Patent

Aristocrat lives to fight another day

O’Bryan J has granted Aristocrat leave to appeal Burley J’s decision ruling that the remitted claims were not patentable subject matter.

Recap

O’Bryan J sets out a convenient summary of how the case came to be before him and IPwars has had a few goes including here and here but in case the meaning of “manner of manufacture” for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 is not tattooed over you heart, a brief recap:

  1. The Commissioner rejected Aristocrat’s innovation patents over an electronic gaming machine (EGM) with a new software-implemented feature game and trigger.
  2. Burley J allowed Aristocrat’s appeal, pointing out it was accepted on all sides that the claims would have been patentable if implemented in the traditional mechanical way rather than software implementation.
  3. The Full Federal Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal restoring the rejection of the claims. Although agreed in the result, the reasoning was divided. Middleton and Perram JJ held at [26] that it was first necessary to decide if the claimed invention was for a computer or computer-implemented. If so, it was then necessary for the claim to result in an advance in computer technology. In the result (and subject to any appeal to the High Court), after setting aside Burley J’s orders, the Full Federal Court ordered: The proceedings are remitted to the primary judge for determination of any residual issues in light of the Full Court’s reasons including any issues which concern the position of claims other than claim 1 of Innovation Patent No. 2016101967 (referred to at [8] of the reasons of the primary judge dated 5 June 2020) and the costs of the hearings before the primary judge.
  4. The High Court memorably failed to reach a decision, with three judges dismissing the appeal while the other three judges would have allowed Aristocrat’s appeal (a seventh judge was unable to sit). Consequently, under Judiciary Act 1903 s 23(2)(a), the decision of the Full Federal Court was affirmed.
  5. On remitter, Burley J considered he was bound by the Full Federal Court’s decision and ruled that the dependent claims of Aristocrat’s patents were also invalid.

Leave to appeal

As Burley J was hearing and determining an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner, Aristocrat needed leave to appeal to the Full Court under s 158(2).

Often where leave is being sought by the patentee or applicant for the patent rather than an opponent, one might expect leave would be granted as otherwise the patent is dead. As O’Bryan J explained at [50]:

The guidance that emerges from the above cases may be summarised as follows. Section 158(2) evinces a legislative policy against the bringing of appeals against a judgment or order of a single judge of the Federal Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from decisions or directions of the Commissioner except where the court, acting judicially, finds reason to grant leave. The discretionary power to grant leave is not constrained by express legislative criteria and the Court should not lay down rigid rules that would restrict the exercise of the discretion given the diversity of cases to which s 158(2) will potentially apply. In determining whether to grant leave, it is relevant to consider: whether the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal; whether the issues proposed to be raised by the appeal are of general application; and the consequences of a refusal to grant leave – particularly whether the refusal will finally determine the matter. None of those considerations is determinative in and of itself and the considerations are interrelated. The cases make clear that the degree of doubt with respect to the decision that would warrant a grant of leave is affected by the consequences of a refusal to grant leave. In a pre-grant opposition proceeding, where there have been two hearings with the opposition dismissed, and where the opponent of the patent will still be able to institute revocation proceedings, leave to appeal will often be granted only where the opponent has demonstrated a clear prima facie case of error in the decision appealed from. In contrast, where an opponent has been successful such that the decision will be final with respect to the grant of the patent, leave to appeal would ordinarily be granted where the grounds are arguable.

O’Bryan J appears to have had some reservation in granting leave this time around. His Honour described the application as “finely balanced”.

The two main areas that seem to have been particularly troubling were that, as the Commissioner characterised it, the parties had agreed that Burley J’s determination of claim 1 in the first hearing would guide the determination of the other claims. Secondly, the innovation patents in question had expired and Aristocrat still had applications for standard patents covering the same subject matter pending.

Ultimately, his Honour found in favour of granting leave in the “unusual circumstances” of this case.

The factor that appears to have tipped his Honour in favour of granting leave was not just that the High Court had divided 3:3 in its previous decision. O’Bryan J was sceptical that this was just Aristocrat trying to have a “second go”. Rather, the additional factor is how s 23 of the Judiciary Act should apply in circumstances where all six judges of the High Court appear to have rejected the majority view in the Full Federal Court.

At [65], O’Bryan J explained:

Having taken all of the foregoing factors into account, I have determined on balance that leave to appeal should be granted. Ultimately, two factors weigh marginally in favour of the grant of leave: that the effect of the primary judgment is to determine finally that the innovation patents in suit will not be granted, and that the grounds of appeal sought to be raised by Aristocrat are arguable (raising novel questions about the operations of s 23(2)(a) in the unusual circumstances of this case). If Aristocrat is able to persuade an appellate court that the primary judge’s application of s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act in this case was erroneous, Aristocrat should be entitled to have the residual claims adjudicated in accordance with the legal principles that the appellate court determines are applicable.

