injunction

Is there a Lenah Game Meats constructive trust?

The short answer is: not in this case in which Snaden J awarded The Game Meats Company $130,000 damages against Farm Transparency International for trespass but rejected Game Meats’ claim to a Lenah Game Meats constructive trust over the copyright in videos made by Farm Transparency during the trespass. The case also challenges whether the victim of the trespass can get an injunction against communicating the fruits of the trespass.

What happened

Game Meats operates abattoirs, including a halal abattoir at Eurobin.

Farm Transparency is a not-for-profit charity dedicated to educating the public about animal exploitation and the prevention of cruelty to animals.

As one of its directors, Mr Delforce, put it, Farm Transparency’s overarching wish is to “…end all forms of business that involve causing harm to animals”.

To that end, Ms McDonald-Eckersall, its Strategy and Campaigns Director, developed Farm Transparency’s “Shut Down Slaughterhouses” campaign.[1] As part of this campaign, between January and April 2024, Farm Transparency operatives (including Mr Delforce and Ms McDonald-Eckersall) broke into the Eurobin abattoir and installed video cameras to record the animal slaughtering process.

In May 2024, Farm Transparency provided some of the footage from those cameras to the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture as part of a complaint about the nature of Game Meats’ operations.

A few days later, Farm Transparency provided 14 minutes of the footage to Channel 7 which broadcast a story on its Albury station, but without the footage. Farm Transparency also posted the 14 minutes of footage with commentary on its Facebook page and on its website with a press release.

Game Meats obtained injunctions ex parte against the continued publication of these materials. Game Meats then sought injunctions and exemplary damages for trespass, injunctions and damages for contraventions of the prohibitions on misleading or deceptive conduct or the tort of injurious falsehood and, finally, it sought a declaration that a constructive trust arose over the copyright in the footage obtained through the trespass.

The decision

By the time of the trial, Farm Transparency admitted liability for trespass and Snaden J ordered damages totalling $130,000 ($30,000 damages and $100,000 in exemplary damages) for the trespass.

Snaden J, however, dismissed the claims for injurious falsehood, misleading or deceptive conduct and for beneficial ownership of the copyright in the footage as a cinematograph film.

The Lenah Game Meats constructive trust

Lenah Game Meats is authority for the principle that an interlocutory injunction cannot be granted except for the protection of some legal or equitable right or interest.

Similarly to the present case, Lenah Game Meats involved an attempt to stop the broadcasting of footage of the operations of the abattoir obtained through unlawful trespassing.[2] In the course of their reasons, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in obiter at [102] (with the individual agreement of Crennan and Callinan JJ):

A cinematograph film may have been made, as in Lincoln Hunt, in circumstances involving the invasion of the legal or equitable rights of the plaintiff or a breach of the obligations of the maker to the plaintiff. It may then be inequitable and against good conscience for the maker to assert ownership of the copyright against the plaintiff and to broadcast the film. The maker may be regarded as a constructive trustee of an item of personal (albeit intangible) property, namely the copyright conferred by s 98 of the Copyright Act. ….

Snaden J noted, therefore, that whether or not a constructive trust would arise depended very much on the particular facts of the particular case.

His Honour noted that, after Lenah Game Meats, Hall J had refused to find a constructive trust arose of footage and photographs taken by trespassers in Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi.

In Windridge Farm, Hall J found that the trespassers did not intend to use the footage for publication (but to facilitate an investigation) and there was no evidence of damage resulting from their conduct. At [129], Hall J said:

Apart from the unlawfulness of the entry onto the premises by the defendants, the evidence does not establish the type of circumstances to which Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lenah] adverted. These circumstances include matters which constitute either an invasion of the legal or equitable rights (such as the right to confidentiality) of the owner or occupier of premises or facts that establish a breach of any equitable obligation operating between (in this case) the plaintiff and the defendants at the time the film and the photographs were made or taken.

First, at [174] – [175] Snaden J rejected breach of confidence as a basis for intervention. While breach of confidence could be invoked to restrain the publication of confidential information “improperly or surreptitiously obtained”,[3] Game Meats had not submitted what was depicted in the footage was confidential nor could it realistically do so.[4]

Next, Snaden J considered there might be situations where how the footage had been obtained (his Honour’s emphasis) could give rise to a sufficient equity. At [177], his Honour explained:

But for the absence of authority, I would have been disposed to the view that it should. For the best part of two centuries, courts of equity have been prepared to grant relief against defendants possessed of information obtained by reason of “…a breach of trust, confidence or contract”: Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 1171, 1178 (Cottenham LC). The fact that information has been obtained through the commission of a crime or tort might not, by itself, suffice to warrant equivalent relief: Lenah, 230–1 [55] (Gleeson CJ); Smethurst v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2020) 272 CLR 177 (“Smethurst”), 219–20 [94] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). But there is, in my view, much to commend the submission that, subject to discretionary considerations, equity might intervene to grant relief in relation to information that is directly obtained:

(1) as the intended consequence of wrongful conduct; and

(2) for the purposes of using it to visit prejudice upon the victim against whom that conduct was carried out.

For a respondent to realise the benefit that was intended to materialise from conduct of that kind would, I think, aptly be described as unconscionable (or unconscientious: see Lenah, 244–5 [98] (Gummow and Hayne JJ)).

However, Snaden J held that this was not a case where a constructive trust arose.

First, at [179], Snaden J noted that obtaining the footage through trespass had not been sufficient in Windridge and Smethurst. While the absence in Windridge of a purpose to shame or damage the abattoir was a difference to the present case, it was not sufficient. At [180], his Honour concluded:

…. The court should, I think, be very slow to favour a result that deviates from what transpired in those cases in the absence of some clearly apparent distinguishing feature or features.

Secondly, Snaden J was influenced at [181] by the absence of precedent recognising the proposed constructive trust. It was not appropriate for a judge at first instance to indulge “in the kind of ‘bold step’ that trial judges should ordinarily leave for higher consideration”.

Injurious falsehood and misleading or deceptive conduct

The claims for injurious falsehood and misleading or deceptive conduct failed because Snaden J found that the publications did not falsely represent that Game Meats condoned animal cruelty or was systematically cruel to the animals it slaughtered at the abattoir.

The injurious falsehood claim failed for the further reason that Farm Transparency did not make the representations in the publications maliciously. Snaden J accepted that there was no element of personal spite against Game Meats. However, his Honour rejected Farm Transparency’s claim that it did not intend harm to Game Meats. On the contrary, Farm Transparency’s very objective was to shame Game Meats and reduce custom for its products by exposing its production practices.

Even so, this was not enough – the intention to injure had to be without just cause. And that was not the case. At [131], his Honour explained:

The making of each of the Three Publications was effected to further the political ends to which FTI is committed. Whatever might be said of those ends, they cannot be impugned as unjust or improper in any sense recognised by law. It is a feature of societies the world over—and liberal democratic societies in particular—that people with shared ideological, religious, commercial or other values will group together with a view to spreading them or having them lawfully imposed upon others. That reality does not bespeak relevant injustice or impropriety.

Game Meats’ claims would also have run into difficulties proving it had suffered damage. Partly because of the state of its evidence, partly because of the speed with which the trial was brought on including the swift court action to secure interlocutory injunctions and partly because Farm Transparency had undertaken that it would not restore the footage to public view until final determination of the proceeding.

