non-use

Motherland, Mothersky and Mother

The Full Court has allowed Energy Beverages’ (EB) appeal opposing Canteralla’s registration of MOTHER as a trade mark for coffee and related products. However, the Full Court rejected EB’s appeal against the removal of its MOTHERLAND trade mark for non-use. In the process, the Full Court provided helpful clarification of the role of Trade Marks Act s44(3)(b) “other circumstances”.

Some background

Cantarella applied to register MOTHERSKY in class 30 in respect of coffee, coffee beans and chocolate, coffee beverages and chocolate beverages and in class 41 in respect of coffee roasting and coffee grinding (TMA 1819816).

EB – the producer and distributor of the MOTHER energy drink – opposed, relying on its prior registered trade marks for MOTHERLAND (TM 1345404), MOTHER LOADED ICED COFFEE (TM 1408011) and MOTHER (TM 1230388) all registered, amongst other things, for non-alcoholic beverages.

Cantarella countered by seeking the removal of the MOTHERLAND and MOTHER LOADED ICED COFFEE marks for non-use under s 92 and deleting coffee beverages and chocolate beverages from its specification of goods.

The delegate ordered removal of MOTHERLAND (here) and MOTHER LOADED ICED COFFEE (here) from the Register for non-use. The delegate also dismissed EB’s opposition to the registration of MOTHERSKY. On appeal, the primary Judge upheld the delegates’ decisions.

EB sought leave to appeal the decisions in respect of MOTHERLAND and allowing the registration of MOTHERSKY. The Full Court refused leave to appeal the MOTHERLAND decision but allowed leave and upheld the appeal against registration of MOTHERSKY.[1]

MOTHERLAND

At [61], the Full Court quoted the well settled principles for trade mark use from Nature’s Blend:

(1) Use as a trade mark is use of the mark as a “badge of origin”, a sign used to distinguish goods dealt with in the course of trade by a person from goods so dealt with by someone else: Coca-Cola Co v All-Fect Distributors Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 107 at 19; E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 265 ALR 645 at [43] (Lion Nathan).

(2) A mark may contain descriptive elements but still be a “badge of origin”: Johnson & Johnson Aust Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 326 at 347–8; 101 ALR 700 at 723; 21 IPR 1 at 24 (Johnson & Johnson); Pepsico Australia Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 192; 33 IPR 161; Aldi Stores Ltd Partnership v Frito-Lay Trading GmbH (2001) 190 ALR 185; 54 IPR 344; [2001] FCA 1874 at [60] (Aldi Stores).

(3) The appropriate question to ask is whether the impugned words would appear to consumers as possessing the character of the brand: Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 422; [1963] ALR 634 at 636; 1B IPR 523 at 532 (Shell Co).

(4) The purpose and nature of the impugned use is the relevant inquiry in answering the question whether the use complained of is use “as a trade mark”: Johnson & Johnson at FCR 347; ALR 723; IPR 24 per Gummow J; Shell Co at CLR 422; ALR 636; IPR 532.

(5) Consideration of the totality of the packaging, including the way in which the words are displayed in relation to the goods and the existence of a label of a clear and dominant brand, are relevant in determining the purpose and nature (or “context”) of the impugned words: Johnson & Johnson at FCR 347; ALR 723; IPR 24; Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budejovicky Budvar (2002) 56 IPR 182; [2002] FCA 390 (Anheuser-Busch).

(6) In determining the nature and purpose of the impugned words, the court must ask what a person looking at the label would see and take from it: Anheuser-Busch at [186] and the authorities there cited.

The problem for EB was that its product is the energy drink MOTHER and its uses of MOTHERLAND focused on it being a fictional fantasyland tailored to “MOTHER-drinking” consumers.

An example of its use, taken from one of two commercials using MOTHERLAND, is:

Another example of use – the description in the “About Us” page of EB’s YouTube channel was “Welcome to MOTHERland”.

The Full Court considered that EB used only MOTHER as a trade mark in respect of energy drinks; MOTHERLAND was just used as the name of the fictional theme park and no more. Accepting that there could be more than one trade mark used in relation to a product, in context MOTHERLAND was not being used as a trade mark to indicate the trade source of the drink. At [67] – [68]:

The depiction of MOTHERLAND in the commercial with the prominent MOTHER in the well-known gothic script representation in contradistinction to LAND, appended in plain red font, emphasises the use of the distinctive gothic script MOTHER mark as the only mark possessing the character of a brand. MOTHERLAND was the name of the fictional theme park, and no more.

The presence of the dominant gothic script MOTHER mark each time MOTHERLAND appears in the commercial, including as the central part of the mark itself, is part of the context relevant to the assessment of the role of MOTHERLAND: Anheuser at [191]. The focus on the well-known gothic script MOTHER, including as part of MOTHERLAND, supports the conclusion that the gothic script MOTHER is the only mark being used to distinguish the MOTHER energy drinks in the commercial from the energy drinks of others.

There was a further problem with reliance on the commercials. The commercials had been run on television well before the non-use period. The commercials had also remained publicly available during the non-use period as they had been uploaded to EB’s YouTube and Facebook pages. There was no evidence, however, that anyone in Australia had accessed the commercials on either site. At [76], the Full Court explained:

Under existing authority, which has not been challenged in the present application, the mere uploading of trade mark content on a website outside Australia is not sufficient to constitute use of the trade mark in Australia …

citing Ward Group Pty Ltd v Brodie & Stone plc [2005] FCA 471; 143 FCR 479; Sports Warehouse Inc v Fry Consulting Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 664; 186 FCR 519; Christian v Societe Des Produits Nestle SA (No 2) [2015] FCAFC 153; 327 ALR 630.

Consequently, EB failed to demonstrate that the primary judge’s order to remove MOTHERLAND for non-use in respect of non-alcoholic beverages etc. was attended by sufficient doubt to warrant leave being granted to appeal.

MOTHERSKY

Despite the deletion of coffee beverages from Cantarella’s specification of goods, both parties conducted the proceedings on the basis that “coffee” included coffee beverages, not just the product of the coffee plant or coffee beans.

In contrast to the MOTHERLAND proceeding, the Full Court found that the primary judge made two material errors. First, his Honour had examined whether coffee beverages were similar goods to energy drinks and the powders and syrups for bottling energy drinks and concluded that the respective products had fundamentally different taste and flavour and were presented for sale and consumed in different circumstances.

This was in error. Section 44(1) calls for comparison of Cantarella’s “coffee” across the full scope of its normal and fair meaning to the full scope of EB’s specification. The correct comparison therefore was between “coffee” and “non-alcoholic beverages”.

Given the way the case had been conducted, the Full Court had little difficulty concluding that coffee beverages were “non-alcoholic beverages” within the scope of EB’s registration.

The fact that coffee as a beverage was classified in class 30 and not class 32 was a matter of administrative convenience and, at [132], irrelevant given Cantarella contended “coffee” covered “coffee beverages”.