What happens next

Having been granted leave to appeal, Aristocrat has foreshadowed an application under Judiciary Act s 40 requesting the High Court to hear and determine the appeal without the need for a further hearing in the Full Federal Court. This is of course a very unusual step. In this case, however, the foundational question can really be answered only by the High Court: how does s 23(2)(a) operate when the decision under appeal is affirmed but all the High Court judges sitting on the appeal appear to have rejected the reasoning of the “affirmed” decision?

Who know, we might even get something approaching a settled test for “manner of manufacture” (again).

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Limited v Commissioner of Patents [2024] FCA 987

Aristocrat lives to fight another day Read More »

An AI is not an inventor after all (or yet)

A strong Full Bench of the Federal Court of Australia has ruled that DABUS, an artificial intelligence, is not an inventor for the purposes of patent law. So, Dr Thaler’s application for DABUS’ patent has been rejected.[1] No doubt the robot will be back again[2] and we can expect that an application for special leave will be pending soon.

A dalek on display
By Moritz B. – Self-photographed, CC BY 2.5,

Dr Thaler had applied for a patent, No. 2019363177 entitled “Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention”, naming DABUS – an acronym for ‘device for the autonomous bootstrapping of unified sentience’ – as the inventor.

The Commissioner had rejected the application under reg. 3.2C for failure to identify the inventor. That rejection was overturned by Beach J on appeal from the Commissioner. And this was the decision on the Commissioner’s appeal.

Essentially, the Full Court ruled that an inventor for the purposes of patent law must be a natural person, not an artificial intelligence.

The Full Court held that identification of the “inventor” was central to the scheme of the Act. This is because, under s 15, only the inventor or someone claiming through the inventor is entitled to a patent.

Under the legislation before the 1990 Act, their Honours considered that an ‘actual inventor’ could be only a person with legal personality. At [98], their Honours summarised:

In each of these provisions, the ability of a person to make an application for a patent was predicated upon the existence of an “actual inventor” from whom the entitlement to the patent was directly or indirectly derived. Paragraphs (a), (c) and (e) describe the actual inventor as, respectively, a person, one that is deceased and has a legal representative (which must be a person), and one that is not resident in Australia. Paragraphs (b), (d), (f) and (fa) all contemplate an assignment happening between the patent applicant and the actual inventor. It is clear from these provisions that only a person with a legal personality could be the “actual inventor” under this legislative scheme.

This scheme, and its consequences, did not materially change under the 1990 Act.

Acknowledging that a none of the case law had to consider whether an AI could be an inventor, the Full Court noted that the ‘entitlement’ cases proceeded on the basis that ‘inventor’ meant the ‘actual inventor’. Their Honours considered the cases interpreting this expression were all premised on the ‘actual inventor’ – the person whose mind devised the claimed invention – being a natural person. At [105] and [106], their Honours explained:

None of the cases cited in the preceding five paragraphs confronted the question that arose before the primary judge of whether or not the “inventor” could include an artificial intelligence machine. We do not take the references in those cases to “person” to mean, definitively, that an inventor under the Patents Act and Regulations must be a human. However, it is plain from these cases that the law relating to the entitlement of a person to the grant of a patent is premised upon an invention for the purposes of the Patents Act arising from the mind of a natural person or persons. Those who contribute to, or supply, the inventive concept are entitled to the grant. The grant of a patent for an invention rewards their ingenuity.

Where s 15(1)(a) provides that a patent for an invention may only be granted to “a person who is an inventor”, the reference to “a person” emphasises, in context, that this is a natural person. …. (emphasis supplied)

Given that conclusion, and the structure of s 15, Dr Thaler’s argument that he was entitled on the basis of ownership of the output of DABUS’ efforts was to no avail. At [113]:

… having regard to the view that we have taken to the construction of s 15(1) and reg 3.2C(2)(aa) [i]t is not to the point that Dr Thaler may have rights to the output of DABUS. Only a natural person can be an inventor for the purposes of the Patents Act and Regulations. Such an inventor must be identified for any person to be entitled to a grant of a patent under ss 15(1)(b)-(d). (emphasis supplied)

The Full Court then drew support from the High Court’s reasoning in D’Arcy v Myriad esp. at [6] in which the majority emphasised that patentable subject matter had to be the product of “human action”.

Although not put in this way, it is apparent that policy considerations played a significant role in their Honours’ conclusion. At [119] to [120], their Honours pointed out:

in filing the application, Dr Thaler no doubt intended to provoke debate as to the role that artificial intelligence may take within the scheme of the Patents Act and Regulations. Such debate is important and worthwhile. However, in the present case it clouded consideration of the prosaic question before the primary judge, which concerned the proper construction of s 15 and reg 3.2C(2)(aa). In our view, there are many propositions that arise for consideration in the context of artificial intelligence and inventions. They include whether, as a matter of policy, a person who is an inventor should be redefined to include an artificial intelligence. If so, to whom should a patent be granted in respect of its output? The options include one or more of: the owner of the machine upon which the artificial intelligence software runs, the developer of the artificial intelligence software, the owner of the copyright in its source code, the person who inputs the data used by the artificial intelligence to develop its output, and no doubt others. If an artificial intelligence is capable of being recognised as an inventor, should the standard of inventive step be recalibrated such that it is no longer judged by reference to the knowledge and thought processes of the hypothetical uninventive skilled worker in the field? If so, how? What continuing role might the ground of revocation for false suggestion or misrepresentation have, in circumstances where the inventor is a machine?