What happened to the injunction

The claims of copyright and injurious falsehood having failed, Game Meats sought an injunction to restrain Farm Transparency from publishing the footage obtained through the trespass. Game Meats argued this was necessary to prevent Farm Transparency from realising the benefits of its trespassing.

The interlocutory injunction was dissolved and no further injunction was granted!

Citing Patrick Stevedores at [33], Snaden J accepted that an injunction might be granted where the damage caused by tortious conduct is ongoing and is “extreme or at all events very serious”.

His Honour noted that Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ in Smethhurst had considered the invasion of Ms Smethurst’s privacy provided a sufficient interest for an injunction requiring the police to return her phone and the data it held. The police had seized the phone by executing a search warrant which was subsequently found to be invalid and so committed trespass. However, their Honours were in the minority.

At [204] – [206], Snaden J observed that the majority in Smethhurst, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ, accepted an injunction could be awarded where the trespass was completed only if its effects were serious and ongoing. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ in particular had ruled the trespass did not support an injunction and there was no other right to be vindicated:

The public interest in both the investigation and the prosecution of crime would not suggest as appropriate an order that the information be taken from the [Australian Federal Police (“AFP”)] and given to the plaintiffs. The prospect that criminal conduct may be disclosed is a sufficient reason to decline the relief sought.

In the present case, the acts of trespass – at least as against the Eurobin premises – were well and truly completed although Snaden J considered it was very likely Farm Transparency would engage in similar acts against other premises.

On that basis, his Honour held that further acts of publishing the footage could not be characterised as continuations of the original trespass. And further, his Honour considered Game Meats could not establish the consequences of such publication(s) would be sufficiently serious.

As to the first point, his Honour accepted Farm Transparency’s submission:

It is correct to observe that obtaining of the footage was made possible by the trespass. However, once trespassing, the respondent did not commit any further breach of the law by filming what was there to be observed nor invade any further rights of the applicant. The respondent was not an outlaw whilst trespassing. The law treats the acts of trespass, and filming (even if whilst a trespasser), as distinct and not interrelated. One cannot slide as between those two separate matters, despite them arising from the same factual matrix.

At [214], Snaden J accepted that submission and explained at [215]:

There is a distinction that must be drawn between the commission of the tort—that is to say, the unauthorised entrance by FTI’s agents onto the Eurobin Premises and the installation there of the covert recording equipment that was thereupon installed—and the publishing of information obtained as a result thereof. The latter involves no interference with any legal right that GMC possesses and is not, in and of itself, tortious. The injury that inheres to GMC’s prejudice as a result of the trespasses is, at most, FTI’s possession of the footage; not its publication. (original emphasis)

At [216], Snaden J illustrated his proposition with the analogy that an injunction could not be granted against Mr Delforce or Ms McDonald-Eckersall to stop them telling others what they had seen during their trespasses.

In addition, Snaden J considered Game Meats could not show its injury from further publication would be sufficiently serious. At [214], his Honour explained:

…. If FTI were to publish the footage that it obtained as the fruit of its unlawful trespass, the consequences for GMC are difficult to pinpoint. I would accept, at a level of generality, that they would unlikely be positive. But the extent to which they might sound in immeasurable or extreme damage to GMC’s goodwill would depend on all manner of circumstances, not the least being the manner in which GMC sought to counter any public backlash. I do not consider it possible to conclude that the damage to GMC’s goodwill would be so significant as to clear the hurdle that needs to be cleared.

So, apart from the damages award, Farm Transparency is free to use the fruits of its trespassing with, it appears, impunity.

As a final point, although it was unnecessary to his decision, Snaden J noted he would have rejected Farm Transparency’s argument that its continued use of the footage was protected by the implied constitutional freedom of expression about matters of politics or government.

It might be questioned how allowing a trespasser to continue using the fruits of their trespassing promotes the objectives of the civil prohition on committing a trespass. This appears to be recognised by his Honour’s reaction at [177] “in the absence of authority”. Even so, one might wonder, with respect, whether telling someone what one had seen is comparable in nature and impact to showing a video. One might also wonder whether acts of unrestricted publication are comparable to disclosure to authorities or use in an investigation.

There’s an appeal

Game Meats and Farm Transparency have both appealed (VID 92/2025).

The Game Meats Company of Australia v Farm Transparency International Ltd [2024] FCA 1455 (Snaden J)


  1. Ms McDonald-Eckersall had previously achieved fame, or notoriety, through the Animal Rebellion campaign which disrupted McDonald’s national supply chain in the UK “costing the company millions”.  ?
  2. Snaden J noted that the injunction rejected by the High Court in Lenah Game Meats was an injunction against the broadcaster. However, the interlocutory injunction against the trespassers themselves was left undisturbed (because they did not appeal).  ?
  3. Citing Gleeson CJ at [34] in Lenah Game Meats.  ?
  4. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by the High Court’s ruling in Lenah Game Meats and the subsequent decision Farm Transparency International Ltd v New South Wales [2022] HCA 23; 277 CLR 537 at [41]; a case involving an unsuccessful challenge to the constitutional validity of sections 11 and 12 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW).  ?

Is there a Lenah Game Meats constructive trust? Read More »

Dying in the FANATICS ditch

The attempt by global online sports merchandise retailer, Fanatics LLC, to expand its operations directly into Australia has resulted in the cancellation of its FANATICS registrations in class 35[1] (but not class 42[2]) and findings that it had infringed FanFirm’s competing registrations in class 25[3]. FanFirm’s own registrations in classes 9, 16, 24, 32 and 38, however, were cancelled for non-use.

The case runs through the gamut of issues: ownership, first use, similarity of goods / services, cancellation under s 88, removal for non-use, honest concurrent user, infringement, defences under s 122(1) and ACL / passing off. Rofe J’s judgment runs to 497 paragraphs so I am not going to try to tackle everything. Rather, I want to pick out three or four issues which I found particularly interesting. In particular, when the US-based respondent sought to expand its business in Australia, it was forced (unsuccessfully) to try to read down the scope of FanFirm’s registered trade marks as mere adjuncts to its tour operator business.

Some background

You might recall watching a sporting event where there were some raucous crowd members wearing green and gold curly wigs. It turns out the original fanatic, a Mr Livingstone, attended the US Open in 1997 where his “enthusiastic support” earned him an invitation to attend a post match celebration with the winner, Pat Rafter.

Beginning with a Davis Cup match in October 1997, Mr Livingstone parlayed this beginning into a business promoting tours to sporting and, eventually, cultural events and selling merchandise. Those attending the tours often wore merchandise such as “FANATICS”- branded t-shirts and caps. In 2004, Mr Livingstone incorporated the applicant and it took over the business which has continued to grow and expand so that, by the time of the trial, there were some 160,000 members in its customer database.

Meanwhile, in 1995, the respondent started life in the United States as Football Fanatics Inc. It formally became Fanatics Inc only in 2010.

The respondent operates around the world selling licensed sports merchandise such as NBA, NFL, F1 and Premier League products and, since 2018, third party merchandise which it manufactures and brands with its FANATICS Marks.

