Broadcast does not include internet streaming

The (NSW) Court of Appeal has rejected WIN’s argument that its exclusive licence to broadcast Nine Network’s content extended to “live streaming” over the internet.

Those of you who have emulated Burke and Wills and wandered out of the CBD of your state’s capital city may have discovered that free-to-air television is (a little bit) different. There are regional broadcasters who arrange at least some local news and advertising, but also carry a lot of the programming of the “big” broadcasters.

WIN Corporation is one such regional broadcaster. For many years, it had a “programming supply agreement” through which it took much of the Nine Network’s programming. Thereby bringing the joys of A Current Affair and the Block to those lucky enough to live in a place where WIN was a broadcaster.

The relevant clause (clause 2.1) said:

“Nine grants WIN the exclusive licence to broadcast on and in the licence areas covered by the WIN Stations the program schedule broadcast by Nine on each of the channels known as ‘Nine’, ‘NineHD’, ‘9Go’, ‘9Gem’, ‘Extra’ and ‘9Life’ (the ‘Nine Channels’), to be picked up by WIN at Nine’s NPC.”

The Court and the parties all agred that “exclusive” in this context meant that Nine could not license anyone else to broadcast its content in WIN’s territory. Nor could it “broadcast” its content in WIN’S territory itself.[1]

WIN’s case was that this clause also meant Nine could not allow people in WIN’s territory to access the content through Nine’s website too. (You may already be perceiving some practical difficulties with WIN’s argument, if right.)

The evidence showed that the scope of the grant had been the subject of some negotiation, with Nine contending for a narrow definition and WIN arguing for a broader definition. The trial judge had found this evidence of pre-contactual negotiations did not assist the interpretation exercise. Apart from anything else, it was inconclusive and incomplete.[2]

Barrett AJA pointed out that a playwright could grant an exclusive licence to perform his or her play at a particular time or place, but that did not prevent the playwright from granting someone else a licence to show the play as a film or to perform the play some other place or time. This was important because it meant (you will be surprised to read) that the scope of exclusivity depended on the terms of the grant. His Honour explained at [34]:

The important point is that a person who has a collection of rights and grants an exclusive licence in respect of only some of those rights does not, through the exclusivity undertaking, promise the grantee not to exercise (or allow others to exercise) the remainder of the rights that is not the subject of the grant. The exclusivity undertaking restricts the grantor only as regards the rights granted. Preclusion of the grantor in relation to the whole or any part of the remainder of the grantor’s rights could come only from some contractual stipulation over and above that which is implied by the exclusive quality of the grant.

Applying this, his Honour considered that WIN’s licence to broadcast was limited to the kinds of broadcasting it was licensed to engage in under the Broadcasting Services Act and only within the territories it held a commercial broadcasting licence for. So this meant its exclusivity related only to free-to-air broadcasting in its territory. In the judgment under appeal, Hammerschlag J had explained at [82]:

Where clause 2.1 refers to broadcasting on and in the licence areas covered by the WIN Stations this is, and can only be, a reference to free-to-air. The licence areas are the geographical delimitations imposed on WIN by its licences under the BSA. These licences cover only free-to-air. Unsurprisingly, it is common cause that the WIN Stations have only ever broadcasted free-to-air and under such licences. They are traditional television stations. They do not deliver by internet. Internet delivery is not geographically based in the same way as is free-to-air.

Barrett AJA also rejected WIN’s argument that exclusivity over internet streaming followed from the implied term not to do anything that would deprive the other party of the benefit of the contract. WIN argued it was necessary for the exclusivity to extend to internet streaming as the promise of exclusivity meant it was to be free from competition.

Judging from the number of people watching TV on the train, tram and buses these days, you might think WIN had something of a point.

Barrett AJA, however, considered the benefit for which WIN had contracted was exclusivity from competition in free-to-air broadcasting. Nine was not under a duty to maximise WIN’s return under the contract, but to ensure that WIN had exclusive rights to broadcast Nine’s programming by free-to-air transmissions. His Honour said at [73]:

In the present case, the PSA, according to its correct construction, required Nine to desist from engaging in free-to-air transmission of Nine programs in the WIN licence areas and from enabling persons other than WIN to undertake free-to-air transmission of those programs in those areas. The “benefit” of the contract, from WIN’s perspective, was the right to transmit the Nine programs free-to-air in the WIN areas without free-to-air competition by Nine or anyone to whom Nine had given transmission rights. Extension of the negative stipulation binding on Nine so as to forbid live-streaming would entail a restriction on Nine and a corresponding “benefit” to WIN over and above those created by the contract and, in that way, enlarge rather than support and underwrite WIN’s contracted benefit. The value of the benefit of the contract to WIN was, as in the Queensland case, dependent on many contingencies, some of which were in Nine’s control. But Nine was not obliged to maximise WIN’s return from the contract.

