2016

Keywords Are Not Trade Mark Use

Katzmann J “gets” the Internet and helps to bring Australian trade mark law well and truly into the 21st century: buying keywords for search engine advertising is not trade mark use. some instances of the use of the trade mark in the sponsored links, however, did infringe.

Malouf is business which helps people who get a bad credit report repair or correct that report.

Veda is a credit reporting agency. Amongst other things, it has registered VEDA in class 36 as a trade mark for:

Financial services; provision of credit risk, financial and asset information and reports; credit scoring and risk assessment services; information provision, advice, research, appraisal, analysis, credit enquiry and consultation ….[1]

Malouf bought advertisements for its business on Google search results pages using the Google AdWords program. Through that program, the advertiser selects terms – keywords – for which, when someone does a “Google” search including one of those keywords, they will pay to have their advertisement appear as an advertisement – a sponsored result – in the search results pages.[2] The keywords Malouf chose included VEDA and 85 other terms using it such as “contact veda”, “veda credit score” etc. Mr Malouf explained his strategy:

So, with Veda approximately anywhere from 20 to 40 per cent — which is published on their website — of people may have an adverse credit history with a credit reporting body. A lot of them don’t know that they’ve got bad credit. So, potentially, one in five customers that are trying to contact Veda may be our target market. … [W]e want to have our ad showing up — anyone trying to contact Veda — because, potentially, one in five of those customers may be wanting to fix their credit file.

Over time, the advertisements Malouf paid to place took 3 forms. Until October 2014, they were along the lines of these sponsored links:

Malouf Sponsored Link type 1
Malouf Sponsored Link type 1

After September/October 2014, the sponsored links did not feature “Veda” in the text.

This gave rise to two main issues: (1) did the use of “keywords” infringe and (2) did the uses in the actual advertisements (sponsored links) infringe?

Keywords

Katzmann J held that Malouf’s “purchase” of keywords using VEDA did not infringe Veda’s trade marks.[3] It was not use as a trade mark. Her Honour gave 3 reasons:

First, all Malouf did was select the keywords and provide them to Google. In doing that, objectively, it was not using the words to distinguish its services from those of other providers. “Rather, it has used them to identify internet users who may have an interest in using [Malouf’s] services.”

Second, anyone could acquire the keywords, not just Malouf. This was not determinative, but it was a consideration. What it meant was that anyone, including any of Malouf’s competitors could also “buy” the same keyword(s). Thus, the keywords were not performing the function of a trade mark: distinguishing (identifying) the trade source to the exclusion of all others.

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, the keywords were invisible to consumers. Katzmann J explained:

… the proposition that using words which are invisible and inaudible, indeed imperceptible, to consumers is using them as a trade mark makes no sense. How could the keywords be understood to be used to distinguish the services of one trader from those of another when the keywords are indiscernible? How could it appear to consumers that, by Malouf’s designation of the Veda keywords to Google, the words are used to denote a connection in the course of trade between Malouf’s services and the services provided by another trader, or to distinguish its services from the services of others, when the consumers have not seen or otherwise perceived the keywords?

Also, when the consumer did not search on the term VEDA alone, how would he or she know which term(s) generated the search results?

At this point, Veda relied on Accor. Katzmann J, however, pointed out, first, that Accor involved metatags, not keywords. More significantly, her Honour noted Accor was inconsistent with Kenny J’s ruling in Complete Technology where Kenny J had said:

I do not accept that the use of any of CTI’s Registered Trade Marks in Green Energy’s metatags would constitute a trade mark infringement for the purposes of s 120(1). Metatags are invisible to the ordinary internet user, although their use will direct the user to (amongst other websites) Green Energy’s website. Once at the Green Energy website, then, in the ordinary course, the internet user will be made aware that the website is concerned with Green Energy’s services. It cannot, therefore, be said that the use in a metatag of CTI’s Registered Trade Marks is a use that indicates the origin of Green Energy’s services.Thus, metatag use is not use as a trade mark …. (emphasis supplied by Katzmann J)

Katzmann J agreed with Kenny J’s analysis.

Katzmann J then rejected Veda’s reliance on 2 New Zealand cases and the CJEU’s decision in Google France. They were decisions in a different context and, in any event, the English courts since Google France had held that keywords did not infringe.

Sponsored links

Whether the sponsored links which used Veda in their text infringed turned on the nature of the actual use.