Further, contrary to the primary judge’s approach, Cantarella’s claim for “coffee beverages” was not limited to “pure” coffee but extended across a range of beverages. Cantarella argued that coffee beverage did not include coffee flavoured milk. The Full Court accepted at [129] that there may be “a penumbra of uncertainty” about when a coffee flavoured beverage is not “coffee”. Treating “coffee” as meaning “coffee beverage”, however, at [128]:

there is nothing in the specification, so construed, which would limit the meaning of “coffee” to any particular coffee beverage or to any particular kind or type of coffee beverage. For example, there is nothing to limit “coffee” to black coffee as opposed to white coffee or coffee made with milk. There is nothing to limit “coffee” to coffee that does not include some additive such as, for example, a flavoured syrup. Further, there is nothing to limit “coffee” to a hot beverage or a freshly-brewed beverage as opposed to a cold or iced beverage. Further still, there is nothing to limit “coffee” to coffee produced by a particular process or prepared in a particular way, or to coffee packaged and promoted in a particular way. There are many permutations of what constitutes “coffee” as a beverage. Thus, coffee beverages cover a range of goods.

Further still, there was a sufficient body of evidence demonstrating that, at the priority date of the MOTHERSKY application, drinks such as pre-packaged iced coffee were regarded in the trade as non-alcoholic beverages and, further, of overlap between the trade channels through which coffee beverages and energy drinks were marketed and sold.

Secondly, the Full Court considered the primary judge materially erred when undertaking the deceptive similarity comparison.

The Full Court recognised that the comparison the test of deceptive similarity called for involved matters of judgment and degree about which opinions could reasonably differ. In the absence of legal error, mere difference of opinion was not enough. In undertaking the comparison, however, the primary judge’s assessment was heavily coloured by his Honour’s conclusion that “coffee beverages” and the goods covered by EB’s MOTHER registration were not the same or even of the same description.

Further, the primary judge erred by comparing only the specific way Cantarella actually used its trade mark with the specific way EB used its mark rather than comparing how notionally the competing marks could fairly be used across their full scope.

Undertaking the comparison themselves, the Full Court concluded that MOTHERSKY was deceptively similar to MOTHER.

First, at [167], while “mother” is a commonly used English word, it is not in any way descriptive of “non-alcoholic beverages” and was inherently distinctive of such goods. This was of considerable importance in the assessment. (emphasis supplied)

Secondly, at [168], “mother” was wholly incorporated in MOTHERSKY and did not lose its identify merely by the addition of “sky”.

Thirdly, at [169] to [170], “sky” did not have a well-understood meaning when added to “mother”. It might for example be understood according to its ordinary signification. Or it might be treated as some sort of playful variant or as creating a diminutive of “mother”. The Full Court considered that “mother” remained the dominanting element and, consequently, the likelihood of confusion arose.

As a result, s 44(1) operated to preclude registration of MOTHERSKY in the face of EB’s MOTHER registration for non-alcoholic beverages.

Other circumstances

It is well established that the registrability of a trade mark application falls to be determined at the date of the application.

Cantarella’s tactic of applying to clear the way for its MOTHERSKY application by removing EB’s blocking registrations for non-use is also long-standing although, of course, as at the date of the MOTHERSKY application, EB’s registrations were still in the way – removal for non-use being prospective, not retrospective.

At [176] – [178], however, the Full Court endorsed the Registrar’s practice (albeit by way of obiter dicta) of allowing an application to proceed to registration if the blocking citation was removed for non-use as “other circumstances” for the purposes of s44(3)(b). There would be “something perverse” in testing the registrability of the application against a mark which will be removed from the Register.

It is understood that an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court has been filed.

Energy Beverages LLC v Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 44 (Yates, Stewart and Rofe JJ)


  1. Leave to appeal being required under s 195(2) and so EB needed to persuade the Full Court that “(a) whether, in all the circumstances, the decision below is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being considered by a Full Court; and (b) whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision to be wrong.” citing Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397 at 398 – 399 and Primary Health Care Ltd v Commonwealth [2017] FCAFC 174; 260 FCR 359 at [206].  ?

Motherland, Mothersky and Mother Read More »

Trade mark licensing problems

Trident Seafoods has failed to get Trident Foods’ registrations for TRIDENT removed for non-use, but only because Gleeson J exercised her Honour’s discretion against removal.

Trident Foods has had TRIDENT registered for fish and fish products in class 29 since 1973, TM No. 266,625 and, since 1983, for meat, fish, poultry and various extracts, preservatives and pickles, TM No. 400,953.

Trident Seafoods was founded in the USA in 1973. It is apparently the largest seafood distributor in North America. It uses and has registrations all round the world – except for Australia and New Zealand – the trade marks “Trident Seafoods” and a stylised logo incorporating those words. It has been marketing its products in Australia since 2007 under the trade mark “Bountiful”, but its attempt to register “Trident Seafoods” has been blocked by Trident Foods’ prior registrations. It brought an action under s 92(4)(b) to remove those blocking registrations on the grounds of non-use. The non-use period was 7 January 2011 to 7 January 2014.

There is a good chance you have, or have had, some TRIDENT condiments on your shelf, but here’s the thing. Since at least 2000, Trident Foods did not itself manufacture and sell TRIDENT branded products. The products were manufactured and sold by Manassen Foods Australia. Trident Foods claimed Manassen’s use was use as an authorised user.[1] Gleeson J, however, rejected this claim but, as noted above, decided it was appropriate to exercise the discretion under s 101(3) not to order removal.

Manassen was not an authorised user

There was no written licence agreement between Trident Foods and Manassen until 3 November 2017.[2]

In addition to that licensing arrangement, Trident Foods relied on the corporate relationship with Manassen, the involvement in their respective businesses of two common directors and Manassen’s compliance with the Bright Food Group’s quality assurance manual.

Trident Foods is a wholly owned subsidiary of Manassen (and both are members of the same corporate group, the ultimate holding company of which is Bright “Cayman Islands”). Nonetheless, Trident Foods relied on the essentially pragmatic approach applied by the Registrar:[3]

There is nothing unusual in a large company such as Henry Schein, Inc and/or its predecessors (that is “the Company” as defined earlier) incorporating a wholly owned subsidiary in order to hold its worldwide trade mark (or, for that matter, patent or other IP right) portfolio. It is very common practice” because, inter alia, it efficiently streamlines processes for the prosecution and renewal of properties in the portfolio and it avoids the need to record name changes, mergers or assignments around the world should the parent company restructure or change names.

Gleeson J rejected this. Based on the Henschke v Rosemount and the Lodestar v Campari cases, her Honour held at [84] that “control” for the purposes of authorised use required “actual control” “as a matter of substance”.

The corporate relationship between Trident Foods and Manassen did not provide that. At [100(1)]: Gleeson J explained:

The corporate relationship between Trident Foods and Manassen does not place Trident Foods in a relationship of control over Manassen; rather, the converse is the case. The commonality of directors does not, without more, permit Trident Foods to exercise control over Manassen.

Trident Foods led evidence from a Ms Swanson, one of the two directors:

We have always maintained control over Manassen from the point of view of [Trident Foods’] as we have fiduciary obligations to act in the interest of [Trident Foods]. One of the things that has been considered, at least by me, since appointment as a director of Trident, is the quality and standard of the goods being sold under [Trident Foods’] trade mark registrations. As a director of Manassen, I appreciate the high standard of the goods that are sold by this company. As such, I have never had any cause for concern regarding the damage that could occur to the TRIDENT brand owned by [Trident Foods]. If there ever was a suggestion that poor quality goods were to be sold under [Trident Foods’] TRIDENT brand, I would be empowered and authorised to prevent such an occurrence.

Ms Swanson also gave evidence that Manassen had to comply with the Bright Food Group’s vendor quality management system (the VQM Manual) which was in place to maintain quality measures over all of the Group’s brands. In addition, she participated each month in meetings of Manassen’s “Innovation Council” which decided what products Manassen would sell, including “Trident” products, and were concerned with brand valuation and impairment to ensure that the brand was performing well and to avoid devaluation.

