amendment

A cautionary trade mark tale

In a rare case of a successful opposition under s 59, Energy Beverages has successfully opposed in the Court KMA’s attempt to register KANGAROO MOTHER.

Overview

As you might recall, Energy Beverages is the owner of registered trade marks in Australia for MOTHER in respect of amongst other things, non-acoholic beverages in class 5 and pharmaceutical and veterinary preparations, dietetic substances and food and beverages for babies in class 32.[1]

A New Zealand company, Erbaviva, applied to register KANGAROO MOTHER for a range of goods in classes 5, 29, 30, 31 and 32. Subsequently, the application was assigned to KMA. A Mr Zheng was the sole director and shareholder of both companies.

Energy Beverages’ opposition to the application on the basis of ss 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Trade Marks Act was unsuccessful. Energy Beverages “appealed” the Delegate’s decision to the Federal Court on the basis of s 59, s 44 and s 60.[2]

Secion 59

Section 59 provides:

The registration of a trade mark may be opposed on the ground that the applicant does not intend:

(a) to use, or authorise the use of, the trade mark in Australia; or

(b) to assign the trade mark to a body corporate for use by the body corporate in Australia;

in relation to the goods and/or services specified in the application.

which mirrors s 27.

Unlike s 92(4)(a), however, the person opposing registration under s 59 bears the onus of proving the lack of the requisite intention.

In very broad terms, this requires demonstration that the applicant does not have “a resolve or settled purpose at the time the application was filed to use the trade mark as a trade mark in relation to the relevant goods or services. A mere ”speculative possibility“ or ”a general intention to use the mark as some future but unascertained time” is not enough.

What happened

Before he incorporated Erbaviva and later KMA, Mr Zheng worked as the “Assistant to the Group Chairman” of NZ Skin Care Company. NZ Skin Care Company, as its name suggests, sold a range of skin care products and also home cleaning products.

The Group Chairman Mr Zheng assisted was a Mr Liu. Mr Liu was also the Chairman of a Chinese company, Shanghai Urganic. Mr Liu, however, was not a director of NZ Skin Care Company and Shanghai Urganic was not a shareholder in NZ Skin Care Company (although later it did become the ultimate shareholder of that company).

While he was still working for NZ Skin Care Company, Mr Zheng incorporated Erbaviva to sell “Erbaviva” brand skin care products and, after the trade mark application in issue had been filed, KMA. Neither company, however, has ever traded.

In the course of 2018, Erbaviva applied for and became registered as the owner of trade marks for a “Kangaroo Mother” logo and Kangaroo Mother in respect of a range of goods in classes 3, 5 and 21.[3]

In February 2019, Mr Zheng received an email from a Shanghai Urganic employee, Ms Lim,[4] informing him that Director Liu had “mentioned” we should apply for a food trade mark for “Kangaroo Mother”. Ms Lim supplied a catalogue for another company’s products to illustrate the goods under consideration. This exchange led to the application the subject of the appeal.

After some back and forth, Mr Zheng contacted Erbaviva’s then trade mark attorneys with instructions to file a trade mark application in Australia for a range of goods in classes 5, 29, 30, 31 and 32. (With the exception of “chocolate flavoured cola drinks”, Mr Zheng had simply cut and pasted the specification for another, unrelated company’s trade mark he had found on the IPONZ site.)

The attorney indicated he could file for this range of goods but proposed he amend it to ensure that Erbaviva had “the widest scope of protection in those classes.” So, after Mr Zheng approved that proposal, the application wound up in the form under opposition.[5]

What O’Callaghan J found

As the application was filed in Erbaviva’s name, the relevant intention was Erbaviva’s at the time the application was filed. That is, the question was whether or not Erbaviva had an intention to use the trade mark in any of the ways specified in s 59 when it filed the application.

O’Callaghan J held it did not.

First, the goods specified in the application as filed were much broader than those suggested by Ms Lim or proposed to the attorney by Mr Zheng.

Secondly, in cross-examination Mr Zheng’s evidence was that he did not regard Ms Lim’s report about what Director Liu “mentioned” as an instruction.

Thirdly, there were no documents produced through discovery or evidence of any plan or proposal beyond use for “gel candies, pressed candies, drops, powdered dairy products, solid beverages or capsules”.

Fourthly, Mr Zheng had simply cut and paste the specification he proposed to the attorney in a matter of minutes.

Fifthly, although the application had been made over four years ago, there was no evidence of any use or preparations to use.

Sixthly, there was no evidence to support the contention that Shanghai Urganic, NZ Skin Care Company and Erbaviva were part of a “conglomerate” (see “secondly” above).

Mr Zheng’s evidence unfortunately only went as far as claiming Erbaviva intended to use or authorise another company to use. So submissions that it intended to assign to KMA on its incorporation did not fly.

The evidence also included a non-disclosure agreement with an Australian manufacturer of various goods, but the counterparty was NZ Skin Care, not Erbaviva.

So O’Calaghan J found the s 59 ground proven and allowed the appeal to refuse registration. By way of obiter, O’Callaghan J would also have upheld the opposition grounds under s 44 and s 60.

Some observations

As noted above, successful oppositions under s 59 are not very common in view of the onus – unlike removal actions under s 92 in which s 100 places the onus on the trade mark owner to prove use.[6] And this case seems to have been particularly assisted by Mr Zheng’s problematic evidence and the amorphous nature of the relationship(s) with Director Liu.

That said, the first thing to note is that Energy Beverages did not pursue the ground before the Registrar but only on “appeal” where the Court procedures of discovery and cross-examination were deployed.

Next, it is significant that this was an opposition rather than an application under s 92. This is because O’Callaghan J followed Yates J’s decision in Apple (at [232]) and accepted that the whole application should be rejected if it failed in respect of any specified goods. At [28]:

There is but one application covering registration of the mark for all the services that have been specified. If the application fails in one respect, it fails as a whole….

In contrast, an application under s 92 may often result in removal of some, but not all, goods or services.

Thirdly, recognising this problem, KMA made an application on the penultimate day of the trial under s 197 to amend the specification of goods for a much more limited scope.

At [35], O’Callaghan J accepted that he should exercise this power in similar manner to that exercised by the Court when considering amendments to patents under s 105 of the Patents Act. That is, the power to amend was discretionary and required consideration of all the circumstances including when the owner became aware of the need to amend and any explanation for delay.

At [36] – [38], O’Callaghan J refused the request. KMA had been aware that Energy Beverages relied on the Apple approach from at least the opening. KMA failed to provide any explanation for its delay or the basis on which it proposed to exclude some goods but not others. Also, Erbaviva had deliberately sought the widest scope of protection possible, much broader than its own instructions.

