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How much did Bugatchi get Bugatti-ed?

Leave a Comment / Trade marks / By war / 9 April 2014 / account, Australia, bugatti, costs, election, indemnity costs, profits, remedies, Trade marks

Last October, Tracey J found that Shine Forever had infringed Bugatti’s registered trade mark (for BUGATTI) by selling clothing and accessories under the trade mark BUGATCHI and BUGATCHI UOMO. Now Tracey J has ordered that Shine Forever pay Bugatti $551,159.39 plus costs on an indemnity basis.

Apart from the magnitude of the amount, the decision illustrates the onus the court places on an infringer, once found to infringe, and the latitude afforded a trade mark owner confronted by a recalcitrant infringer.

In addition to an injunction to stop the infringing conduct, like most intellectual property statutes, the relief one can get for infringement of a registered trade mark includes damages or, at the trade mark owner’s option, an account of profits.[1]

To assist Bugatti in choosing between these two options, Shine Forever was ordered to provide an affidavit deposing to how many goods it had sold bearing the infringing trade mark, the price(s) they were sold for, the costs incurred in acquiring and selling the goods and the estimated profit it made.

Shine Forever was dilatory in complying with this order and there were serious doubts about the genuineness of its compliance. For example, it was claimed in Shine Forever’s “election” affidavit that the total sales were $198,407.39 worth of goods “through the BUGATCHI UOMO branded store” while total outgoings were $157,680 so that, after adjustments, there had in effect been no profit. However, in the course of the liability proceedings, Shine Forever had filed a profit and loss statement for the first 8 months of the infringing period showing total sales of $370,440.10. This profit and loss statement had been audited and certified by Shine Forever’s external accountants.

Shine Forever did not seek to explain the disparity between these two sets of figures. In fact, it failed to turn up to the hearing for the account at all.

Bugatti pointed out that the audited figures for only 8 months of the 24 month period of infringement far exceeded the amount admitted for the whole period in the “election” affidavit. The audited figures showed sales of $46,000 per month. If it were assumed that Shine Forever continued to make sales of $46,000 per month for the whole infringing period, total sales would have been $1,129,440.10. Bugatti then applied a series of assumptions and discounts, including using the costs estimated in the “election” affidavit (not the certified profit and loss statement) to arrive at the figure $551,159.39.

Tracey J recognised that Bugatti’s approach was far from ideal, but was prepared to adopt it as the best available course given the limited and imperfect information available – information which only Shine Forever could supply and which it had manifestly failed to do:

20 This process of calculation is far from ideal. It is beset by many difficulties. These include the need to make assumptions because business records which should have been produced by Shine Forever, pursuant to Court order, were not provided. Of particular concern is that …. This concern is alleviated, to some extent, by the applicant’s willingness to make a number of allowances in Shine Forever’s favour in other aspects of the calculations. ….

21 The evidence before the Court does not enable me to determine, with precision, the actual profit which Shine Forever derived from its infringement of the applicant’s marks. It is to be borne in mind that the difficulties to which I have adverted have, in large measure, been created by the failure of Shine Forever to comply with the Court’s orders and its failure to appear and make submissions on the amount to be awarded as an account of profits. The applicant should not be prejudiced by these failures.

22 The applicant has proposed a plausible method of calculating sales revenue during the relevant period by assuming that the average monthly sales figure in the first eight months of the period continued for the next 16 and a half months. In the absence of audited figures for the latter period this approach is not unreasonable and may be regarded as the best available option. Once the sales revenue figure was established, Shine Forever bore the burden of persuading the Court, by evidence, what costs should properly be deducted in order to determine the profit which it made from selling clothing and accessories bearing the infringing marks. This, Shine Forever has manifestly failed to do. ….

His Honour then awarded Bugatti its costs on an indemnity basis because of Shine Forever’s dismal failure to comply with its obligations to the Court.

Bugatti GmbH v Shine Forever Men Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] FCA 171

The two are alternatives: damages compensate the trade mark owner for the loss it has suffered as a result of the infringement; an account of profits strips the infringer of the profits it has made by reason of the infringement. ?

Accounting for profits: 2 reminders

Leave a Comment / Trade marks / By war / 2 September 2013 / account, boxing, innocent infringer, profits, remedies, self-represented, split trial, Trade marks

Even though (or perhaps because) the trade mark infringer was self-represented at trial, this short case includes two important cautions that it is as well to keep in mind.

Mr King ran some boxing events with some training and the like under the name “White Collar Boxing”. The problem was that Delta Metallics already owned the trade mark for “White Collar Boxing” in respect of those services. Delta Metallics sued and eventually obtained judgment on the liability questions by default. Mr King then provided an affidavit declaring that he made some $12,253 in profits. Delta Metallics elected to pursue an account of profits and the trial judge ultimately awarded it that sum.

