Australia

EU bans stem cell patents

1 Comment / Patents / / / , , , , ,

The European Court of Justice has ruled that human embryonic stems cells are not patentable subject matter in the EU.

Article 6 of the Biotechnology Directive, 98/44/EC, provides:

1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation.

2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.

A Mr Brüstle had a patent in Germany relating to isolated and purified neural precursor cells, processes for their production from embryonic stem cells and the use of neural precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects. It would appear this involved use of isolated and purified precursor cells having neural or glial properties, obtained from embryonic stem cells. That in turn appears to have involved removal of stem cells from the embryo at the blatocyst stage which, in turn, resulted in destruction of the embryo.

Greenpeace sought to invalidate it.

The ECJ had to consider first the meaning of human embryo:

– any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis constitute a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive;

However:

– it is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientific developments, whether a stem cell obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage constitutes a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive.

Secondly, the ECJ considered that the use of human embryos in research for patentable subject matter was prohibited by paragraph 6(2)(c), but use for the development of therapeutic or diagnostic purposes applied to human embryos could be patentable if useful.

Thirdly, the ECJ ruled that:

Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive excludes an invention from patentability where the technical teaching which is the subject-matter of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base material, whatever the stage at which that takes place and even if the description of the technical teaching claimed does not refer to the use of human embryos.

IPKat here; Scientific American here; Patent Docs here.  Lid dip Ian Pascarl and Penny Smith

S 18(2) of our Act provides:

(2) Human beings, and the biological processes for their generation, are not patentable inventions.

As a result of that prohibition, the Deputy Commissioner has rejected the patentability of

40. Claims 10 to 23 are directed to a method of growing preblastocyst human embryos. It is a method applied to a human embryo. The method has clear advantages in better simulating the natural environment, and reducing apoptosis of cells in the blastocyst, resulting in greater success in implantation, and babies of greater body mass and having fewer complications compared to IVF babies born without the benefit of the method – all of which demonstrates that the process is one that directly relates to the generation of a human being. The process is a biological process – it is a process involving the presence of a chemical such that the in vitro environment better simulates the natural fallopian tube environment. I am satisfied that these claims fall within the ambit of `biological processes for {the generation of human beings}’ as proscribed by s.18(2).

Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty. Ltd [2004] APO 19. There is presumably some scope to patent embryonic stem cells at least where they do not relate to the biological processes for the generation of human beings. Thus, in H Bion Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2010] FCA 539 a patent application entitled “Embryonic Stem Cell Line and Method of Preparing the Same was accepted. The acceptance was subsequently withdrawn, however, on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. The decision does not make it clear what the fraud related to.

 

 

 

 

 

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Copyright safe harbour scheme review Mk 2

2 Comments / Copyright / / / , , , , , ,

Last Friday, the Commonwealth Attorney-General released a Consultation Paper on ‘Revising the Scope of the Copyright Safe Harbour Scheme’.

As reported then, there were two components to that review.

Over the weekend, the second component – streamlining the notice and take down procedures – has been edited out of the revised version (pdf) (doc version via here).

So now, the consultation paper just relates to re-defining “carriage service provider“.

There’s a fact sheet on how the scheme currently works. Unfortunately, the links to the previous review and submissions seem to have been taken down.

Last Friday’s post referred to the US-Australia Free Trade Agreement. The relevant provision is in chapter 17. So far as the protections apply to service providers, Art. 17.11 paragraph 29 provides:

(xii) For the purposes of the function referred to in clause (i)(A), service provider means a provider of transmission, routing, or connections for digital online communications without modification of their content between or among points specified by the user of material of the user’s choosing, and for the purposes of the functions referred to in clause (i)(B) through (D), service provider means a provider or operator of facilities for online services or network access.

This may be contrasted with the corresponding provision in the “parent” of article 17.11, §512(k) (pdf) of the US Copyright Act which defines service provider for the purposes of the DMCA safe harbours as follows:

(1) Service provider.—(A) As used in subsection (a), the term “service provider” means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or received. (B) As used in this section, other than subsection (a), the term “service provider” means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in sub- paragraph (A).

At least, the US definition appears to make it clear that a service provider may be one who provides services not just, as the Australian legislation seems to have been drafted to reflect, only providers, or operators, of facilities for such services. Given the nebulous nature of the term ‘facilities’, however, that may be a difference more imagined than real.