In that connection, it is unusual to get the communications between the client and the attorney. While it is part of our jobs to ensure the client is getting appropriate protection, this case should serve as a warning against being too enthusiastic.

The question of discovery is also instructive. In October 2022, KMA had made discovery of 5 documents and a number of other documents over which privilege was claimed.

Two days before trial, however, KMA announced it proposed to rely on documents over which it had previously claimed privilege and, in the course of the trial just before Mr Zheng’s cross-examination, KMA sought to rely on a “further, extensive, tranche of documents which ought to have been produced in answer to the order for discovery”. At [62], O’Callaghan J invoked Aon Risk and refused that attempt on the grounds of prejudice and KMA’s failure to adequately explain the delay.

Energy Beverages LLC v Kangaroo Mother Australia Pty Ltd [2023] FCA 999 (O’Callaghan J)


  1. The class 32 goods were specified in TM No 1320799 for the “Mother” mark in gothic script.  ?
  2. Because the “appeal” is a hearing de novo, it is possible to raise grounds not raised before the Registrar.  ?
  3. After the trade marks were assigned to KMA, the logo mark has subsequently been removed for non-use under s 92 on application by Energy Beverages. KMA did not seek to defend the non-use application.  ?
  4. Although not an employee of NZ Skin Care Company, she did have the use of a NZ Skin Care Company email account.  ?
  5. Reasons for decision at [93] – [94].  ?
  6. S 92(4)(a) can be rebutted by showing use in good faith after the application was filed. And s 92(4)(b) proceedings can be brought only after the expiry of the period specified in s 93 (which is different depending on whether the application was filed before or after the Productivity Commission Implementation Act amendments).  ?

A cautionary trade mark tale Read More »

The ACIP Designs Amendments have been enacted

On 10 September 2021, the Designs Amendment (Advisory Council on Intellectual Property Response) Act 2021 received Royal Assent, becoming the 100th statute enaceted by the Commonwealth Parliament this year.[1]

As the marvellously evocative title indicates, this Act amends the Designs Act 2003 to implement the recommendations of ACIP’s Review of the Designs System: Final Report from March 2015 which have been accepted.

Two amendments come into force straight away. The rest (unless proclaimed earlier) come into force 6 months (and a day) later – 11 10 March 2022.

Amendments with immediate effect

So, for design applications made on or after 11 September 2021, the distinctiveness of a design and its infringement will now be tested by the standard of “the familiar person”.[2] That is, s 19(4) has been amended to test distinctiveness:[3]

(4) In applying subsections (1), (2) and (3), the person must apply the standard of a person (the familiar person) who is familiar with the product to which the design relates, or products similar to the product to which the design relates (the standard of the informed user) (whether or not the familiar person is a user of the product to which the design relates or of products similar to the product to which the design relates).

Australia’s adventure in testing the validity and infringement of a registered design by somethin akin to the EU’s “informed user”, therefore, has come to an end.

Also, s 93(3) has been amended so that the registration of a design can be revoked on lack of entitlement grounds only if the Court is satisfied that it is just and equitable to do so in all the circumstances. This brings revocation on entitlement grounds in line with the Patents Act.[4] The idea here being to ameliorate the harshness of the sanction to validity in the case of essentially honest mistakes.

This amendment will apply to any applications to revoke a registered design made on or after 11 September 2021. It does not matter when the design was registered.[5]

Amendments coming into force later

The remainder of the amendments come into operation later: If not earlier proclaimed, on the day after six months from Royal Assent.

A number of these have been covered in earlier posts. They include:

  • the 12 month grace period for publications or public uses made before the priority date by or with the consent of the registered owner, a predecessor in title or “the person who created the design” (Schedule 1);
  • conferring power on exclusive licensees to sue for infringement (Schedule 5);
  • the introduction of an exemption from infringement on the grounds of prior use (Schedule 2);
  • the application process will be changed so that, if a request for registration is not filed with the design application, a request will be deemed to have been made 6 months from the application date (if not made earlier or the application has not been withdrawn).[6] In other words (and assuming the application passed the formalities test), a design will be registered automatically 6 months after the application is filed rather than lapse if no request has been filed (Schedule 3);
  • relief from liability for infringement for acts done before the design was registered (i.e. between the priority date and publication of the design) (Schedule 4);
  • removal of the unused option to publish a design rather than register it (Schedule 3).

There are also some other, technical amendments.

Some care will be needed with the “transitional provisions”. For the most part, the amendments will apply only to design applications made on or after the commencement of the relevant amendments.

Designs Amendment (Advisory Council on Intellectual Property Response) Act 2021

Explanatory Memorandum

Addendeum to the Explanatory Memorandum

The ACIP Report

Lid dip to Brett Massey at IP Australia for drawing my attention to the correct date the second round commence (assuming not proclaimed earlier).


  1. At the time of writing, the Act does not appear to be on Austlii, but you can find it here.  ?
  2. Schedule 7 Part 1 item 5(1) and (2).  ?
  3. Text in italics inserted by the amendment. This is my mark up I’m afraid.  ?
  4. Patents Act 1990 s 22A and s 138(4).  ?
  5. Schedule 7 Part 2 item 8 and Explanatory Memorandum para 248.  ?
  6. The “relevant period” is to be prescribed in the regulations but the helpful flow chart included in the Explanatory Memorandum indicates the “relevant period” will be 6 months.  ?

The ACIP Designs Amendments have been enacted Read More »

More on the Designs ACIP bill

Following Friday’s post, the text of the Designs Amendment (Advisory Council on Intellectual Property Response) Bill 2020 and the Explanatory Memorandum are now available.

