17 April 2024

Support and sufficiency apply to (mechanical) patents DownUnder

The High Court has refused Jusand’s application for special leave to appeal [1] the Full Federal Court’s affirmation that Jusand’s patent was invalid on sufficiency and support grounds under the Raising the Bar tests.

In refusing special leave, the High Court simply stated:

The proposed appeal does not have sufficient prospects of success. Otherwise, the proceedings are not a suitable vehicle for the point of principle the proposed appeal seeks to raise.

I think Perram J’s reasons in the Full Federal Court were the first detailed consideration of the operation of these “new” provisions at the appellate level and so they will continue to provide guidance on the meaning and application of the sufficiency and support requirements. (Although one wonders if the second sentence of the High Court’s refusal indicates there may still be some doubt.)

Background

Jusand was the owner of Australian Innovation Patent No. 2019100556 entitled ‘Safety System and Method for Protecting Against a Hazard of Drill Rod Failure in a Drilled Rock Bore’. It had sued Rattlejack alleging that Rattlejack’s SafetySpear infringed claim 1 of the Patent. The trial Judge held there was no infringement and also upheld Rattlejack’s cross-claim that the Patent was invalid and ordered revocation.

According to the specification, the usual practice in underground mining is to excavate a shaft under the ore that is to be mined and then drill up from the shaft to the ore. The bore holes can vary in length from 20m to 60m. The bores are drilled by stringing together lengths of hollow steel tube – drill rods – to make a “string” of drill rods or drill string. Because of the forces involved and the variable geology, however, the drill string may break. The broken or loose drill rod components may become stuck or may fall out unexpectedly.

Evidence at the trial[2] indicated that broken drill string sections could be up to 20m long, weighing 500kg. The impact load of such a falling “projectile” would be 67,000kg.

Thus leaving the mine shaft unsafe; all the more so as the broken drill string might fall unexpectedly.

The Patent proposed a system involving an anchor and an impact reduction member to, in effect, plug the bore hole. The impact reduction member could be tapered along its length up the bore hole so that the force of the falling drill component was translated from the vertical sideways to the horizontal and so acted as a braking force.

Claim 1 in terms stated:

A safety system for protecting against a hazard of drill rod failure in a drilled rock bore above horizontal, and especially a hazard posed by a broken drill rod section within the bore, comprising:

an anchor member configured to be fixed in a proximal end region of the bore adjacent to a rock-face; and

an impact reduction member for reducing an impact of the broken drill rod section striking the anchor member in the proximal end region of the bore, wherein the impact reduction member is configured to be located in the proximal end region of the drilled bore and to extend within the bore above the anchor member to be impacted or struck directly by the broken drill rod section falling within the bore.

You will notice that the “anchor member” and the “impact reduction member” are uncharacterised: the material(s) from which they are made are not specified. Although the claim was for an uncharacterised anchor member and impact reduction member, the Specification relevantly disclosed only things made from steel. It was this lack of specification which led the trial judge and the Full Court on appeal to find the Patent was invalid as lacking sufficiency and support.

Perram J’s reasoning

Perram J gave the judgment, Nicholas and McElwaine JJ agreeing.

Sections 40(2)(a) and 40(3) relevantly provide:

(2)A complete specification must:

(a) disclose the invention in a manner which is clear enough and complete enough for the invention to be performed by a person skilled in the relevant art [the sufficiency requirement]; and

(3) The claim or claims must be clear and succinct and supported by matter disclosed in the specification.

Perram J began consideration of the issues by noting at [161] that the terms of the section offered no guidance about how much disclosure would be ‘complete enough’ nor what quantum of ‘support’ was required. Accordingly, the meaning of the provisions was ambiguous.

As a result, it was permissible to resort to extrinsic materials to resolve the ambiguities.[3].

Prior to the Raising the Bar amendments, section 40(2)(a) had only required the complete specification, relevantly, to describe the invention fully and s 40(3) had only required the claim to be fairly based on the matter described in the specification.

In Lockwood No 1, the High Court held that these requirements would be met if the patent explained how to perform the invention in at least one way – to make at least one “thing” falling within the scope of the claims. (Perram J noted that under this test the Jusand Patent would be valid.)

In that respect, Australian law had diverged from the law in the UK but the High Court in Lockwood No 1 had explained that was a result of the UK acceding to the European Patent Convention and adopting the different standards sufficiency and support standards rather than fair basing.

Referring to the Explanatory Memorandum, Perram J noted the intention of the amendments had been to overrule Lockwood No 1 and align Australian law with “overseas jurisdictions”, specifically referring to the approach taken in the UK under Patents Act 1977 s 14(3) and (5) and art.s 83 and 84 of the European Patent Convention. Thus, statements in the Explanatory Memorandum included that ‘support’ picked up two concepts:

• there must be a basis in the description for each claim; and

• the scope of the claims must not be broader than is justified by the extent of the description, drawings and contribution to the art.

