first use

Cantarella lost its appeal and the ORO trade mark

The fallout from the High Court’s ruling that ORO is distinctive for coffee continues. In round 2 of the ORO trade mark saga (Lavazza edition), Cantarella has lost its appeal from Yates J’s ruling to expunge its ORO trade marks.

The tantalising issue of the relationship between s 58 (ownership) and honest concurrent use, however, has been left dangling.

A recap

Cantarella owns two registered trade marks for ORO in Australia in respect of coffee. TM 829098 and TM 1583290.

The earlier of the two, the 098 mark, was filed on 24 March 2000. However, Cantarella’s evidence was that it first began using ORO as a trade mark for its coffee products “at least” from 20 August 1996.

Having successfully sued Modena and fended off the ownership and distinctiveness challenges to its registrations, Cantarella sued Lavazza for infringement of these trade marks by selling in Australia LAVAZZA qualità ORO coffee in packaging such as:

Four images of packaging for coffee showing the trade marks "Caffè Molinari" and ORO

At trial, Yates J found this packaging involved use of ORO as a trade mark but did not infringe Cantarella’s trade marks because they were invalidly registered as Cantarella was not the owner:

The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the applicant is not the owner of the trade mark.

Who used the trade mark first

The key fight in the appeal, as at trial, was whether Caffè Molinari’s products had used “ORO” as a trade mark in Australia before Cantarella’s first use on 20 August 1996.

In the Modena case,[1] evidence from Molinari’s senior executive only showed use after that date. In this case, however, Yates J accepted evidence from two different Molinari employees and two witnesses from CMS / Saeco that CMS / Saeco, a coffee business in Coburg Victoria, had in fact imported shipments of the Molinari product before Cantarella’s first use. So, in contrast to the Modena case, Cantarella was not the owner of the trade mark ORO in Australia[2] and its trade marks were invalidly registered.

For the most part, this conclusion turned on Yates J’s assessment of the creditworthiness of the witnesses which, despite some question marks, the Full Court considered it was not appropriate to disturb.

The Full Court rejected Cantarella’s argument that the finding about the date of Molinari’s first use in Modena was conclusive. It was a factor, but needed to be weighed in the balance with all the other relevant evidence.

Cantarella attacked the evidence from the Molinari witnesses who advanced data from Molinari’s records and set out in Excel spreadsheets. The issue here was that the invoices and shipping documents were no longer available for the sales before the priority date of Cantarella’s use. One of the Molinari witnesses also admitted that the spreadsheet might record “pro forma” invoices. Apparently, these were what we might call quotes, sent to customers and which only became sales if the customers accepted them. The Molinari witnesses were unable to say whether the relevant entries were sales or “pro forma” invoices.

The Full Court, however, pointed out that “pro forma” invoices of this kind would still count as use of the trade mark as offers to sell. (Also, there was the evidence of the CMS / Saeco witnesses that orders were placed and product in the packaging was received.)

Did Molinari use ORO as a trade mark in Australia

Next, Cantarella challenged Yates J’s ruling that ORO was used as a trade mark on the Molinari 3 kg packaging:

Close up views showing "Miscela di Caffè" in small type and ORO underneath but in much larger type.
Molinari’s Miscela Di Caffè ORO composite usage

Cantarella argued that this was use only of a composite mark “Miscela di Caffè ORO”.

As with the finding about when Molinari first used ORO in Australia, Cantarella was unsuccessful in challenging Yates J’s acceptance of the evidence that Molinari’s 3kg packaging in 1995 and 1996 took the form of the 2007 packaging.

On that basis, the Full Court dismissed Cantarella’s appeal on this ground, explaining at [93]:

We have had regard to the primary judge’s finding, applying Modena, that the word ORO is inherently distinctive and capable of acting as a badge of origin when used in relation to coffee. We have had regard to the prominence given to the word ORO both in the context of the packaging as a whole, and relative to the words MISCELA DI CAFFÈ in the much smaller font. We have also had regard to the appearance of what Cantarella calls the composite expression as it appears on both the front and back of the 3kg packaging, where the relevant words are differently arranged. In each case the word ORO appears much more prominently than the words MISCELA DI CAFFÈ. We consider the word ORO simpliciter acts as a badge of origin. We therefore agree with the primary judge’s finding on this topic.