Before 2010, the respondent’s business was operated through a series of audience-specific brands and websites such as www.footballfanatics.com (1997), www.fastballfanatics.com (2006), www.fastbreakfanatics.com (2007), www.faceofffanatics.com (2007), www.fightingfanatics.com (2008), www.surffanatics.com (2008), www.fanaticsoutlet.com (2008), www.kidfanatics.com (2009) and www.ladyfanatics.com (2009).

In 2009, it acquired the domain name <fanatics.com> which initially redirected to the Football Fanatics website. From 2011, however, it became the respondent’s primary website.

It appears the respondent had been making some sales to customers in Australia from its Football Fanatics website since 2000. The respondent also provided what were described in the judgment as modest sales figures from its www.fanatics.com website to Australians beginning in 2014 through till 2020.

In 2020, the respondent’s Australian operations expanded significantly. It began operating the Essendon Football Club’s online store as “A Fanatics Experience” and began selling its FANATICS branded merchandise nationally through Rebel Sports stores.

The trade marks

FanFirm relied on two trade marks of which, TM 1232983, was for FANATICS in classes 9, 16, 24, 25, 32, 38 and 39 which was registered with effect from its filing date on 2 April 2008. (The respondent had unsuccessfully opposed registration back in 2010.)

The respondent also had two registrations for FANATICS, another for FANATICS and Flag device and registrations for FOOTBALL FANATICS and SPORTS FANATICS. The earliest registrations, for FANATICS and FOOTBALL FANATICS, dated from 10 September 2008. That first FANATICS registration was achieved on the basis of continuous prior use under s 44(4).

The respondent’s Flag device:

Who used first (in Australia) and for what

Rofe J’s first crucial ruling was the determination of who was the first user of FANATICS as a trade mark in Australia – and for what.

Her Honour found that FanFirm had been using FANATICS in relation to goods – the merchandise – from its website at www.thefanatics.com from 2004.

Her Honour also found ([151] and [158]) that FanFirm’s use on its website was use in relation to the class 35 services of on-line retail services of sports related clothing and merchandise, order fulfilment services and product merchandising.

In reliance on the CHIFLEY Hotel case, the respondent contended (at [152]) that FanFirm’s sales from its website were neither use in respect of clothing nor retail sales as they were merely an adjunct to FanFirm’s core business of providing tour and event services.

Rofe J rejected this characterisation. At [153], her Honour pointed out that merchandise could be purchased from FanFirm’s website even if no tour or event booking was made. Thus, there was no necessary relationship between tours and events on one hand and, on the other, the merchandise. Her Honour also noted that Markovic J in the Katy Perry case had found that the sale of merchandise at and in conjunction with Katy Perry’s concerts was use in relation to the goods and retail services. Rofe J explained at [155]:

Markovic J’s findings on this issue were not challenged on appeal and I respectfully agree with her Honour. Using a trade mark on goods does not cease to be “use as a trade mark … in relation to goods” for the purposes of s 120(1) of the Act simply because the sale of the relevant goods is “closely tied” or an adjunct to some service offered by the applicant which is their primary or core business. In any event, I do not consider that the sale of merchandise on the applicant’s website to be merely an adjunct to its main business of providing tour and event services.

and at [158]:

…. The applicant’s website provided an online retail service from at least 2004 because customers could visit the website, select a product and then purchase that product. It therefore also provided order fulfillment services and product merchandising within the meaning of the respondent’s class 35 registration. ….

As FanFirm’s use was before the respondent’s earliest use in Australia in 2010 or 2011 (at [144] – [145]), her Honour’s conclusions ultimately led to orders for the cancellation of the respondent’s registered trade marks in class 35.

This conclusion did not extend to the respondent’s class 42 services – setting up, managing and operating an online store for a third party – as her Honour at [159] found such services were not the same kind of thing as online retail services or the class 25 goods.

The respondent’s use infringed FanFirm’s class 25 registration

Next, Rofe J found that the respondent’s sales of clothing merchandise from its fanatics.com website to Australians infringed FanFirm’s registration in class 25.

Some of the goods sold were the respondent’s own products branded with its Fanatics and/or Fanatics Flag mark. The respondent, however, contested that the sales of third party merchandise (i.e., not branded FANATICS) from its website and some products where FANATICS appeared only on the swing tag (or similar) involved use as a trade mark in relation to goods.

The third party merchandise

FanFirm argued that the sale of NBA, NFL and other third-party clothing manufactured by the likes of Adidas and Nike from the respondent’s website constituted not just use of FANATICS in relation to online retail services in class 35 but also use in relation to the goods themselves.

An example is this webpage:

The respondent argued (at [215]) that this was only use of FANATICS in relation to online retail services just as use of REBEL on REBEL SPORTS stores was use in relation to retail services and not the goods themselves.

Rofe J held, however, that this use constituted use in relation to the clothing goods themselves, not just in relation to retail services. In doing so, her Honour relied on the decisions in Sports Warehouse, [Solarhut][sol], [Flexopack][flex], Edgetec and Bob Jane. At least some of these cases involved the sale from the infringer’s website of goods which were not manufactured by (or for) the infringer. Accordingly, her Honour concluded at [220]:

The respondent invites consumers to visit its website at www.fanatics.com. At that website, goods are available for purchase under the name FANATICS as part of the domain name, displayed in page headings and in references to products. I consider that this constitutes use of the FANATICS Marks as trade marks in relation to the goods for which the applicant’s FanFirm Marks are registered, including clothing, sportswear and headgear.

The swing tag use

From 2020, the respondent was offering for sale from sites such as “www.aflstore.com.au” and “www.rebelsport.com.au” shirts and other apparel for 11 AFL teams and also some of its own branded clothing. At least some of the AFL clothing did not bear FANATICS on the labelling or otherwise. The “only” use of FANATICS was on the swing tag:

In addition to the swing tag, the FAQ also stated:

15.1 “When you make a purchase, you are purchasing from rebel. The order is simply being sent from a Fanatics warehouse.”

15.2 “Products shipped by Fanatics will only be available online and will be shipped direct from a Fanatics distribution centre to customers. Rebel does not hold these products in Australia.”

15.3 “Click and Collect is not available for products shipped by Fanatics as they are not stocked in our stores. They will be available for delivery only”

Further, there were other goods on which the respondent’s trade mark had been embroidered or printed on the label (albeit a small proportion of the total).

As with the third party merchandise from the respondent’s own website, the respondent argued this use on the swing tag was only use in relation to retail services, not the goods themselves. Rofe J also rejected this argument in the context of this case.

Given that s 7 defines use as use upon or in physical or other relation to the goods, the fact that the use was on the swing tag and not on the goods themselves was hardly determinative.

At [198], Rofe J considered:

It would be apparent to any reasonable Australian consumer that the Hawthorn Football Club (or any sporting club) does not manufacture clothing, and that the Hawthorn indicia are part of the design of the shirt material. The use of the FANATICS Marks in these instances are being used as “a badge of origin” to distinguish the respondent’s relevant good from goods manufactured by other sports clothing manufacturers such as Nike or Adidas: E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 144 at [41]–[42] (per French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).

