extension of time

IP Australia consults on red tape streamlining and costing

IP Australia has issued to discussion papers:

  • Proposals to streamline IP processes and support small business; and
  • Proposals to streamline IP processes and support small business – Regulatory costs,

apparently following Parliamentary Secretary Karen Andrews’ announcement.

According to IP Australia’s website, the “streamlining” paper:

The … Consultation Paper outlines 22 proposals to align and simplify our IP processes, support small business and make some technical fixes relating to the regulation of IP attorneys.

The first 10 proposals apply across the board (as it were) to patents, trade marks, designs and PBR and relate to matters such as aligning renewals re-examination/revocation, extensions of time, writing and filing requirements.

There are 3 further proposals affecting patents: third party requests for examination, colour drawings and extensions of term – notices to the department of health.

The 14th proposal relates to the acceptance timeframe for trade mark applications.

15 and 16 affect the registration of designs and multiple copies of representations.

There are 6 proposals “supporting small business” including unjustified threats of infringement and trade marks and shelf companies.

And 2 “technical fixes” relating to publishing the personal information of “IP attorneys” and prosecuting “IP attorney” offences.

There are some 84 pages in the paper. So this post is not going to do the paper anything approximating “justice”.

One proposal is to reduce the acceptance period for trade marks from 15 months to 6 months. There are also substantial changes proposed for the regimes relating to extensions of time:

 – Align PBR extensions with those for patents and for a wider range of actions

 – Specify the grounds for the ‘special circumstances’ extension in the trade marks legislation and align circumstances beyond control across the rights

 – Allow extensions of time for renewal grace periods but not renewal dates, for all IP rights

– Make the ‘despite due care’ extension available for all IP rights and have no limit on the period of the extension

– For all rights, limit the ‘error or omission by applicant/owner’ extension to 12 months

 – Streamlined process for short extensions of time

– Simplify and align fees

– Make all extensions of time non-discretionary.

Certificates: you know, things like Certificates of Registration:

The IP legislation would be amended so that certificates would not be required to be issued for examination, registration and grant. Also, the patents and trade marks Acts would be amended to no longer provide that a certificate signed by the Commissioner or Registrar is prima facie evidence of a matter. Instead, the Acts would provide that any document approved by the Commissioner or Registrar (or similar wording) would constitute prima facie evidence of a matter. This would enable IP Australia to continue to provide documents for such purposes, without requiring them to be signed certificates. Signed copies or extracts of the Registers would continue to be admissible in proceedings as if they were the original Register, and therefore prima facie evidence of the particulars on them.

Unjustified threats: this would see removal of the defence under s 129(5) of the Trade Marks Act of bringing infringement proceedings reasonably timely (which is not currently a defence for patent or designs threats), providing the remedy for PBR and introducing a power to award additional damages in respect of blatant and unjustified threats against another party.

Trade marks and shelf companies: this proposal would see amendment of s 27 so that it would not be necessary to incorporate the company that is intended to use the trade mark, but purchase of a shelf company would suffice.

The renewals proposal would see a grace period of 6 months introduced for renewing PBR and provision that all IPR could be infringed during the grace period if subsequently renewed.

In coming up with those proposals, IP Australia has used a costing framework and developed detailed costings which are set out in the “costings” paper. We are being invited to comment on those too.

If you are feeling excited, you should get your submissions in to IP Australia by 7 April 2015.

Proposals to streamline IP processes and support small business (pdf)

Proposals to streamline IP processes and support small business – Regulatory costs (pdf)

IP Australia consults on red tape streamlining and costing Read More »

Alphapharm may have a big bill coming

The High Court has dismissed Alphapharm’s appeal from the Full Federal Court’s ruling granting Lundbeck an extension of time to apply to extend the term of the escitalopram patent. It was close though: 3 to 2.

You will recall that Lundbeck applied 10 years late to extend the term of its pharmaceutical patent. So, not only was Lundbeck applying to extend the term of its patent (under s70), it was applying for an extension of time in which to make that application. In granting special leave, the High Court accepted that, if the power were available, the circumstances justified the 10 year extension. The question was a matter of statutory interpretation: was there power to extend.

Section 71(2) specifies when an application to extend the term of a pharmaceutical patent must be made:

(2) An application for an extension of the term of a standard patent must be made during the term of the patent and within 6 months after the latest of the following dates:

(a) the date the patent was granted;

(b) the date of commencement of the first inclusion in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods of goods that contain, or consist of, any of the pharmaceutical substances referred to in subsection 70(3);

(c) the date of commencement of this section.

