A “new” Act designs case!

Nicholas J has ruled that by selling its Razor fan Martec has infringed Hunter Pacific’s registered design for a ceiling fan hub, ADR No. 340171.

On the right below are two of the representations in the design:[1]

ADR 340171 perspective
ADR 340171 perspective
796.12
Martec’s Razor

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ADR 340171 hub
ADR 340171 hub

 

Martec's Razor hub
Martec’s Razor hub

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

and on the left above are corresponding views of Martec’s infringement.

On the s 19 analysis mandated by s 71, Nicholas J recognised a number of obvious differences between the registered design and the Razor. However, the overall impression conveyed was one of similarity. In particular, the lower “hubs” were similarly proportioned and conveyed a generally sleek and flat appearance. This was particularly important as this was the feature which contributed most to the informed user’s assessment of the design. As Hunter Pacific’s expert pointed out, that was significant as a ceiling fan hub would be viewed from underneath, looking up. Thus, his Honour concluded:

Although they exhibit a number of obvious differences in shape and configuration, these differences are in my view insufficient to displace what I consider to be significant and eye-catching similarities that create an overall impression of substantial similarity.

It is a bit difficult to tell as images of the prior art are not included. That said, the verbal descriptions suggest that the Razor was much closer to the registered design than any of the prior art. The number of prior art advanced by Martec served to emphasise that there were many different ways to achieve the same functional outcome. Accordingly, while the designs were to some extent dictated by function, there was no significant restriction on the designer’s freedom to innovate.

Nicholas J did not explicitly take sides on the debate about who was the informed user, simply restating the statutory test.[2] His Honour did follow Yates’ J lead, however, in emphasising that the impression that the informed user would form was not based on a fleeting or casual inspection. Rather, it required a careful and deliberate visual inspection.

Hunter Pacific International Pty Ltd v Martec Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 796


  1. The annotations were marked up by one of the witnesses.  ?
  2. Contrast the “Review” approach vs Multisteps discussed by Yates J at [57] – [71].  ?

Alphapharm may have a big bill coming

The High Court has dismissed Alphapharm’s appeal from the Full Federal Court’s ruling granting Lundbeck an extension of time to apply to extend the term of the escitalopram patent. It was close though: 3 to 2.

You will recall that Lundbeck applied 10 years late to extend the term of its pharmaceutical patent. So, not only was Lundbeck applying to extend the term of its patent (under s70), it was applying for an extension of time in which to make that application. In granting special leave, the High Court accepted that, if the power were available, the circumstances justified the 10 year extension. The question was a matter of statutory interpretation: was there power to extend.

Section 71(2) specifies when an application to extend the term of a pharmaceutical patent must be made:

(2) An application for an extension of the term of a standard patent must be made during the term of the patent and within 6 months after the latest of the following dates:

(a) the date the patent was granted;

(b) the date of commencement of the first inclusion in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods of goods that contain, or consist of, any of the pharmaceutical substances referred to in subsection 70(3);

(c) the date of commencement of this section.

Lundbeck’s application was made within the term of the standard patent (with 1 day to spare), but well outside the dates specified in paragraphs (a) – (c).

Section 223 confers a general power to extend the time for making an application. Under s 223(11), however, the power cannot be used to extend time in relation to “prescribed actions”.[1] One of those prescribed actions related to s 71(2):

(b) filing, during the term of a standard patent under subsection 71(2) of the Act, an application under subsection 70(1) of the Act for an extension of the term of the patent; ….

Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ, after noting the long history in patents legislation of the power to apply for an extension of time, even after the time had expired, as an important safety valve in the system, ruled that s 71(2) specified 2 requirements. The first time requirement is that the application must be filed within the term of the standard patent. The second time requirement was that the application must also satisfy at least one of the requirements set out in paragraphs (a) – (c).

Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ held, however, that reg. 22.11 applied only to the first requirement: that the application was made within the term of the standard patent. Their Honours considered this was important otherwise a “gap” could arise between when a patent expired but was then restored. That would be highly undesirable.[2] In contrast, there was no policy reason why reg. 22.11 should apply to the second time requirement. At [71]:

There is nothing in any of the extrinsic materials, or in the long policy debates on simplifying extensions of term, which would suggest any rationale for excluding the second time requirement from the remedial power to extend time under s 223(2)(a). Alphapharm’s senior counsel conceded, correctly, that if Alphapharm’s construction of reg 22.11(4)(b) were correct, the remedial power in s 223(2)(a) could never apply to extend time in relation to the second time requirement, no matter what the quality or provenance of any “error or omission” made in respect of that time. Alphapharm’s construction would introduce an inexplicable asymmetry between a patentee and a competitor opposing a s 70(1) application. An opponent can access the general remedial power to extend times cast upon it in mandatory terms[102]. Had it been the legislature’s intention to exclude the second time requirement in s 71(2) from the general remedial power in s 223(2)(a), that would have been simple to accomplish.

Accordingly, s 223 could be invoked as Lundbeck had satisfied the first time requirement (and so did not need it to be extended) but needed an extension in relation to the second time requirement – which reg.22.11 did not apply to.

In dissent, Kiefel and Keane JJ rather tersely said at [111]:

s 71(2) cannot reasonably be read as referring to two actions. There is but one action referred to in s 71(2) – making an application for extension of the term of a patent. That one action is to be done on a date that satisfies the two requirements as to time set out in s 71(2). It is that action to which s 223(2) would apply, were it not for reg 22.11(4)(b).

Their Honours did explain why they considered policy and historical considerations did not lead to a different conclusion. Of potentially more general interest, however, their Honours took a different stand on the role of statutory interpretation at [121]:

In any event, as was said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of statutory text; nor is their examination an end in itself. (footnote omitted)

While acknowledging the primary role of the text, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ invoked the more nuanced role of context espoused in CIC Insurance and Project Blue Sky.

A big bill coming? After the standard term of the patent expired but before the expiry of the extended term, Alphapharm and other generics commenced marketing their own versions of the drug.

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42


  1. The “prescribed actions” are found in reg. 22.11.  ?
  2. See Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ at [68].  ?