May 2011

Affinage and A.S.P. 2

For completeness, I should note that IHC UK has appealed Logan J’s decision earlier this month finding that it infringed IHC Australia’s registered trade mark for AFFINAGE. Summary here.

Interestingly, Logan J has granted a stay of his order to remove all references to A.S.P. from IHC UK’s Web site at www.affinage.com.

You will recall that IHC UK owns AFFINAGE outside Australia and had adopted A.S.P. at least partly to deal with the fact that it could no longer use “its” trade mark in Australia.

Logan J appears to have considered a stay pending the outcome of the appeal was in order as IHC UK:

  1. Had removed all references to Australia (including the drop down country box) from its web site at www.affinage.com;
  2. IHC UK was having some sort of global re-launch of A.S. P. in the UK soon, involving 150 or so distributors from around the world;
  3. His Honour accepted that the decision that the modified Web site infringed had been a “difficult one”; and
  4. IHC Australia had not sought damages and it was difficult to identify what damages might flow from the stay.

His Honour did not think that he needed to order a stay of 7 days of his orders relating to the removal of references to Australia from www.affinage.com. That stay had been sought out of an abundance of caution and IHC UK was generally trying to comply with the orders so it appeared a breach, if any, would have been inadvertent.

International Hair Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd v International Hair Cosmetics Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 540

For the orders under appeal, see International Hair Cosmetics Group Pty Ltd v International Hair Cosmetics Limited [2011] FCA 339

Affinage and A.S.P. 2 Read More »

How wide should injunctions be

Following on from his ruling that Idameneo’s use of its trade mark breached its contractual obligation not to use a trade mark capable of being confused with Symbion’s trade mark, Jessup J has granted an injunction:

The Respondent be permanently restrained, whether by itself or through its subsidiaries from using the Respondent’s Mark.

Three aspects for comment:

First, Symbion sought and his Honour refused to grant an injunction that Idameneo not use its trade mark or “any trade mark, device, brand or logo which is similar to or capable of being confused with” Symbion’s trade mark (i.e., reflecting the terms of the contractual obligation).

In support of that application, Jessup J was referred to a number of cases proclaiming that the usual form of order for infringement of an intellectual property right was an order restraining the respondent from infringing the applicant’s [intellectual property right]. His Honour pointed out, however, that none of those cases established that such an order should be made in the case of breach of contract as a matter of principle.

Jessup J accepted that such a wide injunction might be an appropriate exercise of discretion in a particular case. However, there was nothing in this case which warranted that course:

here is nothing in the facts – or in the dynamics – of the present case which would provide any basis for the suspicion that, if it were precluded from using its present mark, the respondent would devise some artful similarity of the applicant’s mark, or would “sail close to the wind” as it is occasionally said.  If the orders which I made on 13 May 2011 stand, the respondent will be obliged to rebrand its business, its sites and its stationery.  Nothing suggested by the applicant, and nothing which otherwise occurs to me, would give reason to suspect that the respondent would have the slightest interest in adopting a new logo or image which was confusingly similar to the applicant’s mark.  If, contrary to this expectation, the respondent were to do so, it is true that the applicant would be obliged to bring fresh proceedings, but I have little doubt but that the court would not then be readily forgiving of the respondent for failing to keep a sufficient distance between its own new mark and that by reference to which the applicant succeeded in this proceeding.

Secondly, despite the terms of the injunction, Jessup J supplemented it with a further order to:

remove and destroy all signage, corporate stationery, flyers, posters, leaflets, brochures and any other promotional, advertising and marketing materials (whether in hard copy or electronic format) and garments which bear the Respondent’s Mark and which are in the possession, power, custody or control of the Respondent or its subsidiaries

and to deliver up an affidavit confirming all that mayhem has taken place.

Finally, his Honour granted a stay of the injunction – for 6 months or, if Idameneo appealed, for 6 months from the date the appeal was concluded. There is no discussion of the reasons for the stay, so it appears to have been uncontroversial between the parties.

Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 789) Limited (No 2) [2011] FCA 531

Thirdly,

How wide should injunctions be Read More »

A lamp lens too far

The fifth decision under the “new” Designs Act 2004 illustrates the operation of that old principle: in a crowded field, small differences may be enough to confer validity, but equally small differences in the accused products will be sufficient to avoid liability.
You will recall that LED Technologies successfully sued Elecspess (and others) for infringing LED’s registered designs for a dual lens lamp, ARD 302359, and a triple lens lamp, 302360 (links to those decisions via here). Well, LED fell out with its Chinese manufacturer, Valens, and found itself a new supplier. Valens, however, didn’t take things lying down and started supplying another of LED’s competitors, Baxter.
As in the earlier case, Baxter challenged the validity of the earlier design; this time arguing that the Statement of Newness and Distinctiveness was unclear and also relying on some different prior art.
The first objection failed.  The perspective view for the two-lens design looks like this:

 

ARD 302359

The Statement of Newness etc. etc. read:

Separate clip in lenses. Base to take a variety of 2, 3 or 4 combination of lenses for stop, tail, indicator, reverse LED lenses, no visible screws.

At [85], Finkelstein J accepted that the Statement of Newness etc. etc. could have been “better expressed”, but it sufficiently clear and succinct:
…. In my view the statement indicates clearly to the relevantly informed addressee (and probably to anyone familiar with the English language) that the base could be manufactured to take a number of lenses. Reference to “separate clip in lenses”, when read with the phrase “no visible screws”, indicates that the lenses clips in and are not held in place by screws. There is nothing relevantly uncertain contained in the statement. 

There were important visual differences between LED’s designs and the closest prior art. For example, at [104]:
the base of the Rubbolite lamps appeared to provide individual frames for each lens, which is not a feature of the registered designs. … the corners of the Rubbolite lens appeared sharper or squarer than the registered designs but said the difference was minor. … there was a noticeable ledge or lip around the lens (which he referred to as the “lens housing”) which was not shown on the registered designs. The ledge or lip around the lens on the Rubbolite lamps tapered inwards which made it substantially different in appearance when looked at from the side. 

Hence, the registered designs were valid.
Unfortunately (for LED), before Valens started supplying Baxter, it had made some changes to the product. As a result, the products supplied to Baxter were not substantially similar in overall impression to the registered designs. Finkelstein J accepted [105] that there were similarities between the products imported by Baxter and the registered design.  Many of them, however, “were common in the prior art”. Moreover:
[106] There are, to my mind, several important features that lead me to the conclusion that the Baxters lamps are not substantially similar in overall impression to the registered designs. The key features are the prominent cut out pattern on the underside of the designs, which is to be contrasted with the flat closed backs of the Baxters lamps, and the square lenses of the designs having a wide landing between them while the Baxters lights have no landing. Of less significance are the long sides of the frames of the registered designs which have raised edges resulting in a counter-sunk appearance, which is not present on the Baxters lamps. As well, the short sides of the frames of the registered designs are raised at their outer portions and dip down in the central portion, which is not a feature of Baxters’ design. 

[107] Moreover, in my view, it is these features that distinguish the registered designs from the prior art such as to admit of the conclusion that the registered designs are new and distinctive. 

Inducing breach of contract

An interesting twist to this case, was that LED also tried to “get” Baxter for inducing the (ex-) Chinese supplier, Valens, to breach its contract with LED.

Essentially, LED argued it had agreed with Valens that Valens would not supply anyone else in Australia or New Zealand with products made using the moulds for the products supplied to LED. The evidence on this point was less than ideal, with the judge being rather critical of the witnesses. There was also a dispute between LED and Valens over who owned what. Ultimately, his Honour accepted that there was a deal that LED would be supplied exclusively for Australia and New Zealand so the supply of products to Baxter was in breach of the agreement. However, Baxter itself did not procure the breach: Baxter did not know Valens was re-using the moulds: to the contrary, it was paying Valens for new moulds.

It is rather hard to reconcile the story in Elecspess on how the designs came into existence and came to be manufactured with the evidence in this case. Of course, as the parties in the two cases are different, each must be decided on its own evidence. I guess, in terms of ownership of the registered designs, there is commonality in that LED’s principal, Mr Ottobre, was the author of the original conception. Matters get rather murky after that.  At [30], LED apparently started selling the lamps made by Valens in “early 2004”, but the priority date of the designs is 22 June 2004.