So:

  • Schedule 1: the 12 month ‘grace period’ before the priority date for prior use/publication by or with the consent of the design. Publications by the Registrar of Designs (i.e. on the Register of Designs) or by an equivalent overseas person or body will not be able to claim the benefit of this ‘grace period’. On the other hand, if some third party starts using, or publishes, the design or a substantially similar design after the design owner, there will be presumption that the third party derived its design from the design owner. In other words, if the registered owner is relying on the ‘grace period’, the onus will be on the person asserting invalidity by prior use or publication in the 12 month ‘grace period’ to prove the prior art relied on was not derived from the registered owner or the owner’s predecessor in title.
  • Schedule 2: will introduce new s 71A to provide an exemption from infringement for persons who start using a design during the 12 month ‘grace period’ introduced by Schedule 1. The exemption will continue to operate after the design is registered. The exemption extends not only to those who actually engage in an otherwise infringing act but also to a person who: had taken definite steps (contractually or otherwise and whether or not in Australia) to do [the otherwise infringing] act…. According to the EM, ‘definite steps’ will not be satisfied by mere ‘initial steps’. The plans must be finalised and the process of acquiring or making all components must have started. Under 71A(4), the person entitled to the exemption may “dispose” of their entitlement so that the exemption passes to the disposee – presumably, it follows from the disposal of the entitlement that the disposer cannot continue to claim the benefit.
  • Schedule 3: removes the publication option – the nice flowchart of the options for requesting registration and the formalities check is now on p. 23 of the EM.
  • Schedule 4: will amend s 75 to provide a further ‘innocent infringer’ defence for acts done prior to registration of the design (when the design representations are first published). The amendment will give the Court a discretion not to award damages where the defendant satisfies the Court that, when the infringing acts were done, the defendant was not aware, and could not reasonably have been expected to be aware, that the design application had been filed.
  • Schedule 5: will give an exclusive licensee standing to sue for infringements. By proposed s 5A, an exclusive licensee will be defined to be as a person to whom the registered owner has granted the exclusive rights in the design.[1] An exclusive licensee may be empowered to sub-license. A person will not be disqualified as an exclusive licensee, however, if their exclusive rights do not include the right to sub-license.
  • Schedule 6: will empower the Registrar to specify the formal requirements for design applications by publishing notices – these formalities will no longer by specified in the regulations and such notices will not be “legislative instruments”
  • Schedule 7
    1. Repeals “the standard of the informed user” and replaces it with the “standard of the familiar person” adopted in Multisteps.
    2. Will give the Court a discretion whether or not to revoke a registered design on grounds of lack of entitlement unless satisfied in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to do so – this will bring the revocation power on this basis in line with s 138 of the Patents Act.
    3. Will permit revocation on grounds of fraud, false suggestion etc. perpetrated at the examination stage.
    4. Makes provision for ‘revived’ designs where the renewal fees are not paid until after the expiry of the initial 5 year term:
      1. If the renewal fees are paid within 6 months after expiry of the initial term (the so-called ‘renewal grace period’), the registration will be treated as remaining in force and never to have ceased;
      2. But if the renewal fees are paid after 6 months (on the basis of an application for an extension of time), the registration will be treated as having ceased on the expiry of the 5 year term.
      The significance of these differences is that a third party should not start using the design in the 6 month ‘renewal grace period’. The protections under s 140 will be available only to persons who start using after the expiry of the ‘renewal grace period’.

  1. Strictly speaking, the exclusive rights conferred by s 10(1)(a) to (e) only. Can anyone think of a rational reason why s 10 confers on the registered owner the exclusive licence to authorise people to do the acts in s 10(1)(a) to (e), but authorising an infringement is not an infringing act under s 71?  ?

More on the Designs ACIP bill Read More »

Designs Amendment (Advisory Council On Intellectual Property Response) Bill 2020

The Designs Amendment (Advisory Council On Intellectual Property Response) Bill 2020 was introduced into Parliament on Wednesday, 2 December.

At the time of writing the links to the text of the Bill and the Explanatory Memorandum are inactive.[1] You can read, however, the Minister’s Second Reading speech.

Also there has already been consultation on an exposure draft and IP Australia’s response to that public consultation. So we know broadly what is in the Bill, although there were a number of details to be worked out following IP Australia’s response.

According to the Minister’s Second Reading speech:

  • the Bill introduces the 12 month ‘grace period’ for design owners who make their designs publicly available before they file their design applications – this was Sch. 1 in the exposure draft. As the Minister pointed out, this will align Australia’s registered design law with “many of our major trading partners” (including the EU and the USA);
  • the Bill will give exclusive licensees standing to bring infringement proceedings – this was Schedule 4 in the exposure draft. In the exposure draft at least and as with patents, the exclusive licensee had to be the exclusive licensee of the whole right;
  • the Bill will remove the “rarely used” publication option so that every application will be an application for registration – one consequence of this reform as implemented in the exposure draft was that a design application will automatically proceed to formalities examination and registration 6 months after filing if registration was not requested earlier;[2]
  • there will also be a prior user defence for a person who commences using a design during the ‘grace period’ before the design application is filed – this was Schedule 2 in the exposure draft;
  • in addition, in cases where registration is delayed (up to 6 months from the filing date), there will be some sort of “innocent infringer” defence for a person who commences using the design in the period between filing and registration (as it is only on registration that the design representations are published);
  • there are also “smaller technical corrections and improvements” including revocation of a design for fraud, false representation etc. during certification.

Although the Minister’s Second Reading speech does not mention it, the exposure draft also included in Schedule 6 the amendment of s 19(4) to abandon the “informed user” test and adopt the “familiar person” test.

The Minister also indicated the Bill “is just the first stage of the Government’s ongoing program of designs reform, with more improvements to come after further consultation.” According to IP Australia’s consultation page (scroll down), the following matters are still on IP Australia’s Policy Register:

  • Protection of partial designs – Policy ID 42 This issue apparently has “high priority”;
  • Protection of virtual, non-physical and active state designs – Policy ID 43 This issue apparently has “high priority”;
  • Clarify ambiguity in section 19 of the Designs Act – Policy ID 35 A third issue with “high priority”;

(This is in addition to the change from “informed user” to “familiar person”.)

  • Clarification of ‘registered’ and ‘certified’ designs – Policy ID 37 Also “high priority”;
  • Some of the amendments proposed in Recommendation 18 of the ACIP Designs Review (18b, 18d, 18e and 18g are not progressing at this time) – Policy ID 45

For the research reports arising from the longer term Designs Review Project, see here.

Debate on the Bill itself has been adjourned to the first sitting day of the next period of sittings – presumably, in 2021.

Lid dip: Genevieve Corish at LexisNexis


  1. When they do appear (presumably in the next few days), they should be accessible from here and/or here.  ?
  2. This was Sch. 3 in the exposure draft. The exposure draft Explanatory Memorandum at p. 22 had a nice flowchart illustrating the application and registration process under the proposed regime.  ?

Designs Amendment (Advisory Council On Intellectual Property Response) Bill 2020 Read More »

Meat & Livestock Australia loses its appeal against Branhaven’s selective breeding patent

The Full Court has refused Meat & Livestock Australia leave to appeal from Beach J’s rulings to grant Branhaven’s[1] patent for the use of genetic information in the selective breeding of cattle. MLA did not seek leave to appeal the ruling that the claims to uses of the genetic information were patentable subject matter.