At one level, the result is not too surprising. “We” have been generally aware at least from the Optus Now here and here controversies several years back that the major sporting organisations were generating very substantial revenues from internet streaming in addition to the broadcast (pay and/or free-to-air) rights. If you are drafting an exclusive licence relating to the right to communicate to the public, therefore, you will need to pay careful attention to what exactly is intended to be included: the whole right to communicate to the public, broadcasting (in some one or many of its multifarious forms), internet streaming etc.

WIN Corporation Pty Ltd v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 297 (McColl JA, Sackville and Barrett AJJA)


  1. Barrett AJA conveniently collected the well-established propositions at footnote 15: “15. As a matter of general principle, an “exclusive” licence confers relevant rights upon the licensee to the exclusion of the whole world, including the licensor: Carr v Benson (1868) 3 Ch. App. 524 at 532; Reid v Moreland Timber Co Pty Ltd (1946) 73 CLR 1; [1946] HCA 48 at 5 (Latham CJ) and 15 (McTiernan J applying Heap v Hartley (1889) 42 Ch. D. 461). A “sole” licence resembles an “exclusive” licence but does not operate to exclude the grantor: see, for example, Black & Decker Inc v GMCA Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 504; (2008) 76 IPR 99 at [131] (Heerey J).”  ?
  2. WIN Corporation Pty Ltd -v- Nine Network Australia Pty Limited [2016] NSWSC 523 at [71] – [80].  ?

PPCA v Commonwealth

The High Court has rejected the constitutional challenge to the validity of the “1%” cap on licence fees payable by broadcasters to the record companies on very narrow and specific grounds.

Section 109 of the Copyright Act 1968 provides a compulsory licence for the broadcasting to the public of sound recordings. Section 152, however, caps the royalty payable to record companies by broadcasters at 1% of the gross earnings of the broadcaster.

No such limitation had applied to the “corresponding” copyright in sound recordings under the 1911 Act.

The 1911 Act was repealed when the 1968 Act came into force on 1 July 1969. Section 220 of the 1968 Act provided that sound recordings in which copyright subsisted immediately before 1 July 1969 qualified for copyright under the 1969 Act effectively as provided for under the 1968 Act.

The record companies argued that the imposition of the 1% cap was an acquisition of their property in sound recordings made before July 1969 otherwise than on just terms in contravention of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.

The High Court has unanimously rejected that claim.

French CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Bell J said the record companies’ argument was predicated on a wrong assumption. They no longer owned copyright under the 1911 Act which had been qualified. Rather that copyright had been terminated and replaced with a new and different copyright under the 1968 Act. So at [10] and [11]:

[10] The assumption by the plaintiffs is that the copyright presently enjoyed in respect of the pre?1969 recordings, and which will expire in accordance with the extended term fixed by the operation of the Free Trade Act upon the 1968 Act, is that which arose under the 1911 Act and was carried forward by the 1968 Act, but with the impermissible imposition upon those copyrights of the “cap” in the compulsory licensing system introduced by the 1968 Act. The Commonwealth denies that assumption. The Commonwealth submission, which should be accepted, is that upon the proper construction of the 1968 Act: (a) copyrights subsisting in Australia on 1 May 1969 under the Imperial system were terminated; (b) thereafter, no copyright subsisted otherwise than by virtue of the 1968 Act; and (c) to that copyright in respect of sound recordings there attached immediately the compulsory licensing system including the “cap” upon the royalties payable thereunder.

[11] It should be emphasised that the plaintiffs do not assert that the 1968 Act is invalid by reason of its bringing to an end the operation in Australia of the Imperial system without the provision of just terms. To do so successfully would be to leave them with such rights in respect of the pre?1969 recordings as they had under the 1911 Act and the 1912 Act, and without any copyrights subsisting under the 1968 Act. Rather, the plaintiffs seek to attack the validity of the attachment to their rights under the 1968 Act of one aspect of the compulsory licensing system for sound recordings. For the reasons which follow, that attack must fail.