Lundbeck’s application was made within the term of the standard patent (with 1 day to spare), but well outside the dates specified in paragraphs (a) – (c).

Section 223 confers a general power to extend the time for making an application. Under s 223(11), however, the power cannot be used to extend time in relation to “prescribed actions”.[1] One of those prescribed actions related to s 71(2):

(b) filing, during the term of a standard patent under subsection 71(2) of the Act, an application under subsection 70(1) of the Act for an extension of the term of the patent; ….

Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ, after noting the long history in patents legislation of the power to apply for an extension of time, even after the time had expired, as an important safety valve in the system, ruled that s 71(2) specified 2 requirements. The first time requirement is that the application must be filed within the term of the standard patent. The second time requirement was that the application must also satisfy at least one of the requirements set out in paragraphs (a) – (c).

Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ held, however, that reg. 22.11 applied only to the first requirement: that the application was made within the term of the standard patent. Their Honours considered this was important otherwise a “gap” could arise between when a patent expired but was then restored. That would be highly undesirable.[2] In contrast, there was no policy reason why reg. 22.11 should apply to the second time requirement. At [71]:

There is nothing in any of the extrinsic materials, or in the long policy debates on simplifying extensions of term, which would suggest any rationale for excluding the second time requirement from the remedial power to extend time under s 223(2)(a). Alphapharm’s senior counsel conceded, correctly, that if Alphapharm’s construction of reg 22.11(4)(b) were correct, the remedial power in s 223(2)(a) could never apply to extend time in relation to the second time requirement, no matter what the quality or provenance of any “error or omission” made in respect of that time. Alphapharm’s construction would introduce an inexplicable asymmetry between a patentee and a competitor opposing a s 70(1) application. An opponent can access the general remedial power to extend times cast upon it in mandatory terms[102]. Had it been the legislature’s intention to exclude the second time requirement in s 71(2) from the general remedial power in s 223(2)(a), that would have been simple to accomplish.

Accordingly, s 223 could be invoked as Lundbeck had satisfied the first time requirement (and so did not need it to be extended) but needed an extension in relation to the second time requirement – which reg.22.11 did not apply to.

In dissent, Kiefel and Keane JJ rather tersely said at [111]:

s 71(2) cannot reasonably be read as referring to two actions. There is but one action referred to in s 71(2) – making an application for extension of the term of a patent. That one action is to be done on a date that satisfies the two requirements as to time set out in s 71(2). It is that action to which s 223(2) would apply, were it not for reg 22.11(4)(b).

Their Honours did explain why they considered policy and historical considerations did not lead to a different conclusion. Of potentially more general interest, however, their Honours took a different stand on the role of statutory interpretation at [121]:

In any event, as was said in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Consolidated Media Holdings Ltd, legislative history and extrinsic materials cannot displace the meaning of statutory text; nor is their examination an end in itself. (footnote omitted)

While acknowledging the primary role of the text, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ invoked the more nuanced role of context espoused in CIC Insurance and Project Blue Sky.

A big bill coming? After the standard term of the patent expired but before the expiry of the extended term, Alphapharm and other generics commenced marketing their own versions of the drug.

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCA 42


  1. The “prescribed actions” are found in reg. 22.11.  ?
  2. See Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ at [68].  ?

Alphapharm may have a big bill coming Read More »

A patents case goes to the High Court

The High Court has granted special leave to Alphapharm to appeal from the Full Federal Court’s decision to allow Lundbeck to apply to extend the term of its Lexapro patent 10 years late. The High Court was not interested at all in the exercise of the discretion to allow a 10 year extension. the question is whether a power to extend time exists at all.

The extension of term provisions for pharmaceutical patents are found in s 70 and s 71(2). Section 71(2) provides that:

An application for an extension of the term of a standard patent must be made during the term of the patent and within 6 months after the latest of the following dates:

(a) the date the patent was granted;

( b) the date of commencement of the first inclusion in the Australian Register of Therapeutic Goods of goods that contain, or consist of, any of the pharmaceutical substances referred to in subsection 70(3);

(c) the date of commencement of this section.

It was common ground that Lundbeck’s application was outside the latest of the possible dates.

