In two ex parte applications, Greenwood J granted interlocutory injunctions restraining Customs from releasing imported goods which allegedly infringe a trade mark.
The interesting point is that the proceedings for infringement were not brought within the “action period” specified in by s 137 of the Trade Marks Act. Greenwood J reasoned:
Section 136 is headed “Release of Goods to Owner – No Action for Infringement and s 137 is headed “Action for Infringement of Trade Mark”. Some discussion has arisen in earlier authorities, including Jemella v Mackinnon & Another  FCA 1022; 77 IPR 243, in which Logan J had to consider whether non-compliance with these provisions as to commencement and notification within the extension period, might have the effect of depriving the applicant of its standing to maintain infringement proceedings. I am satisfied that ss 136 and 137, taken together, do not deprive the applicant of its standing to maintain proceedings for infringement of the trade mark. Section 137 is not a primary empowering provision conferring rights of action in the applicant. It is permissive in the context in which it appears. Those rights are conferred by s 20 and the provisions of Part 12 of the Trade Marks Act. Section 137 recognises that a trade mark owner may elect to bring proceedings and ss 136 and 137 address what is to occur in the circumstances of those sections in respect of seized goods if the relevant steps are not taken. However, the provisions should be read subject to an order that might be made under s 137(5) to, in effect, preserve the status quo in circumstances where the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case of infringement. Nevertheless, a question arises as to whether it is appropriate to make an order directed to the Customs CEO preventing the goods from being released, in all the circumstances, in the exercise of discretion, when s 136 imposes a statutory obligation upon the Customs CEO to release the goods in the circumstances there identified and s 137 imposes time constraints. That directs attention to the merits.
That is, the foundation of the right to be protected by the interlocutory injunction was the right to sue for infringement of the registered trade mark – a right conferred by ss 20 and 120; s 137 merely facilitated that primary right.
Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v Bouobeid  FCA 1567
Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v Daizli  FCA 1566
In the Daizli action there is a further complication that the respondents seem to be out of the jurisdiction for some time. His Honour also refers to products being offered for sale on eBay. But, other than those products being alleged to be infringing, I’m not sure what particular significance that has.