Australia

Is there a Lenah Game Meats constructive trust?

The short answer is: not in this case in which Snaden J awarded The Game Meats Company $130,000 damages against Farm Transparency International for trespass but rejected Game Meats’ claim to a Lenah Game Meats constructive trust over the copyright in videos made by Farm Transparency during the trespass. The case also challenges whether the victim of the trespass can get an injunction against communicating the fruits of the trespass.

What happened

Game Meats operates abattoirs, including a halal abattoir at Eurobin.

Farm Transparency is a not-for-profit charity dedicated to educating the public about animal exploitation and the prevention of cruelty to animals.

As one of its directors, Mr Delforce, put it, Farm Transparency’s overarching wish is to “…end all forms of business that involve causing harm to animals”.

To that end, Ms McDonald-Eckersall, its Strategy and Campaigns Director, developed Farm Transparency’s “Shut Down Slaughterhouses” campaign.[1] As part of this campaign, between January and April 2024, Farm Transparency operatives (including Mr Delforce and Ms McDonald-Eckersall) broke into the Eurobin abattoir and installed video cameras to record the animal slaughtering process.

In May 2024, Farm Transparency provided some of the footage from those cameras to the Commonwealth Department of Agriculture as part of a complaint about the nature of Game Meats’ operations.

A few days later, Farm Transparency provided 14 minutes of the footage to Channel 7 which broadcast a story on its Albury station, but without the footage. Farm Transparency also posted the 14 minutes of footage with commentary on its Facebook page and on its website with a press release.

Game Meats obtained injunctions ex parte against the continued publication of these materials. Game Meats then sought injunctions and exemplary damages for trespass, injunctions and damages for contraventions of the prohibitions on misleading or deceptive conduct or the tort of injurious falsehood and, finally, it sought a declaration that a constructive trust arose over the copyright in the footage obtained through the trespass.

The decision

By the time of the trial, Farm Transparency admitted liability for trespass and Snaden J ordered damages totalling $130,000 ($30,000 damages and $100,000 in exemplary damages) for the trespass.

Snaden J, however, dismissed the claims for injurious falsehood, misleading or deceptive conduct and for beneficial ownership of the copyright in the footage as a cinematograph film.

The Lenah Game Meats constructive trust

Lenah Game Meats is authority for the principle that an interlocutory injunction cannot be granted except for the protection of some legal or equitable right or interest.

Similarly to the present case, Lenah Game Meats involved an attempt to stop the broadcasting of footage of the operations of the abattoir obtained through unlawful trespassing.[2] In the course of their reasons, Gummow and Hayne JJ said in obiter at [102] (with the individual agreement of Crennan and Callinan JJ):

A cinematograph film may have been made, as in Lincoln Hunt, in circumstances involving the invasion of the legal or equitable rights of the plaintiff or a breach of the obligations of the maker to the plaintiff. It may then be inequitable and against good conscience for the maker to assert ownership of the copyright against the plaintiff and to broadcast the film. The maker may be regarded as a constructive trustee of an item of personal (albeit intangible) property, namely the copyright conferred by s 98 of the Copyright Act. ….

Snaden J noted, therefore, that whether or not a constructive trust would arise depended very much on the particular facts of the particular case.

His Honour noted that, after Lenah Game Meats, Hall J had refused to find a constructive trust arose of footage and photographs taken by trespassers in Windridge Farm Pty Ltd v Grassi.

In Windridge Farm, Hall J found that the trespassers did not intend to use the footage for publication (but to facilitate an investigation) and there was no evidence of damage resulting from their conduct. At [129], Hall J said:

Apart from the unlawfulness of the entry onto the premises by the defendants, the evidence does not establish the type of circumstances to which Gummow and Hayne JJ in Lenah] adverted. These circumstances include matters which constitute either an invasion of the legal or equitable rights (such as the right to confidentiality) of the owner or occupier of premises or facts that establish a breach of any equitable obligation operating between (in this case) the plaintiff and the defendants at the time the film and the photographs were made or taken.

First, at [174] – [175] Snaden J rejected breach of confidence as a basis for intervention. While breach of confidence could be invoked to restrain the publication of confidential information “improperly or surreptitiously obtained”,[3] Game Meats had not submitted what was depicted in the footage was confidential nor could it realistically do so.[4]

Next, Snaden J considered there might be situations where how the footage had been obtained (his Honour’s emphasis) could give rise to a sufficient equity. At [177], his Honour explained:

But for the absence of authority, I would have been disposed to the view that it should. For the best part of two centuries, courts of equity have been prepared to grant relief against defendants possessed of information obtained by reason of “…a breach of trust, confidence or contract”: Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 1171, 1178 (Cottenham LC). The fact that information has been obtained through the commission of a crime or tort might not, by itself, suffice to warrant equivalent relief: Lenah, 230–1 [55] (Gleeson CJ); Smethurst v Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (2020) 272 CLR 177 (“Smethurst”), 219–20 [94] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ). But there is, in my view, much to commend the submission that, subject to discretionary considerations, equity might intervene to grant relief in relation to information that is directly obtained:

(1) as the intended consequence of wrongful conduct; and

(2) for the purposes of using it to visit prejudice upon the victim against whom that conduct was carried out.

For a respondent to realise the benefit that was intended to materialise from conduct of that kind would, I think, aptly be described as unconscionable (or unconscientious: see Lenah, 244–5 [98] (Gummow and Hayne JJ)).

However, Snaden J held that this was not a case where a constructive trust arose.

First, at [179], Snaden J noted that obtaining the footage through trespass had not been sufficient in Windridge and Smethurst. While the absence in Windridge of a purpose to shame or damage the abattoir was a difference to the present case, it was not sufficient. At [180], his Honour concluded:

…. The court should, I think, be very slow to favour a result that deviates from what transpired in those cases in the absence of some clearly apparent distinguishing feature or features.

Secondly, Snaden J was influenced at [181] by the absence of precedent recognising the proposed constructive trust. It was not appropriate for a judge at first instance to indulge “in the kind of ‘bold step’ that trial judges should ordinarily leave for higher consideration”.

Injurious falsehood and misleading or deceptive conduct

The claims for injurious falsehood and misleading or deceptive conduct failed because Snaden J found that the publications did not falsely represent that Game Meats condoned animal cruelty or was systematically cruel to the animals it slaughtered at the abattoir.

The injurious falsehood claim failed for the further reason that Farm Transparency did not make the representations in the publications maliciously. Snaden J accepted that there was no element of personal spite against Game Meats. However, his Honour rejected Farm Transparency’s claim that it did not intend harm to Game Meats. On the contrary, Farm Transparency’s very objective was to shame Game Meats and reduce custom for its products by exposing its production practices.

Even so, this was not enough – the intention to injure had to be without just cause. And that was not the case. At [131], his Honour explained:

The making of each of the Three Publications was effected to further the political ends to which FTI is committed. Whatever might be said of those ends, they cannot be impugned as unjust or improper in any sense recognised by law. It is a feature of societies the world over—and liberal democratic societies in particular—that people with shared ideological, religious, commercial or other values will group together with a view to spreading them or having them lawfully imposed upon others. That reality does not bespeak relevant injustice or impropriety.

Game Meats’ claims would also have run into difficulties proving it had suffered damage. Partly because of the state of its evidence, partly because of the speed with which the trial was brought on including the swift court action to secure interlocutory injunctions and partly because Farm Transparency had undertaken that it would not restore the footage to public view until final determination of the proceeding.

What happened to the injunction

The claims of copyright and injurious falsehood having failed, Game Meats sought an injunction to restrain Farm Transparency from publishing the footage obtained through the trespass. Game Meats argued this was necessary to prevent Farm Transparency from realising the benefits of its trespassing.

The interlocutory injunction was dissolved and no further injunction was granted!

Citing Patrick Stevedores at [33], Snaden J accepted that an injunction might be granted where the damage caused by tortious conduct is ongoing and is “extreme or at all events very serious”.

His Honour noted that Gageler, Gordon and Edelman JJ in Smethhurst had considered the invasion of Ms Smethurst’s privacy provided a sufficient interest for an injunction requiring the police to return her phone and the data it held. The police had seized the phone by executing a search warrant which was subsequently found to be invalid and so committed trespass. However, their Honours were in the minority.