Those questions and many more require consideration. Having regard to the agreed facts in the present case, it would appear that this should be attended to with some urgency. However, the Court must be cautious about approaching the task of statutory construction by reference to what it might regard as desirable policy, imputing that policy to the legislation, and then characterising that as the purpose of the legislation …. (emphasis supplied)

Finally, in this quick reaction, it can be noted that the Full Court recognised that their Honours’ decision was consistent with the English Court of Appeal’s decision on the counterpart application. Their Honours considered, however, there were sufficient differences in the legislative schemes that a wholly autocthonous solution should be essayed.

Commissioner of Patents v Thaler [2022] FCAFC 62 (Allsop CJ, Nicholas, Yates, Moshinsky And Burley JJ)


  1. Patent application No. 2019363177 entitled “Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention”  ?
  2. With apologies to you know who.  ?

An AI is not an inventor after all (or yet) Read More »

The English Court of Appeal rejects AI too

The Court of Appeal has dismissed by a 2:1 majority Dr Thaler’s appeal from Marcus Smith J’s decision rejecting the patent applications on the grounds that DABUS is not an inventor.

A recap

In late 2018, Dr Thaler applied for the grant of two patents, GB18116909.4 entitled “Food Container” concerning the shape of parts of packaging for food and and GB1818161.0 entitled “Devices and Methods for Attracting Enhanced Attention” for a form of flashing light.

In his application forms, Dr Thaler named DABUS as the inventor and stated that his entitlement arose “by ownership of the creativity machine ‘DABUS’”.

In later, amended forms, Dr Thaler explained “the applicant identified no person or persons whom he believes to be an inventor as the invention was entirely and solely conceived by DABUS”.

Patents Act 1977 (UK) ss 7 and 13

Section 7 of the UK’s Patents Act 1977 defines who is entitled to apply for and obtain a patent:

7 Right to apply for and obtain a patent.

(1)Any person may make an application for a patent either alone or jointly with another.

(2)A patent for an invention may be granted—

(a)primarily to the inventor or joint inventors;

(b)in preference to the foregoing, to any person or persons who, by virtue of any enactment or rule of law, or any foreign law or treaty or international convention, or by virtue of an enforceable term of any agreement entered into with the inventor before the making of the invention, was or were at the time of the making of the invention entitled to the whole of the property in it (other than equitable interests) in the United Kingdom;

(c)in any event, to the successor or successors in title of any person or persons mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) above or any person so mentioned and the successor or successors in title of another person so mentioned;

and to no other person.

(3)In this Act “inventor” in relation to an invention means the actual deviser of the invention and “joint inventor” shall be construed accordingly.

(4)Except so far as the contrary is established, a person who makes an application for a patent shall be taken to be the person who is entitled under subsection (2) above to be granted a patent and two or more persons who make such an application jointly shall be taken to be the persons so entitled.

Although the wording is somewhat different, ss 13(1) and (2) of the UK Act appear to be similar in effect as, respectively, s 29 and s 15 of the Australian Act.[1]

Section 13 of the UK Act further provides:

13 Mention of inventor.

(1)The inventor or joint inventors of an invention shall have a right to be mentioned as such in any patent granted for the invention and shall also have a right to be so mentioned if possible in any published application for a patent for the invention and, if not so mentioned, a right to be so mentioned in accordance with rules in a prescribed document.

(2)Unless he has already given the Patent Office the information hereinafter mentioned, an applicant for a patent shall within the prescribed period file with the Patent Office a statement—

(a)identifying the person or persons whom he believes to be the inventor or inventors; and

(b)where the applicant is not the sole inventor or the applicants are not the joint inventors, indicating the derivation of his or their right to be granted the patent;

and, if he fails to do so, the application shall be taken to be withdrawn.

(3)Where a person has been mentioned as sole or joint inventor in pursuance of this section, any other person who alleges that the former ought not to have been so mentioned may at any time apply to the comptroller for a certificate to that effect, and the comptroller may issue such a certificate; and if he does so, he shall accordingly rectify any undistributed copies of the patent and of any documents prescribed for the purposes of subsection (1) above.[2]

Can an AI be an inventor?

All three judges were in agreement that DABUS, as an AI, cannot be an inventor because an inventor must be a person.

