The Institute for Information Law at the University of Amsterdam is holding two copyright related courses between 2 and 6 July:
Follow the links for more information.
Last month, Dallas Buyers Club LLC was reported to have started that process. It has commenced proceedings against various telcos and ISPs seeking preliminary discovery from them of the identities of their customers who were using IP (as in Internet Protocol) addresses at times Dallas Buyers Club LLC says illegal copies of the film were being downloaded from those addresses.
Last Monday, Perram J rejected an application by some journalists and others for access under FCR r 2.29 to most of the documents on the court file. His Honour noted the usual rule that affidavits are not “public” until they have been used in court and the potential privacy sensitivities or releasing, amongst other things, subscriber identification information at this very early stage of the proceeding.
Apparently, Dallas Buyers Club LLC’s application for preliminary discovery will be heard all the way off on 17 – 18 February 2015.
For cases where the record companies successfully obtained preliminary discovery from the Universities of some student details alleged to be engaging in infringing activities, see Sony v University of Tasmania here, here, here and here.
On a slightly different tack, it was reported on 19 November that some Universities have been suspending staff and student access to the internet, and in at least the case of UNSW, issuing fines where “internet piracy” has been discovered.
Dallas Buyers Club, LLC v iiNet Limited (No 1)  FCA 1232
According to Google, government requests (or should that be demands) for access to information about Google users (i.e., you) are up 120% around the world.
Now, it has produced a 3+ minute animated video, The Way of the Warrant, to explain how it deals with such, er, “requests” (in the USA).
Lid dip: Ride The Lightning.
Following on from last week’s Giller v Procopets, I was asked if Max Mosley’s payment of the prostitutes precluded a claim for breach of confidence, leaving him just with his Conventional rights to privacy.
It is certainly true that the trial judge focused primarily on the invasion of Mr Mosley’s rights to privacy. However, his Lordship did also find that “Woman E” breached her obligation of confidence to Mr Mosley:
104 In the light of these two strands of authority, it becomes fairly obvious that the clandestine recording of sexual activity on private property must be taken to engage Article 8. What requires closer examination is the extent to which such intrusive behaviour could be justified by reference to a countervailing public interest; that is to say, at the stage of carrying out the ultimate balancing test. I will focus on those arguments shortly.
105 Before I do so, however, I need to address the separate question of whether Woman E owed a duty of confidence to the Claimant and the other participants in respect of the events at the flat on 28 March. In the ordinary way, those who participate in sexual or personal relationships may be expected not to reveal private conversations or activities. Evidence was given by the Claimant and the other women both generally about the recognised code of discretion on “the scene” and also, specifically, about their relationships with one another. Woman A was a close friend of Woman E and had introduced her to the Claimant. Her outrage is displayed in a text she sent on 11 April:
” … our scene is based on complete trust and complete discretion. However one of my so called close friends dominatrix [Woman E] has betrayed that confidence by doing what she has done. I am devastated by this act of pure total selfish greed, she has no morals, no integrity, no loyalty, complete disregard to others, cruel, and she is a liar!!! No one … deserves this invasion of privacy.”
106 It was often said that “there is no confidence in iniquity”, but it is highly questionable whether in modern society that is a concept that can be applied to sexual activity, fetishist or otherwise, conducted between consenting adults in private. All the other women, as well as the Claimant, felt utterly betrayed by Woman E’s behaviour in filming them without consent and selling the information to the News of the World. I was told that she was soon ostracised from “the scene”, where the need for discretion is widely accepted.
107 It is true that the Claimant on this occasion paid the women participants, although he has not always done so in the past, but this does not mean that it was a purely commercial transaction. Even if it was, that would naturally not preclude an obligation of confidence, but it is quite clear from the evidence that there was a large element of friendship involved, not only as between the women but also between them and the Claimant. For example, had it not been for the intervention of the News of the World there was a plan to offer him a (free) session for his birthday (which falls in April).