Malouf had used expressions like[4] “Clean Your Veda File”, “Fix My Veda History”, “Get Your Veda Report File”, “Veda Credit File Repairs”, but also “The Veda Report Centre” and “The Veda-Report Centre”.

Katzmann J held that the uses like “Clean Your Veda File” were descriptive and used in a descriptive rather thant trade mark sense:

In all but the advertisements featuring “The Veda Report Centre”, I am not satisfied that Malouf has used the Veda Trade Marks as trade marks. Rather, it seems to me that they have been used to describe the object to which its services are directed — fixing, cleaning or repairing Veda credit files or reports — not as a badge of the origin of its business and therefore not as a trade mark. …. the Veda Trade Marks have not been used by Malouf to distinguish its services from those provided by others but to describe the kind or character of the services it provides. ….

The Veda Report Centre, however, was a different case. That was used as a badge of origin to market the Malouf business under the Veda name.

The second conclusion seems to me, with respect, uncontroversial. I also personally agree with the first conclusion that the descriptive uses were not infringements too. In the “old days”, that would have been beyond controversy as the case law clearly established that use of the trade mark Yeastvite in an expression such as “Substitute for Yeastvite” was not use as a trade mark – use of a registered trade mark to refer to the products which the trade mark owner marked with the trade mark was not trade mark use. What the North Americans call “nominative fair use”.

The wrinkle here is that, with the introduction of s 123 into the Act, the High Court has left open the question whether that “old” law is still “good” law.[5] Following that, a number of Full Courts – in which the question did not arise because the goods in question were in fact pirate or counterfeit goods, not genuine goods – have proceeded on the basis that the “old” rule no longer applies.[6]

Even if the Full Court (assuming there is an appeal) continues down that, with respect, heretical path, all may not be lost as Malouf did invoke s 122 in its defence. In reaching her Honour’s, with respect eminently sensible conclusion, Katzmann J did note that it was unclear from the case law how s120 related to s 122. In any event, her Honour found that Malouf could rely on the s 122 defence except in relation to the usage “The Veda Report Centre”. Katzmann J rejected Veda’s arguemnt that the sheer number of keywords showed a systematic and targetted attempt to undermine the registered trade mark. Almost all of those uses were not infringements.

As with the trade mark infringement case, the allegations of misleading or deceptive conduct all failed except in respect of the “Veda Report Centre” usage in the sponsored links.

Lid dip: James McDougall

Veda Advantage Limited v Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Limited
[2016] FCA 255


  1. Veda also has registrations for VEDA ADVANTAGE, VEDACHECK and VEDASCORE.  ?
  2. Hal Varian explained how AdWords advertising works in 2009 and with more polish in 2014.  ?
  3. The claim was brought under s 120(1), the allegation under s 120(2) was abandoned during the trial.  ?
  4. The full list is at [161] of her Honour’s judgment.  ?
  5. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited (2010) 241 CLR 144; [2010] HCA 15 at [33] – [34].  ?
  6. The cases are discussed by Allsop CJ in Scandinavian Tobacco at [65] – [71].  ?

Keywords Are Not Trade Mark Use Read More »

Playgro v Playgo

PLAYGRO v PLAYGO

Well, you’ll never guess what? It turns out that:

playgo

is deceptively similar to:

playgro

No April Fool’s. Now, maybe some of you (like me) are thinking, “Wait a minute, there must be ‘gazillions’ of trade marks for toys with PLAY in them. That’s true, but the second syllables of the verbal elements are just too close, both visually and aurally. As Moshinsky J explained:

In my view, the fact that there are other trade marks for goods in class 28 containing ‘PLAY’ as part of the word, does not assist in resolving the matter. Accepting that it is a crowded market for toys, games and playthings where the word ‘PLAY’ is used as an element of the trade mark, and therefore more attention than usual may be paid to the second syllable, there is nevertheless a closer degree of similarity between the trade marks in issue here and the marks referred to in paragraph [94] above. In the present case, the second syllable of each mark (‘GRO’ and ‘GO’ respectively) is visually and phonetically very similar, while in the other cases (for example, PLAYSKOOL and PLAYBOY) the second syllable is quite different.

The different shaped backgrounds and colours and arrangement of the verbal element(s) were not signficant matters.

A couple of other points.

Playgo is based in Hong Kong. It sold and supplied its products to Myer, Woolworths and Big W there (presumably FOB or some similar arrangement). It argued therefore that it did not use its trade mark in the course of trade in Australia as property in the goods passed on delivery in Hong Kong.