At [116] Arnold LJ, who gave the lead judgment for the majority, said:

In my judgment it is clear that, upon a systematic interpretation of the 1977 Act, only a person can be an “inventor”. The starting point is section 130(1) which provides that “‘inventor’ has the meaning assigned to it by section 7 above”. Section 7(3) provides that “‘inventor’ in relation to an invention means the actual deviser of the invention”. A dictionary definition of “deviser” is “a person who devises; a contriver, a planner, an inventor” (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, 2002). Section 7(2) provides that a patent may be granted (a) “primarily to the inventor or joint inventors”, (b) “to any person or persons who …”, (c) “the successor or successors in title of any person or persons mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) above”, but “to no other person”. As Lord Hoffmann explained in Yeda Research and Development Company Ltd v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings [2007] UKHL 43, [2007] Bus LR 1796 at [20], this is “an exhaustive code”. It is clear from this code that category (a) must consist of a person or persons, just as much as categories (b) and (c) do. Section 7(4) creates a presumption that “a person who makes an application for a patent shall be taken to be the person who is entitled under subsection (2) above to be granted a patent”. Again, it is plain that only a person can be entitled under section 7(2), and thus only a person can fall within paragraph (a).

Similarly, at [50] – [51], Birss LJ said:

50 Second, a purpose of the definition of inventor in section 7(3) was to change the law, from the old law going back to the Statute of Monopolies, and to abolish the idea of a true and first inventor who could be anyone other than the actual deviser of the invention. The concept of the actual deviser of the invention was already known to United Kingdom patent law from the 1949 Act (s16). It was the person who actually devised the invention. The contrast was between that person and others who had not done so but were regarded as the true and first inventor, e.g. importers. So in Yeda paragraph [18] the contrast was drawn between the actual deviser and a pretended or deemed deviser.

51 The rest of the 1977 Act is drafted on the footing that the inventor is a person. For example s7(2)(c) of the 1977 Act refers to “person or persons mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b)” and s13 of the Act require an applicant to identify the “person or persons whom he believes to be the inventor or inventors”. However, for what it is worth, I would hold that the mechanism by which the inventor is a person in the scheme of the 1977 Act is because the “actual deviser” is a person and so, by definition in s7(3), is the inventor.

and at [54] – [55]:

54 I conclude that the answer to the first question is a simple one. Within the meaning of the 1977 Act the “inventor” is the person who actually devised the invention.

55 That conclusion is arrived at without any need to examine the policy arguments raised by both parties. Machines are not persons. The fact that machines can now create inventions, which is what Dr Thaler says happened in this case, would not mean that machines are inventors within the meaning of the Act. Assuming the machine is the entity which actually created these inventions, it has no right to be mentioned as the inventor and no right to employee’s compensation under s39 (which no doubt it never had anyway).

At [102], Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing explained:

Both Birss LJ and Arnold LJ agree that the clear effect of the relevant provisions of the 1977 Act is that an inventor must be a person. I also agree with that conclusion. Rights are a consistent theme which runs through section 7. Only a person can have rights. A machine cannot. The premise of section 7 is that an inventor is and can only be a person. A patent can be granted ‘primarily to the inventor’, and only to someone else in the circumstances described in section 7(2)(c) and (d). A patent is a statutory right and it can only be granted to a person. That means that the effect of section 7(2)(a) is that the inventor must be a person. Only a person can make, before the invention is made, an enforceable agreement by which he is entitled to the whole of the property in the invention (other than equitable interests) (section 7(2)(b)). Such an agreement can only be made with another person. Only a person can have a successor in title (section 7(2)(c)). It follows that, absent a statutory deeming provision, it is simply not possible, as a matter of law, for Dabus to be an ‘inventor’ for the purposes of section 7. Nor, for the reasons given by Arnold LJ, has Dr Thaler identified any enactment of rule of law by which he is entitled to that property (even if he could, that would not help his case, because it would not overcome the hurdle that Dabus in not an inventor for the purposes of the Act). Only a person has a right to be named as an inventor (section 13(1)). Section 13(2)(a) also assumes that the inventor is a person. Arnold LJ gives many other examples of provisions in the 1977 Act which support that construction.

Dr Thaler was not entitled to the inventions

In the Court of Appeal, Dr Thaler appears to have shifted ground from the position taken before Marcus Smith J.

Dr Thaler accepted he was not entitled to the inventions under s 7 as the inventor. At [124], Arnold LJ recorded that Dr Thaler also abandoned his claim to entitlement on the basis of an assignment from DABUS.[3] Instead, Dr Thaler based his entitlement on the doctine of accession. Dr Thaler’s argument was that as the owner of DABUS he was the owner of the inventions it produced just as the owner of a cow is the owner of its calves.

At [130], Arnold LJ cited Blackstone for the common law definition of the doctrine of accession on which Dr Thaler relied:

“The doctrine of property arising from accession is also grounded on the right of occupancy. By the Roman law, if any given corporeal substance received afterwards an accession by natural or by artificial means, as the growth of vegetables, the pregnancy of animals, the embroidering of cloth, or the conversion of wood or metal into vessels and utensils, the original owner of the thing was intitled by right of possession to the property of it under such it’s statement of improvement; but of the thing itself, by such operation, was changed into a different species, as by making wine, oil, or bread, out of another’s grapes, olives, or wheat, it belonged to the new operator; who was only to make a satisfaction to the former proprietor for the materials, which he had converted. And these doctrines are implicitly copied and adopted by our Bracton, in the reign of king Henry III; and have since been confirmed by many resolutions of the courts.”