Gleeson J considered this was inadequate to establish actual control. Trident Seafoods argued that the directors would be in breach of their fiduciary duties to Manassen if they sought to exercise quality control over its operations on behalf of Trident Foods. Thankfully, Gleeson J did not accept this in terms. Rather, it seems Ms Swanson’s evidence was insufficient because it was at the level of assertion, without demonstrating examples of control being exercised by Trident Foods. At [100] points (2) – (6), her Honour explained:

(2) Ms Swanson’s evidence is in the nature of assertion. It does not include any particular illustration of conduct by Trident Foods amounting to actual control of the use of the “TRIDENT” trade mark.

(3) The fact that Ms Swanson considered it unnecessary to give directions, whether by reason of the existence of the VQM Manual or otherwise, is not relevant to the question of whether Manassen had obligations to Trident Foods in relation to the use of the “TRIDENT” trade mark.

(4) Any control that Ms Swanson might personally exercise by virtue of her membership of the Innovations Council (which was asserted but not demonstrated) does not prove control by Trident Foods.

(5) The identification of Trident Foods as trade mark owner on products supplied by Manassen does not prove use of the trade mark under the control of Trident Foods.

(6) Assuming that the VQM Manual is owned by Trident Foods jointly with other corporate entities in the Bright Group, Trident Seafoods did not demonstrate that the VQM Manual conferred any relevant control on Trident Foods over Manassen.

Finally, Gleeson J was not prepared to find there had in fact been an unwritten licence agreement in place as claimed in the recitals to the 2017 document. The claim was inconsistent with the evidence of how things had actually operated.

It is not possible to tell from the judgment what the contents of the VQM Manual were. One must wonder, however, whether much would really be gained by requiring the directors of Trident Foods to have met and formally adopted the relevant parts of the VQM Manual (assuming there were any) as the quality standards that Manassen needed to comply with and, further, to meet formally as directors of Trident Foods and approve changes to any applicable quality standards or even to meet at regular intervals to consider whether Manassen was complying with quality standards they had prescribed. Unless a subsidiary can never exercise control of its parent or a related body corporate that was not a subsidiary, nonetheless, it would seem that level of formalism is required.

Her Honour’s approach may be compared to that of Nicholas J in Dunlop v Goodyear at [88] and [121]. Of course, in that case the trade mark was owned by the parent, not the subsidiary; there seem to have been numerous written agreements in place and some evidence of head office (i.e., the parent) issuing instructions about the business and the use of the trade marks in the business.

As already indicated, Gleeson J went on to exercise the discretion not to remove Trident Foods’ registrations. In what is already an overly long post, that and some other points of interest will have to await consideration another day.

Trident Seafoods Corporation v Trident Foods Pty Limited [2018] FCA 1490


  1. As you know, under s 7(3), authorised use of a trade mark by a person is taken to be use of the trade mark by the registered owner. And, under s 8 a person is an authorised user of a trade mark if that person uses the trade mark under the control of the trade mark owner. Section 8(3) and (4) provide that “control” may be “quality control” or “financial control”, although s 8(5) does provide that s 8(3) and (4) do not limit the meaning of “under the control of”.  ?
  2. The recitals stated that there had been an unwritten licence agreement between them since 2000 and this document reflected the parties’ wish to reduce the terms of their licence to writing. Apparently, in reliance on Film Investment Corporation of New Zealand Ltd (Receiver Appointed) v Golden Editions Pty Ltd [1994] FCA 11; (1994) 28 IPR 1 at 15; Black & Decker Inc at [147] and [148]; Allam at [430] and [431].  ?
  3. HS TM, LLC v Schein Orthopadie-Service KG [2016] ATMO 63 at [23]; heard before Lodestar, but decided afterwards.  ?

Trade mark licensing problems Read More »

ALDI lookalike survives moroccanoil, but is not natural

Morroccanoil Israel Ltd (MIL) has successfully obtained injunctions against some of Aldi’s lookalike products, but only on the basis that the marketing misrepresented they were “natural” products and further that their argan oil content conferred certain “performance” characteristics. MIL’s claims that the products infringed its trade marks and “passed off” failed. MIL did successfully appeal the Registrar’s refusal to register “Moroccanoil” as a trade mark and fended off Aldi’s attempt to have MIL’s trade marks removed on the grounds that they were not capable of distinguishing.

Katzmann J’s decision runs to 741 paragraphs, so there is a lot more ore to be mined than I shall cover in this blog post.

MIL has two registered trade marks in Australia1 in respect of, amongst other things, hair care products:

TM 1221017

TM 1375954

 

 

 

 

 

Although its get up varied over time, you can get a good idea of how it sold its products in Australia from the following:

Aldi (Like Brands, only cheaper) introduced its own range of Moroccan Argan Oil products such as:2

 

The Trade Mark Infringement Claim

MIL put its case on trade mark infringement on Aldi’s use of Moroccan Argan Oil, not the get up of any product packaging.

Despite Aldi’s reliance on the presence of the PROTANE (or PROTANE Naturals) or VISAGE house brands, Katzmann J had little difficulty despatching the claim that Aldi did not use Moroccan Argan Oil as a trade mark over the fence for six. The term was not purely descriptive; argan oil was only one ingredient of many and only the 11th or 12th ingredient in terms of volume. Viewed objectively, it clearly presented as a badge of origin, especially when depicted with oil drops instead of “o”.

However, Katzmann J held that Moroccan Argan Oil was not deceptively to either trade mark. A central consideration was that each of MIL’s trade marks was a composite mark. “Moroccanoil” was a prominent feature, but the prominent “M” was an equally prominent feature.3

Further, by the time Aldi came to adopt “its” trade mark, there other players in the market using the expression “Moroccan Argan Oil”.

Treating “Moroccanoil” as the relevant essential feature of MIL’s trade marks, Katzmann J accepted that the interposition of “Argan” between “moroccan” and “oil” may well not interrupt the recall of the brand moroccanoil but nonetheless went on to hold at [220]:

…. In my view, there is no real, tangible danger that an ordinary or reasonable consumer with an imperfect recollection of one or other or both those marks or, as was argued, the name “Moroccanoil”, would wonder whether a mark called “Moroccan Argan Oil” is or is associated with either of the composite marks that are the First and Second Trade Marks.  Ignoring similarities in the get-up of the respective products, including the colour-scheme and packaging, I am not satisfied that the hypothetical consumer would mistake the Aldi “Moroccan Argan Oil” mark for the First or Second Trade Marks or wonder whether the Aldi product is made by the owner of the First and Second Trade Marks.  Considering each of the First and Second Trade Marks as a whole, I find that the Aldi mark is not deceptively similar to either of the MIL marks.

Four other points

First, MIL placed heavy reliance on what it said was evidence of 58 consumers being confused that Aldi’s product was MIL’s. These included reports of people who said, or were reported to have said, that they had bought MIL’s products in Aldo’s stores although, of course, MIL’s products were not available in Aldo’s stores.

Only one of those consumers gave direct evidence and Katzmann J considered there were sufficient deficiencies in her evidence to regard her as an unreliable witness.

For example, the witness had a clear recollection of seeing different Aldi products displayed together although it appears to have been accepted they were only displayed in different parts of the store, she referenced MIL’s get up rather than its trade mark, she admitted to being distracted by a distressed child and it emerged that she had not disclosed her previous experience working in advertising as the basis for concluding Aldi’s product was some kind of brand extension.