LED Technologies Pty Ltd v Roadvision Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 146

A lamp lens too far Read More »

Amazon’s 1-click in Australia

On Telstra’s opposition to the grant of Amazon’s 1-click patent in Australia, the Commissioner’s delegate has found that:

  • claims 1, 2 and 4 to 61 were invalid;
  • but:

It seems to me that the use to which server generated client identifiers [i.e., cookies] are put in the present invention is both an elegant and inventive way of achieving one action ordering functionality. Therefore I consider that any of the claims having this integer fulfil the requirement of subparagraph 18(1)(b)(ii) of involving an inventive step. These are claims 3 and 62 to 141.

Patentology has a detailed consideration here.

DCC takes a slightly different tack.

Telstra Corporation Limited v Amazon.com, Inc. [2011] APO 28

The specification in AU 762715 (pdf)

Amazon’s 1-click in Australia Read More »

capable of being confused with the trade mark

Jessup J has ruled that Idameneo’s use of:

Idameneo's trade mark

does not infringe Symbion’s registered trade mark for:

Symbion's trade mark

(As registered, the trade mark is not coloured; it was generally used in the colours depicted. See s 70(3).)

However, Idameneo’s use of its trade mark did breach its contractual obligations.


On the trade mark infringement front, you might have been thinking like me, “Who would have thought?” It turns out, however, that what enabled Idameneo to escape was the nature of the services: medical imaging services. Although the customer, you or I needing an x-ray, pays the bill and has the service practised on us, the relevant public were the doctors (and the odd dentist) who referred the patient to the service. This constituted a specialist market within Lord Diplock’s definition :

My Lords, where goods are of a kind which are not normally sold to the general public for consumption or domestic use but are sold in a specialised market consisting of persons engaged in a particular trade, evidence of persons accustomed to dealing in that market as to the likelihood of deception or confusion is essential. A judge, though he must use his common sense in assessing the credibility and probative value of that evidence, is not entitled to supplement any deficiency in evidence of this kind by giving effect to his own subjective view as to whether or not he himself would be likely to be deceived or confused.

By law, the doctor (and presumably the dentist) could not make a referral without providing the patient with the name and address of the service provider: i.e., they had to know who was going to provide the service.

It is rather a messy deal how Symbion came to license its trade mark to the corporate group of which Idameneo was a member. Under the terms of the licence, however, the licensee agreed (for itself and the other members of the corporate group which included Idameneo) by cl. 5.5:

Use of Similar Marks

Except as permitted by this deed, the [respondent] must not, and must ensure that each Licensee does not, use:

(a)       any Trade Mark; or

(b)     any Mark similar to or capable of being confused with any of the Trade Marks or which contain the words SYMBION or FAULDING,

as a trade mark, business name, domain name or otherwise anywhere in the world.

(emphasis supplied)

Jessup J was not prepared to treat the obligation as being 2 separate obligations: not to use similar trade marks or ones capable of being confused …. Rather, his Honour considered that the notion of ‘similar’ had to take colour from its context.

On the other hand, his Honour rejected Idameneo’s argument that the contractual obligation was no different to the test provided by s 10 for deceptive similarity for trade mark infringement:

36. …. The respect in which the test stated by the contractual provision conspicuously differs from that under s 10 is that it is concerned with similarity which is capable of causing confusion, whereas the section is concerned with resemblance which is likely to deceive or to cause confusion.  Here I think that the applicant has the better of the argument.  It is as clear as may be that the parties to the licence agreement were conscious of the circumstance that many of the marks referred therein were registered under the Trade Marks Act; and it may be inferred that they had an active appreciation of the requirements of s 10.  I have no reason to doubt that their choice of different language by which to express the prohibition in cl 5.5(b) was a conscious one.  I consider that for the court to conflate, as it were, the terms of that prohibition into those of s 10 of the Trade Marks Act would be to neutralise that choice, and would go against the parties’ intentions.

In [37], Jessup J went on to note that the contractual prohibition was part of the consideration Symbion had extracted in return for granting the licence and must be thought to have some intended value.

Applying the usual rules of visual comparison and imperfect recollection, the lower threshold established by capable of confusion compared to likely to deceive or cause confusion meant the contract had been breached.