At [204] – [206], Snaden J observed that the majority in Smethhurst, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane and Nettle JJ, accepted an injunction could be awarded where the trespass was completed only if its effects were serious and ongoing. Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ in particular had ruled the trespass did not support an injunction and there was no other right to be vindicated:

The public interest in both the investigation and the prosecution of crime would not suggest as appropriate an order that the information be taken from the [Australian Federal Police (“AFP”)] and given to the plaintiffs. The prospect that criminal conduct may be disclosed is a sufficient reason to decline the relief sought.

In the present case, the acts of trespass – at least as against the Eurobin premises – were well and truly completed although Snaden J considered it was very likely Farm Transparency would engage in similar acts against other premises.

On that basis, his Honour held that further acts of publishing the footage could not be characterised as continuations of the original trespass. And further, his Honour considered Game Meats could not establish the consequences of such publication(s) would be sufficiently serious.

As to the first point, his Honour accepted Farm Transparency’s submission:

It is correct to observe that obtaining of the footage was made possible by the trespass. However, once trespassing, the respondent did not commit any further breach of the law by filming what was there to be observed nor invade any further rights of the applicant. The respondent was not an outlaw whilst trespassing. The law treats the acts of trespass, and filming (even if whilst a trespasser), as distinct and not interrelated. One cannot slide as between those two separate matters, despite them arising from the same factual matrix.

At [214], Snaden J accepted that submission and explained at [215]:

There is a distinction that must be drawn between the commission of the tort—that is to say, the unauthorised entrance by FTI’s agents onto the Eurobin Premises and the installation there of the covert recording equipment that was thereupon installed—and the publishing of information obtained as a result thereof. The latter involves no interference with any legal right that GMC possesses and is not, in and of itself, tortious. The injury that inheres to GMC’s prejudice as a result of the trespasses is, at most, FTI’s possession of the footage; not its publication. (original emphasis)

At [216], Snaden J illustrated his proposition with the analogy that an injunction could not be granted against Mr Delforce or Ms McDonald-Eckersall to stop them telling others what they had seen during their trespasses.

In addition, Snaden J considered Game Meats could not show its injury from further publication would be sufficiently serious. At [214], his Honour explained:

…. If FTI were to publish the footage that it obtained as the fruit of its unlawful trespass, the consequences for GMC are difficult to pinpoint. I would accept, at a level of generality, that they would unlikely be positive. But the extent to which they might sound in immeasurable or extreme damage to GMC’s goodwill would depend on all manner of circumstances, not the least being the manner in which GMC sought to counter any public backlash. I do not consider it possible to conclude that the damage to GMC’s goodwill would be so significant as to clear the hurdle that needs to be cleared.

So, apart from the damages award, Farm Transparency is free to use the fruits of its trespassing with, it appears, impunity.

As a final point, although it was unnecessary to his decision, Snaden J noted he would have rejected Farm Transparency’s argument that its continued use of the footage was protected by the implied constitutional freedom of expression about matters of politics or government.

It might be questioned how allowing a trespasser to continue using the fruits of their trespassing promotes the objectives of the civil prohition on committing a trespass. This appears to be recognised by his Honour’s reaction at [177] “in the absence of authority”. Even so, one might wonder, with respect, whether telling someone what one had seen is comparable in nature and impact to showing a video. One might also wonder whether acts of unrestricted publication are comparable to disclosure to authorities or use in an investigation.

There’s an appeal

Game Meats and Farm Transparency have both appealed (VID 92/2025).

The Game Meats Company of Australia v Farm Transparency International Ltd [2024] FCA 1455 (Snaden J)


  1. Ms McDonald-Eckersall had previously achieved fame, or notoriety, through the Animal Rebellion campaign which disrupted McDonald’s national supply chain in the UK “costing the company millions”.  ?
  2. Snaden J noted that the injunction rejected by the High Court in Lenah Game Meats was an injunction against the broadcaster. However, the interlocutory injunction against the trespassers themselves was left undisturbed (because they did not appeal).  ?
  3. Citing Gleeson CJ at [34] in Lenah Game Meats.  ?
  4. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by the High Court’s ruling in Lenah Game Meats and the subsequent decision Farm Transparency International Ltd v New South Wales [2022] HCA 23; 277 CLR 537 at [41]; a case involving an unsuccessful challenge to the constitutional validity of sections 11 and 12 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW).  ?

Is there a Lenah Game Meats constructive trust? Read More »

Zipped: Firstmac v Zip Co

Firstmac has won its appeal and the Zip Co companies have been found to infringe Firstmac’s ZIP registered trade mark.

For obvious reasons, this is just going to be a fairly bald summary.

Infringement

First, the Full Court held that Zip Co’s formative ZIP marks such as ZIP PAY, ZIP MONEY and:

were deceptively similar to Firstmac’s ZIP trade mark.

The honest concurrent user defence

Secondly, the Full Court held that Zip Co companies were not honest concurrent users for the purposes of section 44(3)and so the defence based on sections 122(1)(f) and (fa) failed. On this point, the Full Court emphasised that the onus was on Zip Co to establish it was an honest concurrent user; not on Firstmac to prove it was not.

The reasons for the failure of the honest concurrent user defence also meant that Zip Co could not rely on the defence under section 122(1)(a) for use in good faith of its own name.

Cancellation because Firstmac’s mark had become deceptive

Thirdly, the Full Court accepted that as a result of Zip Co’s reputation, the use of ZIP by Firstmac would be deceptive or confusing for the purposes of section 88(2)(c). The Full Court, however, exercised the discretion under section 89 and refused to order cancellation.

This case is the reverse of the Katy Perry case.[1] Both Full Courts did reject reliance on the old law “blameworhy” conduct cases in applying section 88 and considered that “blameworthy” conduct was one, but not the only, consideration to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion under section 89.

In the Katy Perry case, the (differently constituted) Full Court found that Ms Taylor knew of Ms Hudson’s reputation as Katy Perry and that artists such as Ms Hudson exploited their celebrity through the sale of branded merchandise such as t-shirts and the like. Consequently, in applying for her trade mark with that knowledge, Ms Taylor was precluded from relying on section 89. For example, the Full Court said at [317]:

We consider that Ms Taylor’s act of filing the trade mark application with knowledge of Ms Hudson, her reputation, and her mark in circumstances where she also knew that popular music stars, such as Ms Hudson, lend their names (and trade marks) to be used in connection with clothes and sell merchandise at their concerts, and accepted such conduct as a common practice, is sufficient not to enliven the discretion under s 89.

See also at [342] – [343].

In contrast, Firstmac was not infected with such knowledge when it registered its trade mark; the Zip buy now pay later business not even being in existence at that time. At [175], the Full Court explained:

… where, as here, the primary judge found that Firstmac was without fault, and we have found that the respondents did not prove that their use of the Firstmac Mark was honest, to exercise the discretion to remove the Firstmac Mark would reward “the assiduous efforts of a misappropriating user”. To pick up on what Brennan J said in Murray Goulburn at 389, it would place a premium on those efforts.

The Full Court also examined the other mandatory considerations prescribed under section 89(2).

Removal for non-use

Fourthly, the Full Court held that Firstmac had proved use of its trade mark through advertising and promotion of its re-launched product such as:

Accordingly, Firstmac had satisfied its burden under section 100(1)(c) to defeat Zip Co’s action for non-use.

Firstmac Limited v Zip Co Limited [2025] FCAFC 30 (Perram, Katzmann and Bromwich JJ)


  1. Killer Queen, LLC v Taylor [2024] FCAFC 149; 306 FCR 199 (Yates, Burley and Rofe JJ). ?

Zipped: Firstmac v Zip Co Read More »

The Practice

O’Callaghan J has awarded “The Practice” $200,000 in damages against The Practice Business Advisers & Tax Practitioners for trade mark infringement.

The Practice has been the owner since 2016 of Registered trade mark No 1757523:

2 TRIANGLES INTERLOCKING

for tax, accounting and business management services in class 35 and financial advisory and tax services in class 36. It had been using this trade mark since 2014, having adopted it in place of two rather more stylised logos in use from 1999.