In any event, her Honour pointed at at [200]:

In this case, the FANATICS Marks on the FANATICS branded goods are being used as a badge of origin and thus the use constitutes trade mark use. The fact that other marks are present on the clothing, such as the logo of the relevant sporting team or league, does not matter. Dual branding is “nothing unusual” and does not have the effect that one of the marks is not being used as a trade mark: see Allergan Australia Pty Ltd v Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd (2021) 162 IPR 52 at [66] (per Jagot, Lee and Thawley JJ) and the cases there cited (these comments were not disturbed on appeal in Self Care). See also Anheuser at [189] and [191] (per Allsop J).

Thus, subject to the respondent’s numerous defences, FanFirm’s trade mark for clothing etc. in class 25 was infringed.

Some issues raised by the defences

The respondent raised a number of defences against a finding of infringement – in addition to its unsuccessful attempt to have FanFirm’s trade mark cancelled.

The respondent was exercising a right to use the trade mark given by registration

The respondent’s first line of defence was s 122(1)(e) – the exercise of a right to use a trade mark given to the user under the Act. That is, someone does not infringe another person’s registered trade mark if the “someone” has registered their own trade mark and is using it within the scope of that registration.

The issue here is that, as the respondent was not the owner of the trade mark for online retail services, its trade mark was not validly registered as a result of the operation of s 88(1)(a) and s 58.

On this issue, while her Honour considered it a “strange result” from a policy perspective, at [313] – [314] Rofe J followed Nicholas J’s ruling in Dunlop and held that cancellation was not retrospective but prospective only. That is, the respondent’s trade marks were not cancelled ab initio but only from the date of her Honour’s order.

While this protected the respondent from awards of damages (or an account) for its past conduct, (at [385]) this did not protect the respondent from an injunction against continued use of the infringing trade marks.

Honest concurrent user

As it had been using its trade marks in Australia since 2010 or 2011, the respondent also argued the Court should find the respondent was entitled to registration (s 122(1)(f) or (fa)) on the basis of honest concurrent user (ss 44(3)).

Ultimately, her Honour rejected this defence, finding that the respondent’s use did not qualify as honest concurrent user.

The problem for the respondent was at least three fold. First, the respondent adopted FANATICS as its corporate name and trade mark with knowledge of FanFirm and its trade mark. Indeed, it had sought to oppose registration of FanFirm’s mark. Rofe J accepted the respondent did not adopt the trade mark to take advantage of FanFirm’s reputation, however, it could not be described as “independent adoption”. Moreover, while two of the respondent’s senior executives involved in the decisions gave evidence, no-one from the respondent gave evidence of any honest belief that confusion would not result. At [331], her Honour concluded:

The adoption of the respondent’s new corporate name and mark occurred with knowledge of the applicant and its mark, and the goods for which registration of that mark was sought. Whilst I do not consider that the respondent adopted the FANATICS Marks in order to divert business or goodwill from the applicant, it cannot be described as “independent adoption”. Further, as I have said above, despite leading evidence from two senior employees of the respondent, the respondent led no evidence as to the existence of any honest belief that there would be no confusion as a result of the respondent adopting the same mark as the applicant’s existing marks. Thus, the two hallmarks of honesty are absent from the respondent’s adoption of the FANATICS Marks.

At [383] – [383], Rofe J relied on similar reasoning to reject the respondent’s contention that her Honour should exercise the discretion arising under s 89 not to remove the trade marks.

The injunction issue

In her Honour’s subsequent ruling on costs and non-pecuniary remedies, Rofe J stayed the operation of the order for cancellation of the registered trade marks pending the outcome of the appeal (for which Rofe J gave leave).

Rofe J also ordered an injunction restraining infringing use but refused to stay that order pending the determination of any appeal.

A number of factors led to her Honour refusing the stay.

These included, first, that her Honour was far from convinced that the respondent had the level of reputation in Australia it claimed given the apparently small scale of its sales here.

Secondly, the respondent’s claims of the disruption to its global business seemed overstated in light of the small scale of its Australian sales compared to the global business, its apparent disregard of the Australian market in deciding to adopt FANATICS and FanFirm’s evidence about the availability and utility of geo-blocking services so that the respondent’s sales to the rest of the world would be unaffected.

Further considerations included the dilution of FanFirm’s own goodwill and the difficulties in quantifying that.

Accordingly, Rofe J considered the balance of convenience lay in favour of not staying the injunction.

Bromwich J substantially upheld her Honour’s refusal to order a stay of the injunction but modified it slightly:

  1. to allow the respondent 28 days to implement geo-blocking of Australia; and
  2. to enable continued use in respect of “global customer care labels” in a particular form and to allow the respondent to deal with returns.

Bromwich J, like Rofe J, also referred to a number of other considerations.

Rofe J’s key finding was that FanFirm was the first user of FANATICS in Australia for goods such as clothing and online retail services for such products. Such use was not merely an adjunct to FanFirm’s tour organisation and supply business. As a result, the respondent’s trade marks for those goods and services will be cancelled and it has been enjoined against continued use in Australia. Just because you are clear to operate under your trade mark in one country does not mean you will be able to use it in another, different market.

FanFirm Pty Limited v Fanatics, LLC [2024] FCA 764 (Rofe J)

FanFirm Pty Limited v Fanatics, LLC (No 2) [2024] FCA 826 (Rofe J)

Fanatics, LLC v FanFirm Pty Limited [2024] FCA 920 (Bromwich J)


  1. Class 35: Business marketing consulting services; customer service in the field of retail store services and on-line retail store services; on-line retail store services featuring sports related and sports team branded clothing and merchandise; order fulfillment services; product merchandising; retail store services featuring sports related and sports team branded clothing and merchandise  ?
  2. Class 42: Development of new technology for others in the field of retail store services for the purpose of creating and maintaining the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting; computer services, namely, creating and maintaining the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting services; computer services, namely designing and implementing the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting services; computer services, namely, managing the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting  ?
  3. Class 25: Clothing, footwear and headgear, shirts, scarves, ties, socks, sportswear  ?

Dying in the FANATICS ditch Read More »

Front views of two prior art microphones, the registered design and the XTrak

A case of design

A case of design

Burley J has ruled that Uniden’s XTrak mobile radio product would infringe GME’s registered design.

Uniden had begun displaying in Australia images of its Xtrak product on its website and in its online shop, but was not yet selling the product. After an exchange of correspondence in which Uniden refused to disclose its proposed launch date, GME sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain infringement of its registered design. Instead, Burley J listed the matter for early final hearing:

How good is that?

Helpfully, Burley J’s decision includes images of the prior art as well as the registered design and the Xtrak. Front views of the two closest prior art as well as the registered design and the Xtrak are set out below:

GME Uniden and the prior art

The legal issue

By s 71, a person infringes a registered design if they make, import, sell, offer to sell etc. a product embodying a design substantially similar in overall impression to the registered design.

Whether a product is substantially similar in overall impression to a registered design is tested by the matters set out in s 19.

Those matters require the Court to give more weight to the similarities than the differnces having regard to the state of development of the prior art, whether or not there is a statement of newness and distinctiveness[1] and the freedom of the designer to innovate. As GME’s design was registered before the ACIP Response Act, these matters fell to be considered from the perspective of the “standard of the informed user”.

The s 19 factors are also used to determine the validity of a registered design.