However, the Patents Act also provides a power to grant extensions of time in s 223.

Lundbeck’s problem – if it turns out to be a problem – is that s 223(11) says that s 223 cannot be used to extend the time for doing “prescribed actions” and reg. 22.11 specifies as one of the prescribed actions:

filing, during the term of a standard patent under subsection 71(2) of the Act, an application under subsection 70(1) of the Act for an extension of the term of the patent;

In the Federal Court,[1] Yates J at [50] found that Lundbeck’s “application” for an extension of time fell outside this because it really involved 2 requirements:

The making of an application under s 70(1) of the Act is governed by two time limits: the application must be made “during the term of the patent” and within six months of the applicable date in s 71(2)(a) to (c). Both time limits must be observed in order to make an application.

While the requirement that the application be made “during the term of the patent” was caught and so excluded by s 223(11), the second requirement – within 6 months of the applicable date – was not.

The High Court (Kiefel J and Keane J) have granted Alphapharm special leave to argue that, as a matter of construction, there was really only one application.

Lundbeck boldly tried to argue that special leave should not be granted because the issue raised no question of general importance: there not that many applications for an extension of time to apply for an extension of the term of a pharmaceutical patent. Kiefel J retorted sharply:

KIEFEL J: But the extension of a patent is itself an important matter, is it not?

MR NIALL: It is.

KIEFEL J: Very important.

It does raise an interesting question. The extended term expired back in December 2012. Alphapharm and others, however, had entered the market when the original term of the patent expired on 13 June 2009 and before Lundbeck’s application for an extension of time in which to file its application to extend the term had been finalised. Therefore, it would appear that the potential exposure of the generics companies to damages awards (or an account of profits) is up for grabs; i.e., another 3 years.

Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2014] HCATrans 79

Lid dip: Opinions on High

Some other commentaries: here, here and here.


  1. Aspen Pharma Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2013] FCAFC 129 (Jessup and Jagot JJ agreeing).  ?

A patents case goes to the High Court Read More »

Oh won’t you stay …

The patent war over escitalopram in Australia is still going!

One aspect of the Alphapharm / Lundbeck case I had forgotten (if I appreciated it at the time) was that Lindgren J quashed the extension of the patent’s term under s 70ff.

In June 2009, after the Full Court upheld Lindgren J’s decision, Lundbeck made a new application for an extension of term and also applied under s 223 for an extension of time to make that application – an extension of some 10 years or so.

In June 2011, the Commissioner granted Lundbeck’s application for an extension of time over oppositions by Alphapharm, Aspen and others. The AAT dismissed an appeal Aspen et al. and Aspen et al. have appealed from the AAT’s decision to the Full Court. That appeal is still pending.

Pending the outcome of the appeal, Yates J has now refused Aspen et al. a stay on the Commissioner’s decision to extend the term of the patent.[1]

Accepting that it was not ordinarily desirable that there be parallel proceedings before both the Commissioner and the Court, Yates J considered it was not appropriate to exercise his discretion to stay the proceedings before the Commissioner in this case.

While a number of considerations were advanced by both sides, the central consideration was that Lundbeck could well lose the ability to sue for some infringements if it was successful in extending the term of its patent. The issue here is that under s 120(4) proceedings for infringement must be brought within 6 years of the infringing conduct. Aspen et al. were not able to point to any real prejudice outweighing that.[2]

It may be of interest to note that the point in common between the 2 sets of proceedings is Aspen _et al._’s contention that the Commissioner has no power to grant the extension of term now under s 70(4) as she has already exercised the power (albeit invalidly) in granting the extension quashed by Lindgren J.[3]

Aspen Pharma Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2013] FCA 324

ps [4]


  1. The Commissioner must now decide whether an extension of term is in order and, if so, the extension of term will be advertised and Aspen _et al. have foreshadowed they intend opposing.  ?
  2. While the costs and disruption of unnecessary opposition proceedings were invoked, Yates J considered at [53] that such costs should not be substantial and, at [55], that they could “exert a real measure of restraint over the costs they will incur in the anticipated oppositions.”  ?
  3. See [40] – [43] of Yates J’s reasons.  ?
  4. I thought apologies were due to Jackson Browne, the soaring soprano and David Linley, but it seems Maurice Williams should also be in the picture.  ?