All the other evidence was the more typical hearsay evidence of employees of MIL and its distributor and stockists about what customers told them. Katzmann J accorded this evidence no weight. Her Honour’s reasons warrant very careful consideration, especially as this type of evidence (if not its scale) is very typical.

206 That is because the evidence largely consists of reports given to others in a way that makes it impossible to decide what was responsible for the confusion. Certainly, there is nothing to suggest that any deceptive similarity arising from the get-up of the products or aspects of it were disregarded. The evidence provides either no or no sufficient foundation for the conclusion that any purchase of an Aldi product was made because of the deceptive similarity of the respective marks.

The indirect nature of the evidence was critical as it meant there was no context to assess the conduct:

207 …. Matters such as the following are often left unclear, or are completely unexplained: whether the person was aware of MIL’s products when they encountered the Aldi products, and if so to what extent; which Aldi product(s) were in issue; in what circumstances the alleged confusion occurred, including what level of attention the person gave to the Aldi products at the time; whether there were other factors at play that might have led to the person acting in the way that they did; and any other relevant circumstances. It would be essential to understand these matters in order to accord any weight to the evidence.

208 In view of the way in which the evidence was adduced (predominantly through witnesses to whom the reports were either directly or indirectly made by anonymous consumers), and in the absence of contemporaneous records, it was not possible for these matters to be explored in cross-examination.

209 Furthermore, even at face value a number of the reports do not bespeak of confusion, let alone deception. In one case, reported by Ms Williamson, the consumer said that she had bought products at Aldi that “look like” MIL’s products. While this is illustrative of similarity, it does not denote deceptive similarity. Some of the evidence consists of second-hand hearsay, such as the complaints received by Thierry Fayard. As a matter of common experience this evidence is unreliable ….

Secondly, MIL sought to rely on Aldi’s alleged intention to trade on MIL’s reputation in its trade marks. There does not seem to have been any real dispute on the evidence that Aldi had set out to “benchmark” its products at least partly on MIL, but also partly on another competing product by Organix:

214 Ms Spinks’4 evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that by the choice of the name “Moroccan Argan Oil” Aldi set out to mislead consumers into thinking that the Aldi brand was moroccanoil. No precise evidence was led as to how Aldi settled on the name “Moroccan Argan Oil” and no questions on this subject were asked in cross-examination. If its object were as alleged, then one would think it would call its products “Moroccan Oil”. The name Aldi chose was different. The name Aldi chose —“Moroccan Argan Oil” — was the name then used by Organix, whose products Aldi had used as the “benchmark” for its shampoo and conditioner. Further, the ultimate product was not taken to market before Aldi had received advice as to compliance with Australian laws. Ms Spinks said that an organisation known as “Silliker” (Silliker Australia Pty Ltd) was retained to undertake “due diligence checks” to ensure that proposed product packaging and labelling complied with relevant “regulations” and the Australian Consumer Law. She was not challenged about this evidence in cross-examination.

A third aspect is that MIL also sought to lead evidence of 13 other major brands which Aldi was said to have knocked off “lookalikes”. MIL wanted to use this evidence as tendency evidence under s 97 of the Evidence Act to show that Aldi deliberately copied product get ups to take advantage of their reputation.

Katzmann J accepted that could potentially be relevant evidence. MIL’s application failed, however, because its notice was not sufficiently specific to comply with the stringent requirements for the admissibility of such evidence and it was given too late. Moreover, the evidence would not carry matters further than the direct evidence of Ms Spinks. At [129]:

… tendency evidence is generally used to prove, “by a process of deduction, that a person acted in a particular way, or had a particular state of mind, on a relevant occasion, when there is no, or inadequate, direct evidence of that conduct or that state of mind on that occasion”: …. Here, however, there was direct evidence from Ms Spinks of the development process in relation to the goods in question. The evidence MIL wished to adduce as “tendency evidence” consisted merely of samples and images of other, unrelated products. It did not include any evidence as to how or why the get-up for the particular products was selected. It takes the evidence given by Ms Spinks no further. Consequently I am not persuaded that the evidence in question has significant probative value.

Even if the tendency evidence had been admitted, it would not have helped on the trade mark case as it was evidence of a tendency to adopt features of get up, not the trade mark itself.

Finally on this part of the case, Katzmann J held that Aldi’s hair brushes and dryers etc. were goods of the same description as the hair care products in class 3 covered by MIL’s registrations. As with Aldi’s own hair care products, however, there was no likelihood of deception or confusion so s 120(2) did not come into play.

The ACL claims

MIL brought three claims under the Australian Consumer Law alleging that Aldi had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct by:

  1. misrepresenting that its products were MIL’s products or in some way sponsored or associated with MIL (i.e., a passing off type claim);
  2. misrepresenting that its products were made from, or substantially from, natural ingredients; and
  3. misrepresenting that the argan oil in the products gave the products performance benefits which they did not in fact have.

As noted above, MIL succeeded only on the latter two claims.

In relation to the passing off claim, Katzmann J accepted that Aldi had modelled the get up of some of its products on MIL’s get up5 and sought to appropriate some of the reputation of MIL’s products to its own benefit. At [380]:

Aldi unquestionably modelled its Oil Product on the MIL Oil Treatment. Ms Spinks referred to it as “the benchmark” product. Aldi copied several of its “diagnostic cues”, including the use of a bottle very similar in style, size, shape, and colour, the same pump mechanism for the extraction of the oil from the bottle, the use of a cardboard box, and the prominent use of a similar colour for both the bottle’s label and the box. Ms Spinks accepted in cross-examination that Aldi’s object was to achieve an exact colour match with the bottles and conceded that consumers would associate the colour of the bottle and the type of packaging with the MIL product. ….

and

384 The evident purpose of copying important features of the MIL Oil Treatment was to remind consumers of that product. It would be naïve to believe that in doing so Aldi was not seeking to capitalise on MIL’s reputation and attract to itself some of its custom. I find that in adopting the particular get-up for the Aldi Oil Treatment bottle and box, Aldi copied from the get-up of the MIL Oil Treatment and box and that it did so in order to appropriate part of MIL’s trade or reputation or the trade of MIL’s authorised distributors and resellers.

That was not sufficient in itself for a finding of misleading or deceptive conduct. The question was whether or not Aldi had sufficiently distinguished its products from MIL’s.

Katzmann J considered that, if regard were paid only to the similarities between the respective get ups, there would have been a likelihood of deception. However, it was necessary to have regard to the respective get ups as a whole. When considered as a whole, there were important differences which served sufficiently to distinguish Aldi’s products:

  • first, ALDI’s products were prominently branded with its well-established house brands PROTANE or VIGOUR;
  • secondly, MIL’s products featured the very prominent large “M”, which was not replicated in ALDI’s get up;
  • thirdly, in MIL’s products “moroccanoil” appeared vertically, while Aldi used “moroccan argan oil” horizontally only;
  • fourthly, there were significant differences in the packaging, especially the shampoo and conditioner which were closer to the Organix product than to MIL’s;
  • fifthly, the closest products – the competing oil treatment products – were sold by MIL in a glass bottle, but Aldi had used a plastic bottle only;

Her Honour considered that none of these differences were concealed and were at least as conspicuous as the similarities. Further, viewed as a whole, the Aldi range was cheaper and the use of the house mark clearly marked the products out as a different brand. Further, the two businesses marketed their products through completely different trade channels and at very different price ranges.