Moshinsky J rejected this argument. When Playgo sold its product to Myer and the others, it knew they were intending to import them into Australia for sale at retail. Moshinsky J considered this was just a straightforward application of Gallo and Estex. Until the goods passed into the hands of the ultimate consumers, they were still in the course of trade and the PLAYGO trade mark operated to denote Playgo as the trade source.

Perhaps surprisingly given this conclusion, however, his Honour considered that Playgo was not liable as a joint tortfeasor with Myer, Woolworths or Big W for the infringements committed by their use. Selling the goods to them, with knowledge of what they intended to do with them (i.e., import them into Australia for retail sale) did not have sufficient commonality of purpose to amount to a common design, to “acting in concert together”; it was merely facilitation:

Nevertheless, in my view, the facts do not establish that Playgo Enterprises and Myer engaged in a ‘common design’ to offer for sale and sell toys bearing the Playgo Device Mark. The relationship between Playgo Enterprises and Myer was merely that of vendor and purchaser. The Supply Agreement appears to be a standard agreement for the sale and purchase of goods; there are no special features which involve Playgo Enterprises in the process of offering for sale and sale of the goods to customers. The facts do not indicate that Playgo Enterprises played any role in the offering for sale or sale of the goods to customers. It is true that Playgo Enterprises sold goods bearing the Playgo Device Mark to Myer, and knew that they were to be offered for sale and sold to customers in Australia. Nevertheless, in my view, that is insufficient to amount to a ‘common design’ because Playgo Enterprises did not engage in any acts in furtherance of the alleged common design. At most, Playgo Enterprises facilitated the infringement by selling the goods to Myer; but mere facilitation is not enough to establish joint tortfeasorship.

Although it is not referred to in the judgment, presumably the other limb of joint tortfeasorship – directing, procuring or inducing the infringement – would also fail in the absence of some positive act (other than selling to the importer for importation in Australia and sale)?[1] If so, that illustrates that the common law principles are much less help to the right holder than the statutory prohibitions in copyright law and patent law against authorising infringement[2] and, even more so, s 117 of the Patents Act 1990.

Playgro Pty Ltd v Playgo Art & Craft Manufactory Limited [2016] FCA 280


  1. See e.g. Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Pty Ltd v Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 898; 44 IPR 481 at [41], [52].  ?
  2. In Cooper v Universal Music, for example, the provision of links on a website which browsers could use to download infringing content did constitute infringement where the website was designed to enable anyone, including the primary infringers, to place the links on the website.  ?

Playgro v Playgo Read More »

Servier best method & amendment

Servier has lost what may be its last round[1] in the arginine perindopril litigation against Apotex. Servier began the litigation back in 2007. Ultimately, it lost with its patent being found invalid on the ground that Servier had failed to disclose the best method of performing the invention. After that ruling, Servier applied to amend its patent to include the best method. Its application failed on discretionary grounds. Now, we have the Full Court’s decision dismissing Servier’s appeal from that refusal.

Best method

Servier’s first argument was that, following the High Court’s Kimberley-Clark decision, all s 40(2)(a) required was a disclosure sufficient to enable a skilled person to produce something within each claim without new invention or additions or prolonged study of matters presenting initial difficulty. Servier argued that there was no separate and independent requirement to disclose the “best method”.

After an extensive review of the case law, the Full Court rejected that argument, ruling that disclosure of the best method was indeed a separate requirement. In this case, Servier had failed to comply with that requirement.

Claim 1 of the patent was for the arginine salt of perindopril. There had been an earlier patent for perindopril and sodium and maleate salt forms had been identified. According to the Specification, the arginine salt form had particular stability advantages in conditions of heat and humidity which resulted in longer shelf life and permitted the use of less expensive forms of packaging. The achievement of these advantages, however, could be affected by the method of production. The Specification described the claimed arginine perindopril only as being produced by “a classical method of salification”.

The experts agreed this description of how to prepare the salt was “pregnant with ambiguity” and following from this evidence the trial judge had found this description was “wholly inadequate” and did not:

allow the skilled addressee to follow a routine process of deduction from that description because it leaves open too many variables.

Servier itself had used two different methods before the filing date – the 1986 method and the 1991 method – and another method – the 2002 study – after the priority date. The evidence showed that the method of salification used and variables such as the solvent used and whether and when to stir significantly affected the properties of the resulting salt, including its stability.

Accordingly, the Full Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that Servier had not disclosed the best method known to it of performing the invention.