Jessup J did accept that the setting in which the competing marks were used should be taken into account in deciding whether or not cl. 5.5 was breached. The facts that Idameneo used its mark for medical diagnotic imaging while Symbion used its mark for the wholesale distribution of pharmaceuticals, however, did not save Idameneo:

47 But I do not accept the respondent’s factual submission that the circumstances in which the respondent’s mark is used are so distinct from the business activities of the applicant as to leave no realistic scope for confusion by reason of similarity.  Both marks are used in the allied health sector: indeed, before 2008, the applicant’s mark was used by the respondent and its subsidiaries (then not part of the Primary group) in both the pharmaceutical and the imaging parts of that sector.  I think I am entitled to regard it as notorious that there is a degree of contact, at both the professional and the consumer levels, as between these parts, such as would make it quite unsurprising if the same people – to some extent at least – had occasion to encounter both the respondent’s mark and the applicant’s mark from time to time.  And there is some evidence that the respondent’s mark is used in settings, such as the premises of hospitals, where those who have regular business dealings with the applicant – pharmacists and the staff of hospital pharmacy departments, for example – might be expected to be found. …. (emphasis supplied)

Idameneo argued that cl. 5.5 should be read down so as not to apply to its use of its trade mark because it had been using its trade mark before Symbion’s trade mark had been developed and it was in use when the licence was negotiated. Thus, it argued it was unreasonable to read cl. 5.5 as applying to its continued use of the trade mark. Jessup J rejected this argument, noting the strictness of the test for implying terms into a comprehensive, professionally drafted written agreement. Moreover, Idameneo’s business appears to have been something of a sideline or relatively remote activity within the corporate group as a whole. Jessup J pointed out at [42]:

there is no evidence that the applicant … knew of the existence of the respondent’s mark in the period August-October 2008.

Thus, the conditions for implication of a term could not be made out.

Symbion Pharmacy Services Pty Ltd v Idameneo (No 789) Limited [2011] FCA 389

capable of being confused with the trade mark Read More »

Apple and Samsung Pt 2

Just noting this as a matter of record:

One week after Apple sued Samsung, Samsung sued Apple for patent infringements, apparently in 4 countries. One point of interest is that this is not Samsung’s defence to Apple’s claims, but is filed so soon after Apple went to court.

Nilay Patel considers it all in detail here.

Apple and Samsung Pt 2 Read More »

Framing the Convergence Review

On 28 April, the Government’s Convergence Review (noted here) issued a Framing Paper.

According to p. 4 of this curious document:

This initial consultation paper seeks to identify the principles that should guide media and communications regulation in Australia, and provide stakeholders with the opportunity to raise the key issues arising from the principles. Its intent is to invite big-picture thinking about the Australian media and communications environment in its global context and how it may need to be shaped in order to achieve principles that serve the public interest. The committee will use these principles as a starting point to advise government of its preferred alternative policy framework

Accordingly (from p. 11):

the committee considers it appropriate to develop and consult with stakeholders on a set of principles to guide the committee’s consideration of specific issues. These principles have two main aims: to provide a consistent and transparent basis on which to consider specific issues and to ultimately form the basis of a set of policy objectives suitable for a converging media environment.

So your comments on the Framing Paper are sought by 10 June 2011. Then, the timetable is:

  • Emerging Issue paper : June 2011
  • Hearings: July 2011
  • detailed Discussion Papers: August 2011
  • Final Report: March 2012.

For the most part, the Framing Paper appears to relate to the regulatory regimes for broadcasting and telecommunications.

When announcing his intention to refer aspects of copyright law to the ALRC, the Attorney-General appeared to indicate that the reference (if any) will be subject to what happens in this Convergence Review. It is not so easy to identify from the Framework Paper, however, what areas might be cut across by the ALRC reviewing copyright law.

The Framework Paper does refer in several papers to “legitimate content services”. May be, it is to be found in “principle 6” which is (proposed to be):

Principle 6: Australians should have access to the broadest range of content across platforms and services as possible

This principle is taken from paragraph 5(e)(ii) of the Terms of Reference and is consistent with the objects in the BSA12, and s.3(1)(a) of the Telecommunications Act to ‘Promote the long-term interests of end-users of carriage services or of services provided by means of carriage services.’ The committee considers that a guiding principle for the review is to maximise the range of legitimate content services available to Australians. A consideration is that regulation should be flexible and adaptable to changing market and technological circumstances, and constructed with a view to enhancing audiences and consumer choice.