MIL’s heavy reliance on the similarity of the turquoise colours used did not avail:

413 Colour-blind, inattentive consumers, and consumers with an imperfect recollection of the MIL products might confuse the colours. I accept Professor Quester’s evidence that consumers are unlikely to detect subtle differences in colour between two sets of products as they would not ordinarily engage in a side-by-side comparison. Indeed, I am prepared to accept that a not insignificant number of consumers might think the colours are the same. On the other hand, as Ms Spinks’ evidence shows, at the time Aldi entered the market with “Moroccan Argan Oil”, at least one other company, Organix, was selling hair care products in turquoise containers and also under the name “Moroccan Argan Oil”. Other products, like Pure Oil of Marrakesh, were sold in cartons, bottles and other containers featuring various shades of blue.

414 Knowledge of third-party usage of a particular get-up or name can affect the chances that a consumer might be misled or deceived.

As in Cadbury v Darrell Lea, MIL did not have a monopoly in the colour.

MIL also failed in its attempt to rely on the printing of “Moroccan Oil” on (at least) some Aldi receipts. At [428], they were issued after purchase, which was too late.

As one would expect, the failure of this part of MIL’s ACL claim was also fatal to its passing off claim.

Natural products

I don’t propose to go into the detail of why the use of the brand name Protane Naturals was misleading or deceptive other than to record that Katzmann J did find the brand name deceptive since the relevant products were not substantially “natural” products. There is some quite involved evidence about what a “natural” product is or may be if you are going to get into that sort of thing.

Performance representations

Some of Aldi’s products claimed on their packaging to “helps strengthen hair” and “helps protect hair from styling, heat and UV damage” and similar claims.

Katzmann J rejected Aldi’s argument that this was a reference to the capabilities of the product as a whole rather than as a result of the use of moroccan argan oil. Apart from the presentation on the packaging and the prominence given to that oil, Aldi’s own internal documents claimed it was the argan oil that conferred these attributes.

MIL’s scientific evidence established, however, that there was too little argan oil (which is apparently very expensive) in Aldi’s products to have the desired effects. Needless to say, the expert evidence dealing with this part of the case is also rather involved.

Wrap up

Overall and barring the outcome of any appeal, this seems like a rather Pyrrhic victory for MIL. I don’t have any idea how much damages will flow for the breaches of the ACL. Nonetheless, here is plenty of scope for Aldi to continue using its lookalike get up; the prevention of which was surely the point of the exercise. What is more, the result was achieved only after a very lengthy trial including, amongst other things, eight experts: 2 lexicographers, four marketing experts and two chemists!

Moroccanoil Israel Ltd v Aldi Foods Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 823

  1. Following her Honour’s decision (and barring any appeal), it will have three including TM No. 1463962 “moroccanoil” in respect of Hair care products, including oil, mask, moisture cream, curly hair moisture cream, curly hair mask, curly and damaged hair mask, argan and saffron shampoo, hair loss shampoo, dandruff shampoo, dry hair shampoo, gel, mousse, conditioner and hair spray in class 3. ?
  2. In addition to hair “lotions” such as shampoo, Aldi also marketed hair brushes and powered hair dryers and the like. ?
  3. Those of you who read 140 year old case law might also be thinking about the striking colour scheme. Katzmann J, citing the 5th edition of Shanahan and the Office Manual, held that MIL’s trade marks were not limited to the specific colours as there was no endorsement under s 70 and so the marks were taken to be registered for all colours. One could be forgiven for thinking this approach renders the Register seriously misleading at times. ?
  4. The Aldi employee charged with introducing the range. ?
  5. The Aldi shampoo and conditioner products were “benchmarked” on Organix’ get up, not MIL’s. ?

ALDI lookalike survives moroccanoil, but is not natural Read More »

A trade mark licence requires actual control

The Full Federal Court has held that the licensor must actually exercise control over the licensee for a trade mark licence to be a valid licence.

The decision is part of a long running global battle between WILD TURKEY and WILD GEESE. The WILD TURKEY interests own and use WILD TURKEY around the world for bourbon whiskey; the WILD GEESE interests use, or want to use, WILD GEESE around the world for Irish whiskey. Instead of the usual battle about who was first to file and whether or not WILD TURKEY was confusingly similar to WILD GEESE or vice versa, there was an unusual twist in this fight: WILD TURKEY tried an end run, tacking on to a registration for WILD GEESE WINES.

Some background

A Mr O’Sullivan QC (and his partners) had established a winery in South Australia under the name WILD GEESE WINES (WGW) in 2000. In due course, WGW set out to register their trade mark. However, the WILD GEESE interests had already registered their trade mark in Australia for whiskey. It was cited against the WGW application and in 2005, WGW brought an application against the WILD GEESE interests’ registration to remove it for non-use. The WILD TURKEY interests had also brought a non-use action against the WILD GEESE interests’ registration.

Mr O’Sullivan (and partners) quickly came to the realisation that they did not to become embroiled in the intergalactic war being waged between WILD TURKEY and WILD GEESE whiskey. Instead, in 2007 WGW assigned its trade mark application and the benefit of its non-use application to the WILD TURKEY interests in return for an exclusive licence to use the trade mark in Australia for wine.

The non-use applications against the WILD GEESE interests’ trade mark was successful and the (now) WILD TURKEY interests registered the WILD GEESE WINES trade mark for wine and spirits that WGW had assigned to them.

In a case of sauce for the goose potentially being sauce also for the turkey, the WILD GEESE interests then brought an application to remove the WGW trade mark for non-use. The WILD TURKEY interests sought to defend that claim on the basis that the use of the trade mark by WGW was authorised use under the Act and so constituted use in the relevant period by the WILD TURKEY interests[1] as registered owner sufficient to defeat the non-use application.

As the removal application by the WILD GEESE interests was filed on 27 September 2010, the three year period in which the WILD TURKEY interests had to show use as a trade mark in good faith ran from 27 August 2007 to 27 August 2010.

Unfortunately for the WILD TURKEY interests, there were a few wrinkles.

WGW produced a merlot under its trade mark in 2004. Due to adverse climate conditions, it did not produce another vintage until 2011. However, wine from the 2004 vintage was for sale (and was sold) in relatively small batches during the non-use period.

Mr O’Sullivan (and his partners) realised that a valid trade mark licence required that the licensee’s use be under the licensor’s control. To that end, Mr O’Sullivan proposed quality control ‘conditions’ for inclusion in the licence:

  • WGW’s wines had to be of sufficient quality to qualify for an export licence from the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation;
  • WGW had to supply samples of their wine to the WILD TURKEY interests if requested to do so.

Notwithstanding this, the licence arrangements did not have any practical effect on WGW’s operations and the WILD TURKEY interests never requested samples until after the WILD GEESE interests brought their non-use application.

The Registrar upheld the removal application. On appeal, Perram J considered that the Full Court’s decision in Yau Entertainment bound him to find that the possibility of control being exercised was sufficient for a valid licence and so, very reluctantly, allowed WILD TURKEY’s appeal.

The Full Court’s decision

All five judges considered that Yau Entertainment did not rule that the potential for the exercise of control by the licensor was sufficient for authorised use under the Act.

Control

Besanko J gave the leading judgment with which Allsop CJ and Nicholas J agreed.