Burley J noted that the ALRC had explained how the substantial similarity test was supposed to work at paragraph 6.7:

…. The word ‘substantially’ is preferred to ‘significantly’ because ‘substantially’ has already been interpreted in a copyright context to be a qualitative and not quantitative term. The qualitative test is useful to determine designs infringement without importing a copying criterion. A qualitative test will assist the courts in evaluating the importance of the similarities and differences between competing designs. ….

and:

The phrase ‘overall impression’ is preferred because it encourages the court to focus on the whole appearance of competing designs instead of counting the differences between them.

(The emphasis is Burley J’s.)

Burley J pointed out, therefore, the prior art is relevant not just to the validity of the design but also infringement as it helps determine the proper scope of the design.

Accordingly, where the state of the art was highly developed, distinctiveness may lie in only small advances. If so, however, a correspondingly close degree of resemblance would be required between the accused product and the registered design.

Comparing the designs

Burley J considered the overall shape of the registered design and the Xtrak was very similar, both being vertically symmetrical curve-shaped trapezoids tapering to the base. The screen arrangement and screen surrounds were very similar. As was the curved PTT (or press to transmit button) and the clear spatial separation below the upper buttons and the lower buttons.

Front views of the registered design and the Xtrac labelled to identify corresponding features
Registered design v Xtrac

His Honour noted a number of differences. The registered design had a slight “step in” feature (which contributed to the spatial separation between the upper and lower buttons on the front face); the lower buttons in the registered design were arranged a central trapezoidal button where the Xtrak had a central column of speakers; thirdly, the Xtrak had a row of dummy buttons centred on the top speaker element while the registered design displayed a curving speaker panel. Other differences, such as the visibility of the microphone and the top buttons, were relatively trivial and given less weight.

Burley J accepted that there were functional and ergonomic considerations affecting the design of such products. For example, the “basic architecture” of such products would include a PTT button, buttons, a speaker, a microphone, a boss and a downward-facing grommet. Others included a shape that could be held in one hand, the positioning of the PTT button on the left-hand side.

However, the evidence of the prior art showed there was considerable scope for variation in these features so a designer had considerable freedom to innovate.

Overall, Burley J held at [84] the Xtrack was closer to the registered design than the registered design was to the prior art and so infringed:

I take into account the state of development of the prior art in making my assessment, in accordance with s 19(2)(a) of the Act. In my view the informed user would regard the XTRAK to be more similar in overall impression to the GME design than any of the other prior art devices. The prior art base demonstrates that the overall shape of each of the devices considered in section 3.3 above varies considerably, from broadly rectangular, to trapezoidal, to the waisted rectangle of the Crystal. The two most similar to the GME design, in terms of shape, in the prior art are the TX4500S and the Standard Horizon, yet they have more obviously different appearances in terms of their front face arrangements.

2 other matters

First, the statement of newness and distinctiveness was so general, not identifying any particular features, it played no role in the assessment.

Secondly, as noted, the comparison fell to be made under the “standard of the informed user” test applicable before the amendments made by the ACIP Response Act.

Burley J applied the “familiar person” test developed by Yates J and also applied by Nicholas J, not the “informed user” approach. It does seem both practical and sensible for the Courts to apply the “familiar person” test to pre-ACIP Response Act cases now, given the divergent responses and the legislative adoption of the “familiar person” test going forward.

Final judgment matters

In his Honour’s final orders disposing of the proceeding, Burley J refused to make an order for delivery up and takedown against Uniden. The orders included an injunction, the infringing products had never been sold in Australia and there was no reason to believe Uniden would not comply with the injunction:

… the broad principle underlying the making of such order is that where an injunction has been made and, that notwithstanding, there is a basis for considering that there may be a temptation to act in breach of the injunction because of materials possessed by a party, then it may be appropriate to order delivery up and takedown: see Goodman Fielder Pte Ltd v Conga Foods Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 307. That circumstance does not arise in the present case. An injunction will be made against Uniden, a large corporation. There is no reason to believe that it would not behave in accordance with the injunction, as counsel for the applicant accepts. In those circumstances, and having regard to the correspondence which indicates that the XTRAK product has never been sold in Australia, it is appropriate to decline to make an order for delivery up and takedown.

Burley J also adopted a process designed to expedite resolution of the order that Uniden pay GME’s costs of the proceeding.

At the parties’ request, Burley J allowed them 14 days to negotiate the quantum of costs payable by Uniden to GME. If they were unable to agree, Burley J ordered that GME should file and serve within a further 14 days a Costs Summary in accordance with the Costs Practice Note (GPN-Costs). Uniden would then have a further 14 days to file and serve a costs response. If the parties were still unable to agree within 14 days of that service, then a Registrar was directed to determine the quantum including, if thought appropriate, on the papers.

A check on Federal Law Search shows the proceeding as “closed”.

GME Pty Ltd v Uniden Australia Pty Ltd [2022] FCA 520


  1. There was a statement of newness and distinctiveness here: “Newness and distinctiveness is claimed in the features of shape and/or configuration of a microphone as illustrated in the accompanying representations.”  ?

A case of design Read More »

The Federal Circuit Court can grant Mareva injunctions

The Federal Circuit Court can issue mareva injunctions[1] under s 14 and s 15 of the Federal Circuit Court Act 1999.

Mr Vartzokas is an architect. Through his company he agreed to provide architectural services in connection with the development of a 5 storey apartment block in Prospect Rd Adelaide to the developer, Nazero Contructions Pty Ltd.

He provided the services and sent in his bill for $48,100.

Mr Younan seems to have been the principal of Nazero Constructions and was the person with whom Mr Vartzokas dealt.

With some difficulty, Mr Vartzokas managed to extract payments totalling $25,000 from Mr Younan. When Mr Vartzokas sent in his final bill for the remaining $23,100 with the final drawings, the drawings were endorsed with the statement:[2]

These drawings are the copyright property of the architect and are not to be reproduced or copied without prior written license of the architect.

Needless to say (this is a court case afterall), Mr Vartzokas was not paid his outstanding $23,100.

Instead, he was contacted by a Mr Chen on behalf of Yi Hong Pty Ltd, which was about to purchase the Prospect Rd property and wanted to engage Mr Vartzokas to provide further architectural services in relation to it.

Mr Chen provided Mr Vartzokas with copies of the working drawings for the property which Mr Chen had obtained from Mr Younan in connection with the proposed purchase and wanted Mr Vartzokas to work on.

Mr Vartzokas recognised the drawings as being the ones he had prepared for Mr Younan and Nacero Constructions. Only the authorship was attributed to “JB Archi-Build”!

Unbeknownst to Mr Vartzokas, around the time Mr Vartzokas was having trouble extracting his initial payments from Mr Younan, Mr Younan caused a new company, Nazero Group SA Pty Ltd to be incorporated. Nazero Constructions sold the Prospect Rd property to Nacero Group for $1,017,500. Nacero Constructions then changed its name to Zeecat Constructions.

When Mr Chen provided the “JB Archi-Build” drawings to Mr Vartzokas, Mr Vartzokas discovered the existence of Nacero Group and that it was in the process of selling the Prospect Rd property to Yi Hong for $1,190,000. Settlement on the contract was due the next day following the hearing.

