The Commissioner of Patents has rejected the DABUS application Down Under.
Stephen L. Thaler applied for a patent, AU 2019363177, entitled “Food container and devices and methods for attracting enhanced attention”. The application named the inventor as:
DABUS, The invention was autonomously generated by an artificial intelligence
When the Delegate objected that an inventor had not been identified. Thaler explained why he considered DABUS was the inventor (in part):
The sole contributor to the invention is DABUS, an artificial intelligence machine that includes artificial intelligence programs written by the applicant. DABUS is capable of devising inventions without the involvement of a natural person who traditionally qualifies as an inventor. For the present invention, the machine only received training in general knowledge and proceeded to independently conceive of the invention and to identify it as novel and salient. How DABUS functions is described in detail in US Patent 10,423,875 and other patent specifications.
The Delegate understood from this response that DABUS is not a person as understood in law – an individual, a corporation or a body politic.
There is no definition of “inventor” in the Act. Thus, Wilcox and Lindgren JJ had declared that the word bears its ordinary English meaning.
At , the Delegate said:
…. Any standard dictionary shows that the traditional meaning of inventor is a person who invents. At the time that the Act came into operation (in 1991) there would have been no doubt that inventors were natural persons, and machines were tools that could be used by inventors. However, it is now well known that machines can do far more than this, and it is reasonable to argue that artificial intelligence machines might be capable of being inventors. I have no evidence whether the ordinary meaning of “inventor”, assessed at the present day, can include a machine. But if this were the ordinary meaning, would this be consistent with the other provisions of the Act?
So far as the other provisions and context provided any (limited) assistance, the Delegate considered at  that it was clear a patentee must be a person. This implied that an inventor also needed to be a person and, in any event, an inventor who was not a person could not be a patentee.
Although it was not part of the decision, it may also be noted that an author for the purposes of copyright must be a natural person. A computer-generated work is not an original work for the purposes of copyright as there is no author. Of course, a patent can protect ideas or function while copyright protects the “expression” of ideas. At least to the extent that the rationale for granting protection in either system is the natural rights of a person to the fruits of their mental labour, one would think the same considerations should apply.
Thaler has enlisted the services of Allen’s pro bono and appealed, No. VID 108/2021.
Stephen L. Thaler  APO 5]
- Correct identification of the inventor(s) is important as a patent can be revoked if it is not granted to an “entitled person” (or all the “entitled persons” (see s 138(3)(a)) and a person can be an “entitled person” only if they can trace their chain of title back to the inventor(s): s 15(1)(a). ?
- Citing Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 2C. ?
- Atlantis Corporation Pty Ltd v Schindler  FCA 1105; 39 IPR 29 at 54. ?
- Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd  FCAFC 149 at  (Keane CJ) and  –  (Perram J). ?