Principle 7 appears to be directed more to the question of ‘net neutrality.

Convergence Review Framing Paper (pdf)

The Convergence Review’s home page

Framing the Convergence Review Read More »

You can arbitrate disputes under an IP licence agreement

Hamerschlag J, in the New South Wales Supreme Court, has ruled that disputes between a licensor and licensee under a technology licence agreement fall within the arbitration clause in the agreement and, consequently, the arbitrator’s determination that he has jurisdication is valid and binding on the parties.

The disputes between the parties related to (1) the application of the “improvements” clause and (2) whether licence fees would be payable if the licensee embarked on different strategies in the future. Hamerschlag J rejected the licensor’s, Lardken’s, argument that neither of the matters were disputes within the scope of the arbitration clause, cl. 19(b):

(b) All disputes arising in connection with this Licence, which are not adjusted by Licensing Agreement between the parties concerned, shall be finally settled by arbitration. The arbitration shall be held before a single arbitrator appointed by the parties or in the absence of agreement by the Chair of the Law Society of New South Wales, and conducted in accordance with and under the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 of New South Wales. Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction, or application may be made to such court for a judicial acceptance of the award, or an order of enforcement as the case may be.

The improvements clause

Lardken licensed Lloyd to use Lardken’s technology relating to methods of collecting energy, converting it to heat, transferring the heat energy to a storage medium based on graphite and extracting and releasing the heat energy into useable form.

The licence agreement had one of those “Improvements” clauses, cl. 5.4(a), by which Lloyd agreed to transfer ownership of any improvements in the technology it developed to Lardken and would receive a non-exclusive licence back.

A third party, Ausra, applied for patents in the USA and Australia. Lloyd had notified Lardken about these applications, but had settled a dispute with Ausra on terms that Ausra assigned its rights in the patent applications to Lloyd. Lardken claimed that “Ausra’s” patent applications had been developed from confidential information about Lardken’s technology which, it was alleged, Ausra accessed at Lloyd’s facility. Lardken also claimed it was entitled to ownership of patent applications filed by one of Lloyd’s subsidiaries, Solfast.

Lloyd denied that any of this technology were improvements within the meaning of the licence agreement and, when Lardken refused to agree, referred the matter to arbitration.

Lardken argued that these disputes were not capable of determination by the arbitrator as a matter of public policy as only the Commissioner of Patents had authority under the Patents Act to grant patents or, subject to appeal to the Court, determine who was an entitled person under s 15 and s 32 and s 36.

Hammerschlag J held that the issue between the parties was a dispute about whether the Ausra or the Solfast technology fell within the terms of cl. 5.4(a). That was a dispute falling within the scope of the arbitration clause. The arbitrator’s decision would not, and could not, affect the Commissioner’s determination whether to grant the patent applications or not. The Commissioner’s powers under ss 15, 32 and 36, to determine entitlement, were not exclusive: questions of assignment for example were regularly determined in other fora. All the arbitrator’s decision would do would be to decide rights and obligations as between Lardken and Lloyd.

The liability to pay licence fees

Lloyd also sought the arbitrator’s ruling that it would not have to pay additional licence fees if:

  1. it itself constructed something using Lardken’s technology; or
  2. it sub-licensed one of its subsidiaries to construct something using Lardken’s technology.

Lardken argued the dispute about Lloyd’s potential liability to pay royalties in the future was not a ‘dispute’ capable of arbitration. There was, as yet, no “live issue” between the parties, it was really an attempt to seek an advisory opinion about a hypothetical eventuality.

Hammerschlag J also found that this was a dispute covered by the arbitration clause.

When Lloyd had written to Lardken stating its interpretation of the licence agreement, Lardken had responded disagreeing. Thus, at [101]:

There is thus clear disagreement between the parties on matters arising in connection with the Licensing Agreement. Each has claimed that the Licensing Agreement operates in a way which the other disputes; see Halki Shipping Corporation v Sopex Oils Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 726 at 757. See also the incisive discussion as to what constitutes a dispute in Tjong Very Sumito v Antig Investments at 747 and following, and Sutton et al, Russell on Arbitration , 23rd ed (2007) at [5-003].