The Respondent was incorporated in January 2017 and began providing business advisory and accountancy services under this logo:

In addition to the logo and in perhaps something of a differentiation from The Agency case, the evidence showed the Respondent’s website also featured:

(i) “At the Practice, our purpose is to Open New Possibilities and Add Value to Your Business”;

(ii) “The Practice can help you with: >> Taxation Advice >> Tax Planning >> Tax Effective Structures”;

(iii) “The Practice has the best business advisory accountants to guide you through this process.”;

(iv) “Contact The Practice”;

(v) “The Practice offers a full suite of financial and administration solutions for business such as small business bookkeeping in Melbourne and preparing sample small business financial statements”;

(vi) “Whether you need big or small business succession planning, The Practice is here to help.”;

(vii) “The Practice: Experts in Tax Compliance for Small Business”; and

(viii) “© The Practice | Privacy Policy” in the footer of each page.

(c) The following statements on the Respondent’s social media accounts:

(i) “The Practice can provide the tax solutions you need.”;

(ii) “The Practice’s Main Purpose is to open new possibility and add value to your business”;

(iii) “Here at The Practice, we tailor our services to meet the unique needs of your business”; and

(iv) “Let The Practice provide tax and business solutions for you!”

(d) On invoices sent to clients the words “THE PRACTICE” are shown in different coloured font to the rest of the invoice, with “THE” in light blue and “PRACTICE” in dark blue.

(e) Mr Hassan’s email signature has the words “The Practice” in bold font above the italicised words Business Advisers and Tax Practitioners.

(the emphasis was added by O’Callaghan J).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case is that the Respondent sought to rely on the use of own name in good faith (s 122(1)(a)) and honest concurrent user (s 44(3) via s 122(1)(f) and (fa) as defences to infringement.

In rejecting both defences, O’Callaghan J considered at [61] and [88] that a person would not be acting in good faith (or honestly) if they did not take the steps that an honest and reasonable person would take to ascertain the ability to use the trade mark; they had in effect taken a risk.

The basis of these defences were searches that Mr Hassan, the sole director of the Respondent, claimed to have made. These claims were rejected. They came under sustained attack as “recent invention”. But O’Callaghan J also pointed out, Mr Hassan claimed to have searched terms like “The Practice Business Advisers and Tax Practitioners”; no where did he claim simply to have searched “The Practice”. Moreover, while Mr Hassan did claim to have undertaken a trade mark search, that was only back in 2001 when he was adopting a different version of the name.

O’Callaghan J did not accept the argument that the Respondent was only a one man company, not a large multinational (at 71] to [72]):

I cannot accept that submission. In my view, a person in the respondent’s position acting honestly and reasonably would have conducted far more extensive and thorough searches than Mr Hassan says he did to ensure that his chosen name did not conflict with a registered trade mark. In those circumstances it is unnecessary to consider the veracity of Mr Hassan’s evidence about his searches in 2013, 2014 and 2017.

The onus was on the respondent to prove that it had used reasonable diligence to ascertain that a chosen name did not conflict with a registered trade mark and in my view, the respondent has not discharged that onus for the reasons I have given.

The $200,000 damages were comprised of $100,000 compensatory damages and $100,000 additional damages. The judgment doesn’t disclose the scale of the Respondent’s business or its impact on the applicant’s business – other than it was a one man company.

The Practice Pty Ltd v The Practice Business Advisers & Tax Practitioners Pty Ltd [2024] FCA 1299

The Practice Read More »

Copyright, designs and sufficiency for patents

I shall be presenting the annual Copyright and Designs Update for IPSANZ in Melbourne on 17 October 2024.

For those attending in person, lunch from 12:30 pm with the talk from 1:00 pm to 2:00 pm.

There is also an online option – but I hope to see you there in person.

Details and registration here.

and a Patents talk

On 24 October 2024, Craig Smith SC and Dr Claire Gregg from Davies Collison Cave Law are presenting on ‘Patent Claims – Support, Sufficiency and ‘Relevant Ranges‘.

Details and registration here.

Copyright, designs and sufficiency for patents Read More »

IP Australia consults on the Draft Design Law Treaty

IP Australia has opened a consultation on the draft Design Law Treaty which will be the subject of a Diplomatic Conference in November.

According to IP Australia’s announcement, most of the text is agreed but the outstanding issues are:

  • grace periods – namely the periods after public disclosure of the product when you can still seek design registration (Article 6) 
  • whether a procedural treaty should include substantive law (e.g. proposal for term of protection in Article 9bis)  
  • the option for an office to require disclosure when a designer has utilised any traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions or biological/genetic resources in the design (Article 3) 
  • whether IP offices should be required to provide an electronic system for design applications (Article 9ter and 9quater
  • the assistance WIPO should provide to developing countries (e.g. technical assistance and capacity building for the ratification of the treaty) (Article 22).  

Most of these seem unlikely to cause much difficulty for Australia.

The main substantive impact, hiding under the “e.g. proposal for term of protection Article 9bis“, is whether the term of protection should be raised to at least 15 years or Member States can choose to stay at the TRIPS minimum of 10 years. (You will remember six years ago now IP Australia published a cost benefit analysis of Australia raising the term of designs protection from 10 to 15 years.)

A requirement for the disclosure of utilisation of traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions or biological/genetic resources would be new – but seems to be the direction policy development is heading in Australia anyway. Of course, a big question will be just what is encompassed by those expressions and the consequences of both disclosure and failure to disclose.

There are also some options about filing requirements such as how many and which representations need to be filed which should be carefully considered if the promises of simplification and efficiency are to be achieved.

IP Australia requires submissions by 22 September 2024. That is a very tight timeframe, no doubt dictated by the fact the Diplomatic Conference is being held in November. As IP Australia has known about all these issues since last November, one might wonder why they are only getting around to consulting now.

These are links to the draft Articles, the draft Regulation and WIPO page on the Diplomatic Conference.

IP Australia consults on the Draft Design Law Treaty Read More »

Aristocrat lives to fight another day

O’Bryan J has granted Aristocrat leave to appeal Burley J’s decision ruling that the remitted claims were not patentable subject matter.

Recap

O’Bryan J sets out a convenient summary of how the case came to be before him and IPwars has had a few goes including here and here but in case the meaning of “manner of manufacture” for the purposes of the Patents Act 1990 is not tattooed over you heart, a brief recap:

  1. The Commissioner rejected Aristocrat’s innovation patents over an electronic gaming machine (EGM) with a new software-implemented feature game and trigger.
  2. Burley J allowed Aristocrat’s appeal, pointing out it was accepted on all sides that the claims would have been patentable if implemented in the traditional mechanical way rather than software implementation.
  3. The Full Federal Court allowed the Commissioner’s appeal restoring the rejection of the claims. Although agreed in the result, the reasoning was divided. Middleton and Perram JJ held at [26] that it was first necessary to decide if the claimed invention was for a computer or computer-implemented. If so, it was then necessary for the claim to result in an advance in computer technology. In the result (and subject to any appeal to the High Court), after setting aside Burley J’s orders, the Full Federal Court ordered: The proceedings are remitted to the primary judge for determination of any residual issues in light of the Full Court’s reasons including any issues which concern the position of claims other than claim 1 of Innovation Patent No. 2016101967 (referred to at [8] of the reasons of the primary judge dated 5 June 2020) and the costs of the hearings before the primary judge.
  4. The High Court memorably failed to reach a decision, with three judges dismissing the appeal while the other three judges would have allowed Aristocrat’s appeal (a seventh judge was unable to sit). Consequently, under Judiciary Act 1903 s 23(2)(a), the decision of the Full Federal Court was affirmed.
  5. On remitter, Burley J considered he was bound by the Full Federal Court’s decision and ruled that the dependent claims of Aristocrat’s patents were also invalid.

Leave to appeal

As Burley J was hearing and determining an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner, Aristocrat needed leave to appeal to the Full Court under s 158(2).