After a detailed review of the legislative history and the case law, Besanko J concluded at [95] – [98] that “control” for the purposes of s 8 meant actual control. At [95]:

The meaning of “under the control of” in s 8 is informed by the principle stated by Aickin J in Pioneer, that is to say, that the trade mark must indicate a connection in the course of trade with the registered owner. The connection may be slight, such as selection or quality control or control of the user in the sense in which a parent company controls a subsidiary. It is the connection which may be slight. Aickin J was not saying the selection or quality control or financial control which may be slight. I think the principle stated by Aickin J informs the meaning of “under the control of” ….

His Honour acknowledged at [98] that whether there was actual control was a question of fact and degree, but “there must be control as a matter of substance.”

His Honour recognised that this conclusion was different to the conclusion reached under the Trade Marks Act 1994 by the House of Lords in Scandecor. That however was because UK law had taken a different course under the influence of EU law. Similarly, the CJEU’s decision in Ideal-Standard [2] was directed to a very different issue: exhaustion of rights.

WILD TURKEY did not actually exercise control

Besanko J went on to find that the WILD TURKEY interests did not actually exercise control over WGW’s use of the trade mark. Bearing in mind that it was a question of fact and degree, his Honour considered the most significant factor was that the licence arrangement had no practical effect on how WGW conducted itself.

At [107]:

The quality control provision in the Licence Agreement is that the wine be of a sufficient standard to obtain the approval for export of the AWBC. There was no evidence of the precise content of that standard. It was not an exacting standard as the approval rate shows (at [51] above).[3] The primary judge considered that the standard involved no more than a rejection of what he called truly undrinkable wine (at [55]). It is plain that the standard had no effect on Mr O’Sullivan’s wine making practices. He was interested in making good to high quality wine. At no time during the relevant period did [WILD TURKEY] contact Mr O’Sullivan about the wine he was making or selling or both. There was never any request by [WILD TURKEY] for samples under cl 3.1 or for the product to be supplied to the Australian Wine Research Institute under cl 3.2. [WILD TURKEY] never asked Mr O’Sullivan for any information about the use of the trade marks or Mr O’Sullivan’s wine making operations generally. There was no monitoring by [WILD TURKEY] and nothing to suggest that [WILD TURKEY] took steps to ascertain whether the terms in cl 3 were being complied with. I do not think s 8(3) was satisfied by the existence of cl 3 in the Licence Agreement.

The conditions in the licence that WGW could use the trade mark only for wine it manufactured and only on wines sold in Australia were restrictions, but they were not restrictions that went to the quality of what was produced necessary to maintain the connection in the course of trade with the (putative) licensor. At [108], his Honour explained:

…. These are restrictions but not ones like controls on quality or manufacturing process which might suggest a connection between the registered owner and the use of the trade marks in connection with the provision or dealing with goods in the course of trade. There is no evidence that [WILD TURKEY] monitored or informed itself as to whether WGW was only selling Australian wine in Australia. These requirements do not give rise to control. WGW was not permitted to amend or abbreviate the trade marks or use them in a scandalous fashion. These provisions seem to me to be standard provisions to be expected in a licence agreement for trade marks. There is no evidence of monitoring by [WILD TURKEY] of these provisions and they do not amount to control within s 8. Finally, the provision about standard liability insurance and [WILD TURKEY]’ ability to terminate the Licence Agreement for a material breach is not sufficient to constitute control under s 8 of the Act.

Thus, the use by WGW was not authorised use and the registrations for WILD GEESE for wines should be removed for non-use.

Some other points

Nicholas J agreed with Besanko J’s reasons. Nicholas J also pointed out that the use which would defeat a non-use application under s 92 had to be use as a trade mark in good faith. His Honour considered that the failure by the WILD TURKEY interests to exercise actual control over WGW would be a factor disqualifying that use from being use in good faith. As this line of attack was not actually argued by the WILD GEESE interests, his Honour did not decide the case on this basis. nonetheless at [132], his Honour said:

However, in considering whether or not the registered owner has exercised sufficient control over another person’s use of a mark so as to defeat an attack on the grounds of non-use, it is important to recognise that the boundary between “use” and “use in good faith” by the registered owner cannot be defined by a bright line. This is because the question whether there has been any use by the registered owner may itself depend on whether the control it is said to have exercised was real or genuine control as opposed to something that was merely token or colourable.

Allsop CJ agreed with both Besanko J and Nicholas J.

Katzmann J also found that authorised use required the licensor actually to exercise control over the licensee. That had plainly not happened in this case. Her Honour did accept that the WILD TURKEY interests’ request for samples in 2011 (after the non-use period and after the WILD GEESE interests had filed their non-use application) could lead to ‘a “‘retrospectant’ circumstantial inference”’[4] that control was actually exercised. But the inference that control had not been exercised was also open and, as the WILD TURKEY interests had not shown the inference they contended for was more probable than not, they would still lose. Her Honour pointed out that the wine show medals that the WILD TURKEY interests relied on to support the good quality of the wines did not survive scrutiny. The judges’ comments at the wine shows included:

Very disappointing class with no highlights. From this class it would appear to be unsuited to the region. No wines showed any varietal character or even just brightness of fruit and character.

Perhaps more importantly, there was no evidence that the WILD TURKEY interests had any idea that WGW’s wines had won any medals or whether the wine was of good, bad or indifferent quality.

Greenwood J also concurred in the result, but was not prepared to condemn the licensing arrangements between the WILD TURKEY interests and WGW in the strong terms used by the trial judge.

Wrap up

So, if you are acting for a trade mark licensor, make sure that it actually exercises control over its licensee(s). And, at least when the control relied on is quality control, make sure the control goes to the quality of the goods or services provided under the licence. The use won’t be authorised use otherwise. In that case, the licensor won’t be able to rely on it to defeat a non-use application as in this case. Even if that is not a risk, there will also be the danger that use which is not authorised use may render the trade mark deceptive and liable to cancellation.

If you have a comment or a question, please feel free to post it in the comments section. Or, if you would prefer, email me.

Lodestar Anstalt v Campari America LLC [2016] FCAFC 92 reversing Skyy Spirits LLC v Lodestar Anstalt [2015] FCA 509


  1. Section 7(3).  ?
  2. IHT Internationale Heitztechnik GmbH & Anor v Ideal-Standard GmbH & Anor [1994] 1 ECR 2789.  ?
  3. In the year ending 30 June 2010, only 40 wines out of 18,019 wines tested ultimately failed to receive export approval, and the figure in the following year was 43 wines out of 14,569 wines tested.  ?
  4. Referring to Heydon J at [76] in Gallo.  ?

A trade mark licence requires actual control Read More »

Phillip Morris sues Australia!

Phillip Morris has announced that it plans to sue Australia under the Australia-Hong Kong (SA) Bilateral Investment Treaty over the planned plain packaging legislation.

What the Government is proposing to do

Under the proposed Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011, tobacco companies would be required to adopt a prescribed form of packaging for tobacco products.

In its most recent form, this would involve all tobacco companies using the same olive brown colour for their packaging with large, graphic images and health warnings. Some illustrations here. The contemplated regulations would limit brand names to be positioned on the top, bottom and a designated position on the front of the box in Lucida sans serif font, point size 14. (See pp. 12 and 13 of the Consultation Paper (pdf).

The trade mark lawyers amongst us will notice that clause 15 of the proposed bill will preclude a registered trade mark from being removed for non-use resulting from the strictures imposed by the proposed legislation.

The announced intention is for the laws to come into full operation on 1 July 2012. The proposal is only in exposure draft form at this stage, with public comment being scheduled to have closed by 6 June. However, the Opposition has apparently indicated its support for the Government’s position.