Mr Vartzokas sued seeking a mareva injunction to require the proceeds from the sale (after paying out the bank holding a registered mortgage over the property) be paid into the Federal Circuit Court pending trial of Mr Vartzokas’ copyright infringement claims.

Judge Brown granted the mareva injunction ex parte. On the question whether Mr Vartzokas had demonstrated a real risk that the assets would be dissipated and the Court’s process frustrated, his Honour pointed to the sneaky swap in ownership of the Prospect Rd property between Mr Younan’s companies, his failure to pay all Mr Vartzokas’ bills and continued use of the drawings without payment or recognition:

[35] I am also satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie case that there is a real risk of assets being dissipated, if the relief sought is not granted. In my view, the significant evidence in this regard arises as a consequence of the change of name of Nazero Constructions Pty Ltd, which coincided with that entity not honouring the invoices submitted to it by the applicant. This failure to pay its debt, to the applicant, ultimately led to the winding up of the company concerned.

[36] More significantly, after the company had been liquidated, Mr Younan incorporated an entity with a similar name and transferred the land at Prospect to it. At the same time, Mr Younan appears to have been intent on developing the land in a similar manner to that which envisaged the intellectual input of Mr Vartzokas, but without either payment or recognition to him.

[37] In all these circumstances, I am satisfied that there is a significant risk that, if the injunction sought is not made, the proceeds of sale of the Prospect property will not be available to the applicant to either satisfy any award of damages to which he is entitled or to provide any accounting for the profits made on the sale of the land concerned, which, at least on a prima facie basis, seems to have included his architectural designs to be utilised on the property’s development.

His Honour also noted there was no prejudice to third parties as the bank mortgagee would get paid its due before money’s were paid into court.

Vartzokas Architects Pty Ltd v Nacero Group SA Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 849


  1. Yes, I know we are supposed to call them an asset preservation order, but really ….  ?
  2. The usual implied licence can be excluded by an express written term to the contrary: Devefi v Mateffy Perl Nagy  ?

The Federal Circuit Court can grant Mareva injunctions Read More »

Now for the PLAYGO word mark

Moshinsky J has now extended the declarations and injunctions in the Playgro v Playgo proceedings to include the PLAYGO word mark, but refused orders to recall infringing products and for delivery up.

The previous decision concerned the use of the PLAYGO device. This device appeared prominently on the top and the four sides of the product packaging. In small print (6 point or 8 point) on the bottom of the packaging, the following legend was printed:

Screen Shot 2016-05-11 at 12.28.21 PM

Moshinsky J has now ruled that PLAYGO in the first line of that “notice” also infringed, but not the other occurrences of PLAYGO in the company names.

The respondents argued that the PLAYGO device placed prominently on the top and sides of the packaging was clearly the trade mark and would be understood by the consumers to be the trade mark. This “notice” was just a legend referring to that device. Consumers would never even see it, unless they picked the package up and looked at its underside. His Honour said at [17]:

In the present case, the word, ‘PLAYGO’ was immediately followed by the letters, ‘TM’ in superscript and the words “is a trademark of”. These are strong indicators that the word, ‘PLAYGO’ is being used as a trade mark, that is, as a ‘badge of origin’ to distinguish the respondents’ playthings from playthings made by others. While the nature and purpose of the use of the word must be considered in the context of the packaging as a whole, which includes the Playgo Device Mark on the front and sides of the box, the fact that the Playgo Device Mark is used as a trade mark does not diminish the fact, in this case, that the word, ‘PLAYGO’ in the small print is also being used as a trade mark. This case may be contrasted with cases where a word which is arguably descriptive is used in small print on the packaging and it is concluded that, in the context of the packaging as a whole, including the use of a prominent brand elsewhere on the packet, the word is not being used as a trade mark: compare, for example, Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd v Nestle Australia Ltd (2010) 86 IPR 1 at [22], [37]-[40] per Sundberg J; Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd v Nestlé Australia Ltd (2010) 87 IPR 464 at [42], [48] per Stone, Gordon and McKerracher JJ. In the present case, the word, ‘PLAYGO’ is not descriptive and the presence of the superscript letters, ‘TM’ and the words “is a trademark of” indicate use as a trade mark.

Even if the word PLAYGO in the first line of the “notice” could be seen as a legend, it would be sufficient that one of the impressions a consumer could take away from the use was that it was used as a trade mark and that was the case here.

Bearing in mind that Playgo was outside Australia (in China) and supplied its products there to retailers who imported them into Australia for sale, the injunctions Moshinsky J ordered were against supplying for sale in Australia playthings under or by reference to the PLAYGO device or in packaging bearing both the PLAYGO device and the word PLAYGO in small print on the packaging (other than as part of a company name).

The words “under or by reference to” were preferred to “use as a trade mark” as, while the latter expression is the term used in the Act, it was liable to debate and uncertainty about its scope. The use of PLAYGO in the company names was not enjoined as it was not trade mark use. In addition, his Honour was not prepared to enjoin wider uses of PLAYGO where the trial had concerned only the limited use in small print on the bottom of the packaging.

Moshinsky J refused to order Playgo to recall all unsold goods. Playgo had stopped supplying goods with the trade mark in November 2014. His Honour considered it unlikely that stocks would still be held by retailers. Even if there were, there was no evidence that Playgo had any right to require the retailers to return the products. (That of course does not mean that retailers who sell would not infringe.)

The order for delivery up was also refused. This was because any goods in Playgo’s possession or control were in China – where it was located and operated – and could be sold to places other than Australia where there might not be an infringement.

Playgro Pty Ltd v Playgo Art & Craft Manufactory Limited (No 2) [2016] FCA 478

Now for the PLAYGO word mark Read More »

Abilify interlocutory injunction continues pending appeal

Last month, Yates J found that Otsuka’s patent for aripiprazole was invalid.[1] As a consequence, his Honour ordered that the interlocutory injunction preventing Generic Health from listing its product on the PBS and selling it be dissolved. Otsuka has appealed and now Nicholas J has granted a stay to preserve the interlocutory injunction pending the appeal.

While not being prepared to characterise Otsuka’s prospects on the appeal as higher than arguable, Nicholas J considered the balance of convenience favoured continuation of the interlocutory injunction.

Otsuka relied principally on the fact that there would be an automatic reduction of 16% the price payable under the PBS for Abilify[2] once Generic Health’s product was listed. It contended that it would not be possible to recover that price drop if its appeal were successful.

Generic Health countered that it risked losing the benefits of first mover advantage if it were enjoined and other generic producers were not. Generic Health’s evidence was that pharmacists would usually only carry one generic brand of each drug and that was likely to be the first brand “in”. This would exacerbate the difficulties in calculating its losses. Nicholas J did not dismiss that argument, but Otsuka said it would be seeking interlocutory injunctions against any other generics who tried to enter the market pending the appeal. Nicholas J noted further that, if Otsuka failed in an injunction applications against a second or further generic, that would be a strong basis to terminate the stay.

The Commonwealth also sought a specific undertaking to pay damages from Otsuka as the price of the injunction. It argues it will suffer loss, in the form of the higher prices payable under the PBS, if Generic Health continues to be enjoined but the appeal ultimately fails.