Often where leave is being sought by the patentee or applicant for the patent rather than an opponent, one might expect leave would be granted as otherwise the patent is dead. As O’Bryan J explained at [50]:

The guidance that emerges from the above cases may be summarised as follows. Section 158(2) evinces a legislative policy against the bringing of appeals against a judgment or order of a single judge of the Federal Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from decisions or directions of the Commissioner except where the court, acting judicially, finds reason to grant leave. The discretionary power to grant leave is not constrained by express legislative criteria and the Court should not lay down rigid rules that would restrict the exercise of the discretion given the diversity of cases to which s 158(2) will potentially apply. In determining whether to grant leave, it is relevant to consider: whether the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant it being reconsidered on appeal; whether the issues proposed to be raised by the appeal are of general application; and the consequences of a refusal to grant leave – particularly whether the refusal will finally determine the matter. None of those considerations is determinative in and of itself and the considerations are interrelated. The cases make clear that the degree of doubt with respect to the decision that would warrant a grant of leave is affected by the consequences of a refusal to grant leave. In a pre-grant opposition proceeding, where there have been two hearings with the opposition dismissed, and where the opponent of the patent will still be able to institute revocation proceedings, leave to appeal will often be granted only where the opponent has demonstrated a clear prima facie case of error in the decision appealed from. In contrast, where an opponent has been successful such that the decision will be final with respect to the grant of the patent, leave to appeal would ordinarily be granted where the grounds are arguable.

O’Bryan J appears to have had some reservation in granting leave this time around. His Honour described the application as “finely balanced”.

The two main areas that seem to have been particularly troubling were that, as the Commissioner characterised it, the parties had agreed that Burley J’s determination of claim 1 in the first hearing would guide the determination of the other claims. Secondly, the innovation patents in question had expired and Aristocrat still had applications for standard patents covering the same subject matter pending.

Ultimately, his Honour found in favour of granting leave in the “unusual circumstances” of this case.

The factor that appears to have tipped his Honour in favour of granting leave was not just that the High Court had divided 3:3 in its previous decision. O’Bryan J was sceptical that this was just Aristocrat trying to have a “second go”. Rather, the additional factor is how s 23 of the Judiciary Act should apply in circumstances where all six judges of the High Court appear to have rejected the majority view in the Full Federal Court.

At [65], O’Bryan J explained:

Having taken all of the foregoing factors into account, I have determined on balance that leave to appeal should be granted. Ultimately, two factors weigh marginally in favour of the grant of leave: that the effect of the primary judgment is to determine finally that the innovation patents in suit will not be granted, and that the grounds of appeal sought to be raised by Aristocrat are arguable (raising novel questions about the operations of s 23(2)(a) in the unusual circumstances of this case). If Aristocrat is able to persuade an appellate court that the primary judge’s application of s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act in this case was erroneous, Aristocrat should be entitled to have the residual claims adjudicated in accordance with the legal principles that the appellate court determines are applicable.

What happens next

Having been granted leave to appeal, Aristocrat has foreshadowed an application under Judiciary Act s 40 requesting the High Court to hear and determine the appeal without the need for a further hearing in the Full Federal Court. This is of course a very unusual step. In this case, however, the foundational question can really be answered only by the High Court: how does s 23(2)(a) operate when the decision under appeal is affirmed but all the High Court judges sitting on the appeal appear to have rejected the reasoning of the “affirmed” decision?

Who know, we might even get something approaching a settled test for “manner of manufacture” (again).

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Limited v Commissioner of Patents [2024] FCA 987

Aristocrat lives to fight another day Read More »

Moral rights and the statute of limitations

Ms Skildum-Reid’s application for preliminary discovery against the University of Queensland (UQ) has failed for a number of reasons, the most interesting of which is Derrington J’s ruling that it is likely that a six year statute of limitations applies to infringements of moral rights.

Some background

Ms Skildum-Reid is a corporate sponsorship consultant, adviser, speaker and author. Over the years since 2006, she has given presentations at various workshops. In the course of doing so, Ms Skildum-Reid developed one or more slide decks.

In July 2023, Ms Skildum-Reid discovered through internet searches some 15 slide decks with 79 instances of what she considered plagiarism being, or having been used, in two marketing courses being run by UQ.

Through her lawyers, Ms Skildum-Reid wrote to the University stating (amongst other things):

In addition to the egregious and blatant infringement of our client’s Copyright Works, our client considers the unauthorised use of the Copyright Works by the University without any accreditation or reference to her as author (in breach of her moral rights in the Copyright Works) to constitute plagiarism and serious academic misconduct on the part of the UQ staff members who have been responsible for delivering/presenting the UQ Courses.

Correspondence between the parties’ lawyers followed, without resolving the dispute.

Ms Skildum-Reid then brought a preliminary discovery application against the University under both FCR 2011 r 7.22 and r. 7.23. That is, seeking discovery from the University of documents or information to enable her to identify a prospective respondent or, alternatively, whether she had a right to relief against the prospective respondent.

In responding to the application, however, the University provided evidence from the person running the course, a Dr Chien, that she was simply using and updating slide decks provided to her by the University when she took over the course in 2009, some 15 years earlier.

The problem

This evidence caused considerable consternation in Ms Skildum-Reid’s camp. Ms Skildum-Reid wanted to identify who were the person(s) who had prepared the slide decks passed on to Dr Chien.

As those events occurred more than six years previously, Ms Skildum-Reid ran into the limitation of actions provided by Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 134(1):

An action shall not be brought for an infringement of copyright or in respect of the conversion or detention of an infringing copy, or of a device (including a circumvention device) used or intended to be used for making infringing copies, after the expiration of six years from the time when the infringement took place or the infringing copy or device was made, as the case may be. (emphasis supplied)

and the University made it plain it intended to rely on s 134(1).

At the hearing of the application for preliminary discovery, Ms Skildum-Reid sought to modify her claims to include infringement of her moral rights.

By this stage, Ms Skildum-Reid had realised that any claims of copyright infringement against whomever had prepared the slide decks provided to Dr Chien were well and truly statute barred. Ms Skildum-Reid’s argument was quite simple. Section 134(1) applies only to infringement of copyright. Infringement of moral rights is not infringement of copyright so, therefore, s 134(1) has no application.

An attempted solution

The argument is that infringement of copyright is defined by ss 36 to 38 in Part III and ss 101 to 102 in Part IV. So, for example, s 36(1) provides in part that “copyright subsisting in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work is infringed by ….”[1] (emphasis supplied)

And, further, what constitutes copyright is defined by s 31 “Nature of copyright in original works” in the case of original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works[2] and ss 85 – 88 in the case of other subject matter. None of these provisions confers a right of attribution or a right of integrity.

Moral rights while subsisting in original works and other (Part IV) subject matter, are not “copyright” and do not arise under Part III (original works) or Part IV (other subject matter). Instead, moral rights arise under Part IX – all the way down in s 189 and following.

These provisions include separate provisions about infringement. So, for example, s 195AO provides:

… a person infringes an author’s right of attribution of authorship in respect of a work if ….

Sections 195AP and 195AQ make corresponding provision for infringement of the moral rights of integrity and against false attribution.

No mention of “copyright” in any of them.

Despite running (in the case of “author’s rights) all the way down to s 195AZO, there is no counterpart to s 134. The Copyright Act does not in terms include a statute of limitations on moral rights claims.

The University, however, sought to invoke the six year statute of limitations on claims of tort arising under Queensland state law[3] which, the University contended, applied through s 79(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth):

The laws of each State or Territory, including the laws relating to procedure, evidence, and the competency of witnesses, shall, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or the laws of the Commonwealth, be binding on all Courts exercising federal jurisdiction in that State or Territory in all cases to which they are applicable.

The State statute of limitations applied

At [40] – [42], Derrington J cited the High Court’s interpretation of the role of s 79 as filling any “gaps” in Federal law by allowing the application of the relevant state or territory law in such cases.[4]

Derrington J could discern nothing in the Copyright Act or the Explanatory Memorandum for the bill introducing moral rights to suggest that a limitations period for moral rights had been deliberately excluded. Accordingly, there was a “gap” and it was generally accepted infringement of copyright, while statute based, was tortious conduct.

Rule 7.22 requires only that the prospective applicant for preliminary discovery may have a claim, not a prima facie case. Derrington J considered, however, it was still necessary to take into account the prospects of success. Pointing out at [53]:

…. It would be productive of wasted time and money to require a person to make discovery of documents to a prospective applicant in circumstances where, if the contemplated action were pursued, it would necessarily fail.