Use as part of a composite mark

To succeed on the s 58 ground, Lavazza had to show not just that Molinari was the first user of ORO as a trade mark in Australia, but also that it had used it continuously and not abandoned it.

During the Modena litigation, howeve, Molinari had changed its packaging to use the expression “QUALITÀ ORO” – which Cantarella had not challenged. Thus, the evidence showed a progression of uses:

Caffè Molinari’s QUALITA ORO branding vs the Miscela di Caffè ORO branding

Cantarella contended these were use of the composite mark “QUALITÀ ORO” only, not ORO alone.

Lavazza did not try to argue that “QUALITÀ ORO” was substantially identical to ORO (and so might invoke s 7(1)).[3] Rather, it argued these later forms of packaging were use of ORO itself.

At [113], the Full Court explained:

The fact that the mark in question may appear as a component of a larger mark does not preclude a finding that it has been used as a trade mark. Whether or not there has been such use will depend on the circumstances and the overall impression conveyed.

Then, the Full Court accepted Molinari had used ORO itself as a trade mark in the later forms of packaging. Their Honours noted this depended on matters of impression about which minds might reasonably differ but “on balance” agreed with Yates J’s finding explaining at [114]:

In the case of both the 6077 and 6021A/6021E products, the word ORO is given prominence by the use of a larger font and, in the case of 6021A/6021E, ORO occupies a central position on the pack separated from the word QUALITÀ by the horizontal line immediately above the word ORO. We also note that the word ORO is given prominence across the relevant product range including on packaged coffee products 1525E, 6091 (as depicted in J [201], being the December 2003 1kg packaging) and 6071. The use across the range is consistent with the use of ORO as a sub-brand within the Molinari range of packaged coffee.

No exercise of the discretion against removal

The Full Court then rejected Cantarella’s appeal from Yates J’s refusal to exercise the discretion under s 88 not to remove the registrations.

At [141], the Full Court recorded the long established proposition that, once a ground for cancellation is established, the registration should be cancelled unless sufficient reason appears for leaving it on the Register. The trade mark owner having the onus to show sufficient reason.

As this was a discretionary judgment, this required Cantarella to show legal error. The Full Court considered Cantarella failed to demonstrate any error and so this ground failed.

The main reason advanced by Cantarella was its reputation arising from its long use. However, the Full Court at [148] agreed with Yates J that this was not a matter of significant weight.

Assuming Cantarella had a strong reputation, it still retained the ability to prevent misrepresentation through passing off and the prohibition on misleading or deceptive conduct. And so, there was no compelling necessity for the marks to remain on the Register.

The unresolved issue

Cantarella sought to argue for the first time on appeal that it should be considered a joint owner of ORO at common law as a result of its long use as an honest concurrent user.

That is, Cantarella sought to throw into question the relationship between s 58 and s 44(3).

In McCormick, Kenny J had ruled that the new “plain English” version of the Act which put “honest concurrent user” in Part 4 of the Act dealing with grounds of rejection and “ownership” in Part 5 dealing with grounds of opposition meant that s 58 was in effect in a separate sphere from honest concurrent user and independent and superior to that ground. So that, even if an applicant established it was an honest concurrent user, it still could not be validly registered in the face of a successful s 58 opposition.

The Full Court refused leave for Cantarella to argue this for the first time on appeal.[4] At [134], however, their Honours did say:

The preferable solution to this difficulty may be to read s 58 and s 44(3) together to form a harmonious legislative scheme in which s 58 is read subject to s 44(3): Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69] – [71] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ citing (inter alia) Ross v The Queen (1979) 141 CLR 432 at 440 per Gibbs J. That would involve recognising that s 58 does not apply in the circumstances where s 44(3) has been satisfied. But it is not necessary to resolve this issue in the present case because even if s 58 operates subject to s 44(3), the requirements of s 44(3) were not shown to have been met in this case. (emphasis supplied)

The problem for Cantarella was that it had not led any evidence explaining how it had come to adopt ORO and so of honest concurrent user would not be available.

I guess we shall have to wait and see whether a special leave application is forthcoming and, if it does, its fate.

Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Lavazza Australia Pty Ltd [2025] FCAFC 12 {Nicholas, Jackson and Rofe JJ)


  1. Modena was Molinari’s exclusive distributor in Australia. The High Court’s decision, of course, laid down the law in Australia to determine when a mark has no inherent capacity to distinguish and held ORO was inherently distinctive for coffee. Consequently, Modena’s defence to infringement failed.  ?
  2. The owner being the first person either to use the mark in Australia as a trade mark for the relevant goods or services or to apply to register it with the intention of using it as a trade mark here: Re Hicks’s Trade Mark (1897) 22 VLR 636 at 640; Food Channel Network Pty Ltd v Television Food Network GP (2010) 185 FCR 9 (Keane CJ, Stone and Jagot JJ) at [49] – [55], Pham Global Pty Ltd v Insight Clinical Imaging Pty Ltd (2017) 251 FCR 379 (Greenwood, Jagot and Beach JJ) at [18] – [19].  ?
  3. If the Registrar or a prescribed court, having regard to the circumstances of a particular case, thinks fit, the Registrar or the court may decide that a person has used a trade mark if it is established that the person has used the trade mark with additions or alterations that do not substantially affect the identity of the trade mark.  ?
  4. In fact, the issue was raised in obiter dicta by Yates J at [647] – [649].  ?

Cantarella lost its appeal and the ORO trade mark Read More »

Dying in the FANATICS ditch

The attempt by global online sports merchandise retailer, Fanatics LLC, to expand its operations directly into Australia has resulted in the cancellation of its FANATICS registrations in class 35[1] (but not class 42[2]) and findings that it had infringed FanFirm’s competing registrations in class 25[3]. FanFirm’s own registrations in classes 9, 16, 24, 32 and 38, however, were cancelled for non-use.

The case runs through the gamut of issues: ownership, first use, similarity of goods / services, cancellation under s 88, removal for non-use, honest concurrent user, infringement, defences under s 122(1) and ACL / passing off. Rofe J’s judgment runs to 497 paragraphs so I am not going to try to tackle everything. Rather, I want to pick out three or four issues which I found particularly interesting. In particular, when the US-based respondent sought to expand its business in Australia, it was forced (unsuccessfully) to try to read down the scope of FanFirm’s registered trade marks as mere adjuncts to its tour operator business.

Some background

You might recall watching a sporting event where there were some raucous crowd members wearing green and gold curly wigs. It turns out the original fanatic, a Mr Livingstone, attended the US Open in 1997 where his “enthusiastic support” earned him an invitation to attend a post match celebration with the winner, Pat Rafter.

Beginning with a Davis Cup match in October 1997, Mr Livingstone parlayed this beginning into a business promoting tours to sporting and, eventually, cultural events and selling merchandise. Those attending the tours often wore merchandise such as “FANATICS”- branded t-shirts and caps. In 2004, Mr Livingstone incorporated the applicant and it took over the business which has continued to grow and expand so that, by the time of the trial, there were some 160,000 members in its customer database.

Meanwhile, in 1995, the respondent started life in the United States as Football Fanatics Inc. It formally became Fanatics Inc only in 2010.

The respondent operates around the world selling licensed sports merchandise such as NBA, NFL, F1 and Premier League products and, since 2018, third party merchandise which it manufactures and brands with its FANATICS Marks.

Before 2010, the respondent’s business was operated through a series of audience-specific brands and websites such as www.footballfanatics.com (1997), www.fastballfanatics.com (2006), www.fastbreakfanatics.com (2007), www.faceofffanatics.com (2007), www.fightingfanatics.com (2008), www.surffanatics.com (2008), www.fanaticsoutlet.com (2008), www.kidfanatics.com (2009) and www.ladyfanatics.com (2009).

In 2009, it acquired the domain name <fanatics.com> which initially redirected to the Football Fanatics website. From 2011, however, it became the respondent’s primary website.

It appears the respondent had been making some sales to customers in Australia from its Football Fanatics website since 2000. The respondent also provided what were described in the judgment as modest sales figures from its www.fanatics.com website to Australians beginning in 2014 through till 2020.