What Phillip Morris claims

If you read a newspaper in Australia, you can hardly have failed to notice the advertisements taken out by the tobacco companies violently opposed to this plan. There is also a website.

Phillip Morris has taken matters a step further and lodged a notice of claim against Australia under the Australia-Hong Kong (SAR) Bilateral Investment Treaty.

Unlike Free Trade Agreements and WTO / TRIPS, apparently, companies can bring claims against a party (alleged) to be in breach of its treaty obligations, not just another country party.

It would appear that Phillip Morris is not just after compensation but also an order requiring Australia to suspend operation of the law.

Details about the basis of Phillip Morris’ claim are sketchy at this stage. According to Phillip Morris’ own News Release:

“The forced removal of trade marks and other valuable intellectual property is a clear violation of the terms of the bilateral investment treaty between Australia and Hong Kong. We believe we have a very strong legal case and will be seeking significant financial compensation for the damage to our business”.

The speculation is that Phillip Morris will argue that the proposed law is an expropriation of Phillip Morris’ investments (trade mark rights) without fair compensation: see Article 6.

According to its Press Release, Phillip Morris has apparently garnered support from an eminent Georgetown professor (and Harvard graduate) for its position.

The Government has previously denied its plans will breach its international obligations.

Assoc. Prof. Jurgen Kurtz at Melbourne University has a very interesting consideration of the issues, noting that there is case law which would support the Government’s position as well as a contrary line. Prof. Rothwell from the ANU also explores the issues. He also reportedly contends that Phillip Morris may well have lodged its complaint too soon as the bill is not law yet, although, presumably, that would not preclude another complaint at a later stage.

The News Release also indicates that a period of 3 months’ negotiating follows before an arbitration proceeding is implemented under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 2010. The process will not be a short one!

Phillip Morris sues Australia! Read More »

DGTEK v Digiteck II

For DGTEK v Digiteck I, see here.

Non-use

Lander J considered that the goods covered by Hills’ registration should be limited as a result of non-use for the statutory period of 3 continuous years under s 92.

One interesting point on this part of the case is that Bitek had sought removal of all goods in its original application for removal. It accepted that evidence filed by Hills showed use in relation to some goods. Hills argued therefore the non-use application must fail since the application was directed to all goods.

Lander J rejected that argument:

[279] Because Bitek was seeking to remove “all of the goods” for non-use, Hills submitted that it was required to rebut the allegation of non-use of all of those goods. Hills argued that the evidence demonstrated use of the DGTEC trade mark in respect of several products including televisions, DVD players, CD players, decoders and cameras. On this basis, it argued that the application should be dismissed.
[280] In the alternative, Hills argued that Bitek could not alter its position or limit its application as an application for removal under s 92(2) is required to be in an approved form: reg 9.1 of the Regulations. The only application for removal in approved form is the initial application in which Bitek seeks to remove “all of the goods” in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
[281] Hills also said that Bitek should not be allowed to limit its application because to do so would lead to a denial of procedural fairness. …

Following a review of the cases, Lander J rejected these arguments:

[295] Hills’ argument that if the Court considered Bitek’s argument that the class of goods should be narrowed would result in a denial of procedural fairness should be rejected. Bitek’s concession means that it cannot have the relief it sought in the application but in seeking to argue that it is entitled to have the restricted relief it is thereby narrowing the scope of the inquiry. In those circumstances it could not be a denial of procedural fairness to allow the matter to proceed by reference to a narrower class of goods.

[296] I also reject Hills’ submission that the application must fail because there is evidence of use of some of its goods. I accept Bitek’s argument that the Court may exercise its discretion under s 101(2) to narrow the scope of the registration where the applicant establishes that a ground exists in relation to only some of the goods to which the application relates.

The power to excise some, but not all goods, was consistent with the policy of Part 9: to ensure that Register (and freedom to trade) was not cluttered with unused marks: [304] and consistent with the terms of s 101(2).

Lander J then refused to exercise a discretion against non-removal, apparently on the basis that any reputation that had been generated in respect of the goods on which there had been use did not spill over on to the goods for which there had not been use:

Bitek submitted that s 101(3) does not save Hills’ registration because there is no evidence of use of similar or closely related goods. The only evidence of use relates to a limited group of products which Bitek mainly excluded from its application for removal.

[316] In my opinion, Hills’ argument should be rejected. The fact that it has used its mark in respect of goods which are similar to those goods marketed by Bitek is not in my opinion to the point.

[317] The circumstance which is addressed in s 101(4) is whether Hills has used the mark in respect of similar goods to those to which the application relates. In Hills’ case it has not used the goods except in relation to set-top boxes, remote controls, digital video recorders with hard drive, televisions, CD and MP3 players, DVD players, micro sound systems, iPod docking speakers and web-based cameras. I do not think there is any evidence to suggest any use of any similar goods to those proved used by Hills which ought to be retained in the statement of goods.

Perhaps rather surprisingly given the finding of non-use in respect of some products, Lander J considered Hills’ specification of goods should be amended to read:

Digital and electronic products including set top boxes, remote controls, digital video recorders with hard drive, televisions, CD and MP3 players, DVD players, micro sound systems, iPod docking speakers and web-based cameras. (my emphasis)

Infringement

Lander J accepted he was bound be the decision in Gallo that removal of a mark for non-use operated only from the date of removal of the mark from the Register.

Bitech admitted it had used DIGITECH since 2003 in respect ofantennas, cables (including speaker, coaxial, data and security), plasma TV brackets, leads, AV switch selectors, connectors, wall plates of various types, splitters, TV mounting hardware, video senders, video intercoms, industry tools, remote controls, multi-switches, set-top boxes, cable ties and cable clips.

Ultimately, his Honour found that Bitek infringed by reason of its use on set-top boxes and remote controls, but not the other products.

Consistently with his Honour’s earlier findings, DIGITECH was of course deceptively similar to DGTECH. Apart from set-top boxes and remote controls, the goods for which Bitek had used its trade mark were either covered by its own (now) registration (s 122(1)(fa)) – and all use had been after the application date – or were not shown to be within the scope of Hills’ registration or goods of the same description. S 120(3) also could not be invoked as Hills’ trade mark was not well-known.

Hills Industries Limited v Bitek Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 94

DGTEK v Digiteck II Read More »

Wild Geese survive Wild Turkey attack

Anita Brown, over at IPanz, reports on Cowdroy J’s exercise of discretion to leave the Wild Geese trade mark for whiskey on the Registrar, even though non-use throughout the relevant statutory period was proved, on the basis of the perceived risk of public confusion.

His Honour also addressed the standing requirement for a non-use action.

His Honour’s reasons in full:

Austin, Nichols & Co Inc v Lodestar Anstalt [2011] FCA 39

Wild Geese survive Wild Turkey attack Read More »

The Australian High Court on trade marks

Janice Luck and Peiwen Chen have published at the Fortnightly Review an analysis of the High Court’s recent rulings in the trade mark cases: Gallo v Lion Nathan (the Barefoot case) and Health World v Shin-Sun.

As Janice was one of the members of the Working Party whose review led to the 1995 Act and has been teaching trade mark courses at Melbourne Uni. for longer than she probably cares to remember, you should read it here.

The Australian High Court on trade marks Read More »

Satellite broadcast and trade mark use

In a further round of the Food Channel / Network war, Greenwood J has accepted that the inclusion of the trade mark on programming broadcast by ABC Asia Pacific is use of the trade mark in Australia.