Nicholas J noted that a case has been stated to the Full Court on whether the Commonwealth can indeed claim under the “usual undertaking as to damages”. Subject to the outcome of that case, his Honour considered the Commonwealth was sufficiently within the scope of the usual undertaking and so did not need a separate, specific undertaking.

Nicholas J increased the security for costs that Otsuka had to provide to Generic Health in the amount of an additional $8.7 million[3] and, in addition, required a security of $6 million separately to the Commonwealth. His Honour also noted that the Commonwealth could apply to extend that security if the appeal was not decied in the first half of 2016.[4]

Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 848


  1. Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd v Generic Health Pty Ltd (No 4) [2015] FCA 634. Patentology looked at the ‘swiss claims’ aspects of his Honour’s decision.  ?
  2. The commercial name under which aripiprazole is marketed by Otsuka and its licensee.  ?
  3. Otsuka has already provided $6.5 million pursuant to the orders made by Yates J at first instance.  ?
  4. At [35], Nicholas J recored that the Commonwealth estimated its losses from the continuation of the interlocutory injunction would be $6 million over the next 12 months and $15 million over the next 18 months.  ?

Abilify interlocutory injunction continues pending appeal Read More »

Interlocutory Injunction to transfer domain name

Nicholas J has granted Thomas International an interlocutory injunction ordering Humantech to transfer the domain names, thomasinternational.com.au and thomas.co.za, to Thomas International. Thomas International had to give the usual undertakings and, as a foreign corporation, provide security for costs.

Thomas International is an English company which provides psychological testing and psychometric assessments, and competency and skills-based assessments, particularly using computerised services accessed over the internet through thomasinternational.net. It also makes its materials and services available through distributors. It appointed Humantech, a company associated with a Mr Schutte, as its master distributor/licensee for South Africa and Australia with power to exercise its rights through distributors. Humantech was permitted to use the “Thomas” trade marks, to incorporate a company in Australia under the name Thomas International (Australia) and to register the domain names. There were also obligations when the arrangements ceased or were terminated to cease use of the trade marks and change the corporate name of Thomas International (Australia) to a name which did not include Thomas.

In due course, the Schutte interests also incorporated another entity, ACT, which offered similar services to Thomas International’s assessment and training services. Thomas International alleges that, after some successful years’ trading, revenues from Thomas International (Australia) starting dropping off and the Schutte interests were diverting customers to ACT which, without permission, was using materials based on Thomas International’s materials.

Thomas International sued Humantech, Thomas International (Australia), ACT and Mr Schutte. There was a meeting between the parties and their lawyers shortly after. Thomas International said it would not discuss a new licensing arrangement until an undertaking dealing with the existing issues was provided. As a result, Humantech and the Schutte interests provided an undertaking to cease use of Thomas International’s trade marks, intellectual property and to transfer the domain names over. Thomas International also agreed to negotiate about a new licensing arrangement in good faith.

The next day Thomas International made its licence proposal to the Schutte interests. They considered it was financially unworkable and left the meeting. Later that day, they then put Humantech (and subsequently the other corporate entities) into administration and disabled the website. Shortly thereafter, Thomas International applied for interlocutory injunctions.

As noted, Nicholas J granted the interlocutory injunctions including an order that the domain names be transferred to Thomas International. The terms of the Undertaking meant it had a prima facie case to force the Schutte interests to stop using the Thomas name and trade mark and for the transfer of the domain names.

The Schutte interests’ main attempt to rebut that was their argument that the Undertaking was invalid or unenforceable. That was said to result because, it was alleged, that Thomas International extracted the Undertaking in return for its promise to negotiate a new licence arrangement in good faith. The Schutte interests contended that the terms of the licence they were offered were so unreasonable as to show that Thomas International did not negotiate, and had no intention of negotiating, in good faith. This issue was not developed in detail at this stage, but Nicholas J pointed out that, on the current state of the law in Australia, an obligation to negotiate in good faith did not require a party to subordinate its own interests to that of the other party.

On the balance of convenience, Nicholas J accepted Thomas International’s argument that:

the present state of affairs may cause TIL significant reputational damage as a result of customers who have purchased units entitling them to make use of facilities provided by TIL at the Thomas Hub being prevented from gaining access to it through the TIA website. I accept this submission. I also consider that any such damage may be irreparable and that damages will most likely not provide an adequate remedy. The financial statements of TIA for the financial year ending 30 June 2014 show that the company has net assets of just under $145,000.

On the other hand, the Schutte interests’ main argument was the disruption to their business, and that of their customers, if they could not continue to use the domain names, the main access point for provision of services both to Thomas International (Australia)’s customers and those ACT. As Nicholas J pointed out, however, the Schutte parties had already disabled access to the websites so they had already caused that problem themselves.

It would appear that Thomas International first learned something about ACT’s activities, the subject of the complaint, in May 2014 (i.e., a year earlier). However, Thomas International was able to lead evidence showing all the work it did, and the difficulties it encounted, in trying to ascertain what ACT was doing until proceedings were issued. In this context, the termination by Humantech of the main employee with responsibilities for running the Thomas part of its business may will have been highly significant.

Permission to proceed against the companies although administrators were appointed was granted as the interests of the administrators were adequately protected by the undertaking as to damages and provision for securities.

Thomas International Limited v Humantech Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 541

Interlocutory Injunction to transfer domain name Read More »

Blocking injunctions – the Bill

The Commonwealth Government has introduced into Parliament the Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015. This bill will implement the second (or third) of the Government’s online infringement proposals.

The Bill would insert a new s 115A into the Act. Under s 115A, a copyright owner would have a right to apply to the Federal Court for an injunction against a carriage service provider[1] requiring the carriage service provider to take reasonable steps to block access to on online location outside Australia the primary purpose of which is to infringe copyright (whether in Australia or not).

The EM is at pains to stress that the website must be outside Australia – otherwise the copyright owner could sue directly – and its primary purpose must be copyright infringement. Thus, the EM says services like Youtube, iTunes and so on would not be exposed to the risk of injunction.

The bill does not prescribe what steps would be reasonable (to attempt) to block access, but presumably guidance may be sought from English decisions on this issue.

In deciding whether or not to grant the injunction, the Court will be directed to take into account a range of factors including, in particular, the flagrancy of the infringement and the proportionality of blocking access to the extent of the infringement.

Provision is also made for the person operating the website to be, or become, a party to the proceeding and to apply after an injunction has been granted for it to be rescinded or varied.

The carriage service provider will be liable for costs only if it enters an appearance and takes part in the proceedings. The bill does not make provision for whom should bear the costs of implementing and maintaining the injunction.

The injunctions provided by the English courts include a mechanism for copyright holders to “update” the webiste addresses so that, if the website operator changes the URL, it is an administrative exercise to notify the ISP. The Bill does not appear specifically to contemplate this, and it is unclear whether the Federal Court would, or should, adopt such a mechanism.

In addition to discussion of blocking methods, the Cartier[2] ruling in England includes an interesting discussion of the costs of such applications and also the costs incurred by the ISPs in implementing the injunctions. Apparently, after the initial cases, such an application typically cost the copyright owners around £14,000 with a further fee of around £3,600 per year per website for monitoring. The costs to ISPs reported by the judge ranged from a “low four figure sum per month” to a “low six figure sum a year”.