In 2020, the respondent’s Australian operations expanded significantly. It began operating the Essendon Football Club’s online store as “A Fanatics Experience” and began selling its FANATICS branded merchandise nationally through Rebel Sports stores.

The trade marks

FanFirm relied on two trade marks of which, TM 1232983, was for FANATICS in classes 9, 16, 24, 25, 32, 38 and 39 which was registered with effect from its filing date on 2 April 2008. (The respondent had unsuccessfully opposed registration back in 2010.)

The respondent also had two registrations for FANATICS, another for FANATICS and Flag device and registrations for FOOTBALL FANATICS and SPORTS FANATICS. The earliest registrations, for FANATICS and FOOTBALL FANATICS, dated from 10 September 2008. That first FANATICS registration was achieved on the basis of continuous prior use under s 44(4).

The respondent’s Flag device:

Who used first (in Australia) and for what

Rofe J’s first crucial ruling was the determination of who was the first user of FANATICS as a trade mark in Australia – and for what.

Her Honour found that FanFirm had been using FANATICS in relation to goods – the merchandise – from its website at www.thefanatics.com from 2004.

Her Honour also found ([151] and [158]) that FanFirm’s use on its website was use in relation to the class 35 services of on-line retail services of sports related clothing and merchandise, order fulfilment services and product merchandising.

In reliance on the CHIFLEY Hotel case, the respondent contended (at [152]) that FanFirm’s sales from its website were neither use in respect of clothing nor retail sales as they were merely an adjunct to FanFirm’s core business of providing tour and event services.

Rofe J rejected this characterisation. At [153], her Honour pointed out that merchandise could be purchased from FanFirm’s website even if no tour or event booking was made. Thus, there was no necessary relationship between tours and events on one hand and, on the other, the merchandise. Her Honour also noted that Markovic J in the Katy Perry case had found that the sale of merchandise at and in conjunction with Katy Perry’s concerts was use in relation to the goods and retail services. Rofe J explained at [155]:

Markovic J’s findings on this issue were not challenged on appeal and I respectfully agree with her Honour. Using a trade mark on goods does not cease to be “use as a trade mark … in relation to goods” for the purposes of s 120(1) of the Act simply because the sale of the relevant goods is “closely tied” or an adjunct to some service offered by the applicant which is their primary or core business. In any event, I do not consider that the sale of merchandise on the applicant’s website to be merely an adjunct to its main business of providing tour and event services.

and at [158]:

…. The applicant’s website provided an online retail service from at least 2004 because customers could visit the website, select a product and then purchase that product. It therefore also provided order fulfillment services and product merchandising within the meaning of the respondent’s class 35 registration. ….

As FanFirm’s use was before the respondent’s earliest use in Australia in 2010 or 2011 (at [144] – [145]), her Honour’s conclusions ultimately led to orders for the cancellation of the respondent’s registered trade marks in class 35.

This conclusion did not extend to the respondent’s class 42 services – setting up, managing and operating an online store for a third party – as her Honour at [159] found such services were not the same kind of thing as online retail services or the class 25 goods.

The respondent’s use infringed FanFirm’s class 25 registration

Next, Rofe J found that the respondent’s sales of clothing merchandise from its fanatics.com website to Australians infringed FanFirm’s registration in class 25.

Some of the goods sold were the respondent’s own products branded with its Fanatics and/or Fanatics Flag mark. The respondent, however, contested that the sales of third party merchandise (i.e., not branded FANATICS) from its website and some products where FANATICS appeared only on the swing tag (or similar) involved use as a trade mark in relation to goods.

The third party merchandise

FanFirm argued that the sale of NBA, NFL and other third-party clothing manufactured by the likes of Adidas and Nike from the respondent’s website constituted not just use of FANATICS in relation to online retail services in class 35 but also use in relation to the goods themselves.

An example is this webpage:

The respondent argued (at [215]) that this was only use of FANATICS in relation to online retail services just as use of REBEL on REBEL SPORTS stores was use in relation to retail services and not the goods themselves.

