too.  ?
  2. It is not clear whether the search was just of the two words or the two words in quotation marks.  ?
  3. At [25].  ?
  4. At [13].  ?
  5. Noting that at least 2 prior decisions had ruled internet archive materials inadmissible: Athens v Randwick City Council [2005] NSWCA 317 and E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2008] FCA 93.  ?
  6. I.e., the Wayback Machine print outs.  ?

Annual IP Report 2017

IP Australia has published its Australian Intellectual Property Report 2017.

Some key points:

  • there were 28,394 applications for standard patents filed in 2016, a one per cent decline from 2015. At the other end, 23,734 patents were granted last year, an increase of 3 per cent from 2015;
  • there were 2,322 innovation patent applications in 2016 up by 27% from 2015;
  • there were 71,344 trade mark applications in 2016, down by 3 per cent from 2015 – Madrid filings decreased by 14 per cent;
  • there were 7,202 design applications filed in 2016, a 3 per cent increase over 2015;
  • in 2016, IP Australia registered 6,644 designs and certified 978;
  • the number of PBR applications increased by a whopping 8 per cent: from 359 to 387. IP Australia registered 111 PBRs.

IP Australia has completed a draft of its cost-benefit analysis for Australia joining the Hague Agreement and “will look to share the draft and seek feedback on the research later in 2017”.

There is also a long(-sh) chapter challenging the view that there is an Australian crisis in university-business collaboration. The chapter includes convoluted node diagrams showing the types of collaboration by institution and concludes that, rather than being at the bottom of the OECD rankings, we are merely “middle of the road”; in about 13th place.

With a view to geographical indications, IP Australia and Melbourne University have been building a world-first database linking Australian registered trade marks to a global atlas of place names. Apparently, this database will be released later this year.

On the research front, IP Australia has also released the 2017 edition of “IPGOD”. This year IP Australia should also release a database of pharma substances subject to patent term extensions. IP Australia has also made available the literature review on grace periods it commissioned from the University of California, Davis here (pdf). There is also a paper (pdf) on how grace periods affect innovation.

Download the report from here.

Minister’s press release here.

Exposure draft not stillborn

Back in the dying days of 2016, IP Australia landed us with the early Christmas present of an exposure draft of a proposed Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 201? and associated regulations and explanatory materials.

After everyone (well, 17 different organisations) ran around getting in their comments so that IP Australia had something to do after they came back from the holidays …

… IP Australia has announced that the bill itself is still coming, but will be delayed until the Government has finalised its response to the Productivity Commission’s Final Report on Intellectual Property Arrangements.

IP Australia explains:

This is because if any legislative amendments are required as a result of the Government’s response, two intellectual property Bills might be in Parliament at the same time, leading to great complexity and uncertainty.

In the meantime, you could spend World IP Day (or what’s left of it) reviewing the sterling efforts of those brave souls who responded to the call for comments.

Accor gets its trade marks back

Accor has trade mark registrations for “Cairns Harbour Lights” and “Harbour Lights”, which it used to promote accommodation at the Harbour Lights complex in, you guessed it, Cairns. It sued Liv Pty Ltd which was renting out apartments owned in the complex by others.

Amongst other things, the trial judge had held that “Cairns Harbour Lights” should be expunged from the Register and the registrations for “Harbour Lights” should be amended to remove some of the services including “accommodation rental services” and “rental of accommodation”. Liv, however was found to infringe through the use of:

(a) “Harbour Lights Cairns”; and

(b) “cairnsharbourlights.com.au”; and

(c) “harbourlightscairns.com.au”; and

(d) “harbourlightscairns.com”.

The Full Court has now allowed Accor’s appeal, revoking the trial judge’s orders to expunge “Cairns Harbour Lights” and remove some of the services for which “Harbour Lights” is registered.

At 360+ paragraphs, more detailed consideration will have to wait.

One interesting aspect is that the Full Court confirmed that Liv’s use of “keywords” (really metatags) in the source code of its website was trade mark use and so infringing:

323 The title used in the source data is “Cairns Luxury Accommodation – Waterfront Apartments – Harbour Lights – Cairns Queensland”. The primary judge finds that the use of the words “Harbour Lights” in that title appears to be merely a description of the waterfront apartments referred to in the title: PJ at [434]. As to the use of the keyword “Harbour Lights” (as described by the primary judge at [430] and quoted above), the primary judge regarded that use as also a reference to the apartments as those words appeared in the context of surrounding words such as “Cairns apartments”, “waterfront, luxury apartment” and “harbourside”. Thus, the words were not used as a badge of origin: PJ at [434].

324 The other words used in the source data as recited at [430] by the primary judge are these:

  “content: = Harbour Lights Apartments in Cairns offer luxury private waterfront apartment accommodation for holiday letting and short-term rental”.

325 As to those words, the primary judge finds that the use of the words “Harbour Lights Apartments” in that phrase was, effectively, use as a business name for a business which offers “accommodation for letting and short?term rental” thus operating as a badge of origin to distinguish Liv’s services from others: PJ at [435]. Such use is use of a mark substantially identical with and deceptively similar to each of the registered trade marks in suit. It is use in relation to each of the Class 36 and Class 43 services other than “commercial real estate agency services”, “agency services for the leasing of real estate properties” and “hotel services”: PJ at [436]. (emphasis supplied)

Accor Australia & New Zealand Hospitality Pty Ltd v Liv Pty Ltd
[2017] FCAFC 56 )Greenwood, Besanko and Katzmann JJ)