ABC Asia Pacific is primarily intended to transmit ABC programming into countries in the Asia Pacific region. Depending on the satellite, however, Australia or large parts of mainland Australia fell within the transmission footprint and not on the periphery. As the ABC Asia Pacific transmissions were free-to-air, the transmissions could be received and viewed by members of the Australian public who installed appropriate satellite dishes and there was evidence before his Honour of businesses operating in Australia which sold and installed the necessary equipment.

As a result, his Honour found that the trade mark was used in relation to the television production services in class 41 for which it was registered. However, the trade mark was not used in relation to the class 38 services of television broadcasting – ABC Asia Pacific was the broadcaster.

Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network G.P. [2010] FCA 703

Satellite broadcast and trade mark use Read More »

High Court allows appeal in Barefoot case

E & J Gallo owns TM No 787765, BAREFOOT, for “wines” in class 33. It had acquired ownership of the trade mark by assignment in 2005 from a Mr Houlihan.

Lion Nathan introduced a new beer into Australia under the trade mark BAREFOOT RADLER (with a barefoot device):

The Full Federal Court found that Lion’s beer infringed Gallo’s trade mark as goods of the same description, but ordered the trade mark removed because it had not been used for the 3 year statutory period prescribed by s 92(4) – in this case between 7 May 2004 and 7 May 2007.

Neither Gallo nor Mr Houlihan had ever sold, or specifically authorised the sale of, any wine under the BAREFOOT trade mark in Australia. If that were all, it would have been an end to the matter. However, there was a complication. Wine made by Mr Houlihan’s company, Barefoot Cellars, in California had actually found its way into Australia and been offered for sale.

Barefoot Cellars had sold a shipment of 60 cases of its wine to a distributor in Germany in 2001. Some of the consignment to the German distributor was imported into Australia by a liquor wholesaler, Beach Avenue. In the 3 years relevant to the non-use claim, Beach Avenue imported 144 bottles of the wine; at least 41 of which were actually sold during the period (and a further 18 were given away).

Lion Nathan argued, and the Full Federal Court had accepted, that there had been no use of the trade mark as a trade mark because neither of the trade mark owners had intended to project their goods into the Australian market.

There was use in the course of trade

The High Court rejected this argument.

51  The capacity of a trade mark to distinguish a registered owner’s goods from those of others, as required by s 17, does not depend on whether the owner knowingly projects the goods into the Australian market. It depends on the goods being in the course of trade in Australia. Each occasion of trade in Australia, whilst goods sold under the trade mark remain in the course of trade, is a use for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act. A registered owner who has registered a trade mark under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act can be taken, in general terms, to have an intention to use that trade mark on goods in Australia. It is a commonplace of contemporary international trade that prior to consumption goods may be in the course of trade across national boundaries.

52  An overseas manufacturer who has registered a trade mark in Australia and who himself (or through an authorised user) places the trade mark on goods which are then sold to a trader overseas can be said to be a user of the trade mark when those same goods, to which the trade mark is affixed, are in the course of trade, that is, are offered for sale and sold in Australia. This is because the trade mark remains the trade mark of the registered owner (through an authorised user if there is one) whilst the goods are in the course of trade before they are bought for consumption[29]. As affirmed by Gummow J in Wingate Marketing Pty Ltd v Levi Strauss & Co[30],
“whilst a trade mark remains on goods, it functions as an indicator of the person who attached or authorised the initial use of the mark”.
During the trading period, the trade mark functions as an indicator of the origin of the goods, irrespective of the location of the first sale.

That is, what is required is that (1) there be some sign which functions as a trade mark – a badge of origin – and (2) the sign be used in the course of trade in Australia.

The sale in England by the English manufacturer to retailers for resale in Estex was sufficient for this, but awareness that the retail markets in Australia was the intended destination was not necessary.

As the High Court’s references to Champagne Heidsieck v Buxton (a case, if not exactly dear to my heart, certainly engraved on it!) show, any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the cases establishing that parallel imports do not infringe trade marks and which have been enshrined in s 123.

In context, therefore, the last sentence of [50], noting that the goods had been sold to the German trader without any limitation on resale should not be determinative.

Was there enough use?

Lion’s first fall back position was to rely on the insubstantiality of the 144 bottles imported compared to the size of the market for wine in Australia. The High Court rejected this attack:

65  A commercial quantity of wine, some 144 bottles, was imported and offered for sale under the registered trade mark by Beach Avenue during the statutory period. Some 41 sales during that time were proven by reference to invoices and tax paid. There was no suggestion in the evidence that the offering for sale and selling either overseas or in Australia was for any purpose other than making profit and establishing goodwill in the registered trade mark. It was not contended that the use was fictitious or colourable. In all the circumstances the use was genuine and sufficient to establish use in good faith for the purposes of Lion Nathan’s application for removal.

That is, the High Court adopted a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. It is also worth noting the careful reservation that it was not called upon to decide whether or not a single use would suffice.

What trade mark was used?

Lion’s next attack argued that use of BAREFOOT with a representation of a bare footprint on the wine bottle label was not use of the trade mark as registered – BAREFOOT.

The High Court did not reject this argument on the grounds that there was use of BAREFOOT alone.

Rather, at [68] it distinguished the Colorado case (a case from which special leave was refused) on the grounds that the word COLORADO had no inherent capacity to distinguish because of its geographical significance and so the mountain peak device used with the word element was “not a mere descriptor but a distinguishing feature”. In this case, however, at [69] the device element was an addition which did not substantially affect the trade mark’s identity: consumers were likely to identify the mark by reference to the word, the device merely illustrated the word and, except in the case of honest concurrent use, the device alone would not be registrable in the face of the word mark.

An evidential issue about authorised use

Lion’s last attack, arguing that Barefoot Cellars was not an authorised user when it applied the trade mark to the wine, also failed. The potential problem for Gallo here was that neither Mr Houlihan nor anyone else involved in the production of the wine gave evidence about what quality control, if any, Mr Houlihan had exercised. There were 2 strands to this attack.

The first strand was to contend that some assertions of quality control recorded in a consultancy  agreement were not in fact statements of fact. This failed as a matter of interpretation of the document. In a separate concurring judgment, Heydon J explained that the consultancy agreement constituted a “business record” and the statements were therefore admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.

The second argument that there was no quality control by Mr Houlihan because he was only a joint principal in Barefoot Cellars and in addition a third person was the winemaker. This was not, however, sufficient to preclude the exercise of quality control by Mr Houlihan.

E. & J. Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2010] HCA 15 (19 May 2010)

Update: should have added links to report on Full Federal Court and first instance (here and here).

Some things the High Court didn’t deal with:

  1. The Full Federal Court’s finding that, notwithstanding the order to remove the trade mark for non-use, Lion still had to pay damages for infringement until the judgment.
  2. Whether or not Gallo’s negotiations with McWilliams Wines to introduce a BAREFOOT wine into Australia constituted use of the trade mark or warranted an exercise of discretion to leave the trade mark on the Register. The negotiations culminated in the grant of a licence to McWilliams and the sale of products under the trade mark in September 2007, some 4 months after the expiry of the relevant 3 year period.
  3. Whether beer and wine are goods of the same description.

The first question, of course, did not arise as a result of the High Court’s principal ruling. The third question was part of the “evaluative findings” which did not raise general questions of public importance. See [72]

High Court allows appeal in Barefoot case Read More »