Arnold LJ explained that the doctrine of accession was rooted in the principle of “dominion” – exclusive possession: a person who has exclusive possession of a tangible (the cow) which produces a tangible (a calf) will generally also have exclusive possession of the tangible produced.

However, an invention is information, an intangible. As an intangible, Arnold LJ noted at [133] it was distinguishable from a tangible on the basis that intangibles are non-rivalrous goods: they were capable of simultaneous consumption by more than one person. Accordingly, a new intangible is not capable of exclusive possession.

Furthermore, Dr Thaler was forced to accept that the doctrine of accession did not apply to at least some situations where an intangible was produced by a tangible. At [135], Arnold LJ gave the example of a photograph taken by A using a camera owned by B: subject to an agreement to the contrary, the copyright in the photograph would be owned by the photographer, not the owner of the camera.[4]

Arnold LJ considered that Dr Thaler’s arguments were more about what the law should be rather than what it is. As to what it is, his Lordship said at [136] it ran into two obstacles:

…. As matters stand, it seems to me that the argument faces two obstacles. The first is that it pre-supposes that a machine can be an inventor for the purposes of the 1977 Act. The second is that I cannot see any basis in current law for a person to have a legal right to stand in the place of a machine with respect to the right to apply for a patent, because that pre-supposes that the machine would otherwise have that right, but as noted above machines do not have rights. A point which underlies both these obstacles is that modern patent law is almost entirely a creature of statute.

Accordingly, Dr Thaler’s applications should be rejected.

Birss LJ dissented

Despite agreeing that an AI was not an inventor for the purposes of the Patents Act 1977, Birss LJ would have allowed the appeal. For his Lordship, it was no part of the Comptroller’s role under section 13 to inquire into whether DABUS was in fact an inventor.

To reach this conclusion, Birss LJ examined the history of s 13 and its predecessor under the Patents Act 1949, s 16. Section 16 of the 1949 Act wrought a number of changes. One of those was to permit assignment of the right to apply for a patent which in turn brought in the requirement that the assignee applicant provide an assent from the inventor.

The Banks Committee, however, reported that these arrangements had led to a number of problems. One problem was the difficulty in confidently identifying the inventors.[5] A second problem was that at the examination stage the Comptroller was in no position to check the accuracy of claims to inventorship or assignment. At [44], Birss LJ explained that the Banks Committee had recommended abolishing declarations of inventorship and assent:

This, we think, would simplify the procedure for applicants, protect patentees against invalidation of their patents through inadvertent error in naming inventors, give recognition to the fact that the Patent Office is in no position to check the completeness of declarations of assent and inventorship at present required (which therefore provide no real safeguard against wrongful obtaining of patents), and abolish the anomaly of “communicated” invention. We realise, however, that safeguards are necessary to protect the interests of inventors, and would stress that making of any application by a person other than the inventor should not imply in any way that the inventor has assented to the making of the application or acknowledged the right of the applicant to make it. Furthermore, since we believe that it is most important that the contribution of the inventor, where he is not the applicant, should not be overlooked, we recommend that the applicant, both in Convention and in non-Convention applications, should be required to name the person(s) believed to be the inventor(s), who would then be named in the published specification, but that the fulfilling of this requirement should not prejudice the right of any other person to apply under section 16 of the [1949] Act to be mentioned in the patent, nor should a bona fide error in the naming of inventors invalidate a patent. Where disputes arise over ownership of applications or patents, a new procedure will be necessary for their resolution, and this we recommend in Chapter 13.

Having regard to this history, Birss LJ considered at [58] – [59] that the requirements of s 13(2)(a) would be satisfied so long as the applicant identified who the applicant believed was the inventor. Correspondingly, s 13(2)(b) merely required the applicant to identify the basis on which the applicant claimed derivation from the inventor.

It was no part of the Comptroller’s role, at this stage, to investigate whether or not the identified inventor was in fact legally an inventor or the identified basis of derivation was legally effective. Any other approach would resurrect the very problems encountered under the 1949 Act [s 16][49uk].

In light of this conclusion, his Lordship did not consider Dr Thaler’s arguments based on the doctrine of accession.

With respect, a difficulty with Birss LJ’s approach is that an application would proceed to grant and could be asserted against third parties, or block subsequent applications, unless someone came forward to challenge the grant. And under the UK Act it seems objections on the ground of entitlement can be brought only by someone else claiming entitlement: See Birss LJ at [70] citing s 72.

