Copyright

A fairly close look at ACTA

Terry Hart embarks on a fairly detailed comparison of (what was known about the draft) ACTA and US copyright law to see how much would need to change “ACTA: Thought for FUD” in 4 parts

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

One might well be very sceptical about something being negotiated “in private”. Nonetheless, if you get past the reliance on proposed art. 1.2 as “not requiring new laws”, it is definitely worth a read. If nothing else, you will come away very much better informed.

Lid dip: Ben Sheffner

A fairly close look at ACTA Read More »

No copyright in newspaper headlines

Bennett J’s reasons for ruling that Fairfax does not hold copyright in the Australian Financial Review’s headlines have now been published.

In conclusion, Bennett J stated:

159 As to the subsistence of copyright in the contended works, I have reached the following conclusions:

  • None of the ten selected headlines are capable of being literary works in which copyright can subsist.
  • Fairfax has failed to prove that any of the ten selected Article/Headline Combination is a discrete work of joint authorship in which copyright can subsist.
  • Copyright subsists in the Article Compilation and the Edition Work in each of the June and November editions as original literary works and this copyright is owned by Fairfax.
160 Reed takes the whole of each headline. As to whether Reed, in reproducing and communicating headlines of the AFR as part of the Abstracts, takes a substantial part of any of the contended works:
  • Even if the Article/Headline Combination constitutes a copyright work, Reed does not take a substantial part of such a work.
  • Reed does not take a substantial part of either the Article Compilation or the Edition Work.
161 Although it is not necessary to decide whether Reed is entitled to rely on the defences claimed, I nonetheless consider that:
  • Reed’s conduct in reproducing and communicating the AFR headlines as part of the Abstracts is a fair dealing for the purpose of reporting news such that Reed’s conduct would not constitute an infringement of copyright by reason of s 42(1)(b) of the Act;
  • Fairfax is not estopped from asserting that Reed’s reproduction and communication of AFR headlines in the Abstracts as part of the ABIX service amounts to infringement of its copyright in the contended works.
162 It follows that Fairfax’s application should be dismissed.

[160] is strikingly reminiscent of her Honour’s ruling at first instance in IceTV. As you will see from [161], her Honour also addressed the fair dealing defence and rejected Reed’s argument that Fairfax was estopped.

While the courts have been careful not to say there can never be copyright in film titles and the like, one wonders, if there wasn’t copyright in The Man Who Broke The Bank at Monte Carlo, whatever were they thinking?

The Australian (rather ironically given News Corp’s campaign) has some fun at Fairfax’ expense picking out some key points and repeats Alan Kohler’s question what would they have achieved commercially even if they succeeded?

Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Reed International Books Australia Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 984

No copyright in newspaper headlines Read More »

New DMCA exemptions

The Librarian of Congress has announced 6 new categories of exemption from the prohibitions under US law against circumventing DRM mechanisms (what we call TPM and ERMI).

The (Australian) Copyright Council has a nice bullet point summary.

Jonathon Bailey, at Plagiarism Today, looks at the politics and the ramifications from a practical perspective. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if he didn’t spend a fair bit of time on the issue in his weekly podcast, so check back to his site on, say, Monday.

Now, the Librarian of Congress’ exemptions are applicable under US law only. Our law does contemplate the introduction of additional, so-called “ad hoc” exemptions against circumventing access control tpm, by means of the Regulations: s 116AN(9), Sch. 10A of the regs has 6 nice categories of exemption. These were added way back in 2006 around the time we had a review to find out if we should have some more. Wonder if someone, somewhere is thinking we should investigate some more?

New DMCA exemptions Read More »

Who owns the news?

For those who didn’t make it to last week’s IPRIA / CMCL /MBS Cite seminar, the organisers have helpfully posted the videos and some of the slides.

Of course, from a purely legalistic point of view, the copyright owner owns at least his/her/its “expression” of the news and, as the various attempts to set up pay-walls and the like expose, website owners can “block” Google/Bing’s spiders and linking if they really, really want to (see Danny Sullivan via here).

Over at Techcrunch, John Biggs speculates that paywalls and the era of micro-payments are coming. Meanwhile, the Guardian appears to be making a bid to become the blogosphere’s source of reported news (lid dip, @lods1211) which might be thought of as an application of Jeff Jarvis’ What Would Google Do?

Now, I’m all in favour of News Corp trying to put the lid on linking to its websites and the Guardian taking a different strategy. Afterall, that might be thought the essence of competition. More generally, however, do we really want to develop some additional legal protection that makes linking (when it is not technologically blocked) some sort of infringement?

Wouldn’t that mean “Bye bye world wide web” (as we know and use it)?

Who owns the news? Read More »

Viacom v YouTube: a decision

District Court Judge Stanton has granted YouTube summary judgment in Viacom’s action for copyright infringement.

The judge’s opinion is here (pdf).

Prof. Goldman provides an initial summary here.

As Prof. Goldman notes, Viacom will presumably seek to appeal.

Given the provenance of our own limited “safe harbours” in the US DMCA via the US Free Trade Agreement, nonetheless, the decision should repay consideration in the Australian context.