Further, that fact that there was an element of futurity about the liability to pay did not render it purely abstract or hypothetical. Hammerschlag J accepted that purely hypothetical matters may not qualify as ‘disputes’, At [104]:

Although both of these disputes involve an element of futurity they are not purely abstract or hypothetical in the sense which makes them incapable of being the subject of determination. They concern whether certain prospective conduct will result in liability to pay fees under the Licensing Agreement (or put another way whether in the event of that conduct occurring the failure to pay would be a breach of contract). It was not suggested that the prospect that that conduct would occur was fanciful.

In reaching this conclusion, his Honour noted that declarations could be granted by the Court in similar situations:

98. In The Commonwealth v Sterling Nicholas Duty Free [1972] HCA 19; (1972) 126 CLR 297 at 305 Barwick CJ said:

The jurisdiction to make a declaratory order without consequential relief is a large and most useful jurisdiction. In my opinion, the present was an apt case for its exercise. The respondent undoubtedly desired and intended to do as he asked the Court to declare he lawfully could do. The matter, in my opinion, was in no sense hypothetical, but in any case not hypothetical in a sense relevant to the exercise of this jurisdiction. Of its nature, the jurisdiction includes the power to declare that conduct which has not yet taken place will not be in breach of a contract or a law. Indeed, it is that capacity which contributes enormously to the utility of the jurisdiction.

Hammerschlag J did note, however, it was a matter for the arbitrator’s discretion whether or not to make a determination on the issue.

The judgment doesn’t say how much it would cost to build one of these plant, but one might well think it makes sense for a party to be able to find out in advance what, if any, licence fee would be payable before it had committed to, or incurred, the expense of building the plant.

Larkden Pty Limited -v- Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 268

Lid dip: Steve White

You can arbitrate disputes under an IP licence agreement Read More »

(Not) a case of PBR

Caithness applied for the grant of plant variety rights for the potato variety ‘Nadine’ on 21 May 1992.

That application was accepted by the Registrar on 28 May 1992.

On 10 November 1994, the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 came into force and repealed the Plant Variety Rights Act 1987.

On 16 August 1995, Caithness’ application for Nadine was granted and certificate 465 was issued.

Under the old Act (the PVRA), the term of a registration was 20 years from the date of acceptance; i.e. until 28 May 2012. The term of registration under the New Act, however, was 20 years from the date of grant; i.e. until 16 August 2015. Elders, Caithness’ exclusive agent for Australia, challenged the Registrar’s conclusion that the term applicable was that under the old Act.

If Nadine had actually been registered before the old Act was repealed, s 82 of the new Act meant it would have the longer term of protection (i.e., measured from the date of grant) conferred by the new Act as if it had been registered under the new Act.

Because Nadine had only been accepted when the new Act came into force, however, Lander J has ruled that it did not fall under s 82, but s 83.

Moreover, the drafting of s 83 led to the ‘unfairness’ that Nadine was only entitled to protection for the term applicable under the old Act; i.e. until 28 May 2012.

His Honour refused to apply the principle in Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] UKHL 15 and interpret s 83 as if additional words could be read into it to remedy an obvious drafting error:

85 The additional words which should be read in at the end of s 83 are said to be “save that a successful applicant will be granted PBR pursuant to the provisions of the Act”.

86 Assuming this Court had the power to do what the applicant contends, the Court should decline to exercise the power for two reasons which follow from the reasons for the construction that I have suggested. First, it would mean that an applicant who could not comply with s 44 of the new Act would have to be deemed to have complied otherwise the application would have to be refused. That would require some further words to be notionally added. Secondly, the applicant would obtain rights, being PBR, that s 82 contemplates that an old Act applicant should not be entitled. The applicant would obtain the rights which are specifically excluded in s 82(3) and (4). That would be a very odd result. It would mean that an applicant who had been granted plant variety rights under the old Act would be deemed to be entitled to PBR without the rights in s 82(3) and (4), but an applicant who had made an application under the old Act but who had not been granted any rights would become entitled to PBR including the rights under s 82(3) and (4).

87 This is not a piece of legislation which can be redrawn by the Court. The unfortunate result which the drafting error discloses is a matter for Parliament.

    Elders Rural Services Australia Limited v Registrar of Plant Breeder’s Rights [2011] FCA 384

    Patentology’s take

    (Not) a case of PBR Read More »

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