Arnold LJ (with the agreement of Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing) accepted that the role of the Comptroller under s 13 was limited. His Lordship considered, however, rejection of Dr Thaler’s application did not involve such issues. Rather, the Comptroller took the information provided by Dr Thaler at face value and on its face that information failed to identify the person who was the inventor or any basis operative to transfer the rights of an inventor to Dr Thaler.[6]

As the applications failed to comply with two important statutory requirements, therefore, Arnold LJ held at [148] that the Comptroller was right to reject them.

A moral right

Before concluding, it is worth also noting that the Court of Appeal recognised that the requirement to identify the inventor is really a species of moral right. As Arnold LJ noted at [121], a paternity right: the right to be identified as the creator. At [44], Birss LJ noted the Banks Committee’s recognition that:

it is most important that the contribution of the inventor, where he is not the applicant, should not be overlooked, we recommend that the applicant, both in Convention and in non-Convention applications, should be required to name the person(s) believed to be the inventor(s), who would then be named in the published specification….

Thaler v Comptroller General of Patents Trade Marks And Designs [2021] EWCA Civ 1374 (Arnold and Elisabeth Laing LJJ, Birss LJ dissenting)


  1. See Foster’s Australia Limited v Cash’s (Australia) Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 527. Section 31 extends s 29 to joint applicants.  ?
  2. Section 13 of the UK Act does not have a counterpart in the Australian Act. However, ss 29(4A) and (4B) require applications to be in the approved form – which requires the inventor to be identified and reg. 3.2C(2)(aa) requires applications under the PCT to identify the inventor.  ?
  3. Before Beach J in Australia, Dr Thaler also accepted that, as an artificial intelligence system is not a legal person, DABUS could not legally assign the invention: see e.g. [115].  ?
  4. In Australia, see Copyright Act 1968 s 35, bearing in mind there are exceptions for works made in the course of employment, taking of photographs for a private or domestic purpose or the exception for photographs taken by journalists for newspapers etc.  ?
  5. A problem finally addressed in the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) by the enactment in the “Raising the Bar” Act of s 22A and s 138(4).  ?
  6. At [108], Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing explained “It will be clear from what I have already said that I do not agree that section 13(2)(a) only requires an applicant to ‘state their genuine belief about who the inventor was’ (judgment, paragraph 60). Rather, it expressly requires the applicant to identify the person who, he believes, is the inventor. That is a different requirement, and it is not met by a statement that the applicant genuinely believes that the invention was devised by a machine ….” (emphasis supplied)  ?

The English Court of Appeal rejects AI too Read More »

Should AI systems be classifiable as patent inventors?

Should AI systems be classifiable as patent inventors? Read More »

Artificial intelligences and inventions Down Under

The Commissioner of Patents has rejected the DABUS application Down Under.

Stephen L. Thaler applied for a patent, AU 2019363177, entitled “Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention”. The application named the inventor as:

DABUS, The invention was autonomously generated by an artificial intelligence

The application being made under the PCT, there was a formalities check, which, in reg. 3.2C(2)(aa), requires the Commissioner to check whether the named inventor has been identified.[1]

When the Delegate objected that an inventor had not been identified. Thaler explained why he considered DABUS was the inventor (in part):

The sole contributor to the invention is DABUS, an artificial intelligence machine that includes artificial intelligence programs written by the applicant. DABUS is capable of devising inventions without the involvement of a natural person who traditionally qualifies as an inventor. For the present invention, the machine only received training in general knowledge and proceeded to independently conceive of the invention and to identify it as novel and salient. How DABUS functions is described in detail in US Patent 10,423,875 and other patent specifications.

The Delegate understood from this response that DABUS is not a person as understood in law – an individual, a corporation or a body politic.[2]

There is no definition of “inventor” in the Act. Thus, Wilcox and Lindgren JJ had declared that the word bears its ordinary English meaning.[3]

At [12], the Delegate said:

…. Any standard dictionary shows that the traditional meaning of inventor is a person who invents. At the time that the Act came into operation (in 1991) there would have been no doubt that inventors were natural persons, and machines were tools that could be used by inventors. However, it is now well known that machines can do far more than this, and it is reasonable to argue that artificial intelligence machines might be capable of being inventors. I have no evidence whether the ordinary meaning of “inventor”, assessed at the present day, can include a machine. But if this were the ordinary meaning, would this be consistent with the other provisions of the Act?

So far as the other provisions and context provided any (limited) assistance, the Delegate considered at [20] that it was clear a patentee must be a person. This implied that an inventor also needed to be a person and, in any event, an inventor who was not a person could not be a patentee.

Although it was not part of the decision, it may also be noted that an author for the purposes of copyright must be a natural person. A computer-generated work is not an original work for the purposes of copyright as there is no author.[4] Of course, a patent can protect ideas or function while copyright protects the “expression” of ideas. At least to the extent that the rationale for granting protection in either system is the natural rights of a person to the fruits of their mental labour,[4] one would think the same considerations should apply.

Thaler has enlisted the services of Allen’s pro bono and appealed, No. VID 108/2021.