Heydon J to similar effect at [63]:

In short, the 1968 Act did not preserve the second to sixth plaintiffs’ rights under the 1911 Act and the 1912 Act. It abolished those rights. It substituted for them distinct and fresh rights – some more advantageous to those plaintiffs, some less. Thus ss 109 and 152 did not cause any property to be acquired. Property may have been extinguished by other provisions, but the plaintiffs’ case was not concerned with them.

After considering the application of s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution to statutory intellectual property rights generally, Crennan and Kiefel JJ reached the same conclusion at [129], pointing out at [130] that the record companies could not accept s 220 of the Copyright Act as valid and at the same time contend that ss 109 and 152 were invalid.

[129] When ss 8, 31, 85, 89(1), 207 and 220(1) of the 1968 Act are read together, it is clear that the copyright of the relevant plaintiffs under the 1911 Act, which included the exclusive right to perform the record in public, is not continued under the 1968 Act; rather it is replaced. Whilst it is true that, as the plaintiffs submit, certain records in which copyright subsisted under the 1911 Act are brought within the scheme of the 1968 Act, that is achieved by the re enactment, in substance, of qualifying provisions in the 1911 Act in, and for the purposes of, the 1968 Act. The effect is that the plaintiffs’ entitlement to sue for infringements under s 101 of the 1968 Act in respect of sound recordings in which copyright subsists pursuant to s 89(1) is an entitlement to sue in respect of infringements of the copyright in sound recordings contained in s 85, which replaces the copyright in records under s 19(1) of the 1911 Act. Inasmuch as ss 109 and 152 operate to qualify a record manufacturer’s exclusive rights by providing an exception to infringement, it is the exclusive rights under s 85 which are affected, not the exclusive rights under the 1911 Act (which have been replaced).

[130] Whilst the plaintiffs mount no attack on the validity of provisions of the 1968 Act which effect the replacement of the relevant plaintiffs’ copyright under the 1911 Act with a copyright under the 1968 Act, their attack on the validity of ss 109 and 152, which depends on the continuing subsistence of copyright under s 19(1) of the 1911 Act, is untenable. If the plaintiffs were to attack the validity of the provisions of the 1968 Act which effect the replacement of copyright under s 19(1) of the 1911 Act with a differently constituted copyright under s 85 of the 1968 Act, they would risk being left not only with the awkwardly expressed copyright under s 19(1) of the 1911 Act in respect of records, but also with a copyright, the term of which was limited to 50, rather than 70, years.

Now the High Court have reminded themselves of all these matters, they will be primed for the tobacco companies challenge to the validity of the Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011, the hearings for which start in April.

Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Limited v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 8

Simulcasting radio broadcasts over the internet

Foster J has ruled that radio stations do not have to pay an additional licence fee to the record companies for simultaneously transmitting their radio broadcasts over the internet.

If you want to understand how recorded music is licensed to the radio stations, this is a good place to start.

The broadcasting of recorded music over the “airways” by the commercial radio stations is covered by licence agreements with PPCA. When the radio stations broadcast recorded music as part of a “program”, the audio stream is split between the FM and DAB+ radio bands and a webcast service; that is, the audio stream is sent to 3 different distribution means.

In deciding what is comprehended within the broadcast right under the Copyright Act (see ss 85(1) and 10(1)), it is necessary to determine what is included in a “broadcast service” under the Broadcasting Services Act. The relevant Ministerial Determination under this legislation excluded from the definition of “broadcasting service”:

.. [any] service that makes available television programs or radio programs using the Internet

but then excepted from that:

… [any] service that delivers television programs or radio programs using the broadcast services bands.

Foster J considered this definition required him to focus on what was “the service” and not just the means of transmission:

130 The service which transmits the very same radio programs at essentially the same time both to the FM transmitters and beyond and to the web stream servers and beyond is the one service. On the facts before me, the members of CRA who stream their radio programs on the Internet do so only as part of a program package which also simultaneously transmits those programs via frequency modulated radio waves to the consumer’s FM receiver. In truth, the service is but one service being a service which combines various delivery methods or platforms and which delivers the same radio program using the broadcasting services band. It falls within the exception to the exclusion set out in the Ministerial Determination.