The Cartier case concerned websites infringing trade marks, not copyright. One might wonder whether the Australian law should also extend to trade marks?

The Senate has referred the Bill to its Legal and Constitutional Affairs committee for review. There is plainly not much to discuss about the bill, as the committee is due to report back by 13 May 2015 and you must make your submissions, if any, by 16 April 2015.

Copyright Amendment (Online Infringement) Bill 2015 (pdf)
Explanatory Memorandum (pdf)


  1. For you and me, that’s Telstra, Optus, iiNet/TPG, Foxtel etc., but real lawyers should go via s10 to here (take a tent and all necessary provisions and we’ll see you in several years).  ?
  2. Also known as Richemont after the third claimant.  ?

Blocking injunctions – the Bill Read More »

Springboard injunctions and patents

In December, Beach J found AUG infringed Streetworx’ innovation patent for a street light fitting. Now, his Honour has granted an injunction restraining AUG from further infringing the patent, but has refused to grant a “springboard injunction” or order delivery up.

Before the trial, AUG had secured contracts with two municipal councils, Monash and Moonee Valley, to supply, respectively, 8,000 and 6,000 infringing light fittings. The lights have yet to be supplied. AUG couldn’t negotiate a royalty or licence fee with Streetworx so it could supply. Therefore, it sought to modify its fittings so they no longer infringed. Streetworx sought the “springboard injunction” to block that supply on the basis that AUG secured the contracts with the infringing product and should not be allowed to take the benefit of that infringement.

Beach J accepted that the Court does have power to order a “springboard injunction” of the kind sought.

Beach J accepted Streetworx’ argument that but for the infringing conduct there would not have been any contract to supply.[1] However, that was not enough to secure the “springboard injunction” as his Honour considered it was also necessary to consider the quality of the advantage obtained by the infringement.

[81] …. The quality of the unwarranted advantage needs to be considered. In the scenario where the relevant integers had no causal significance (ie absent the relevant integers the contract would have been awarded for the product in any event), the nature and quality of the unwarranted advantage is less egregious than if the presence of the relevant integers in the product played a critical role in the decision to award the contract. So, in that more nuanced fashion, it is relevant to consider the causal significance of the presence of the relevant integers to the decision to award the contract. The more the unwarranted advantage is causally tied to the significance of the presence of the relevant integers, the stronger the basis for the injunction and vice versa. The concept of unwarranted advantage contains within it a normative aspect and has a spectrum quality rather than Streetworx’s simplistic binary characterisation of it either being established or not established. In other words, there are degrees of unwarranted advantage which are to be considered and which are not foreclosed from consideration by merely demonstrating “but for” factual causation as Streetworx has demonstrated in the present case.

In this case, Beach J considered that damages or an account of profits would be an adequate remedy.[2] Secondly, the qualitative advantage gained by the infringement was low. So far as the evidence went, the infringing features were not a selling point in AUG achieving the sales. Although there was no evidence directly from the Councils themselves, this was supported by the fact they were prepared to accept the non-infringing products in place of the infringing fittings. Thirdly, his Honour took into account the impact of the proposed injunction on the innocent Councils in a market where there were limited suppliers.

His Honour also refused to order delivery up as the fittings had been modified so that they no longer infringed.

Streetworx Pty Ltd v Artcraft Urban Group Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] FCA 140


  1. If the fitting to be supplied had not been itself the infringement – a holistic infringement, but rather merely a component such as the brake of a car, Beach J may have been prepared to take the more nuanced approach advocated by AUG at the causation stage.  ?
  2. This is an unusual consideration at the final injunction stage as typically the Courts will not condone future infringing conduct. Here, of course, his Honour found the conduct would not be infringing. His Honour did order that the price of escaping the injunction would be an undertaking from AUG to pay its gross margin from the sales into a trust account pending the damages/account inquiry.  ?

Springboard injunctions and patents Read More »

3 stripes v 4 stripes: the remedies

4 stripes 3 stripes now the remedies

Following the decision a couple of months back that 3 of 12 Pacific Brands’s shoes had infringed adidas’ 3-stripes trade mark, Robertson J has now:

  1. made a declaration that Pacific Brands infringed;
  2. granted an injunction permanently restraining Pacific Brands from making or selling etc. 2 of the 3 shoes found to infringe;[1]
  3. awarded $20,000 damages; and
  4. ordered Pacific Brands to pay 30% of adidas’ costs.

The amount of damages was resolved between the parties. There are a couple of points of interest in the terms of the injunction and the costs order.

First, in relation to the injunction, adidas had sought an injunction which restrained Pacific Brands both in relation to the specific shoes found to infringe and also “from otherwise infringing” the 3-stripes trade mark. Robertson J refused this wider injunction. The practical reality of 9 styles either abandoned or found not to infringe served a telling warning against the injunction sought:

because, as these proceedings have shown, such an order would lack sufficient clarity and definition and the Court should not make an order in relation to conduct where a person would not readily know whether or not its proposed conduct breached the order. What is the appropriate relief must depend on the facts and on the underlying dispute and I do not derive much assistance from the form of relief granted in trade mark cases which concerned primarily words because infringements by words are generally clearer than by designs.[2]

His Honour also refused to include one of the 3 infringing styles in the order because the shoe had been taken off the market 7 years earlier and there was no sufficient risk of its reintroduction. While the other 2 infringing shoes had been taken off the market in 2009, an injunction was warranted. First, no unconditional undertaking had been given in relation to them. Secondly, while a broad undertaking had been given, his Honour considered the sale of these 2 styles after that undertaking was in place breached it. His Honour also considered that the evidence that Pacific Brands’ Global Trading division – the “division” which had sold the shoes – had been closed down was not “sufficiently cogent” to persuade him that there was no sufficient further risk of infringement.

Thirdly, the terms of the injunction extend also to authorising, directing or procuring other to make or sell the infringing shoes.

On the costs question, Robertson J considered the “old” rules which included an automatic one third reduction to the costs where less than $100,000 was recovered were applicable as the action started before the new, 2011, rules came into force. However, his Honour exercised his discretion not to apply that rule. The Federal Court was an appropriate forum to have brought the action in and damages were not the primary relief being sought. The costs were reduced, however, to reflect the degree of adidas’ success, particularly bearing in mind it had pursued 12 styles of shoe as part of an overall strategy to obtain broad injunctive relief. The little weight accorded to the survey having regard to the substantial amount of evidence it involved, in the face of Pacific Brands’ objections, was also a factor in the reduction of costs.

Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] FCA 1335


  1. The terms of the injunction were:  ?

    The respondent, whether by its servants, agents or otherwise, be permanently restrained from:

    (a) manufacturing, procuring the manufacture of, importing, purchasing, selling, offering to sell, supplying, offering to supply or distributing footwear in the form depicted in any of Exhibits K or L in these proceedings, being the footwear depicted in Annexures B and C to these Orders;
    (b) authorising, directing or procuring any other company or person to engage in any of the conduct restrained by sub-paragraph (a).

  2. This may be contrasted with the typical injunction in a patent case that thou shalt not infringe the patent; leaving the infringer to run the gauntlet.  ?

3 stripes v 4 stripes: the remedies Read More »

Scroll to Top