reproduction

iiNet and the movie studios

Some points worth pondering arising from the recent pleadings fight

Both the movie studios and iiNet brought motions for summary judgment and/or to strike parts of the other side’s pleadings relating to the claims that (1) iiNet authorised infringement, (2) iiNet was liable as a primary infringer for actually reproducing the allegedly copied films and (3) whether or not iiNet was also liable in conversion.

The movie companies are obviously suing iiNet for authorising the (alleged) infringing activities of iiNet’s subscribers on a theory similar to the successful theories in Cooper v Universal.

Part of iiNet’s defence is that the notice it received of the claimed infringements were ‘mere allegations of copyright infringement’. The judge considered this sufficient to make iiNet’s point:

56.   The Court has no difficulty in understanding such pleading as being a statement that the AFACT notifications did no more than bring to iiNet’s attention an allegation of copyright infringement. Whether the notifications from DtecNet of alleged infringement are sufficient to prove infringement by iiNet’s users or might be used as evidence that iiNet was aware of the infringement of its users is necessarily a matter requiring evidence and thus is a matter for determination at the hearing. So considered, there is nothing further which needs to be added to the pleading. The Court rejects Roadshow’s assertion that such statement is inadequate.

 That is, iiNet appears to be defending the allegation of authorising copyright infringement in part by contending it did not have sufficient knowledge of what was going on to have the necessary control. As the quote shows, however, whether or not iiNet’s position will be good enough to win the day remains to be seen.

The other fights which are of potentially more general interest relate to the movie companies’ allegations that iiNet is itself a direct or primary infringer (not just an authoriser) or liable in conversion under s 116.

In relation to conversion, the judge considered it wasn’t clear whether the movie companies were alleging that the ‘infringing copies’ alleged to be converted were the data electronically transmitted across iiNet’s network (facilities) as temporary or transient copies stored in iiNet’s switches and servers or in some other way.

43.   It does not follow from the fact that the Court may find that the iiNet users have ‘electronically transmitted’ the films that the Court will necessarily have to find that the data so transmitted constitutes an ‘infringing copy.’ For example, the Court could find as a fact that the users have ‘electronically transmitted’ the whole or substantial part of the films by reference only to the conduct of the users without the Court having to consider the involvement of the technical process by which that transmission occurs. In such instance, the Court’s finding in relation to the conduct of the iiNet users may have no bearing on whether it finds that the data transmitted is, while in transmission, a copy of the film as defined, meaning an article or thing in which the visual images or sounds comprising the film are embodied. The data would need to be a copy for it to constitute an infringing copy, and there would have to be an infringing copy for there to be conversion.

The judge described the movie companies’ claims as novel but, at this stage of the proceedings, refused summary judgment and required them

47.   … to specify exactly what the ‘infringing copies’ are; how they are created; and at least one instance of them, as is required by O 58 r 16 of the Rules

Thirdly, it does appear that the movie companies contend that iiNet directly infringes because any temporary/transient copies of infringing material stored in its network or on its servers as users download or transmit them are infringing reproductions. Unlike the conversion claim, the judge considered this adequately pleaded:

50.   The issues the Court has raised regarding the definition of ‘infringing copy’, and whether that could apply on the facts pleaded, do not arise in relation to this claim. If it is found that there was transient storage of the whole or substantial part of the films, this may give rise to there being a ‘copy’ for the purposes of s 86(c) of the Copyright Act, and consequently the problems discussed above in relation to ‘electronic transmission’ do not apply.

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited [2009] FCA 332

Earlier background on the case here and here.

iiNet and the movie studios Read More »

Is copying enough to infringe Down Under?

The Full Court (Lindgren, Goldberg and Bennett JJ) has allowed the appeal in Elwood v Cotton On. So, for example, contrary to the trial Judge’s ruling, Elwood’s copyright in this:

 

Elwood New Deal T-shirt
Elwood New Deal T-shirt

was infringed by this:
  

Cotton On Moscow T-shirt
Cotton On Moscow T-shirt

First, the Full Court agreed with the trial Judge that Elwood’s t-shirt design was properly classified as an artistic work and not a literary work nor both an artistic work and a literary work: the semiotic component – the words and numbers – was too slight for the design to be viewed as an artistic work.

As an aside, the Full Court did not express a view of whether or not the ruling in Anacon that a circuit diagram was both an artistic work and a literary work represented the law in Australia.

Secondly, the Full Court reiterated that infringement was to be tested in 3 steps:

(1) to identify the work in suit in which copyright subsists;

(2) to identify in the alleged infringing work the part taken (ie derived or copied) from the work in suit; and

(3) to determine whether the part taken constitutes a substantial part of the work in suit.

At the stage of identifying the work in suit, the Full Court ruled that it was the work as a whole which needed to be identified.  The Full Court held, however, that the trial Judge had erred by excluding from consideration at this stage those matters which her Honour found were matters of “idea” rather than “expression”.

Cotton On was found, both at trial and on appeal, to have blatantly copied from Elwood’s work. As a comparison of the work and Cotton On’s designs above shows what Cotton On took was the the layout, positioning of elements and the overall “look and feel”.  What it didn’t take were the actual words, symbols and images.