Without going into all the procedural aspects of the appeal: the cautionary points:

(1) If you want to argue that you shouldn’t have to account for the profits because you are an innoncent infringer, you need to get that innocence established at the liability stage of the proceeding. (Unless you make special provision for it somehow), you won’t get the chance when quantum is being determined.

(2) If you are an infringer (and don’t make out the innocence defence), you are required to account only for those profits made by reason of the infringing conduct.[1] As a result, you may not be liable to account for all the profits you made if you can satisfy the Court that some of the profits did not derive from the use of the trade mark. Mr King couldn’t rely on this on the appeal because he had not tried to argue it at the trial (see [50]-[54]).

King v Delta Metallics Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 93 (North, Cowdroy and McKerracher JJ)

Lid dip: Siobhan Ryan

Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd (1968) 122 CLR 25 ?

Infringing a registered design

Leave a Comment / Designs / By war / 8 December 2009 / 1906 Act, account, Australia, Chiropedic, Design, fraudulent imitation, infringement, monopoly, novelty, obvious imitation, Radburg, trade variant, validity

Back in October, Jessup J found Chiropedic’s design for a mattress and base (registered under the 1906 Act) valid and infringed, by only 2 of a number of Radburg’s competing mattresses.

The first point of interest is the impact of a statement of novelty. A second point of interest is the impact of trade variants or “features commonly used in the trade”. Thirdly, his Honour ruled on the costs to be taken into account in the course of an account of profits.

This was the representation in the design (ADR 127723)

There was the usual statement of monopoly, limiting the design to the features of shape or configuration.

Unusually, there was also a statement of novelty:

Novelty is claimed in the shape and configuration of the upper layer of the mattress portion of the mattress and base as indicated by the beading as shown in the representations.

Chiropedic (the design owner) contended that novelty or originality of its design was not limited by this statement and, even if it were, validity and infringement still fell to be assessed by consideration of the design as a whole citing, in support, the judgment of Davies and Whitlam JJ in Richsell v Khoury at [7].

Jessup J reviewed the cases referred to in Richsell, but discovered that they did not actually deal with it. His Honour found considerably greater assistance in the Franki Report which had led to the introduction of the concept:

On the other hand we were of the opinion that the Registrar should be given power to require a ‘statement of novelty’ to be lodged. By ‘statement of novelty’ we mean a statement dealing with the features of a design that may be said to provide the basis for the design being new or original. For example, if in a design for a chair the significant feature is in the shape of the two front legs and attention is drawn to this fact in a statement of novelty, while there would be no infringement of the design unless the infringing article satisfied the tests for infringement of the chair as a whole, nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that, in testing the novelty and originality of the design, attention would be directed to the two front legs and that this feature of the design would be given particular weight in testing infringement, although an infringement could not be proved unless the relevant tests were satisfied in respect of the whole chair. (my emphasis)

and Slade LJ’s consideration in Sommer Allibert of the similar concept in the UK legislation (the latter of which had not been referred to in Richsell or Polyaire). Accordingly, Jessup J held:

[22] …. The argument which Davies and Whitlam JJ rejected in that case was that, in making the comparison required by s 17(1), one should look only at the features for which novelty had been claimed. It is one thing to say that the registered owner should not be permitted to use his or her own statement of novelty for the purpose of shutting the court’s eyes to the appearance of a complete design, and to do so to his or her own advantage. It is another thing altogether to say that the registered owner should not be held to such a statement of novelty when the court comes to consider what aspects of the registered design are new or original. The court’s eyes would then be open to the complete design, of course, but it should, in my view, assess that design against the prior art with a particular emphasis upon those features that the registered owner himself or herself, at the point of registration, considered to be novel.

Paying particular attention to the features identified in the Statement of Novelty, his Honour went on to find the design valid over the prior art. For example, it had a relatively square look where the horizontal surface met the upper line of beading, while the prior art was relatively curved. Similarly, the proportion of the upper layer to the lower lower of the mattress was significant over the prior art.

These findings had particular significance when it came to considering infringement. One of Radburg’s designs was found to be identical to the registered design. A second was an obvious imitation. A number of others, however, escaped liability as they either had similar convex curvature to the prior art rather than the square look of the registered design or the upper layer of the mattress was a significantly smaller proportion of the mattress; many of them also had quite different ribbing.

One striking visual difference was discounted in the comparisons: the mattresses in some of the prior art had three layers, not two; so that the mattress could be flipped over and used. The evidence established, however, that the omission or inclusion of the bottom or third layer was a variant commonly resorted to in the trade. Another feature, an “inward set” was apparently visible to those in the trade on fastidious inspection, but his Honour found it did not strike the eye and was an immaterial variation.

Finally, on the principles to be applied in the account, Jessup J ruled that the respondent’s bills of materials should be used (where available) on the principle that they reflected as closely as possible the actual costs incurred and so, where the evidence showed that margins earned on different product lines were not uniform, the respondent would not generate a windfall profit.

Chiropedic Bedding Pty Ltd v Radburg Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1163

So far as I can see, no application for leave to appeal has been filed.

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