His Honour found that it was unlikely Ms Skildum-Reid would be able to avoid the operation of the Queensland Limitations of Actions Act. Accordingly, her application under r. 7.22 failed. At [54], his Honour concluded:

Here, no answer was provided to the prospective respondents’ submissions that the claims sought to be made would be barred by s 10 of the Limitation of Actions Act. Though there may be arguments that actions for the infringement of statutory intellectual property rights are not tortious in nature so that s 10 of the Act does not apply to them, such arguments would have to overturn long lines of authority to the contrary. The prospect of doing so is unlikely. In those circumstances, the prospective applicant has not established for the purposes of r 7.22(1)(a) that she may have a right to obtain relief against the unidentified previous course co-ordinator or guest lecturer for infringement of her moral rights.

The prospects of a successful claim, or rather the lack of prospects, also meant Derrington J would not have exercised the discretion in favour of ordering preliminary discovery.

Rule 7.23

Ms Skildum-Reid’s application for preliminary discovery under r 7.23 ran into other difficulties. The main problem being, having accused the University of “egregious and blatant” copyright infringement, it was rather difficult to satisfy the requirement that Ms Skildum-Reid had insufficient information to decide whether to sue or not.

Having made allegations in “emphatic and unequivocal terms”, there was nothing in her evidence explaining why she had insufficient information to decide whether to proceed. At [88] – [89]:

…. It might be inferred from her affidavit material that she believes that she has claims against the prospective respondents. However, there is nothing to suggest that her belief is only that she may have claims against them. No statement of uncertainty about the veracity of her anticipated claims, or why that uncertainty might exist, is provided. Further, she did not identify what information she lacked but needed in order to decide whether to start proceedings. (original emphasis)

These were fatal omissions. Whilst it might occasionally be possible to attribute to the prospective applicant the assertions of their solicitor or counsel for the purposes of establishing the reasonable belief, the drawing of that inference can be difficult. It is preferable, on any application for there to be direct evidence of the prospective applicant’s belief for the purposes of subparagraph (1)(a) and of the lack of information which prevents a decision being made for the purposes of (1)(b). Here, none of those matters were addressed in the affidavits relied upon.

Skildum-Reid v University of Queensland [2024] FCA 733


  1. Section 101 makes similar provision: “a copyright subsisting by virtue of this Part is infringed by ….”  ?
  2. In the case of literary, dramatic and musical works, the familiar rights to reproduce the work in a material form, publish it (for the first time), perform it in public, communicate it to the public etc.  ?
  3. s 10 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). Every state and territory has equivalent legislaton.  ?
  4. Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 262 CLR 1 at [16] (Kiefel CJ) and [90] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).  ?

Moral rights and the statute of limitations Read More »

A notice and take down / moderation scheme for trade marks

The Full Federal Court has allowed Redbubble’s appeal from the remedies granted for its eleven infringements of five Hells Angels’ registered trade marks. In doing so, the majority instituted a kind of monitoring and notice and take down system as a “safe harbour” against trade mark infringement. In addition, the Court raised questions about how use of a trade mark on a website overseas may, or may not, constitute infringing conduct in Australia.

Some background

Redbubble operates a website at www.redbubble.com. Creators can upload images to the website. Other users can browse the website, select one or more of these images for application to merchandise such as t-shirts and coffee mugs. Once the orders have been placed, Redbubble contracts for the merchandise to be manufactured and shipped to the purchaser. Redbubble provides the payment processing service, it also provides the fulfilment functions including communications such as order confirmation and invoices with the purchaser. Redbubble’s trade marks were on the communications, the goods ordered and the packaging.

The servers for Redbubble’s website, however, are located in the USA and the day to day management is carried out there.

The Hells Angels had successfully sued Redbubble in 2019 for infringement of the registered trade marks in issue.

In this round, in two decisions,[1] Greenwood J at first instance had found Redbubble infringed the Hells Angels registered trade marks by 11 transactions. The 11 transactions were trap purchases by Hells Angels Australia’s trade mark officer.

His Honour went on to order declarations of infringement, damages of $8,250 and additional damages of $70,000. His Honour also ordered an injunction in general terms – for example:

Redbubble is restrained whether by itself, its officers, servants or agents or otherwise howsoever, from using the sign being the device described in Declaration 2 …, or any sign substantially identical with, or deceptively similar to, a sign consisting of the device, on the website operated by Redbubble in relation to trade in goods to which the sign can be applied, where such goods are goods in respect of which Trade Mark No. 526530, Trade Mark No. 723463 and Trade Mark No. 1257993 is registered.

On appeal, Redbubble did not challenge the infringement findings but sought to set aside the remedies.

The injunction

At the time of the judgment, creators were uploading to the website some 90,000 new images each day.

To address the risks of infringement, Redbubble adopted a two-pronged strategy.[2] First, it implemented a Notice and Take down / counter-notice scheme.

Secondly, it adopted what it called a Proactive Moderation Policy. This involved co-operating with rights holders to build up a stock of Reference Content, which it then used to monitor uploads and remove content assessed as too similar. Redbubble had extended the moderation policy to include some rights even without input from the rights owner. As part of this, Redbubble had been developing a software tool, RB Protect, with image matching and optical character recognition capabilities. This tool was limited to identifying identical images and had not yet developed to the point where it could do so in real time.[3]

At the time of the trial, Redbubble was conducting proactive moderation for some 477 rights holders (up from 200 in 2017). It had proactively moderated about two million artworks since January 2017 and terminated over one million uploader accounts.

On appeal, the Full Federal Court split 3:2 on the injunction issue.

All five judges were agreed that the injunctions ordered by Greenwood J were in error because they were not limited to restraining use of the trade marks as a trade marks; i.e., as badges of origin (see e.g Perram and Downes JJ at [213] – [214]).

There was a disagreement whether it was right to describe a trade mark owner who had proved infringement as having a prima facie right to a final injunction, or generally having such a right. Perram and Downes JJ would not have ordered any injunction. Nicholas, Burley and Rofe JJ ordered an injunction but, as noted above, instituted a “safe harbour” scheme based on Redbubble’s moderation policies.

Perram and Downes JJ

Perram and Downes JJ were concerned that describing a final injunction as a prima facie entitlement risked enlarging the trade mark owner’s rights beyond its statutory entitlement under s 20. Their Honours recognised that a final injunction was generally appropriate but emphasised the remedy, albeit statutory, nonetheless retained its equitable nature and was discretionary.

At [224], their Honours considered a good working rule was that an injunction may be refused if:

(a) the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small;

(b) the injury is one which is capable of being estimated in money;

(c) the injury is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment; and

(d) it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant the injunction.

Adopting Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co [1895] 1 Ch 287 at 322–323 and an article by Burley J and Angus Lang in (2018) 12 Journal of Equity 132 at 137–142.

The working rule was significant in this case. First, the evidence demonstrated that the only way Redbubble could comply with the usual form of injunction was to cease operating. Thus at [225] complying with the injunction would not just be inconvenient but grossly disproportionate to the right protected.

The remedy was grossly disproportionate because the Hells Angels had not demonstrated any loss and was not likely to suffer loss of any kind. At [226], Perram and Downes JJ explained:

We do not accept therefore that it would be correct to grant an injunction which could only be obeyed by Redbubble ceasing to trade. The shuttering of Redbubble’s business at the instance of a party which has suffered and is likely to suffer no loss of any kind falls within the working rule. If Hells Angels had demonstrated some actual or apprehended loss then the question would be much more difficult. Such a case might be presented by the owner of a trade mark which had a reputation for the exclusive nature of the products to which it was affixed (although there might be many other circumstances generating similar problems). For such a trader, even the intermittent appearance of its marks on Redbubble’s website for short periods of time could cause real harm to that goodwill and this could be so even without any sales. ….

In the “somewhat unusual circumstances of this case”, therefore, their Honours considered it was not appropriate to grant an injunction at all.

Nicholas, Burley and Rofe JJ

While agreeing that the award of a final injunction is discretionary, at [248] Nicholas, Burley and Rofe JJ considered at [248] that describing the right holder as having prima facie entitlement to a permanent injunction is both unexceptional and correct. Their Honours explained at [245]:

But generally speaking, unless the court is persuaded that there is no significant risk of further infringement occurring, or unless there exists some other discretionary reason for refusing the remedy, a final injunction will usually be granted against a party that is found to have infringed.