Stephen L. Thaler [2021] APO 5]


  1. Correct identification of the inventor(s) is important as a patent can be revoked if it is not granted to an “entitled person” (or all the “entitled persons” (see s 138(3)(a)) and a person can be an “entitled person” only if they can trace their chain of title back to the inventor(s): s 15(1)(a).  ?
  2. Citing Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 2C.  ?
  3. Atlantis Corporation Pty Ltd v Schindler [1997] FCA 1105; 39 IPR 29 at 54.  ?
  4. Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCAFC 149 at [90] (Keane CJ) and [117] – [119] (Perram J).  ?

Artificial intelligences and inventions Down Under Read More »

IP Australia and Indigenous Knowledge – consultations

In September 2020, IP Australia published its work plan to make provision for the better protection of Indigenous Knowledge in Australia’s Intellectual Property System.

Now it has released a consultation paper on four topics from that work plan it wishes to advance.

As summarised in the Introduction, the consultation paper raises four topics:

  1. Establishing an Indigenous Advisory Panel – providing a formalised Indigenous voice to IP Australia.
  2. Measures for trade mark or designs using Indigenous Knowledge – changes to processes to ensure IK owners benefit from, or have consented to, the use of their IK as the basis for rights.
  3. New requirements to declare the source of Indigenous Knowledge used in new innovations – make it easier to determine if IK has been used in a patent or plant breeder’s right, and encourage conversations about access and benefit sharing.
  4. Labelling to promote authentic Indigenous Products – exploring interest in labelling schemes that distinguish authentic Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander goods.

Topic 2, relating to trade marks and designs, notes that IP Australia may currently reject an application if the application uses “IK” which is secret or sacred; the name of a group or a nation where there is no connection to that group or nation or uses a an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander word which should be available for other business to use.

Noting the limitations in that range, the consultation paper seeks input on a range of issues including:

(a) whether people would have concerns providing a statutory declaration etc. as evidence to support an objection to an application;

(b) whether IP Australia should ask applicants whether they have consent to use the “IK”;

(c) the introduction of a check to assess whether an application would cause cultural offence to a community or communities;

(d) whether IP Australia should assess whether the the application involves a use of “IK” in a way which falsely suggests a connection to an Indigenous person, community or nation.

Other questions relate to tools for better identifying applications which involve the use of “IK”.

Topic 3 raises questions about whether patent applicants should be required to declare the source of (1) genetic resources and/or (2) traditional knowledge included in their applications or on which an application is based.

Additional questions relate to how such requirements would be implemented, enforced and, if not complied with, penalised.

The Overview page states that consultations close on 24 May 2021.

IP Australia and Indigenous Knowledge – consultations Read More »

Was the patent infringed?

Both A Pty Ltd and R Pty Ltd are located in Australia.

A Pty Ltd has a patent in Australia over a gizmo.

R Pty Ltd has entered into a contract with T LL C to make 100 gizmos for T for delivery to T’s facility in Eritrea. R Pty Ltd won’t make the gizmos itself; they will be made by its manufacturer in Shenzhen, China . Once made, R’s manufacturer will deliver the 100 gizmos FOB to a ship T has chartered in Hong Kong.

Assuming that the gizmos made in Shenzhen fall squarely within the claims of A’s patent, has R Pty Ltd infringed A’s patent? Cast your vote (anonymously) below:

[socialpoll id=”2382621″]

The answer should be posted on Friday.

Was the patent infringed? Read More »

Selected links from the last week

I am going to try an experiment. With the rise of “week in review” style blogposts and your day job probably means you don’t have all day to watch Twitter streaming by, here is a selection of links to IP-related matters I found interesting this week:

Patents

Trade marks

  • MACCOFFEE? We’re not lovin’ it, says General Court here

    The “Mac” family of trade marks are too well known for someone esle to register MACCOFFEE in the EU

  • “Own Name” defence in Singapore–when “honest practices” does the heavy lifting here
  • CJEU says operators of physical marketplaces may be forced to stop trade mark infringements of market-traders

    although you could contrast that to Dowsett J’s decision

  • Book Review: The law and practice of trademark transactions – A global and local outlook

Not categorised

  • Employees Bound By Clickthrough Agreements–ADP v. Lynch (USA)

Bit of a slow week in the northern hemisphere, but I hope you find some interesting. If you did or have a question, leave a comment or send me an email

Selected links from the last week Read More »

Another Infringed Innovation Patent And A Delivery Up Question

Product Management Group (PMG) has lost its appeal from Middleton J’s finding that it infringed Blue Gentian’s innovation patents for a self extending/collapsing garden hose.

The appeal seems like a fairly straightforward application of construction principles and demonstrates, yet again, how slender an innovation need be to secure a monopoly for eight years.