In light of this his Honour concluded at [172]:

It will be seen therefore that the European and United Kingdom provisions are relevantly the same as ss 40(2)(a) and (3). I would conclude from that equivalence, the clear statements made to both Chambers by the Ministers who moved for the bill’s second reading and the Explanatory Memorandum that the purpose of the amendments was to ensure that the Australian law of sufficiency and support developed along the same lines as the law of the United Kingdom and the members of the European Union (each of which is a signatory to the European Patent Convention).

To determine whether the requirements of sufficiency and support under s40(2)(a) and (3) were met, therefore, Perram J accepted at [186] and [190] – [195] that the eight principles propounded by Lord Briggs at [56] in Regeneron[4] as explained by Birss J in Illumina were appropriate.

Application to Jusand’s Patent

As the anchor and impact reduction members were uncharacterised, there were a range of materials which could potentially be used within the scope of the claims.

In seeking to invalidate the Patent, Rattlejack invoked proposition (vii) from Regeneron:

(vii) Nor will a claim which in substance passes the sufficiency test be defeated by dividing the product claim into a range denominated by some wholly irrelevant factor, such as the length of a mouse’s tail. The requirement to show enablement across the whole scope of the claim applies only across a relevant range. Put broadly, the range will be relevant if it is denominated by reference to a variable which significantly affects the value or utility of the product in achieving the purpose for which it is to be made. (emphasis supplied)

In Illumina at [277] (in what Perram J described at [190] as “a celebrated discussion of a teapot” illustration), Birss J had explained the concept of relevance for these purposes as turning on the technical contribution or inventive concept. Thus, where a hypothetical claim was to a new teapot with a spout shaped in a new way so as not to drip, while the material from which the teapot was made was relevant to its function as a teapot, that was not relevant in the Regeneron sense as what gave the claimed invention value, utility and purpose was the design of the spout.

This in turn required consideration of what made the claim “inventive” and what its technical contribution to the art is.

At [201], Perram J pointed out that these could be two different things. Echoing Hicton’s Patent, Perram J pointed out that the inventive contribution to a claimed invention may be an abstract idea. However, that was not the patentable subject matter. What the monopoly conferred by a patent was granted for was the claimed invention – the practical implementation of the idea.

From this, it followed that the technical contribution to the relevant art was the product claimed or at [205], in the case of a method, the explanation of how to perform the method disclosed in the specification.

As noted above, the first factual finding was that claim 1 was not limited only to anchors and impact reduction members made from steel. It extended to such things made from anything.

However, relevantly, the Specification disclosed only anchors and impact reduction members made from steel.

Next, based on the evidence before her, the trial judge had held that identifying other suitable materials would involve the person skilled in the art in the exercise of inventive skill.[5]

Claim 1 therefore failed both the sufficiency and support requirements.

At [215], Perram J explained:

…. The invention as claimed was the Safety System which disclosed only a method using an anchor member and a tapered impact reduction member made from steel. Its innovative step was the idea of converting downward weight force into lateral braking forces using the interaction of an anchor member with a tapered impact reduction member. Its technical contribution to the art was taking that idea and explaining how to use it in a Safety System utilising steel. I would therefore see the essence or core of the invention, in terms of Illumina, as involving a consideration of each of these concepts.

His Honour explained that the purpose of the claimed invention was to prevent drill rod sections falling into the shaft. Given the potential forces that such a falling drill rod section could generate, the material(s) from which the anchor and impact reduction member were made significantly affected the utility of the system. As the identification of appropriate materials (other than steel) involved inventive effort, the sufficiency requirement was not satisfied.

Correspondingly, the claim was not enabled across its full scope and the claim was not supported by the description. For example, at [222]:

…. The invention as claimed was a Safety System able to be constructed from a range of materials but the specification showed only how to make it from steel. Thus the monopoly defined by the claims exceeded the technical contribution made to the art. Effectively, if this patent were upheld it would confer upon the Appellant a monopoly over a range of Safety Systems which it has simply not invented. This would reward the patentee for something it has not done and it would prevent others of an inventive disposition from discovering how to make ingenious systems of anchor and impact reduction members from other materials including materials not yet known.

A comment

So far as I am aware, this is the first case in Australia in which the sufficiency and support requirements have operated to invalidate a mechanical patent – these requirements typically arising in cases where classes of chemical compounds and the like have been claimed.

Regeneron’s propositions #5 and #6 are:

(v) A claim which seeks to protect products which cannot be made by the skilled person using the disclosure in the patent will, subject to de minimis or wholly irrelevant exceptions, be bound to exceed the contribution to the art made by the patent, measured as it must be at the priority date.