Although it doesn’t provide any “binding” authority like the Free Trade Agreement, the EU directives proceed on the basis of persons providing “information society services”. See e.g. art.s 12 -15 of the E-Commerce Directive, DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC (pdf).

Lid dip: Leanne O’Donnell.

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More plain packaging for tobacco products

Leave a Comment / Trade marks / / / , , , , ,

Back in July, the Government introduced the Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill and related legislation.

As you will recall it generated quite some controversy as it effectively bans the use of some types of trade marks and severely restricts the way others can be used. It has passed the House and, now that the Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs committee has recommended the Trade Marks Amendment (Tobacco Plain Packaging) Bill be passed, is due to return to the Senate for passage, with the aim that all product on shelves on 1 July 2012 will comply with the new rules.

The Government has now released a second round of consultations on the form the packaging should take for cigars and other non-cigarette tobacco products.

Submissions should be received by 28 October 2011 with the resulting regulations expected to released in January 2012.

Consultation paper (pdf)

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Gene (no)patenting bill going down

Leave a Comment / Patents / / / , , , , , ,

The Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee has, by majority, recommended that the Senate should not pass the Patent Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Materials) Bill 2010.

The Bill is a private members’ effort and, perhaps not surprisingly, the three of its sponsor still in the Senate dissented.

(At the time of writing, it is proving difficult to get a working link to the text of the Bill itself.) According to the EM it was considered desirable to expand the ban in s 18(2) on patenting human beings and the biological processes for their generation:

The purpose of this Bill is to advance medical and scientific research and the diagnosis, treatment and cure of human illness and disease by enabling doctors, clinicians and medical and scientific researchers to gain free and unfettered access to biological materials, however made, that are identical or substantially identical to such materials as they exist in nature.

These biological materials even if they have been isolated, purified or synthetically made have not been transformed from products of nature into products of humankind.

Thus the Bill (a) reinforces the applicability of the proviso in section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies within the meaning of section 18(1)(a) and section 18(1A)(a), (b) reinforces the applicability of the distinction between discovery and invention and (c) applies that distinction by expressly excluding from patentability, biological materials which are identical or substantially identical to such materials as they exist in nature, however made.

Notwithstanding this, it is rather difficult to find an Australian research institute researching genes etc. which supported the idea.

The ALRC of course had previously recommended leave well enough alone.

The issue doesn’t seem likely to go away. Apart from whatever the Bill’s sponsors and their allies may get up to, the majority concluded:

5.26 Like many of those who gave evidence, the committee prefers the solutions offered in the proposed amendments of the Raising the Bar Bill. However, the committee does not consider that the amendments in the Raising the Bar Bill will resolve all of the issues in the patent system. In the opinion of the committee, serious consideration should also be given to the proposals for legislative enactment of the patentable subject matter test and the general ‘ethical’ exclusion made in the ACIP report on patentable subject matter. Other reforms may also be necessary in the future, particularly in relation to ensuring equitable access to healthcare. In this context, the committee recognises that the Senate Community Affairs References Committee has indicated it will maintain a ‘watching brief’ in relation to the impact of gene patents in Australia.[5] Despite the need for further reform to the patent system, the committee agrees that removing an area of patentable subject matter, as proposed by the Bill, is not an appropriate solution to this complex set of issues. (emphasis and hyperlink supplied)

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Google’s keywords advertising

Leave a Comment / Internet / / / , , , , ,

News just in:

Google’s placement of advertisements, generated through its AdWords program, on search results pages is not misleading or deceptive conduct contrary to s 52 TPA / s 18 ACL (I’m afraid you have to scroll down).  However, the advertiser’s use of another trader’s name in the headline for an advertisement which had nothing to do with that trade was.

So for example, the Trading Post used the AdWords program to generate an ad:

Kloster Ford

www.tradingpost.com.au New/Used Fords – Search 90,000 + auto ads online. Great finds daily!

The advertisements at the URL did not have anything to do with Kloster Ford or vehicles Kloster Ford was offering for sale.

The Trading Post therefore had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct; Google did not.

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Trading Post Australia Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 1086

 

 

357 paragraphs to read now (or a bit later)

Lid dip @wenhu

SMH report

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How wide should an injunction be?

Leave a Comment / Copyright, Trade marks / / / , , , , , , , , ,

Having granted summary judgment against Paul’s Retail for infringement of a range of fashion brands trade marks and copyright, Kenny J has now made orders for the remedies flowing from the infringements. One point of general interest was the dispute about the scope of the injunctions.