There may, however, be a question for the future whether or not the “substantial contribution” to the working of the “invention” required by s 7(4) must be a positive contribution to the working of the invention.[1]

An interesting point is the Order Middleton J made for delivery up. His Honour did not just require delivery up of PMG’s unsold stock and componentry. In addition, by paragraph 3(c), his Honour ordered that PMG should contact the customers to which it hold sold the infringing products, offer them a refund and request that they return the products to PMG.

Nicholas J considered this travelled well beyond the purpose of an order for delivery up. His Honour considered that purpose was to relieve the infringer from the “temptation” of further infringing and so, in that sense, was in aid of the injunction. Nicholas J considered that an order requiring a party to try and retrieve property to which it no longer had any legal title could not fairly be described as in aid of delivery up and so would have set aside that part of the Order.

In circumstances where the Court had not been favoured with any oral submissions and only brief mention in written submissions, however, Kenny and Beach JJ were not persuaded that his Honour’s discretion miscarried and their Honours would let it stand in this case. However, they warned:

But our rejection of this ground should not be taken as any endorsement of this form of order for the future. We doubt that such an order would ordinarily be appropriate. We do not need to comment further.

This may pose an interesting dilemma for “convicted” infringers: object to such an order or, as the purchasers’ use of an infringing product would itself be an infringement, risk having the successful plaintiff require discovery and then suing the individual customers for infringement too.[2]

Product Management Group Pty Ltd v Blue Gentian LLC [2015] FCAFC 179


  1. Compare Kenny and Beach JJ at [178] to Nicholas J at [284].  ?
  2. On the approach taken vy Yates J in Winnebago (No 4). Of course, the plaintiff might not be willing to pursue individual purchasers of garden hoses, but what about Bunnings and the other hardware chains?  ?

Another Infringed Innovation Patent And A Delivery Up Question Read More »

Alphapharm v Lundbeck per se

The Full Federal Court has dismissed yet another appeal in the Alphapharm v Lundbeck (escitalopram) saga:

You will recall that Lundbeck had applied (10 years late)[1] for an extension of the term of its escitalopram patent under s 70 of the Patents Act, escitalopram being the (+) enantiomer of citalopram.[2]

The issue in this appeal was whether escitalopram satisfied the requirement in s 70(2)(a) that:

one or more pharmaceutical substances per se must in substance be disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance fall within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification

Alphapharm’s argument was that Lundbeck’s patent was a claim to a pharmaceutical substance – the isolated or pure enantiomer – but it was not a claim to a pharmaceutical substance per se. Rather, Alphapharm characterised the claim as a claim to the substance limited by a requirement of purity of manufacture.

Bennett, Nicholas and Yates JJ rejected Alphapharm’s characterisation.

Claim 1 of the escitalopram patent is to:

(+)–1-(3-dimethylaminopropyl)–1-(4’-fluorophenyl)–1,3-dihydroisobenzofuran–5-carbonitrile and non-toxic acid addition salts thereof.

Their Honours pointed out that the claim did not itself use the word “isolated” or “pure”. Nonetheless, the skilled addressee would understand the claim to be referring to the substance constituted by the isolated enantiomer, not as existing in the racemate. That substance was a new chemical entity with different characteristics and properties to the racemate.

92 …. the claim is to the (+)-enantiomer and nothing else. The term “pharmaceutical substance per se” simply means the pharmaceutical substance “in itself”. In Boehringer, Heerey J observed that per se meant ‘by or in itself’ ‘intrinsically’ or ‘essentially’ (at [7]). The Full Court approved that approach on appeal (at [37]).

93 Semantics aside, it is clear that the claim describes a pharmaceutical substance per se. The substance was, as explained by Lindgren J at [536], a new chemical entity. The racemate and the (+)-enantiomer had different physico-chemical interactions manifested in different pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics (the Decision at [234]). The claim is to (+)-citalopram, irrespective of how it is produced. The isolated (+)-enantiomer plainly qualifies as a pharmaceutical substance per se and the primary Judge was correct in concluding that it satisfies s 70(2)(a) of the Act.

It looks like things are now getting down to the sharp pointy question of how much will have to be paid in terms of pecuniary remedies. As this was an appeal from a single judge who, in turn, was hearing an appeal from the Commissioner, Alphapharm needed leave to appeal.[3] While cases granting “leave” are not quite as rare as hen’s teeth, the Full Court noted leave should be granted because:

35 This application also represents Alphapharm’s only course in challenging the extension of term of the Patent, which has significant consequences to Alphapharm. If Lundbeck is successful, the term of the Patent will be extended and Lundbeck’s infringement proceedings against Alphapharm can proceed.

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2015] FCAFC 138 (Bennett, Nicholas and Yates JJ)


  1. The High Court held that Lundbeck was not “out of time” in making its application last year.  ?
  2. Lundbeck patented the racemate citalopram in 1980 and marketed it in Australia as Cipramil. The racemate being a mixture of both the (+) and (-) enantiomers. Lundbeck marketed escitalopram as Lexapro.  ?
  3. Patents Act s 158(2).  ?

Alphapharm v Lundbeck per se Read More »

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