(vi) This does not mean that the patentee has to demonstrate in the disclosure that every embodiment within the scope of the claim has been tried, tested and proved to have been enabled to be made. Patentees may rely, if they can, upon a principle of general application if it would appear reasonably likely to enable the whole range of products within the scope of the claim to be made. But they take the risk, if challenged, that the supposed general principle will be proved at trial not in fact to enable a significant, relevant, part of the claimed range to be made, as at the priority date. (emphasis supplied)

What will happen in mechanical (or for that matter any other art’s) patents which are not drafted with this precision. For example, to borrow from Birss J’s celebrated teapot example: a patent for a teapot made from a suitable material.

In his Lordship’s hypothetical and unlike Jusand, Birss J assumed the selection of suitable material did not involve inventive skill. That may be sufficient.

As I understand matters, the risk flagged in Regeneron proposition #6 motivated IPTA to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the special leave application.

Dr Claire Gregg and Will Hird at DCC have reported that IP Australia is increasingly raising sufficiency and support objections against such patents. James Lawrence and John Hogan, patent attorneys at, respectively, Addisons and FB Rice provide some recommendations for drafting practices – at least for new applications.[6]

Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 178 (Perram J, Nicholas and McElwaine JJ agreeing)


  1. Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2024] HCASL 104.  ?
  2. Jusand FCAFC at [216].  ?
  3. s 15AB(1) and (2) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.  ?
  4. For ease of reference, the eight propositions have been extracted here.  ?
  5. At [212], Perram J summarised the trial judge’s reasoning: “Since it was a plausible working of the claims of the patent to carry out the invention in materials apart from steel, the trial judge reasoned that to do so the skilled addressee would need to engage in the two endeavours identified by her Honour at J [475]-[479] (set out above): first, the skilled addressee would need to select a material which would be suitable for the Safety System’s construction having regard to the enormous forces to which it would be subjected during the impact event; and secondly, the skilled addressee would need to design the Safety System having regard to the physical qualities of the material thus selected. As the trial judge explained, this was because different materials had different degrees of elasticity and stiffness (‘modulus’) (J [420]-[427]), different compressive strengths (J [428]-[432]), different coefficients of friction (J [433]-[435]), different degrees of ductility (J [436]-[437]) and different behaviours when it came to shearing and galling (J [438]-[440]), as well as having different melting points (J [441]-[442]) (noting that the impact event generates heat).”  ?
  6. James Lawrence and John Hogan, ‘Sufficiency and the Patent Bargain Post-Jusand v Rattlejack: How Much Disclosure is Enough?’ (2024) 135 Intellectual Property Forum 9 at 18 – 19.  ?

Support and sufficiency apply to (mechanical) patents DownUnder Read More »

Eight propositions to test support and sufficiency from Regeneron

Reflection upon those European and UK authorities yields the following principles:

(i) The requirement of sufficiency imposed by art. 83 of the EPC exists to ensure that the extent of the monopoly conferred by the patent corresponds with the extent of the contribution which it makes to the art.

(ii) In the case of a product claim, the contribution to the art is the ability of the skilled person to make the product itself, rather than (if different) the invention.

(iii) Patentees are free to choose how widely to frame the range of products for which they claim protection. But they need to ensure that they make no broader claim than is enabled by their disclosure.

(iv) The disclosure required of the patentee is such as will, coupled with the common general knowledge existing as at the priority date, be sufficient to enable the skilled person to make substantially all the types or embodiments of products within the scope of the claim. That is what, in the context of a product claim, enablement means.

(v) A claim which seeks to protect products which cannot be made by the skilled person using the disclosure in the patent will, subject to de minimis or wholly irrelevant exceptions, be bound to exceed the contribution to the art made by the patent, measured as it must be at the priority date.

(vi) This does not mean that the patentee has to demonstrate in the disclosure that every embodiment within the scope of the claim has been tried, tested and proved to have been enabled to be made. Patentees may rely, if they can, upon a principle of general application if it would appear reasonably likely to enable the whole range of products within the scope of the claim to be made. But they take the risk, if challenged, that the supposed general principle will be proved at trial not in fact to enable a significant, relevant, part of the claimed range to be made, as at the priority date.

(vii) Nor will a claim which in substance passes the sufficiency test be defeated by dividing the product claim into a range denominated by some wholly irrelevant factor, such as the length of a mouse’s tail. The requirement to show enablement across the whole scope of the claim applies only across a relevant range. Put broadly, the range will be relevant if it is denominated by reference to a variable which significantly affects the value or utility of the product in achieving the purpose for which it is to be made.

(viii) Enablement across the scope of a product claim is not established merely by showing that all products within the relevant range will, if and when they can be made, deliver the same general benefit intended to be generated by the invention, regardless how valuable and ground-breaking that invention may prove to be.

Regeneron Pharmaceuticals Inc v Kymab Ltd [2020] UKSC 27 at [56] (Lord Briggs) cited with approval by Perram J in Jusand Nominees Pty Ltd v Rattlejack Innovations Pty Ltd [2023] FCAFC 178 at [186] but at [188] – [195] subject to the clarification by Illumina

Eight propositions to test support and sufficiency from Regeneron Read More »

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