Image by VIVIANE MONCONDUIT from Pixabay

In its amended form as allowed by Beach J, claim 1 reads:

  1. A method for identifying a trait of a bovine subject from a nucleic acid sample of the bovine subject, comprising identifying in the nucleic acid sample an occurrence of at least three single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) wherein each of the at least three SNPs are significantly associated with the trait, with the degree of statistical significance being p?0.05, and wherein the at least three SNPs occur in more than one gene; and wherein

[and wherein] (a) at least one of the SNPs corresponds to position 300 of any one of SEQ ID NOS: 19473 to 21982, or

(b) the SNP is about 500,000 or less nucleotides from position 300 of any one of SEQ ID NOS: 19473 to 21982 and is in linkage disequilibrium with the SNP at position 300 with an r2 value of ?0.7.

(The [ ] indicates deletions and the italics insertions from the original claim.)

In his Honour’s first ruling, Beach J held that claim 13[2] was invalid as a claim to genetic information, but otherwise rejected MLA’s attacks based on manner of manufacture, novelty and inventive step. His Honour, however, found that the claims lacked clarity. So Branhaven came back with the amended form.

In his Honour’s second ruling, MLA argued there was no power to amend and, in any event, the proposed amendments were not fairly based. In the result, his Honour rejected MLA’s attacks and directed the patent in amended form proceed to grant. MLA sought leave to appeal.

Did the Court have power to permit amendment?

Following the Raising the Bar Act, the power of the Court to deal with amendments was expanded by the addition of s 105(1A):

If an appeal is made to the Federal Court against a decision or direction of the Commissioner in relation to a patent application, the Federal Court may, on the application of the applicant for the patent, by order direct the amendment of the patent request or the complete specification in the manner specified in the order.[3]

At [91] and [93], the Full Court considered the plain meaning of this provision was to confer on the Court power to deal with amendments of patent applications under appeal.

The Full Court considered MLA’s argument that Beach J had decided the appeal in his Honour’s first decision and so was functus officio “untenable”.

When handing down his first reasons for judgment, Beach J had simply ordered:[4]

Within 14 days of the date of these orders, each of the parties file and serve proposed minutes of orders and short submissions (limited to three pages) to give effect to these reasons, including on the question of any steps necessary to deal with any application to amend the claims of patent application no. 2010202253 and on the question of costs.

The Full Court accepted that this order did not dispose of the appeal and so Beach J still had jurisdiction over the patent application in its amended form. At [87]:

The order made by his Honour at the time did not dispose of the appeal but was instead a procedural order requiring the parties to file and serve proposed minutes of order and short submissions to give effect to his Honour’s reasons including in relation to any application to amend the claims of the patent application. There is no substance to the applicant’s submission that either the publication of his Honour’s first set of reasons or the making of that order brought the proceeding to an end.

and [90]:

However, as his Honour correctly observed, the publication of his first set of reasons did not dispose of the appeal since no order to that effect was made. Nor could the publication of his Honour’s first set of reasons amount to an order disposing of the appeal. His Honour made it clear in his reasons that he would refrain from making any such order until any question in relation to amendment had been dealt with.

The Full Court turned then to the substantive argument about whether Beach J erred in allowing the amendments.

Were the amendments permissible?

As already noted, his Honour had found in his first reasons that the relevant claims lacked clarity. The main issue here was that claim 1 did not explicitly state the requirement of “linkage disequilibrium” (LD) for the relevant single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or what degree of LD was required: see [348] – [362] reproduced at [69] of the Full Court’s reasons.

As the elements were not disclosed in the claim, MLA argued the amendments were impermissible as they introduced new matter into the claims. Beach J, however, allowed the amendments on the grounds that they were limiting amendments and had been in substance disclosed in the specification.

The Full Court essentially accepted this conclusion on the facts. It did note that, generally, a claim which defined an invention more narrowly than the disclosure in the specification would be fairly based, but there may be some situations where that was not the case. The overriding question was whether the claim described an invention different to the disclosure in the specification. At [104] – [105]:

All other things being equal, a claim that defines an invention in terms that are narrower than a more general description in the body of the specification would support is not likely to travel beyond what is more generally described. But there may be some situations in which what is more specifically defined results in a claim that travels beyond what is described in the specification: AstraZeneca at 244 and [285]-286 where reference is made to Sir Robin Jacob’s judgment in Dr Reddy’s Laboratories (UK) Ltd v Eli Lilly and Co Ltd [2010] RPC 9 at [26] and [28]. In these situations a claim may be invalid if the invention more specifically defined is an invention that is different from the invention described in the specification as opposed to some narrower embodiment of the latter.

In circumstances where it can be concluded that there is an implicit disclosure of the relevant feature, it is unnecessary to inquire into whether the feature is truly limiting. But even in the absence of an implicit disclosure, a claim does not necessarily lack fair basis because it includes a matter of detail that is not described in the specification so long as it defines an invention that is not different from the invention described in the specification. The proper characterisation of the invention described in the specification is critical when determining whether the claim is to an invention different from that described in the body of the specification. Each case will depend on its own facts and on the proper characterisation of the invention described in the body of the specification. (emphasis supplied)

If the feature added to the claim was implicitly disclosed in the specification, therefore, the claim could be amended. But, amendment might be permissible even if not implicitly disclosed.

At [110] – [115], the Full Court focused on Beach J’s unchallenged findings including, in particular, that the skilled addressee “would understand that the specification requires that there be high or strong LD between the limb (a) SNP and the limb (b) SNP”, but not necessarily a very high or perfect LD. The proposed amendments gave effect to that understanding by reference to more precise rather than some less precise criteria.

The Full Court accepted MLA’s criticism that the specification (before amendment) made no mention at all of r2 values. Beach J accepted expert evidence, however, that the r2 values were broadly equivalent to LD values that might fairly be regarded as high or strong. As a result, its inclusion was permissible. Noting that high LD or strong LD were “less precise criterion” than the expressed r2 vaues, at [114], the Full Court explained:

…. To hold that it is not open to use the r2 statistic or the 0.7 value for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is a high or strong degree of LD between the limb (a) SNP and the limb (b) SNP would involve, in our view, the very kind of over meticulous verbal analysis that should be eschewed when determining whether a proposed amended claim satisfies the requirements of s 102(1) of the Act. This is particularly so in circumstances where the amendment is propounded for the purpose of clarifying an ambiguity that would otherwise prevent the patent application proceeding to grant. In the present case we do not think the use of the r2 statistic in limb (b) results in a claim that defines an invention different from that which is more generally disclosed in the body of the specification as filed. (emphasis supplied)

As a result, the Full Court came to “the very clear conclusion” that MLA had not made out a clear prima facie case of error where the likely result would be allowing an invalid patent to proceed to grant. Accordingly, leave to appeal was refused.