Further, at [249], their Honours agreed with Perram and Downes JJ that it is not necessary for the right owner to prove it will suffer irreparable harm or that damages will not be an adequate remedy.

It is also not necessary for the trade mark owner to prove that it is more probable than not that the infringer will commit further infringing acts. A final injunction might still be granted even if the Court considers the risk of repetition is “slight” or “negligible”.

In this case, there was admittedly a significant risk of repeat infringements. Indeed, the case itself involved repeat infringements.

Like Perram and Downes JJ, Nicholas, Burley and Rofe JJ considered a general injunction was not appropriate. The risk of repitition, however, meant an injunction was appropriate. Accordingly, at [251] their Honours limited its effects by specifying that the general injunction would not be breached by compliance with the moderation policies. Therefore, the general injunction was qualified:

3 The Appellant will not be in breach of orders 1 or 2 (the general injunction) if:

(a) it maintains a system involving the surveillance of its website at www.redbubble.com (the Website) and the removal of images that might infringe the marks referred to in orders 1 and 2 above which is no less rigorous than that which it had in place as at 24 August 2022 and is referred to in the affidavit of Mr Joel Barrett of that date as “Proactive Moderation”; and

(b) within seven days of an image to which orders 1 or 2 above refers being identified on the Website by the Appellants or its servants or agents, the Appellant removes the image from the Website.

4 Notwithstanding Order 3, the Appellant will be in breach of order 1 or order 2 if, on the First Respondent or the Second Respondent or both of them becoming aware of an image to which such order refers being available on the Website, and notifying the Appellant of the image by sending an email to legal@redbubble.com (or such other email address as notified by Appellant in writing from time to time):

(a) with the subject field ‘Hells Angels Complaint’;

(b) identifying the image by reference to the location of the image on the Website in the form http://www.redbubble.com/people/[username] /works/[work number and name]; and

(c) stating that the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent considers that the image would breach Order 1, Order 2 or both,

the Appellant fails to remove the image or images from the Website within seven days of such email.

Perram and Downes JJ had considered such a limitation inappropriate as it required Redbubble to comply with its existing policies and, further, would be seen as giving the Court’s imprimatur to those policies.

Nicholas, Burely and Rofe JJ countered that the Order did not require Redbubble to maintain any surveillance system but would reduce the burden and risks of the usual form of injunction and was similar to the “site blocking” orders under the Copyright Act 1968. In addition, their Honours considered the making of the injunction in this form did not preclude a general injunction alone or different remedies in different cases. At [254]:

What injunctive relief (if any) should be granted at the suit of a different applicant who establishes that its rights have been infringed by Redbubble will depend on the right infringed (eg. copyright or trade mark), the circumstances of the infringement and the evidence, including any evidence of the surveillance and moderation policies and practices followed by Redbubble at the time any such proceeding is heard.

Concluding comments

Review of the discussion about use as a trade mark on websites outside Australia and damages will have to await another occasion.

The judicial acceptance of a notice and take down / moderation scheme for trade mark infringement is a significant development as such a scheme has been implemented in Australia only by statutory intervention in the Copyright Act 1968. The development does have echoes of a similar development in the United Kingdom (albeit in a different regulatory regime).[4]

It is important, however, to keep in mind that the Full Federal Court was very conscious of the limited impact of the infringements in this particular case and the Hells Angels’ very limited attack on Redbubble’s argument that it was not feasible yet to develop a system which did more than detect exact image matches as discussed by Perram and Downes JJ at [147] and [161] – [162].

Redbubble Ltd v Hells Angels Motorcycle Corporation (Australia) Pty Limited [2024] FCAFC 15 (Perram, Nicholas, Burley, Rofe and Downes JJ)


  1. The Hells Angels discovered several new transactions after the initial hearing on liability had been heard and successfully applied to re-open the trial to address transactions 8 to 11.  ?
  2. The strategy had not saved it from injunctions in the 2019 proceeding.  ?
  3. Greenwood J’s remedies decision at [90] – [107]; [104] cataloguing a history of 8 notifications or infringements by the Hells Angels since 2014.  ?
  4. Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Limited [2016] EWCA Civ 658 and the Supreme Court’s decision on who bears the costs of compliance: Cartier International AG v British Telecommunications Plc [2018] UKSC 28.  ?

A notice and take down / moderation scheme for trade marks Read More »

Aristocrat 2 or 3 or 4 or

After Burley J dismissed Aristocrat’s remitted claims for innovation patents over an electronic gaming machine (EGM), Aristocrat has now sought leave to appeal.[1]

To recap

Aristocrat had three innovation patents – AU 2016101967, 2017101629 and 2017101097 – for an EGM with a new, free feature game and trigger. The Commissioner revoked the patents on the ground that they not a manner of manufacture on the basis that the substance of the invention was merely a game or the rules of a game.[2]

Burley J allowed Aristocrat’s appeal, finding that the claim 1 was a mechanism of a particular construction and so was a practical embodiment rather than a mere, abstract scheme.

Although it was accepted before their Honours that the claimed invention would be a manner of manufacture if the game had been implemented in a device made in the “traditional” way utlising cogs and spinning wheels rather than software, the Full Federal Court unanimously upheld the Commissioner’s appeal, albeit for different reasons.

As it had been sufficient for Burley J to deal with claim 1 only and Aristocrat contended there were further issues raised by the dependent claims, the Full Federal Court ordered that:

The proceedings are remitted to the primary judge for determination of any residual issues in light of the Full Court’s reasons including any issues which concern the position of [the residual claims] and the costs of the hearings before the primary judge. (emphasis supplied)

Before that could happen, however, the High Court subsequently granted leave to appeal – unusually for that time, on the papers. As I am sure you no doubt recall, three Judges (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ) of the High Court would have dismissed the appeal; three other Judges (Gordon, Edelman and Steward JJ) would have allowed it; Gleeson J was apparently unable to sit.

The High Court being equally divided, the decision of the Full Federal Court was affirmed.[3] Even the the three judges who would have dismissed the appeal, however, appeared to reject the principle propounded by the majority in the Full Federal Court. At [77], Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ said:

…. the two?step analysis proposed by their Honours unnecessarily complicates the analysis of the crucial issue. As explained in Myriad, the crucial issue is as to the characterisation of the invention by reference to the terms of the specification having regard to the claim and in light of the common general knowledge. It is not apparent in the present case that asking whether the claimed invention is an advance in computer technology as opposed to gaming technology, or indeed is any advance in technology at all, is either necessary or helpful in addressing that issue. As Nicholas J explained, the issue is not one of an “advance” in the sense of inventiveness or novelty. In conformity with the decision in N V Philips, the issue is whether the implementation of what is otherwise an unpatentable idea or plan or game involves some adaptation or alteration of, or addition to, technology otherwise well?known in the common general knowledge to accommodate the exigencies of the new idea or plan or game. (citation omitted)

As the tied result in the High Court meant the Full Federal Court’s decision was affirmed, that in turn meant that the patentability of Aristocrat’s claimed invention was remitted to Burley J for determination of any residual issues.

On remitter

On remittal, Burley J rejected Aristocrat’s invitation to adopt the reasons of the three Judges in the High Court who would have allowed the appeal.

Burley J considered it was inappropriate to search for a principle, or principles, which a majority of the High Court judges had agreed on. Rather, pursuant to s 23(2)(a) of the Judiciary Act, the Full Federal Court’s decision had been affirmed and, accordingly, he was required to decide the residual issues in accordance with the order remitting those issues to him to be decided in light of the [majority’s] reasons.

His Honour concluded that the additional features specified in the dependent claims did not make any technical contribution that could be described as an advance in computer technology. Therefore, in accordance with the majority’s conclusions in the Full Federal Court, the claims with the additional features were still nonetheless not patentable subject matter.