Her Honour accepted that injunctions were a conventional remedy for intellectual property infringement and were appropriate for grant in this case, largely because it appears the respondents did not offer undertakings and continued to engage in infringing conduct after they had claimed to have ceased it.

The applicants sought broad injunctions in terms typically granted in patent cases (where the order is often as broad as “thou shalt not infringe the patent” – expressed in modern plain English of course). The respondents argued such wide injunctions would travel well beyond the pleaded and proved infringements. Kenny J referred to cases identifying the Court’s concerns against overly broad injunctions, especially as they carried with them the risk of contempt.

Kenny J accepted, on the basis of those cases, that an injunction could in appropriate cases be framed in terms of the statutory command and need not necessarily be tied to prescribe specific conduct. Nonetheless, her Honour considered:

23 As noted above, in Universal Music Branson J stated that it may be permissible to incorporate in an injunction the terms of a statutory prohibition. It does not follow from this, however, that it is permissible to include in injunctions prohibitions against forms of infringing conduct that have not been proven, let alone alleged: compare Microsoft Corp v Goodview Electronics at 592. Bearing these considerations in mind, I propose to grant injunctions in terms incorporating the statutory language but substantially designed to guard against the infringing conduct that has been proven.

Thus, the specific terms of the injunctions granted differed according to the nature of the infringing conduct.

For example, instead of granting an injunction to restrain the respondents from infringing copyright [or the applicant’s copyright in a particular work], Kenny J granted an injunction:

Pursuant to section 115(2) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), the first respondent be permanently restrained from:

(a) reproducing or authorising the reproduction of the whole or a substantial part of any of the Ug Manufacturing Copyright Works without the licence or authority of the fifth applicant;

(b) publishing and communicating to the public or authorising the publication and communication to the public of the whole or a substantial part of any of the Ug Manufacturing Copyright Works without the licence or authority of the fifth applicant;

(c) selling, offering for sale, supplying, offering to supply, importing or distributing any articles bearing any Infringing Ug Manufacturing Copyright Works (such Works being a copy of the whole or a substantial part of any of the Ug Manufacturing Copyright Works which has not been made or applied by or with the licence or authority of the fifth applicant);

(d) authorising, directing or procuring any other company or person to engage in any of the conduct sought to be restrained by sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).

Apparently, the injunctions against the proven trade mark infringements were also tailored more narrowly.

QS Holdings Sarl v Paul’s Retail Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 1038

 

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Telstra v PDC update

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The transcript of Telstra’s unsuccessful application for special leave has now been posted here.

The Sydney Morning Herald speculates that Telstra is seeking talks with the Attorney General “to close the loophole”.

One consequence of the High Court’s revolution in copyright law is that the privacy regime which prevents the use of the Integrated Public Number Database (and IPND Industry Code) to create reverse-number directories has been undermined.

As its name suggests, a reverse-number directory is one where you have the telephone number and you can use it to identify who the subscriber is. Now, you may question whether that is an invasion of privacy (and many people happily (or maybe unknowingly) permit their telephone number to be transmitted to the person they are calling, but Parliament, the ALRC and the Privacy Commissioner (pdf see p. 402) have taken the view that it is, or should be.

Now, it could well be argued that copyright (I mean) a sui-generis database protection right would be a blunt instrument for protection of privacy and that privacy concerns would be better addressed, if necessary, by amending privacy laws. The economic case for database protection, therefore, would be key.

The Full Federal Court’s decision from which leave was not granted.

Lid dip: Copyright Council.

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Names and transfer policies for .au domain names

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auDA is the body regulating the .au “name space” or ccTLD.

In that role, it has issued a number of policies including the auDRP (modelled on the UDRP) for the resolution of disputes between rights “holders” and the registrants of confusingly similar domain names.

auDA’s Board has now announced its acceptance of a number of the recommendations of:

2010 Names Policy Panel

Among the recommendations that have been accepted are:

Domain Name Eligibility and Allocation Policy Rules for Open 2LDs:

  • That the requirement for registrants to be Australian (or registered to trade in Australia) should remain in place.
  • That the “special interest club” eligibility criterion for org.au and asn.au domain names should be more clearly defined.
  • That auDA should publish the results of its periodic audits.
  • That auDA’s position on third party rights with respect to domain name leasing or sub-licensing arrangements should be clarified and published.
  • That the close and substantial connection rule for id.au should be relaxed to include domain names that refer to personal hobbies and interests.
  • That direct registrations under .au should not be allowed at this time.
  • the list of reserved names (i.e., those you can’t have) should be maintained and updated.
  • the misspellings policy should be continued in its current form (e.g. you can’t register acebook.com.au, aaami.com.au etc.).
  • A revision of the “domain monetisation” policy so that it will no longer be a standalone policy and “the definition of “domain monetisation” will be replaced with a description of permissible practice, to accommodate a range of monetisation models”.