Since this is a pre-Raising the Bar patent, the old “practically certain” test applies to the opposition. That raises the question whether things would turn out differently in a revocation proceeding on the balance of probabilities. After 949 paragraphs for the first decision and 470 paragraphs for the second, perhaps the “very clear conclusion” language might help discourage that course?

Meat and Livestock Australia Limited v Branhaven LLC [2020] FCAFC 171 (Kenny, Nicholas and Burley JJ)


  1. Cargill Inc. and Branhave were joint applicants but in the course of the hearings before Beach J, Cargill assigned its interest to SelecTraits Genomics LLC.  ?
  2. Claim 13. An isolated polynucleotide identified according to the method of claim 8.  ?
  3. Sch. 3 item 6. Prior to the introduction of this amendment, the appeal to the Court was limited to the form of the specification before the Commissioner in the decision under appeal. If an application to amend was made after the Commissioner’s decision, the application could only be dealt with by the Commissioner: see e.g. Airsense Technology Limited v Vision Systems Limited [2007] FCA 828  ?
  4. Costs were also reserved.  ?

Meat & Livestock Australia loses its appeal against Branhaven’s selective breeding patent Read More »

Section 105(1A) passes its test

While some of us have been sweltering on the beach or disporting in the northern snows, Beach J has granted Branhaven’s application to amend its patent application for compositions and methods of inferring bovine traits following Meat & Livestock Australia’s opposition.

You will recall that Beach J had earlier rejected MLA’s attack based on manner of manufacture, novelty and inventive step. However, his Honour upheld the challenges based on lack of clarity and, to an extent, utility.

Branhaven applied to amend under s 105(1A) of the Patents Act 1990.

MLA opposed; in broad terms arguing that Branhaven was too late, there was no power to amend at this stage; the amendments were not permissible in any event and, as a matter of discretion, should not be allowed even if the Court did have power.

Prior to the Raising the Bar Amendments, the Court had power under s 60(4) to hear an appeal from the Commissioner’s decision in an opposition. The Court was restricted, however, to dealing with the application in the form the subject of the opposition before the Commissioner. If the opposition was successful but on grounds that could be cured, any application to amend had to be remitted to the Commissioner.[1] Two of the amendments introduced by Raising the Bar were s 105(1A) and s 112A. Section 105(1A) provides:

If an appeal is made to the Federal Court against a decision or direction of the Commissioner in relation to a patent application, the Federal Court may, on the application of the applicant for the patent, by order direct the amendment of the patent request or the complete specification in the manner specified in the order.

MLA argued that, after such a hotly contested ‘appeal’ and detailed reasons, Beach J was in effect functus officio. Amongst other things, MLA’s application was not made during the appeal and the Court therefore had no power to deal with the amendment application.

Beach J has rejected all these attacks. In the course of doing so, his Honour recognised it would not be appropriate to remit the matter to the Commissioner (even if there were power). His Honour also found that s 105(1A), like s 105(1) but unlike the Commissioner’s powers under s 60, was discretionary. His Honour’s reasons also explored the types of considerations that might affect the exercise of that discretion in the context of an application instead of a granted patent.

At this stage, it is not known if MLA will seek to appeal.

Meat & Livestock Australia Limited v Cargill, Inc (No 2) [2019] FCA 33

Section 105(1A) passes its test Read More »

Shades of green – 2

Last week’s post looked at the substantive reasons for the rejection of Frucor’s attempt to register a shade of green as a trade mark for energy drinks. There were also a couple of points about grounds of opposition and amendment of applications on appeal worth noting.

image002.jpg

You will remember that Frucor’s application included a green swatch, copied from its New Zealand trade mark application, which was for a different colour than the colour identified by the written description under reg. 4.3(7), Pantone 367c.

What’s a ground of rejection (for opposition purposes)

In addition to the grounds of opposition provided by sections 58 to 62A, as you will know s 57 provides that an application may be opposed on any of the grounds on which the application could have been rejected during examination.

Coca-Cola argued that the inconsistency between the graphic representation of the mark and the written description was itself a ground of rejection.

The basis for this argument was that s 33 required the Registrar to reject an application where the application had not been made in accordance with the Act. It argued the Registrar should have rejected the application because the inconsistency meant that Frucor’s application had not been made in accordance with the Regulations as required by s 27(2)(a).

Yates J rejected this argument at [136]ff. The grounds of rejection contemplated by s 57 were, relevantly, those provided by s 39s 44. (They even appear under a heading “Grounds for rejecting an application”.)

The power to amend

Frucor had not sought to amend its application to substitute a swatch of the correct colour before the Registrar during the examination process. It did apply to amend, however, during the appeal to the Federal Court.

Yates J, citing the approach taken by Heerey J under the Patents Act in Genetics Institute,[1] held that the Court had power to consider the amendment application under s 197 even though there had not been an application to amend before the Registrar. At [195], his Honour explained:[2]

…. I do not see how an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Registrar in opposition to registration proceedings under the Trade Marks Act differs materially from an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Commissioner in opposition to grant proceedings under the Patents Act. Whilst I acknowledge that, in the present case, an application under s 63 of the Trade Marks Act was not before the Registrar, the registrability of the mark the subject of the application was in contest. In the proceedings below, the Registrar had the power to permit the application to be amended subject to the constraints placed upon the exercise of that power by the Act. Given the nature of the “appeal” to this Court, the Court’s power to quell the controversy as to the registrability of the mark—the subject matter of the appeal—cannot be more limited than the Registrar’s power. Further, it cannot matter that the Registrar was not asked to exercise the power of amendment, just as it cannot matter that an opponent might seek to raise additional or new grounds of opposition, or that the parties might seek to adduce different evidence to the evidence that was before the Registrar or raise new or different arguments. The opposition proceeds afresh before the Court on the subject matter that was before the Registrar and is adjudicated upon accordingly.

This practical approach is, with respect, to be welcomed in the interests of efficiency and, if followed, would obviate the need to introduce into the Trade Marks Act a counterpart to s 105(1A) of the Patents Act which, in turn, arose because Courts applying NEB had ruled a Court hearing an appeal from an opposition before the Commissioner had no power to deal with an amendment application.

Even though the power existed, Yates J at [206] denied Frucor’s application to amend. The substitution of “a markedly different green-coloured swatch” for the existing swatch would substantially affect the identity of the trade mark and so was prohibited by s 65(2).

Frucor also made a very late application to the Court to amend the application on the basis of s 65A.