Oh won’t you stay … Read More »

Restored patents and licences to exploit

Mr Law has a patent, Australian Patent No. 784051 titled “Conveyor Belt Cleaner”. For some reason, the renewal fees were not paid and the patent became a “ceased patent” (presumably). Almost 2 years later, he applied for an extension of time (I’m guessing here and here) and paid the renewal fees and his patent became a “restored patent“. So, Mr Law’s patent wasn’t on the register between 27 September 2007 and 26 October 2009.

From 1 September 2008, Razer started selling products which it appears fell within the claims of Mr Law’s (at that time ceased) patent. It would appear it did so at the behest and encouragement of someone glorying in the name of TuffStuff. After Mr Law’s patent was restored, Razer kept on selling.

Mr Law sues for infringement. (Mr Law doesn’t sue for infringements committed during the period while his patent was a ceased patent – see s 223(10).) Razer then applied to the Commissioner for a licence to exploit the patent (and an extension of time to make the application).

Mr Law applied for an interlocutory injunction to stop Razer continuing to sell. Razer applied for a stay of the proceeding pending the outcome of its application for a licence. Bennett J refused the stay and granted the injunctions –

[31] Mr Law has a presently enforceable right by reason of the valid and existing Patent to exploit the invention and to prevent others from doing so without a licence. A stay until the licence application is determined necessarily interferes with Mr Law’s rights under the Patent. On the facts as agreed between the parties and as led in respect of the two notices of motion, Razer is not a person to whom s 223(9) of the Act and reg 22.21 of the Regulations applies. That being the case, Razer’s likelihood of success in obtaining a licence from the Commissioner is such that it is not appropriate, in my view, to stay the proceedings, let alone for the substantial length of time that would be necessary for the Commissioner to determine the licence application under the Act.

The interesting thing is why Razer was not likely to get a licence: Razer did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement under s 223(9).

Under s 223(9) the licence is (potentially) available to someone who exploits the patent (or took definite steps … to exploit the patent) as a result of the patentee’s failure to pay the renewal fees (do a relevant act) or the ceasing of the patent.

The problem for Razer was that it had a patent search conducted before it embarked on its enterprise. Unfortunately, the search criteria did not reveal the patent (even in its “ceased” state). This seems to have been largely because the search criteria included searching for patents owned (or in respect of which an interest was registered0 by Mr Law’s company, ESS. ESS, however, was only a licensee and the interest as a licensee had not been registered. (Little digression for the technically minded amongst us down this garden path).

Her Honour noted:

[21] A search using the appropriate parameters would have revealed both active and ceased patents. It is apparent that, because the search terms did not include “Law” or the title of the Patent and ESS was not a registered licensee, the search failed to reveal the Patent.

[22] It is not in dispute that Razer was unaware of the existence of the Patent or its ceased status when it entered into the agreement and subsequently took the steps to manufacture and sell the infringing products. Razer relied on the result of the searches of the Register, the statements made by officers of TuffStuff to the effect that ‘there are no patent issues associated with the product’ and warranties in the agreement. It is also not in dispute that TuffStuff was not aware of the existence of the Patent at the time of entering into the agreement. (her Honour’s emphasis)

In other words, with TuffStuff’s assurances and the results of the patent search Razer thought there were no patents because there had never been (at least Mr Law’s) patent. It didn’t embark on this enterprise because it thought Mr Law had abandoned (let lapse) his patent.

Also, Razer did not monitor the Official Journal, so it did not discover the advertising of Mr Law’s application for an extension of time to restore his patent and (consequently) it did not oppose his application for an extension.

Then, the hammer was dropped: Razer was not protected from infringement by being unaware that the Patent had ceased.

[27] Section 223(9) of the Act is not designed to protect a person who by happenstance takes steps to exploit a patent during a period in which it is ceased. It cannot be that a person who manufactures and sells products within the scope of the claims of a patent can be protected simply because that person is lucky enough to have commenced those steps while that patent was not in force through an error or omission of the patentee. There must be a link between the fact that the particular patent has ceased and reliance upon that fact by the person seeking to obtain the protection. Regulation 22.21 of the Regulations does not specifically refer to that necessary link but the regulation can rise no higher than the subsection to which it refers and for which it is prescribed.

At this point, I am rather glad I am not a patent searcher.

Law v Razer Industries Pty Limited [2010] FCA 1058

Restored patents and licences to exploit Read More »

Bushfires and IP Australia

Bushfires and IP Australia Read More »