On a general note, Judge Stanton distinguished YouTube’s position from Grokster, finding:

It is not remotely the case that You Tube exists “solely to provide the site and facilities for copyright infringement.” . Even the plaintiffs do not (and could not) suggest as much. Indeed, they have repeatedly acknowledged the contrary.
The Grokster model does not comport with that of a service provider who furnishes a platform on which its users
post and access all sorts of materials as they wish, while the provider is unaware of its content, but identifies an agent to receive complaints of infringement, and removes identified material when he learns it infringes. To such a provider, the DMCA gives a safe harbor, even if otherwise he would be held as a contributory infringer under the general law.

While that is made in the context of the DMCA “safe harbour” defences, the point should be well worth bearing in mind when the Full Court comes to decide the iiNet appeal.

Viacom International Inc. v YouTube Inc

Viacom v YouTube: a decision Read More »

Ramifications of IceTV

Last February, Gordon J ruled that there was no copyright in White Pages subscriber listings and (perhaps more surprisingly) Yellow Pages listings. Now, Stone J has applied IceTV (here and here) to find that copyright did not subsist in medical records held by a range of general practitioners.

Primary Health Care (PHC) is a publicly listed company that has been buying up medical practices. As part of the purchase, the medical practitioner contracted to work at the new practice for a period. The vendor practice’s patient records consisting of (1) consultation notes, (2) prescriptions and (3) referral letters were transferred to the new PHC practice. PHC claimed deductions from its income tax for depreciation of the value of the copyright said to subsist in the patient records and the Commissioner disallowed the claim.

Stone J accepted that copyright subsisted in the sample patient referral letters written by the medical practitioners and one sample consultation note (the so called di Michiel patient 6), but rejected the claim to copyright in all the other sample patient records. Her Honour did note that her ruling was not a finding that copyright could never subsist in any patient records, only that it did not subsist in the particular samples addressed in the case.

The case could easily become a ready instructional tool for students and “new” intellectual property lawyers.

The consultation notes

Each practice maintained a file for each patient. The file usually consisted of a summary sheet which contained information such as the patient’s name, address, age, medicare number and, sometimes, important medical issues. This information was usually taken down by the receptionist or other clerical staff. In addition, there were cards, or sheets of paper, or in some cases electronic records containing a series of notes entered sequentially about each consultation with the patient.

All the notes recorded for di Michiel patient 6 were in fact made by Dr di Michiel himself. In the case of all the other samples tendered in evidence, however, the individual notes were made by different practitioners: sometimes the principal, sometimes an employee, sometimes a locum and sometimes another partner in the practice.

This led to PHC’s first problem.

Stone J held that the consultation notes where the entries were made at different times by different practitioners were not works of joint authorship. Her Honour did accept that that, at least in some cases, the consultation notes for each patient could be seen as a continuous narrative. They were not, however, the fruits of a collaborative effort in which the contributions of each author could not be distinguished. To the contrary, each individual contribution could be simply identified by looking at the different handwriting for each entry. (Hmm. I wonder what would happen if all the entries were made electronically and it was not possible to identify who made them?)

A first consequence of this conclusion was that large swathes of many of the consultation notes fell out of consideration as, following IceTV, (1) the person who had actually written them – the author – had not been identified and (2) nor was it established that those unidentified individual authors were “qualified persons” as defined in s 10(1).

The principals of the sample practices (well, some of them) were able to identify various individual entries in particular consultation notes that they had written. That, however, led to the second problem.

Some entries were simply listings of medical conditions. Three examples particularly relied on by PHC by 3 different doctors for 3 different patients were given in [127]:

(a) Triferne 28 Microgynon 20 C&N
(b) H/T, NIDDM, Asthma
(c) Hypertension, Uterine Fibroids, Pagets D, Lumbar Disc Deg

While these entries conveyed information, her Honour held that such clinical data and the names of particular medications did not originate with the doctor who recorded them.

Some were more developed – 3 further entries for 3 different patients:

7kg – growing well. On fresh milk and vitamins

Now c/o diarrhoea – possibly antibiotic induced …

Last 2/12 notices wheezy breathing if lies flat – associated with dry irritant cough – Says doesn’t feel SOB

These too “were not sufficiently substantial to qualify as works the product of independent intellectual effort directed at expression.” Stone J explained at [133]:

None of this denies the intellectual effort and professional skill needed to form the diagnoses, to select methods of treatment or to understand the significance of clinical data that is recorded, however, copyright protects a form of expression not this underlying expertise.

On the other hand, Dr di Michiel patient 6 record, which did constitute a continuous and single work as a whole, was an original work.

Sample prescriptions

The sample prescriptions [113]-[114] and summary notes were at [135] similarly too insubstantial to qualify “as original literary works embodying independent intellectual effort directed towards expression.”

A problem of assignment

A further problem for PHC was that only one of the sale  agreements included an express assignment of copyright. Stone J refused to infer an intention to assign the copyright, as distinct from the property in the physical record, from the sale of the medical practice as a going concern. It simply wasn’t necessary to infer such a term. The lack of such necessity was supported both by the fact that PHC did not claim copyright in third party documents forming part of the patients’ medical records, such as x-rays and letters from specialist consultants, and a consideration of how the records were in fact used after the sale.