The very late stage of the application and the lack of any utility (as the application would fail the distinctiveness requirement in any event) were fatal.

In contrast to his Honour’s practical approach to allowing consideration of an amendment under s 65 through s 197, however, Yates J considered allowing a party to bring an application under s 65A for the first time in the Court would subvert the statutory process for the consideration of such amendments by the Registrar prescribed by s 65A. Section 65A contemplated publication of the amendment application in the Official Journal and opposition proceedings before the Registrar.

In further contrast to Yates J’s views about s 65A, it may be noted that Courts dealing with amendment applications under s 105(1A) have directed the amendment applicant to publish the application in the Official Journal so that the Commissioner and any potential opponents may intervene.[3] The difference is of course that the Patents Act through s105(1A) expressly tells the Court to deal with the request to amend because of the inefficiencies and delays which had resulted.

As previously noted, it does not appear that Frucor has appealed.

Frucor Beverages Limited v The Coca-Cola Company [2018] FCA 993


  1. Which Yates J noted was apparently endorsed by the Full Court in New England Biolabs at [50].  ?
  2. See also at [200] – [201] and [204].  ?
  3. A recent example is Electronic Tax-Free Shopping Ltd v Fexco Merchant Services (No 3) [2017] FCA 569 at [2] – [3].  ?

Shades of green – 2 Read More »

A Basket Is Still Not A Cylinder

Glaxo has lost its appeal against Beach J’s ruling that Apotex and Generic Partners did not infringe its sustained release paracetamol patent. In a battle between what the skilled addressee would understand and the plain, literal wording of the claim, the lawyers won out.

Interpreting the claim

Claim 1 of the patent is for a pharmaceutical composition with a bilayer tablet having both an immediate release phase of paracetamol and a sustained release phase wherein:

said composition has an in vitro paracetamol dissolution profile (as determined by the USP type III apparatus, reciprocating basket, with 250ml of 0.1M HCl at 37C set at a cycle speed of 15 strokes/min) with the following constraints:

(a) 30 – 48% released after 15 minutes,

(b) 56 to 75% after 60 minutes and

(c) more than 85% after 180 minutes.

The problem was in that reference to a “reciprocating basket”, as a USP type III apparatus had a reciprocating cylinder, not a basket.

At the relevant time, there were four types of apparatus for testing dissolution – a USP type I apparatus, a USP type II apparatus, a USP type III apparatus and a USP type IV apparatus. The four types of machines provided different hydrodynamics which, in turn, meant the user would obtain different dissolution results. If one used a different apparatus, therefore, one might get a different dissolution profile.[1]

As already noted, the USP type III apparatus did not have a reciprocating basket. “Pharmaceutical scientists” generally referred to the USP type 1 apparatus as a “basket”, the type II apparatus as a “paddle”, the type III apparatus as a “reciprocating cylinder” and the type IV apparatus as a “flow through cell”.

This reflected the different construction and working of the machines. To test dissolution using a type I apparatus, the composition was placed in a cylindrical mesh basket which was then placed inside a cylindrical vessel containg the dissolution medium. The basket then rotated around inside the cylindrical vessel.

In a type III apparatus, the composition is placed inside a glass reciprocating cylinder which is then moved up and down in a glass vessel containing the dissolution medium.

Apparently, it would be possible to modify a type III apparatus to use a “basket”, but there was no evidence anyone had ever done so.

Against this background, the evidence established that the skilled addressee would recognise that the reference to “basket” in the claim was a mistake.

The question is then how is the claim to be interpreted. GSK argued that the skilled addressee would simply read the reference to a “reciprocating basket” as a reference to the reciprocating cylinder that type III apparatus used. The Full Court considered that this went beyond a purposive construction and would involve impermissibly rewriting the claim.

After referring to Catnic[2] and Kirin-Amgen, the Full Court said at [109]:

It is important to note that Lord Hoffman [in Kirin-Amgen at [34]] was referring here to the meaning conveyed to the skilled addressee by the language used and was not directing himself to a situation in which the skilled addressee deduced that the language of the claim, although conveying to him or her a particular meaning, could never have been intended to mean what it conveyed.

Here, the skilled addressee knew what the term “basket” meant, but “deduced” it couldn’t be intended to mean that.

The Full Court then emphasised a point made in many cases: a patent is a document prepared by the patentee “in words of the patentee’s own choosing” and “the words will usually have been chosen upon skilled advice.”

First, if a mistake had been made, there was a procedure for amendment – which GSK had not invoked in this case. The availability of that procedure had the further significance that [s 115][s115] provided alleged infringers with some protection from damages before the amendments were allowed.

Secondly, in describing the device used for dissolution testing, GSK (at least on its case) was not trying to identify something new. So, the difficulties of describing something which had not existed before would not arise.[3]

Thirdly, the words had to have been put there to mean something. At [138]:

GSK’s infringement case can only succeed if the words “reciprocating basket” are either interpreted to mean “reciprocating cylinder” or simply ignored. Either approach involves an impermissible re-writing of the relevant claims.

And, really, that is the Full Court’s point. Athough one is supposed to interpet the claim through the eyes of the skilled addressee, reading claim 1 the way the skilled addressee apparently would have done did not make proper allowance for the function of the claims. At [139]:

This is a case in which the skilled addressee’s understanding of the claims, as found by the primary judge, does not make proper allowance for the function of the claims in defining the invention. Ultimately, it is for the court to decide the meaning of the claims. This is a case in which we think the language of the claim must be understood to mean what it actually says.

So, although the patent specification is addressed to, and to be understood through the eyes of the person skilled in the art, the Full Court qualified that approach in light of other policies gleaned fron the Act.

Fair basis

Apotex and Generic Partners also lost their appeals against the trial judge’s ruling that GSK’s patent was fairly based and there had been no failure to disclose the best method.

On fair basis, the claims were consistent with the consistory clauses, but Apotex argued the body of the specification showed that the invention was narrower than the broad consistory clauses. This appears to have been an attempt to read the claims down to two specific formulations discussed in the specification, Formulations C and D.