131 Therefore, in my view, the service provided by the members of CRA is a broadcasting service.

132 That being so, the simulcast transmission of the same radio program via the FM waves and the Internet is also a “broadcast” within the current definition of that term in s 10(1) of the Copyright Act and, for that reason, is within the scope of the licence which PPCA agreed to grant to the members of CRA and which it did grant from time to time to members of CRA upon the terms and conditions set out in the Member Agreement.

Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Ltd v Commercial Radio Australia Limited [2012] FCA 93

Optus wins first round of Optus TV Now!

At first instance, Rares J has ruled that Optus’ TV Now service does not infringe the copyright in broadcasts of the AFL or the NRL (its the first round only as, by agreement, leave to appeal to the Full Court was given to whichever party lost before the decision was handed down).

The pressures of time mean that I can only provide a very brief synopsis at this stage: however, his Honour has also published a very helpful Summary in what would probably be considered more user friendly language (and length).

To recap: Optus offered its 3G mobile (cellular) customers – well the personal and small and medium business ones – with a service in which they could choose to record a broadcast of a free to air (FTA) television broadcast. Once a customer chose a recording, Optus’ equipment recorded the FTA transmission (in 4 different formats: PC, Apple, Android and iOS) on Optus’ servers and the customer could then chose to replay the recording at a later time (within 30 days) by having it streamed to their computer, iOS or Android device. All customers got some storage (45 minutes) as part of their subscription, but could pay for more. (For Optus’ descriptions see here and here.)

Back in 2006, the law was amended to make it clear that time shifting (what used to be called home taping such as when people had VCRs) or format shifting of FTA broadcasts for personal use did not infringe copyright in the broadcast or any underlying works. See s. 111.

In finding that there was no infringement, Rares J had to deal with 7 issues. For present purposes, however, the key finding was that it did not make any difference whether or not the customer used their own equipment in their own “house” or the equipment was owned by someone else or located elsewhere.

When the legislation to amend s 111 was introduced it underwent some amendment of its own and Rares J noted that the further amendments were stated to be intended to:

“The bill adds new copyright exceptions that permit the recording or copying of copyright material for private and domestic use in some circumstances. This amendment makes it clear that private and domestic use can occur outside a person’s home as well as inside. The amendment ensures that it is clear that, for example, a person who under new section 109A copies music to an iPod can listen to that music in a public place or on public transport. (Rares J’s emphasis)

and

57 The Minister then explained in the Senate, repeating the words of the Further Supplementary Explanatory Memorandum, why cl 111(1) had been reworded saying (ibid):

“This relates to time shifting. … This amendment substitutes a new section 111(1), which removes the requirement that a recording of a broadcast under section 111 must be made in domestic premises. This amendment provides greater flexibility in the conditions that apply to time-shift recording. The development of digital technologies is likely to result in increasing use of personal consumer devices and other means which enable individuals to record television and radio broadcasts on or off domestic premises. The revised wording of section 111 by this amendment enables an individual to record broadcasts as well as view and listen to the recording outside their homes as well as inside for private and domestic use.” (Rares J’s emphasis)

Thus, it appeared Parliament did not intend to draw a distinction between equipment owned and operated by the viewer in his or her own premises. Accordingly, his Honour considered (at [63]):

… the user of the TV Now service makes each of the films in the four formats when he or she clicks on the “record” button on the TV Now electronic program guide. This is because the user is solely responsible for the creation of those films. He or she decides whether or not to make the films and only he or she has the means of being able to view them. If the user does not click “record”, no films will be brought into existence that he or she can play back later. The service that TV Now offers the user is substantively no different from a VCR or DVR. Of course, TV Now may offer the user a greater range of playback environments than the means provided by a VCR or DVR, although this can depend on the technologies available to the user.

Like the 2nd Circuit in Cartoon Network, his Honour considered (at [66]) that there was no real or sufficient distinction between the characterisation of a user of the service to record a FTA broadcast and someone who used a VCR or DVR to do so.

Rares J noted the careful contractual obligations imposed by Optus to ensure that users promised to use the service only for their own private or domestic purposes and, in recognition of the ordinary experience of life, was prepared to infer that was typically the purpose for which the service was used, even apparently in the case of small and business customers.