No use of copyright

As to the second point, while PHC claimed that the copyright was used after the sale, most of the evidence was not consistent with this. In one case, her Honour accepted that the records had been transferred into a computerised database (and so the copyright was used) but, in the other cases, the most that could be said was that some information only had been used.

Primary Health Care Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 419

Ramifications of IceTV Read More »

How much to pay for a music download?

The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has ruled that no royalty is payable for downloads (should that be “streaming”?) of those 30 second previews of music. Apparently, it falls with the fair dealing provisions for “research”. The “1709” blog has the story.

Meanwhile, last year, the Australian Copyright Tribunal accepted that music download services such as iTunes, Bigpond Music, Sony and Universal should pay composers a royalty of:

  • the higher of 9% of retail price or 9 cents per track, for music downloads; and
  • the higher of 8% of retail price or 8 cents per track,

for single track downloads. There is a sliding scale for the track rates where an album, rather than a single track, is downloaded.

As the price on iTunes is typically $1.69 per “song”, I guess the % rate will usually apply for single track downloads.

(This is just what the composers get paid for the transmission and reproduction on the ‘buyer’s’ computer; not what the record companies or performers (will) get.

The composers’ collecting societies, APRA and AMCOS, had started out trying to get 12% but, in the end, the monopolies and the monopsonistic buyer(s) wound up reaching agreement. Even the ACCC, after some twisting and turning seems to have gone along with the deal, perhaps in recognition of the fact that the Copyright Act specifically gives the Copyright Tribunal power to fix these rates.

By way of comparison, the Copyright Tribunal reported that the corresponding rates were:

• United Kingdom – 8%.
• Canada – 11%.
• United States – 9.1 cents.
The rate in the United States is a fixed monetary rate. The vast majority of single track downloads in the United States at present are supplied at a price of 99 cents per download. Thus the monetary rate is equivalent to 9.1% of the sale price.

Australasian Performing Right Association Limited and Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society Limited [2009] ACopyT 2

How much to pay for a music download? Read More »

Recorded music royalties at the gym

The Copyright Tribunal has ordered a very significant increase in the licence fees payable by fitness clubs for the use of recorded music.

At this stage, there seems to be press reports only:

The old fee was 96.8c per person attending the class, capped at $2654 per year. The new fee will be $15 per class or $1 per attendee.

This is just the fee payable to the record company, not the fee for the composition payable to APRA.

Presumably it follows on the striking recalibration effected in the Hotels case.

Recorded music royalties at the gym Read More »

Not complying with an injunction

IP disputes often involve the (alleged) infringer providing undertakings or being subjected to injunctions to stop infringing the IP in the future. The sanction for non-compliance being (potentially) contempt of court.

The long running Deckers litigation has now reached the point where Tracey J has found a number of the respondents in contempt of court for breaching undertakings and injunctions from litigation in 2003, 2004 and 2007.

His Honour’s reasons provide a useful guide to prove the contempt(s). Unfortunately, it looks like there will need to be another hearing to establish the penalty.

Deckers Outdoor Corporation Pty Ltd v Farley (No 6) [2010] FCA 391

Not complying with an injunction Read More »

Resale royalty right in the EU

In a dispute over which of Salvador Dali’s heirs is entitled to the benefits of the Community Resale Royalty, the ECJ has ruled that this is a matter for national law.

The 1709 blog has a short report here; IPKat waxes lyrical here.

Case C?518/08, Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos (VEGAP) v Société des auteurs dans les arts graphiques et plastiques (ADAGP)

CAL was recently appointed to administer the absolutely inalienable artist’s resale royalty scheme under the Australian Act, Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009 (Cth), and Minister Garrett has announced that the scheme will come into force on 9 June 2010.

Section 15 of our Act will specify who the heirs can be – the person or person who satisfy “the succession test”:

Succession test
(1)  An entity satisfies the succession test in relation to resale royalty right on the commercial resale of an artistic work, if the entity satisfies:
(a)  criteria 1 and 2 (in subsections (2) and (3)); or
(b)  criteria 3 and 4 (in subsections (4) and (5)).
Criterion 1
(2)  The entity received its interest in the right by testamentary disposition, or in accordance with the rules of intestate succession, on the death of an individual.
Criterion 2
(3)  The entity is one of the following:
(a)  an individual with a beneficial interest in the right;
(b)  a charity or charitable institution with a beneficial interest in the right;
(c)  a community body with a beneficial interest in the right;
(d)  a person who holds an interest in the right in trust for:
(i)  an individual; or
(ii)  a charity or charitable institution; or
(iii)  a community body.
Criterion 3
(4)  The entity received its interest in the right on the winding up of a charity, charitable institution or a community body.
Criterion 4
(5)  The entity is a charity, charitable institution or a community body formed for substantially the same purposes as the body that was wound up.

Resale royalty right in the EU Read More »

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