A key point was whether the trial judge had impermissibly taken into account information in an FDA report to ascertain if the claims travelled beyond the disclosure in the specification. Apotex argued this was excluded by the High Court’s decision in the first Lockwood decision, where it had said at [48]:

If all that is essential in assessing a fair basing objection is recourse to the contents of the specification, there is no call, for example, for an examination (except on construction questions) of common general knowledge (which is essential when considering an objection based on want of an inventive step), or of prior art (which is essential when considering novelty (s 7(1))) …

The Full Court, however, rejected this attack; concluding that the information in the FDA Report (which was common general knowledge) informed how the skilled addressee would understand the claims. At [166], the Full Court said:

What is critical to the pharmacokinetic behaviour of the many formulations within the claims is the dissolution profile (or release rate) of the formulation. The primary judge accepted that the FDA Report recognised that a variation of ±10% percentage points in the release rate was acceptable to the FDA even where no IVIVC had been established. This provides evidentiary support for the finding that the skilled addressee would know that various formulations within the claims apart from Formulations C and D were likely to have similar pharmacokinetic properties. This also provides a complete answer to Apotex’s argument that the skilled addressee (equipped with the common general knowledge) would approach the Patent with an understanding that there would be no reason to think that other formulations within the claims would have a similar pharmacokinetic profile to Formulations C and D in the absence of any established IVIVC.

The Full Court also rejected Apotex’ argument that a claim could not be fairly based unless the specification explained why the claims worked. Making it clear that they were dealing only with the position before the Raising the Bar Act reforms, the Full Court said at [170]:

Of course, it is important to note that s 40(2)(a) requires that the complete specification “describe the invention fully”. A complete specification may still “describe the invention fully” without explaining why the invention works. After all, the inventor, who presumably believes that the invention described works, may not understand why it works. But this does not prevent him or her from obtaining patent protection for the invention.

Best method

For best method, the argument built on the Servier ruling to argue there had been a failute to disclose the best method because the specification did not disclose the particular grade or viscosity of the high viscosity HPMC or the granulation end points used to make Formulations C and D.

At [192], the Full Court accepted that there could be a failure of best method if information was withheld even though it could be ascertained by routine experiment. The Full Court rejected the best method attack, however, finding that the informatin omitted was inessential manufacturing and production information. According to the Full Court at [201]:

It does not follow merely because the patent applicant uses a particular manufacturing process or a particular excipient in formulating its commercial embodiment that it will form part of the best method. The patent applicant may have adopted a particular process, or used a particular excipient, for reasons that are associated with its own particular circumstances rather than because it believes that they reflect the best method. The best method known to the patent applicant may be one that allows for the optimisation of a formulation by the skilled addressee rather than one that adheres to one specific formulation that the patent applicant seeks to commercialise.

Those preparing specifications might want, first, to note the reservation that the Full Court was not dealing with the “new” post-Raising the Bar regime. Secondly, [192] appears to carry with it the warning that, if one leaves something out, one does so at one’s own peril.

GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare Investments (Ireland) (No 2) Limited v
Generic Partners Pty Limited
[2018] FCAFC 71 (Middleton, Nicholas and Burley JJ)


  1. At [50], the Full Court explained, “There is no established correlation between dissolution results measured using the different USP apparatus. Sometimes small differences are measured, other times the measured differences are large. Differences in measured dissolution profiles as between each of USP type I, II and III apparatus may not be predictable.”  ?
  2. Catnic Components Limited & Anor v Hill & Smith Limited [1982] RPC 183 (HL).  ?
  3. Referring to another aspect of the construction problem adverted to by Lord Hoffmann at [34] in Kirin-Amgen. Leading of course to the irony that GSK did in fact describe something new!  ?

A Basket Is Still Not A Cylinder Read More »

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2017 – exposure draft

IP Australia has published an exposure draft of an Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2017 and the proposed accompanying regulations, explanatory memorandum and statement. So that everyone at IP Australia has something to do when they come back from their summer hols, you have to get your comments in by 22 January 2017.

A large part of the changes seem to be about aligning the administrative processes under the different statutory regimes According to the EM:

The patents, trade marks, designs and plant breeder’s rights (PBR) systems have a number of different administrative processes and rules specific to each IP right. A number of these differences are unnecessary or too onerous. Some processes take too long to resolve. This needlessly increases complexity, uncertainty and cost for users of the IP system.

This Bill will align and streamline the processes for obtaining, maintaining and challenging IP rights. Using similar processes for the different IP rights will make the IP system simpler and assist businesses dealing with more than one right. A simpler IP system will decrease administration costs for the Australian Government and reduce the regulatory burden for businesses that use it. The Bill will also enable greater use of electronic systems to manage and monitor IP rights.

A laudable objective! But, there are some 23 Parts and 596 items in the exposure draft bill alone. However, lots of them are plainly necessary changes such as replacing “reject” with “refuse” in the PBR Act, but there are others which will have more impact.

Overall, the broad topics addressed are:

  • Part 1 relating to renewals and terminology
  • Part 2 relating to re-examination and re-consideration
  • Part 3 relating to extensions of time
  • Part 4 relating to written requirements
  • Part 5 relating to the filing requirements
  • Part 6 relating to Official Journals
  • Part 7 relating to amendments of applications or other documents
  • Part 8 relating to signature requirements
  • Part 9 relating to computerised decision-making
  • Part 10 relating to addresses and service of documents
  • Part 11 relating to examination of patent requests and specifications
  • Part 12 relating to requirements for patent documents
  • Part 13 relating to acceptance of trade mark applications
  • Part 14 relating to registration of designs
  • Part 15 relating to unjustified threats of infringement
  • Part 16 relating to ownership of Plant Breeder’s Rights and entries in the Register
  • Part 17 relating to trade mark oppositions
  • Part 18 relating to seizure notices
  • Part 19 relating to publishing personal information of registered patent or trade marks attorneys
  • Part 20 relating to (criminal) prosecutions
  • Part 21 relating to the Secretary’s role in the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act
  • Part 22 relating to updating references to Designs Act
  • Part 23 abolishing the Plant Breeder’s Rights Advisory Committee.

I have no hope of trying to cover all that. Some of the things that caught my eye:

Part 15 introduces substantive changes to “unjustified threats”. The provisions in the Trade Marks Act will be amended to remove the defence of bringing infringement proceedings with due diligence. This will bring the trade marks regime in line with that for patents, designs and copyright. A corresponding regime is to be introduced for PBR.

Part 15 will also introduce a right for a victim of an unjustified threat to seek additional damages. What will be a flagrantly unjustified threat should be fun to explore.[1] Curiously, this remedy is not proposed for copyright.[2]

Part 13 proposes to reduce the period for acceptance of a trade mark, but expand the grounds for deferment. Items 421, 423 and 425 of the exposure draft regulations propose to reduce the period under reg. 4.12 from 15 months to 9 months after an adverse first report. However, item 427 inserts a new ground for deferring acceptance on the basis that:

(1A) The Registrar may, at the request of the applicant in writing, defer acceptance of an application for registration of a trade mark if:

(a) the request is made within the period applicable under regulation 4.12 or that period as extended under section 224, 224B or 224C of the Act; and

(b) the Registrar reasonably believes that there are grounds for refusing the application under section 41 or 177 of the Act; and

(c) the applicant is seeking to gather documents or evidence as to why the applicant considers there are no grounds for so refusing the application.