Amendment

Servier had applied after the trial to amend the Specification to add the best method.

The Full Court affirmed the Pfizer Full Court’s ruling that the best method requirement required disclosure of the best method of performing the invention known to the applicant at the filing date. However, it was possible to remedy a failure to disclose the best method by amendment of the Specification made after the filing date.

The Full Court agreed with the trial judge that the amendment power under s 105 could be invoked even after trial and judgment finding all claims invalid. While there was a proprietal interest in being allowed to amend, it was still necessary for the patentee to satisfy the Court that discretionary grounds did not warrant exclusion.

In this case, however, discretionary grounds warranted refusal. Back in 2004, the examiner had issued a report as a result of which Servier’s patent attorney had advised Servier to include a description of the method of manufacture of arginine perindopril, even if it was well known. The inhouse instructor replied “we will see later”.

Although there was no suggestion of bad faith on the part of the inhouse instructor, the Full Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the inhouse instructor’s decision to ignore the advice of her Australian patent attorney was not reasonable.

The Full Court considered that there was no error of principle in the trial judge’s rejection of the length of the delay as otherwise warranting rejection of the application. However, they would appear themselves have felt the trial judge had been overly generous.

Finally, the Full Court allowed Apotex’ appeal from the trial judge’s order that Apotex pay 66% of Servier’s costs. Rather, Servier should pay 40% of Aptex’ costs of the revocation proceeding and 75% of Aptex’ costs of the amendment proceedings.

Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 27 (Bennett, Besanko and Beach JJ)


  1. Barring (potentially) a special leave application.  ?

Servier best method & amendment Read More »

Online copyright infringement in australia

Playing catch up: last month saw some significant developments for online copyright infringement in Australia:

  1. First, Dallas Buyers Club’s lawyers announced it is no longer pursuing its court action to get prelimiary discovery of the contact details of the 4726 alleged infringers: it’s over;
  2. Secondly, Mr Burke from Village Roadshow announced that the proposed Graduated Response industry code has been shelved;
  3. Thirdly, Village Roadshow and Foxtel announced that they are both bringing court proceedings to obtain website blocking injunctions against ISPs.

Graduated response (or 3-strikes)

One of the factors in the iiNet case which influenced the High Court to find that iiNet did not authorise the infringing acts of its subscribers was that iiNet could not credibly threaten to discipline subscribers accused of infringing by peer to peer downloading because, in the absence of an Industry Code, the subscribers could simply switch to another provider.

In response to that, the draft Industry Code arose from [a Government warning][agltr] that, if the parties did not come up with a solution, the Government would impose one.

However, Mr Burke has now reported that it would cost between $16 and $20 to issue each Infringement Notice under the proposed scheme because it would be necessary to check each notice manually. As he pithily explained, it would be cheaper to give the (putative) infringer a copy of the film:

“And it’s just so labour intense, that it’s somewhere in the vicinity of $16 to $20 per notice, which is prohibitive. You might as well give people a DVD.”

According to Mr Burke, if it is possible to develop an automated scheme, the costs should fall to “cents”. Until then, the scheme has been shelved.[1]

Finally, Mr Burke did go on to say that it was incumbent on rights holders to fight piracy by improving access to their content.

I wonder if we shall see a resumption of efforts to “fix” the authorisation provisions in the Act?

Website blocking injunctions

In the meantime, you will remember that last year Parliament added s 115A to the Copyright Act 1968, giving rights holders power to go to court to get injunctions ordering ISPs to block access to offshore piracy websites.

Now Village Roadshow and a number of Hollywood studios have brought action in the Federal Court seeking orders to block access to Solamovie, which is alleged to facilitate unauthorised streaming. There are 50 named ISP respondents including Telstra, Optus, M2 and TPG. The first directions hearing appears to be scheduled before Nicholas J in Sydney at 9:30am on 16 March. The website s115a.com has links to the Court documents, including the Originating Application and the Statement of Claim uploaded by Rohan Pearce.

Meanwhile, in a separate action, Foxtel has also gone after The Pirate Bay, Torrenz, TorrentHunt and IsoHunt. Nicholas J is holding the first directions for this one at 9:30am on 15 March. As with the Village Roadshow case, s115a.com has links to the documents, courtesy of Mr Pearce.


  1. The announcement seems to have come as some surprise to the ISPs. The report did not indicate who would pay for the development of the prognoticated automated system.  ?

Online copyright infringement in australia Read More »

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