The other major issue for comment at present is who makes the communication when the customer pressed the “play” button. Rares J recognised that, in a sense, Optus made the communication as it was its servers which transmitted the stream to the customer. Having regard to the deeming provisions in s 22(6) and (6A), however, his Honour considered that the more correct characterisation was that it was the customer him or herself who made the communication. It was the individual customer who decided what was recorded and who also decided whether, when and to where it was transmitted. In reaching this conclusion, Rares J distinguished the situation in Roadshow where a Full Court had found that there could be a communication to the public by transmission of Bittorrent streams between computers without any human intervention. At [91], Rares J considered that the role of the customer of the TV Now service was very different from that of someone who just clicked on a link on a web page. His Honour commented at [95]:

It may appear odd that Optus, which has stored the films in its NAS computer, does not “communicate” (make available online or electronically transmit) the film in the compatible format, but that is because it did nothing to determine the content of that communication. The user initially chose to record the program so that later he or she could choose to play the film so recorded using the TV Now service. Optus’ service enables the user to make those choices and to give effect to them. But in doing so, Optus does not determine what the user decided to record when he or she later decides to play it on the compatible device he or she is then using to watch the film. Hence, the user, not Optus, is the person responsible for determining the content of the communication within the meaning of s 22(6) when he or she plays a film recorded for him or her on the TV Now service. Thus, the user did the act of electronically transmitting the film within the meaning of ss 86(c) and 87(c).

Needless to say, there are quite a few “other” points in Rares J’s 115 paragraphs:

Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v National Rugby League Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 34

For a more recent “no volitional act, therefore no infringement” case in the USA see Prof Goldman’s ‘Photobucket Qualifies for the 512(c) Safe Harbor (Again)–Wolk v. Kodak

There seems to have been a similar success in Singapore; but Rares J considered the TV Catch Up case in the UK less helpful as the legislation and type of usage in question was rather different. A question on communication to the public has been referred by the English court to the CJEU.

Lid dip: Copyright Council

Optus TV Now … 2

Follow last Friday’s post, in the twittersphere @wenhu points out that s 22(6) defines who the maker of a communication is:

(6)  For the purposes of this Act, a communication other than a broadcast is taken to have been made by the person responsible for determining the content of the communication.

(6A)  To avoid doubt, for the purposes of subsection (6), a person is not responsible for determining the content of a communication merely because the person takes one or more steps for the purpose of:

                     (a)  gaining access to what is made available online by someone else in the communication; or

(b)  receiving the electronic transmission of which the communication consists.

Example:    A person is not responsible for determining the content of the communication to the person of a web page merely because the person clicks on a link to gain access to the page.

It’s a good point, but I’m not sure at first impression why that doesn’t make the subscriber the maker.

Section 22(6) was introduced as part of the legislative clean-up of the mess made in the Music on Hold case –  to make it clear the telephone company was not communicating the music played by the subscriber to a caller when they were placed on hold. For example, para. 40 of the EM explains:

40.    The new s.22(6) provides that a communication other than a broadcast is taken to have been made by the person responsible for the content of the communication.  This provision relies on the extended definition of communicate in Item 6.  The provision has the effect that communications carriers and Internet Service Providers will not be directly liable for communicating material to the public via their networks if they are not responsible for determining the content of that material.

Meanwhile in the comments “Copyright Fanatic” asks why Optus TV Now is any different to using your TIVO at home? That (if the media reports are to be believed) is the $153 million question: is using someone else’s servers in some other point in cadastral space different to using your own equipment in the privacy of your own home?

Optus TV Now and the threat to sports’ millions

The media yesterday was splashed with stories about how Optus is threatening the flow of revenues to sports such as the NRL and the AFL through its TV Now service (for example, here and here and here). Hundreds of millions of dollars are apparently at stake.

Basically, it looks like you download an “app” to your phone or computer and you can then record (or perhaps more strictly, instruct Optus to record) a television program being broadcast on free to air television on Optus’ servers and then have the recording streamed to your mobile or computer at a time and place of your choosing – Optus’ promotional video suggests as your sitting on the bus. The media reports suggest you might be able to start watching as soon as 2 minutes after the game program starts broadcasting. There are a few constraints: You have to watch within 30 days of the recording. You can only nominate programs broadcast in the area where your account address is located. It looks like, if you’re an Optus (mobile) subscriber you get 45 minutes storage “free”, but you can “buy” more if you want.

Optus’ version of how it works here and here.

It is billed as just like home taping or recording only for the 21st century.