For renewal and re-examination (Part 2), apparently, it is possible to request examination of a registered design even after it has already been examined and certified. A formal re-examination process will be introduced. A re-examination regime is also proposed for PBR. The regimes for re-examination of patents and trade marks will also be clarified.

For re-examination (Part 3)

The EM says there are three broad issues with the current regimes:

> There are three broad issues with the extension of time system. The first issue is the differences in the number and types of extensions available between the IP rights. This increases complexity and confusion as to which extension is applicable and what evidence is required for supporting the request in a given situation. The second issue is the administrative burden placed on customers and IP Australia. Short extensions rarely have a significant impact on third parties, yet require the same declarations from applicants and assessment by IP Australia as long extensions. The third issue is that the protection for third parties that used an invention or trade mark while the IP application or right was lapsed or ceased can be inadequate or burdensome to obtain.  

The EM then says the main changes are:

  • repeal the ‘despite due care’ extension for patents;
  • remove the Commissioner’s and Registrar’s discretion for all general extensions, for all rights. This will
  • simplify the process and ensure compliance with the Patent Law Treaty and Patent Cooperation Treaty;
  • require all requests for extensions to be filed within two months of the removal of the cause of the failure to comply, to ensure there are no unreasonable delays;
  • improve the compensation for third parties that use inventions when a patent lapsed or ceased to reduce the burden on third parties;
  • expand the protection against infringement for third parties that use a trade mark while it was ceased to include while a trade mark application was lapsed;
  • introduce a streamlined process for short extensions, but ensure IP Australia can review and remake a decision on an extension of time;
  • prevent applicants from obtaining consecutive ‘short’ extensions for the same action;
  • provide general extensions and corresponding third party protection for PBRs.

Part 6 plans repeal of the requirements to publish information in the Official Journals, replacing them instead with an obligation to publish some information on the website or other electronic means.

Part 7 plans changes to the processes for amendments of information entered on the Registers and in documents. Perhaps alarmingly, these include plans to allow rights owners to make some changes to the Registers themselves!

Part 9 proposes introducing the potential for computerised decision making. An example of what is intended is the situation where an application has been accepted and the opposition period has expired without an opposition being filed. In such a situation “the computer” will “decide” to grant the right (presumably after,checking the fee has been paid). This seems intriguing, but you will have to go to a proposed legislative instrument to find out what decisions can be (have been) automated.

No doubt there will be something else to meet your curiosity lurking in the details!

You can find links to the exposure draft documents here. Remember though, get your submissions by 22 January 2017.


  1. Of course, in line with the existing provisions for additional damages for infringements, it may be possible to “score” even if the threat itself is not flagrant.  ?
  2. It can’t be because copyright falls under a different department because the exposure draft amends the Copyright Act to allow for electronic notifications (“notice” is also deprecated in this new simplified regime) relating to customs seizures – see Part 18.  ?

Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Bill 2017 – exposure draft Read More »

Servier best method & amendment

Servier has lost what may be its last round[1] in the arginine perindopril litigation against Apotex. Servier began the litigation back in 2007. Ultimately, it lost with its patent being found invalid on the ground that Servier had failed to disclose the best method of performing the invention. After that ruling, Servier applied to amend its patent to include the best method. Its application failed on discretionary grounds. Now, we have the Full Court’s decision dismissing Servier’s appeal from that refusal.

Best method

Servier’s first argument was that, following the High Court’s Kimberley-Clark decision, all s 40(2)(a) required was a disclosure sufficient to enable a skilled person to produce something within each claim without new invention or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting initial difficulty. Servier argued that there was no separate and independent requirement to disclose the “best method”.

After an extensive review of the case law, the Full Court rejected that argument, ruling that disclosure of the best method was indeed a separate requirement. In this case, Servier had failed to comply with that requirement.

Claim 1 of the patent was for the arginine salt of perindopril. There had been an earlier patent for perindopril and sodium and maleate salt forms had been identified. According to the Specification, the arginine salt form had particular stability advantages in conditions of heat and humidity which resulted in longer shelf life and permitted the use of less expensive forms of packaging. The achievement of these advantages, however, could be affected by the method of production. The Specification described the claimed arginine perindopril only as being produced by “a classical method of salification”.

The experts agreed this description of how to prepare the salt was “pregnant with ambiguity” and following from this evidence the trial judge had found this description was “wholly inadequate” and did not:

allow the skilled addressee to follow a routine process of deduction from that description because it leaves open too many variables.

Servier itself had used two different methods before the filing date – the 1986 method and the 1991 method – and another method – the 2002 study – after the priority date. The evidence showed that the method of salification used and variables such as the solvent used and whether and when to stir significantly affected the properties of the resulting salt, including its stability.

Accordingly, the Full Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that Servier had not disclosed the best method known to it of performing the invention.

Amendment

Servier had applied after the trial to amend the Specification to add the best method.

The Full Court affirmed the Pfizer Full Court’s ruling that the best method requirement required disclosure of the best method of performing the invention known to the applicant at the filing date. However, it was possible to remedy a failure to disclose the best method by amendment of the Specification made after the filing date.

The Full Court agreed with the trial judge that the amendment power under s 105 could be invoked even after trial and judgment finding all claims invalid. While there was a proprietal interest in being allowed to amend, it was still necessary for the patentee to satisfy the Court that discretionary grounds did not warrant exclusion.

In this case, however, discretionary grounds warranted refusal. Back in 2004, the examiner had issued a report as a result of which Servier’s patent attorney had advised Servier to include a description of the method of manufacture of arginine perindopril, even if it was well known. The inhouse instructor replied “we will see later”.

Although there was no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the inhouse instructor, the Full Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the inhouse instructor’s decision to ignore the advice of her Australian patent attorney was not reasonable.

The Full Court considered that there was no error of principle in the trial judge’s rejection of the length of the delay as otherwise warranting rejection of the application. However, they would appear themselves have felt the trial judge had been overly generous.

Finally, the Full Court allowed Apotex’ appeal from the trial judge’s order that Apotex pay 66% of Servier’s costs. Rather, Servier should pay 40% of Aptex’ costs of the revocation proceeding and 75% of Aptex’ costs of the amendment proceedings.

Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 27 (Bennett, Besanko and Beach JJ)


  1. Barring (potentially) a special leave application.  ?

Servier best method & amendment Read More »