Rofe J held, however, that this use constituted use in relation to the clothing goods themselves, not just in relation to retail services. In doing so, her Honour relied on the decisions in Sports Warehouse, [Solarhut][sol], [Flexopack][flex], Edgetec and Bob Jane. At least some of these cases involved the sale from the infringer’s website of goods which were not manufactured by (or for) the infringer. Accordingly, her Honour concluded at [220]:

The respondent invites consumers to visit its website at www.fanatics.com. At that website, goods are available for purchase under the name FANATICS as part of the domain name, displayed in page headings and in references to products. I consider that this constitutes use of the FANATICS Marks as trade marks in relation to the goods for which the applicant’s FanFirm Marks are registered, including clothing, sportswear and headgear.

The swing tag use

From 2020, the respondent was offering for sale from sites such as “www.aflstore.com.au” and “www.rebelsport.com.au” shirts and other apparel for 11 AFL teams and also some of its own branded clothing. At least some of the AFL clothing did not bear FANATICS on the labelling or otherwise. The “only” use of FANATICS was on the swing tag:

In addition to the swing tag, the FAQ also stated:

15.1 “When you make a purchase, you are purchasing from rebel. The order is simply being sent from a Fanatics warehouse.”

15.2 “Products shipped by Fanatics will only be available online and will be shipped direct from a Fanatics distribution centre to customers. Rebel does not hold these products in Australia.”

15.3 “Click and Collect is not available for products shipped by Fanatics as they are not stocked in our stores. They will be available for delivery only”

Further, there were other goods on which the respondent’s trade mark had been embroidered or printed on the label (albeit a small proportion of the total).

As with the third party merchandise from the respondent’s own website, the respondent argued this use on the swing tag was only use in relation to retail services, not the goods themselves. Rofe J also rejected this argument in the context of this case.

Given that s 7 defines use as use upon or in physical or other relation to the goods, the fact that the use was on the swing tag and not on the goods themselves was hardly determinative.

At [198], Rofe J considered:

It would be apparent to any reasonable Australian consumer that the Hawthorn Football Club (or any sporting club) does not manufacture clothing, and that the Hawthorn indicia are part of the design of the shirt material. The use of the FANATICS Marks in these instances are being used as “a badge of origin” to distinguish the respondent’s relevant good from goods manufactured by other sports clothing manufacturers such as Nike or Adidas: E & J Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 144 at [41]–[42] (per French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ).

In any event, her Honour pointed at at [200]:

In this case, the FANATICS Marks on the FANATICS branded goods are being used as a badge of origin and thus the use constitutes trade mark use. The fact that other marks are present on the clothing, such as the logo of the relevant sporting team or league, does not matter. Dual branding is “nothing unusual” and does not have the effect that one of the marks is not being used as a trade mark: see Allergan Australia Pty Ltd v Self Care IP Holdings Pty Ltd (2021) 162 IPR 52 at [66] (per Jagot, Lee and Thawley JJ) and the cases there cited (these comments were not disturbed on appeal in Self Care). See also Anheuser at [189] and [191] (per Allsop J).

Thus, subject to the respondent’s numerous defences, FanFirm’s trade mark for clothing etc. in class 25 was infringed.

Some issues raised by the defences

The respondent raised a number of defences against a finding of infringement – in addition to its unsuccessful attempt to have FanFirm’s trade mark cancelled.

The respondent was exercising a right to use the trade mark given by registration

The respondent’s first line of defence was s 122(1)(e) – the exercise of a right to use a trade mark given to the user under the Act. That is, someone does not infringe another person’s registered trade mark if the “someone” has registered their own trade mark and is using it within the scope of that registration.

The issue here is that, as the respondent was not the owner of the trade mark for online retail services, its trade mark was not validly registered as a result of the operation of s 88(1)(a) and s 58.

On this issue, while her Honour considered it a “strange result” from a policy perspective, at [313] – [314] Rofe J followed Nicholas J’s ruling in Dunlop and held that cancellation was not retrospective but prospective only. That is, the respondent’s trade marks were not cancelled ab initio but only from the date of her Honour’s order.

While this protected the respondent from awards of damages (or an account) for its past conduct, (at [385]) this did not protect the respondent from an injunction against continued use of the infringing trade marks.

Honest concurrent user

As it had been using its trade marks in Australia since 2010 or 2011, the respondent also argued the Court should find the respondent was entitled to registration (s 122(1)(f) or (fa)) on the basis of honest concurrent user (ss 44(3)).