Optus is reported to be seeking an injunction against the AFL and the NRL to stop them suing it for copyright infringement. In fact, Optus has brought proceedings against both the NRL and the AFL and the first directions hearing was heard by Rares J today: NSD1430/2011. Rares J made timetabling orders for defences (and cross-claims) and evidence with the trial fixed for 19 December 2011.

The injunction part is easy: someone who is on the receiving end of threats of copyright infringement can bring an action for groundless threats of infringement and, if successful, the remedies include an injunction against continuation of the threats and possibly damages for loss suffered.

Presumably, the AFL and/or the NRL sent Optus letters of demand telling it to stop or else. If so, there will be a threat and then it will be over to the AFL and/or the NRL to establish that what Optus is doing infringes their copyright.

In the case of a (largely unscripted) sporting spectacle like a footy final, the copyright is going to subsist only in the broadcast (hmmm, what about the jumpers and logos and ….)

I am guessing (but I don’t know) that the AFL’s and the NRL’s contracts with the broadcasters involve the broadcasters assigning their copyright in the broadcast to, respectively, the AFL and the NRL.

As I haven’t seen Optus’ claim or, more likely, defence to cross-claim, I am also guessing Optus will be relying on s 111 of the Copyright Act:

(1) This section applies if a person makes a cinematograph film or sound recording of a broadcast solely for private and domestic use by watching or listening to the material broadcast at a time more convenient than the time when the broadcast is made. Note: Subsection 10(1) defines broadcast as a communication to the public delivered by a broadcasting service within the meaning of the Broadcasting Services Act 1992 . Making the film or recording does not infringe copyright

(2) The making of the film or recording does not infringe copyright in the broadcast or in any work or other subject-matter included in the broadcast.

Note: Even though the making of the film or recording does not infringe that copyright, that copyright may be infringed if a copy of the film or recording is made.

Dealing with embodiment of film or recording

(3) Subsection (2) is taken never to have applied if an article or thing embodying the film or recording is:

(a) sold; or

(b) let for hire; or

(c) by way of trade offered or exposed for sale or hire; or

(d) distributed for the purpose of trade or otherwise; or

(e) used for causing the film or recording to be seen or heard in public; or

(f) used for broadcasting the film or recording.

Note: If the article or thing embodying the film or recording is dealt with as described in subsection (3), then copyright may be infringed not only by the making of the article or thing but also by the dealing with the article or thing.

(4) To avoid doubt, paragraph (3)(d) does not apply to a loan of the article or thing by the lender to a member of the lender’s family or household for the member’s private and domestic use.

The first thing here will be who makes the recording. Will the Optus subscriber’s use of the technology to get a recording made on Optus’ servers (in the cloud) mean that the subscriber is the person who makes the recording or will it be Optus?

If Optus is the person who makes the recording (a) can the subscriber delegate the making to them as an agent or (b) does the recording need to be made for Optus’ private and domestic use or will the private and domestic use of its subscriber suffice?

As to who makes the recording, the US Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the rather different legislative setting of the US Copyright Act considered that the party in the position of Optus did not make the recording: Cartoon Network v Cablevision Inc. 536 F. 3d 121.

On the other hand, while recognising the possibility of a person making a fair dealing copy through an agent, in Australia Beaumont J found that a news monitoring service infringed copyright by making clippings of newspaper articles for its clients. While the clients may have had a relevant fair dealing purpose, the news monitoring service’s purpose was not a fair dealing purpose but a commercial purpose of making copies for its clients: De Garis v Nevill Jeffris Pidler Pty Limited [1990] FCA 218.

(You will have noticed that s 111(2) applies to not just to the copyright in the broadcast, but also any other copyright included in the broadcast. So that takes care of the logo, jumpers and all the other copyrights in scripted shows like, er, Home and Away etc.)

Section 111(2) only immunises the making of the recording. What happens when Optus streams the recording back to the subscriber? If it is set up so that the recording is streamed only to the individual subscriber, it will be difficult to call it a broadcast. But is it otherwise a communication to the public? This might turn on whether the communication is made by the subscriber (or his or her agent) to themselves or Optus. In the Music on Hold case (largely superseded now as a result of significant changes in the legislation), Dawson and Gaudron JJ emphasised that the public were people whom the copyright owner might fairly regard as its public and downplayed the number of persons involved. Will the commercial nature of Optus relationship with its subscribers colour the characterisation of this situation?

I guess we will have to wait and see.

Singtel Optus v National Rugby League and the Australian Football League NSD1430/2011.