When the “domain monetisation” policy was originally adopted:

a monetised website was easily recognisable and mostly followed a common format, which meant that enforcement of the policy was relatively straightforward. However, the practice of domain monetisation has significantly changed from a simple webpage with click-through advertising links, to incorporate other formats such as news articles, blogs, images and so on. Methods employed by domainers (ie. people who register domain names for monetisation purposes) are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. In some cases it may be that domainers are attempting to circumvent the policy. However, to be fair to the domainer industry, the practice itself is constantly evolving as domainers test and refine ways of generating revenue.

If this were a gTLD, the trade mark owners would be going ballistic – “to be fair to the domainer industry”?????

The proposed revisions, however, would still prohibit allow objection on grounds that “the domain name must not be, or incorporate, an entity name, personal name or brand name in existence at the time the domain name was registered.” See chapter 3 and p. 20 of the Name Policy Panel’s final report (pdf).

Some recommendations still under consideration:

  • That registrants should be able to license a domain name for a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 year period.
  • That, in the absence of any compelling technical or policy reason to maintain the restriction, single character domain names should be released (subject to the registrant being eligible to register the name).

Secondary Market working group

The accepted recommendations of this group effectively aim to put in place a mechanism to transfer domain names from one registrant to another in place of the current “workaround” involving surrender and (re-)registration (with the attendant risk that someone might get the name in between those two events.

Announcements: Names policy, Secondary Market

Reports: Names policy (pdf), Secondary Market (pdf)

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IPSANZ and patent amendments

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One of the interesting sessions at the IPSANZ conference was David Catterns QC and the 2 Gregs talking about amending patent specifications – before and after grant.

I certainly wouldn’t disagree with the view that, all other things being equal, you should amend before litigation rather than during (although how often are all other things equal, especially for patents in multiple jurisdictions). Australian law, at least insofar as it concerns amendments before the Commissioner, however, may be moving closer to the New Zealand situation.

The Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011 includes in Sch 1 at item 31 an amendment to s 102:

(2D) An amendment of a patent request or a complete specification is not allowable if it is of a kind prescribed by regulations made for the purposes of this section.

For some reason I have a (vague) recollection that this provision may be used to confer on the Commissioner through the Regs a discretion similar to that which the Court has under s 105. I am afraid I have not been able to re-locate wherever it was that I read or heard this.

Does anyone know any better or differently?

It doesn’t seem to be what the EM contemplates as the role for item 31 and one might have thought that there might be scope to expand the regulations made for the purposes of s 104 to effect that goal (if it were intended to be achieved) as it is the “narrowness” of those regulations which leads to the present situation.

One might question the constitutional desirability of putting such ‘substantive’ matters in the Regs rather than expressing them in the Act itself. However, that fight seems, sadly, to have been well and truly lost. In any event, if the introduction of such a discretion in the Commissioner be intended, it would surely be in everyone’s interests to amend the terms of s 104 itself to track the terms of s 105(1) rather than bury it away in the Regs.

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Telstra v PDC special leave

Leave a Comment / Copyright / / / , , , , , ,

The High Court (Gummow and Bell JJ) refused Telstra’s special leave application this morning.

Young QC for Telstra ran hard on the concurrent findings that there was human skill and effort in the collection and verification of the data. However, that ran up against Yates J‘s findings at [167] – [169] and Keane CJ’s findings at [89] – [90].

At [113], Perram J had said:

Had the tasks been attended to manually an original work would have ensued.

Which might seem a very strange, technology specific approach to take in this day and age.

Bell J, however, challenged Young QC about the difference between “computer-assisted” and “computer-generated”. Gummow J at one point stated, you need a database directive.

One might wonder whether allowing special leave in this case would have thrown any light on the differences in approach between the two judgments in IceTV. In November, the Full Federal Court is scheduled to hear an appeal in Dynamic Supplies. Who knows whether it will get there or not. If it did, however, it might present an interesting vehicle for exploring the new world which IceTV ushered in.

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