Although patents are supposed to be available for any inventions in all fields of technology and without discrimination as to the field of technology,[4] Middleton and Perram JJ had ruled at [25] that, in a case of the kind before their Honours, it was not appropriate to inquire whether the claimed invention was a scheme as that “may reduce the richness of analysis called for.” Paradoxically given the narrowness of the approach compared to that of Nicholas J, their Honours held at [26] that the issue fell to be determined by two questions:

(a) Is the invention claimed a computer-implemented invention?

(b) If so, can the invention claimed broadly be described as an advance in computer technology?

In the case of claim 1, the Full Federal Court found that it was only the integers comprising the feature game (see features 1.10 to 1.12 below) that distinguished the EGM from the state of the art. However, the implementation of the feature game did not involve any advance in computer technology and so claim 1 was not a manner of manufacture.

Claim 5 of the 967 Patent

Burley J identified the features of claim 5 of the 967 Patent (as you will appreciate, those numbered “1.” are from claim 1):

(1.0) A gaming machine comprising:

(1.1) a display;

(1.2) a credit input mechanism operable to establish credits on the gaming machine, the credit input mechanism including at least one of a coin input chute, a bill collector, a card reader and a ticket reader;

(1.3) meters configured for monitoring credits established via the credit input mechanism and changes to the established credits due to play of the gaming machine, the meters including a credit meter to which credit input via the credit input mechanism is added and a win meter;

(1.4) a random number generator;

(1.5) a game play mechanism including a plurality of buttons configured for operation by a player to input a wager from the established credits and to initiate a play of a game; and

(1.6) a game controller comprising a processor and memory storing (i) game program code, and (ii) symbol data defining reels, and wherein the game controller is operable to assign prize values to configurable symbols as required during play of the game,

(1.7) the game controller executing the game program code stored in the memory and responsive to initiation of the play of the game with the game play mechanism to:

(1.8) select a plurality of symbols from a first set of reels defined by the symbol data using the random number generator;

(4.1) wherein each reel of the first set of reels comprises configurable symbols and non-configurable symbols and

(4.2) wherein the game controller is configured to assign prize values to each displayed configurable symbol.

(1.9) control the display to display the selected symbols in a plurality of columns of display positions during play of a base game;

(1.10) monitor play of the base game and trigger a feature game comprising free games in response to a trigger event occurring in play of the base game,

(1.11) conduct the free games on the display by, for each free game, (a) retaining configurable symbols on the display, (b) replacing non-configurable symbols by selecting, using the random number generator, symbols from a second set of reels defined by the symbol data for symbol positions not occupied by configurable symbols, and (c) controlling the display to display the symbols selected from the second set of reels, each of the second reels comprising a plurality of non-configurable symbols and a plurality of configurable symbols, and

(3.1) wherein the second set of reels comprises individual reels each corresponding to an individual display position.

(5.1) wherein the game controller is configured to increase a number of free games remaining in response to the selection of one or more additional configurable symbols in at least one of the free games.

(1.12) when the free games end, make an award of credits to the win meter or the credit meter based on a total of prize values assigned to collected configurable symbols.

Then his Honour held:

[135] Having regard to the findings of the majority decision of the Full Court, in my view, the only conclusion available is that dependent claim 5 of the 967 patent provides no additional features that would warrant a conclusion different to the conclusion reached by the majority decision in respect of claim 1 of the 967 patent. Having regard to dependent claim 5 of the 967 patent as set out above, integers 4.1 and 4.2 add features relating to the use of “configurable symbols” in the “first set of reels” for the first or base game identified in integer 1.8. Integer 3.1 adds that the second set of reels identified in integer 1.11 comprises individual reels each corresponding to an individual display position. Integer 5.1 refers to the game controller (identified in integer 1.6) being configured to increase a number of free games remaining in response to the selection of one or more additional configurable symbols in one or more of the free games.

[136] Taken collectively, the additional integers of dependent claim 5 of the 967 patent impose additional features or limitations on the conduct of the game referred to in claim 1. None, to adopt the language of the majority decision at [63], may be said to pertain to the development of computer technology. Each leaves it to the person designing the EGM to do the programming which gives effect to the family of games (or rules) which those integers define.

Similar reasoning applied for the other patents.

Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Limited v Commissioner of Patents (No 3) [2024] FCA 212


  1. Aristocrat Technologies Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Patents, NSD506 / 2024, filed on 26 April 2024. As Burley J’s decision is on appeal from the Commissioner, an appeal is not as of right but requires leave: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 158(2).  ?
  2. Patents Act s 18(1A)(a) and, for standard patents, 18(1)(a).  ?
  3. Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 23(2)(a).  ?
  4. TRIPS art. 27.1  ?

Aristocrat 2 or 3 or 4 or Read More »

Support and sufficiency apply to (mechanical) patents DownUnder

The High Court has refused Jusand’s application for special leave to appeal [1] the Full Federal Court’s affirmation that Jusand’s patent was invalid on sufficiency and support grounds under the Raising the Bar tests.

In refusing special leave, the High Court simply stated:

The proposed appeal does not have sufficient prospects of success. Otherwise, the proceedings are not a suitable vehicle for the point of principle the proposed appeal seeks to raise.

I think Perram J’s reasons in the Full Federal Court were the first detailed consideration of the operation of these “new” provisions at the appellate level and so they will continue to provide guidance on the meaning and application of the sufficiency and support requirements. (Although one wonders if the second sentence of the High Court’s refusal indicates there may still be some doubt.)

Background

Jusand was the owner of Australian Innovation Patent No. 2019100556 entitled ‘Safety System and Method for Protecting Against a Hazard of Drill Rod Failure in a Drilled Rock Bore’. It had sued Rattlejack alleging that Rattlejack’s SafetySpear infringed claim 1 of the Patent. The trial Judge held there was no infringement and also upheld Rattlejack’s cross-claim that the Patent was invalid and ordered revocation.

According to the specification, the usual practice in underground mining is to excavate a shaft under the ore that is to be mined and then drill up from the shaft to the ore. The bore holes can vary in length from 20m to 60m. The bores are drilled by stringing together lengths of hollow steel tube – drill rods – to make a “string” of drill rods or drill string. Because of the forces involved and the variable geology, however, the drill string may break. The broken or loose drill rod components may become stuck or may fall out unexpectedly.

Evidence at the trial[2] indicated that broken drill string sections could be up to 20m long, weighing 500kg. The impact load of such a falling “projectile” would be 67,000kg.

Thus leaving the mine shaft unsafe; all the more so as the broken drill string might fall unexpectedly.

The Patent proposed a system involving an anchor and an impact reduction member to, in effect, plug the bore hole. The impact reduction member could be tapered along its length up the bore hole so that the force of the falling drill component was translated from the vertical sideways to the horizontal and so acted as a braking force.

Claim 1 in terms stated:

A safety system for protecting against a hazard of drill rod failure in a drilled rock bore above horizontal, and especially a hazard posed by a broken drill rod section within the bore, comprising:

an anchor member configured to be fixed in a proximal end region of the bore adjacent to a rock-face; and

an impact reduction member for reducing an impact of the broken drill rod section striking the anchor member in the proximal end region of the bore, wherein the impact reduction member is configured to be located in the proximal end region of the drilled bore and to extend within the bore above the anchor member to be impacted or struck directly by the broken drill rod section falling within the bore.

You will notice that the “anchor member” and the “impact reduction member” are uncharacterised: the material(s) from which they are made are not specified. Although the claim was for an uncharacterised anchor member and impact reduction member, the Specification relevantly disclosed only things made from steel. It was this lack of specification which led the trial judge and the Full Court on appeal to find the Patent was invalid as lacking sufficiency and support.

Perram J’s reasoning

Perram J gave the judgment, Nicholas and McElwaine JJ agreeing.

Sections 40(2)(a) and 40(3) relevantly provide:

(2)A complete specification must:

(a) disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant art [the sufficiency requirement]; and

(3) The claim or claims must be clear and succinct and supported by matter disclosed in the specification.

Perram J began consideration of the issues by noting at [161] that the terms of the section offered no guidance about how much disclosure would be ‘complete enough’ nor what quantum of ‘support’ was required. Accordingly, the meaning of the provisions was ambiguous.

As a result, it was permissible to resort to extrinsic materials to resolve the ambiguities.[3].

Prior to the Raising the Bar amendments, section 40(2)(a) had only required the complete specification, relevantly, to describe the invention fully and s 40(3) had only required the claim to be fairly based on the matter described in the specification.