The trial Judge had found this significant, ruling that:

The text and symbols matter. The colours matter. Similarly, unlike Finkelstein J in Autocaps [a reference to Autocaps (Aust) Pty Ltd v Pro-Kit Pty Ltd (1999) 46 IPR 339], I cannot say that what is conveyed by the two prints is the same – it is not.

Having found the error identified above, the Full Court disagreed.  Their Honours found that the layout, selection , arrangement and style of the various elements were a substantial part of the copyright work and so there had been an infringing reproduction.

The means by which the Full Court arrived at this conclusion is significant.

The Full Court had appeared to accept that there may be a role for “ideas” and “expression” at the infringement stage of the inquiry.  However:

35 While the idea/expression dichotomy is basic to the law of copyright, it is a difficult one, particularly in the case of artistic works. What principles are to govern the demarcation? The “idea” underlying a copyright work can plausibly be identified at different levels of generality. The higher the level of abstraction, the more that is left as protectable expression. The lower the level of abstraction, the less that is left as protectable expression. ….

….

37 A difficulty associated with the idea/expression dichotomy is that the choice of the level of abstraction is subjective and uncertain. Mr Simons’s identification of the underlying concept (see [21] above) was not conclusive.

In contrast, the Full Court preferred a rather more mechanistic approach.  The layout, etc., “look and feel” were substantial because the evidence showed that far more effort went into achieving them:

70 Mr Gillott said that he and Mr Simons tried to achieve a “balance” of the six elements on the front and the five elements on the back, and the proportion they bore to one another. He estimated that there were at least 10 to 15 printouts by Mr Simons on which he (Mr Gillott) wrote his comments and his “scribbles”. He said that the entire process took a good two weeks, but no more than three weeks, from the time he handed over his initial draft to Mr Simons.

71 Mr Gillott described Elwood’s design procedure. He said that the form and shape was settled upon first, and the “type elements”, “wording and text elements”, last. It was after that two to three week period that attention was directed to finalising the wording and text. Mr Gillott said that “once we’re down to inputting the words that we would like in the art, that happens quite quickly”. He explained that it took no more than two days to put those elements into the design, because he “already had the ideas to carry “Raging Bulls” through”, and the expression “Durable by Design” was Elwood’s “core logo”. He said that once those elements were introduced, he signed off on the NewDeal print and it took no more than two days for production to commence.

….

73 Mr Gillott’s evidence recounted above, which was not contradicted, was to the effect that by far the greater part of the effort, skill and time involved in designing of the NewDeal T-shirt was devoted to layout rather than with the choice of words and numerals. (emphasis supplied)

Two weeks versus two days may seem, perhaps, a rather quantitative approach to the qualitative assessment of judgment and degree which the traditional inquiry into a substantial part is acknowledged to require.

It also turned out that Elwood’s design was in fact a development of its earlier 96ers T.  Unfortunately, an image of that earlier design is not included in the judgment.  Their Honours explained, however, that the New Generation design involved the following differences:

74 There are obvious similarities between the 96ers and the NewDeal design but the NewDeal design contained artistic expressions of an underlying idea that were not found in the 96ers. Mr Gillott and Mr Simons introduced the following features:

• curved sections;

• some changes to the presentation of the bull’s head trade mark;

• new letter forms;

• accentuation of the overall V shape;

• a balance of the six elements on the front and the five elements on the back; and

• changes in the proportions borne by the respective elements to one another.

By taking these features of the NewDeal design or layout, Cotton On reproduced something that was or included a substantial part of that design or layout.

Elwood Clothing Pty Ltd v Cotton On Clothing Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 197

Is copying enough to infringe Down Under? Read More »

Copyright liability for hosting material posted by others

Section 116AE of the Copyright Act 1968 (Category C activity) provides for a limitation on the liability of hosting services for material posted by others.  Think, for example, of YouTube or those websites that ISPs provide their subscribers. The broad conditions for the protection to apply are set out in s 116AH. Copyright Regulations reg. 20A to 20X provide more detailed requirements, including the notice and take down procedures.

Apart from the failed attempts of pretty much naked infringers to rely on these provisions, we don’t have much case law on how these provisions apply.  See Cooper and KaZaa.

The provision is closely modelled on §512(c) of the US Copyright Act (putting to one side the problematical “carriage service provider” criterion).

Therefore, you might find a US case, Io v Veoh, in which the host successfully relied on the defence worthwhile reading.  

Prof. Goldman has an excellent discussion here.

One of Prof. Goldman’s points is the problem of the relationship of the ‘safe harbours’ to liability for secondary infringement (the nearest analog in Australia being liability for authorising copyright infringement).

That could be an issue here too on the Moorhouse principles, but it has always seemed to me that, before this safe harbour was introduced, the web host had an even more direct exposure for direct infringement by reproduction and, possibly, communication. I wonder if the US Second Circuit’s approach in Cartoon Network v Cablevision (Aug. 4) has potential here?

Copyright liability for hosting material posted by others Read More »

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