Ultimately, her Honour rejected this defence, finding that the respondent’s use did not qualify as honest concurrent user.

The problem for the respondent was at least three fold. First, the respondent adopted FANATICS as its corporate name and trade mark with knowledge of FanFirm and its trade mark. Indeed, it had sought to oppose registration of FanFirm’s mark. Rofe J accepted the respondent did not adopt the trade mark to take advantage of FanFirm’s reputation, however, it could not be described as “independent adoption”. Moreover, while two of the respondent’s senior executives involved in the decisions gave evidence, no-one from the respondent gave evidence of any honest belief that confusion would not result. At [331], her Honour concluded:

The adoption of the respondent’s new corporate name and mark occurred with knowledge of the applicant and its mark, and the goods for which registration of that mark was sought. Whilst I do not consider that the respondent adopted the FANATICS Marks in order to divert business or goodwill from the applicant, it cannot be described as “independent adoption”. Further, as I have said above, despite leading evidence from two senior employees of the respondent, the respondent led no evidence as to the existence of any honest belief that there would be no confusion as a result of the respondent adopting the same mark as the applicant’s existing marks. Thus, the two hallmarks of honesty are absent from the respondent’s adoption of the FANATICS Marks.

At [383] – [383], Rofe J relied on similar reasoning to reject the respondent’s contention that her Honour should exercise the discretion arising under s 89 not to remove the trade marks.

The injunction issue

In her Honour’s subsequent ruling on costs and non-pecuniary remedies, Rofe J stayed the operation of the order for cancellation of the registered trade marks pending the outcome of the appeal (for which Rofe J gave leave).

Rofe J also ordered an injunction restraining infringing use but refused to stay that order pending the determination of any appeal.

A number of factors led to her Honour refusing the stay.

These included, first, that her Honour was far from convinced that the respondent had the level of reputation in Australia it claimed given the apparently small scale of its sales here.

Secondly, the respondent’s claims of the disruption to its global business seemed overstated in light of the small scale of its Australian sales compared to the global business, its apparent disregard of the Australian market in deciding to adopt FANATICS and FanFirm’s evidence about the availability and utility of geo-blocking services so that the respondent’s sales to the rest of the world would be unaffected.

Further considerations included the dilution of FanFirm’s own goodwill and the difficulties in quantifying that.

Accordingly, Rofe J considered the balance of convenience lay in favour of not staying the injunction.

Bromwich J substantially upheld her Honour’s refusal to order a stay of the injunction but modified it slightly:

  1. to allow the respondent 28 days to implement geo-blocking of Australia; and
  2. to enable continued use in respect of “global customer care labels” in a particular form and to allow the respondent to deal with returns.

Bromwich J, like Rofe J, also referred to a number of other considerations.

Rofe J’s key finding was that FanFirm was the first user of FANATICS in Australia for goods such as clothing and online retail services for such products. Such use was not merely an adjunct to FanFirm’s tour organisation and supply business. As a result, the respondent’s trade marks for those goods and services will be cancelled and it has been enjoined against continued use in Australia. Just because you are clear to operate under your trade mark in one country does not mean you will be able to use it in another, different market.

FanFirm Pty Limited v Fanatics, LLC [2024] FCA 764 (Rofe J)

FanFirm Pty Limited v Fanatics, LLC (No 2) [2024] FCA 826 (Rofe J)

Fanatics, LLC v FanFirm Pty Limited [2024] FCA 920 (Bromwich J)


  1. Class 35: Business marketing consulting services; customer service in the field of retail store services and on-line retail store services; on-line retail store services featuring sports related and sports team branded clothing and merchandise; order fulfillment services; product merchandising; retail store services featuring sports related and sports team branded clothing and merchandise  ?
  2. Class 42: Development of new technology for others in the field of retail store services for the purpose of creating and maintaining the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting; computer services, namely, creating and maintaining the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting services; computer services, namely designing and implementing the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting services; computer services, namely, managing the look and feel of web sites for others, not in the field of web site hosting  ?
  3. Class 25: Clothing, footwear and headgear, shirts, scarves, ties, socks, sportswear  ?

Dying in the FANATICS ditch Read More »

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