In Lockwood No 1, the High Court held that these requirements would be met if the patent explained how to perform the invention in at least one way – to make at least one “thing” falling within the scope of the claims. (Perram J noted that under this test the Jusand Patent would be valid.)

In that respect, Australian law had diverged from the law in the UK but the High Court in Lockwood No 1 had explained that was a result of the UK acceding to the European Patent Convention and adopting the different standards sufficiency and support standards rather than fair basing.

Referring to the Explanatory Memorandum, Perram J noted the intention of the amendments had been to overrule Lockwood No 1 and align Australian law with “overseas jurisdictions”, specifically referring to the approach taken in the UK under Patents Act 1977 s 14(3) and (5) and art.s 83 and 84 of the European Patent Convention. Thus, statements in the Explanatory Memorandum included that ‘support’ picked up two concepts:

• there must be a basis in the description for each claim; and

• the scope of the claims must not be broader than is justified by the extent of the description, drawings and contribution to the art.

In light of this his Honour concluded at [172]:

It will be seen therefore that the European and United Kingdom provisions are relevantly the same as ss 40(2)(a) and (3). I would conclude from that equivalence, the clear statements made to both Chambers by the Ministers who moved for the bill’s second reading and the Explanatory Memorandum that the purpose of the amendments was to ensure that the Australian law of sufficiency and support developed along the same lines as the law of the United Kingdom and the members of the European Union (each of which is a signatory to the European Patent Convention).

To determine whether the requirements of sufficiency and support under s40(2)(a) and (3) were met, therefore, Perram J accepted at [186] and [190] – [195] that the eight principles propounded by Lord Briggs at [56] in Regeneron[4] as explained by Birss J in Illumina were appropriate.

Application to Jusand’s Patent

As the anchor and impact reduction members were uncharacterised, there were a range of materials which could potentially be used within the scope of the claims.

In seeking to invalidate the Patent, Rattlejack invoked proposition (vii) from Regeneron:

(vii) Nor will a claim which in substance passes the sufficiency test be defeated by dividing the product claim into a range denominated by some wholly irrelevant factor, such as the length of a mouse’s tail. The requirement to show enablement across the whole scope of the claim applies only across a relevant range. Put broadly, the range will be relevant if it is denominated by reference to a variable which significantly affects the value or utility of the product in achieving the purpose for which it is to be made. (emphasis supplied)

In Illumina at [277] (in what Perram J described at [190] as “a celebrated discussion of a teapot” illustration), Birss J had explained the concept of relevance for these purposes as turning on the technical contribution or inventive concept. Thus, where a hypothetical claim was to a new teapot with a spout shaped in a new way so as not to drip, while the material from which the teapot was made was relevant to its function as a teapot, that was not relevant in the Regeneron sense as what gave the claimed invention value, utility and purpose was the design of the spout.

This in turn required consideration of what made the claim “inventive” and what its technical contribution to the art is.

At [201], Perram J pointed out that these could be two different things. Echoing Hicton’s Patent, Perram J pointed out that the inventive contribution to a claimed invention may be an abstract idea. However, that was not the patentable subject matter. What the monopoly conferred by a patent was granted for was the claimed invention – the practical implementation of the idea.

From this, it followed that the technical contribution to the relevant art was the product claimed or at [205], in the case of a method, the explanation of how to perform the method disclosed in the specification.

As noted above, the first factual finding was that claim 1 was not limited only to anchors and impact reduction members made from steel. It extended to such things made from anything.

However, relevantly, the Specification disclosed only anchors and impact reduction members made from steel.

Next, based on the evidence before her, the trial judge had held that identifying other suitable materials would involve the person skilled in the art in the exercise of inventive skill.[5]

Claim 1 therefore failed both the sufficiency and support requirements.

At [215], Perram J explained:

…. The invention as claimed was the Safety System which disclosed only a method using an anchor member and a tapered impact reduction member made from steel. Its innovative step was the idea of converting downward weight force into lateral braking forces using the interaction of an anchor member with a tapered impact reduction member. Its technical contribution to the art was taking that idea and explaining how to use it in a Safety System utilising steel. I would therefore see the essence or core of the invention, in terms of Illumina, as involving a consideration of each of these concepts.

His Honour explained that the purpose of the claimed invention was to prevent drill rod sections falling into the shaft. Given the potential forces that such a falling drill rod section could generate, the material(s) from which the anchor and impact reduction member were made significantly affected the utility of the system. As the identification of appropriate materials (other than steel) involved inventive effort, the sufficiency requirement was not satisfied.

Correspondingly, the claim was not enabled across its full scope and the claim was not supported by the description. For example, at [222]:

…. The invention as claimed was a Safety System able to be constructed from a range of materials but the specification showed only how to make it from steel. Thus the monopoly defined by the claims exceeded the technical contribution made to the art. Effectively, if this patent were upheld it would confer upon the Appellant a monopoly over a range of Safety Systems which it has simply not invented. This would reward the patentee for something it has not done and it would prevent others of an inventive disposition from discovering how to make ingenious systems of anchor and impact reduction members from other materials including materials not yet known.

A comment

So far as I am aware, this is the first case in Australia in which the sufficiency and support requirements have operated to invalidate a mechanical patent – these requirements typically arising in cases where classes of chemical compounds and the like have been claimed.

Regeneron’s propositions #5 and #6 are:

(v) A claim which seeks to protect products which cannot be made by the skilled person using the disclosure in the patent will, subject to de minimis or wholly irrelevant exceptions, be bound to exceed the contribution to the art made by the patent, measured as it must be at the priority date.

(vi) This does not mean that the patentee has to demonstrate in the disclosure that every embodiment within the scope of the claim has been tried, tested and proved to have been enabled to be made. Patentees may rely, if they can, upon a principle of general application if it would appear reasonably likely to enable the whole range of products within the scope of the claim to be made. But they take the risk, if challenged, that the supposed general principle will be proved at trial not in fact to enable a significant, relevant, part of the claimed range to be made, as at the priority date. (emphasis supplied)

What will happen in mechanical (or for that matter any other art’s) patents which are not drafted with this precision. For example, to borrow from Birss J’s celebrated teapot example: a patent for a teapot made from a suitable material.

In his Lordship’s hypothetical and unlike Jusand, Birss J assumed the selection of suitable material did not involve inventive skill. That may be sufficient.

As I understand matters, the risk flagged in Regeneron proposition #6 motivated IPTA to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the special leave application.

Dr Claire Gregg and Will Hird at DCC have reported that IP Australia is increasingly raising sufficiency and support objections against such patents. James Lawrence and John Hogan, patent attorneys at, respectively, Addisons and FB Rice provide some recommendations for drafting practices – at least for new applications.[6]

Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 178 (Perram J, Nicholas and McElwaine JJ agreeing)


  1. Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2024] HCASL 104.  ?
  2. Jusand FCAFC at [216].  ?
  3. s 15AB(1) and (2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.  ?
  4. For ease of reference, the eight propositions have been extracted here.  ?
  5. At [212], Perram J summarised the trial judge’s reasoning: “Since it was a plausible working of the claims of the patent to carry out the invention in materials apart from steel, the trial judge reasoned that to do so the skilled addressee would need to engage in the two endeavours identified by her Honour at J [475]-[479] (set out above): first, the skilled addressee would need to select a material which would be suitable for the Safety System’s construction having regard to the enormous forces to which it would be subjected during the impact event; and secondly, the skilled addressee would need to design the Safety System having regard to the physical qualities of the material thus selected. As the trial judge explained, this was because different materials had different degrees of elasticity and stiffness (‘modulus’) (J [420]-[427]), different compressive strengths (J [428]-[432]), different coefficients of friction (J [433]-[435]), different degrees of ductility (J [436]-[437]) and different behaviours when it came to shearing and galling (J [438]-[440]), as well as having different melting points (J [441]-[442]) (noting that the impact event generates heat).”  ?
  6. James Lawrence and John Hogan, ‘Sufficiency and the Patent Bargain Post-Jusand v Rattlejack: How Much Disclosure is Enough?’ (2024) 135 Intellectual Property Forum 9 at 18 – 19.  ?

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