108 In any event, irrespective of payment, I would be prepared to hold that Woman E had committed an “old fashioned breach of confidence” as well as a violation of the Article 8 rights of all those involved. This may have been at the instigation of her husband, who saw the opportunity of making £25,000 out of the News of the World and who made the first approach. (emphasis supplied)
One might add that the equitable obligation of confidence long since escaped the confines of private relationships involved in (Prince) Albert v Strange and Argyll v Argyll to afford protection in many commercial situations such as employer-employee relationships where money changed hands.
So, while the obligation of confidence was recognised, it would seem the English court took the converse approach to the Victorian Court of Appeal – concentrating on the modern right to privacy. So e.g. Eady J noted at :
The cause of action now commonly described as infringement or breach of privacy, involving the balancing of competing Convention rights, usually those embodied in Articles 8 and 10, has recently evolved from the equitable doctrines that traditionally governed the protection of confidential information. Now (and especially since the formulation by Lord Nicholls in Campbell v MGN Ltd  2 AC 457) it is common to speak of the protection of personal information in this context, without importing the customary indicia of a duty of confidence.
Max Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd  EWQB 1777
The “IP issue” arose amid a number of claims arising from the breakdown of a defacto relationship.
Ms Giller came from Russia in 1990 and shortly after commenced living with Mr Procopets. Together, they had twins, but the relationship was very rocky to say the least. Neave JA explained the circumstances giving rise to this part of Ms Giller’s claim:
358 … Ms Giller obtained an interim intervention order against Mr Procopets on 12 November 1996. As is often the case where a relationship involves violence, Ms Giller continued to see Mr Procopets after the interim intervention order was granted. Ms Giller’s claim for damages for breach of confidence, breach of privacy and intentionally causing mental harm arose out of the events which followed the granting of this intervention order. The relevant factual findings made by his Honour are summarised below.
359 The couple had intercourse on 19 November 1996 and on a number of other occasions between then and 1 December 1996. Mr Procopets filmed their sexual activities on a hidden video camera. Until 25 November, Ms Giller was unaware of the filming. Thereafter she became aware of the filming and acquiesced in it.
360 Shortly after 1 December 1996, relations between Ms Giller and Mr Procopets deteriorated, to the point where Mr Procopets began threatening to show videos of their sexual activities to Ms Giller’s friends and family.
Mr Procopets also rang Ms Giller’s employer and said that he had a video showing her abusing her position to obtain sexual favours. Mr Procopets also showed the videotape to his subsequent girlfriend for the purposes of degrading Ms Giller.
The trial judge found that:
I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established that the relationship was a confidential one, that she did not authorise him to distribute the video or show it, that his unauthorised distribution was a breach of that confidence and she would be entitled to relief for that breach of confidence.
I also find in respect of the threats to show, the distribution and the showing of the tape in December 1996, that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff mental harm and that in distributing the video the plaintiff was distressed, annoyed and embarrassed.
His Honour explained why the videotapes were subject to an equitable obligation of confidence:
In my view persons indulging in a sexual activity in the privacy of their own home create a confidential relationship during such activity. In my view it is difficult to think of anything more intimate than consensual sexual activities between two parties in the privacy of their home. It involves a relationship of mutual trust and confidence which is to be shared between the persons but is not to be divulged to others without the consent of both parties.
(Salacious) shades of (Prince) Albert v Strange.
His Honour however refused damages in the equitable jurisdiction because Ms Giller did not seek an injunction and, further, equitable damages (my terminology used impermissibly loosely for the monetary remedy available under Lord Cairn’s Act) were not available for mental harm falling short of psychological or psychiatric injury.
The Victorian Court of Appeal unanimously held that damages (or perhaps equitable compensation for the purists amongst you), including aggravated damages, were available. If damages had been available, the trial judge would have awarded $5,000 + $3,000 by way of aggravated compensatory damages. Neave JA, with whom Maxwell P agreed, awarded $50,000 included $10,000 by way of aggravated damages. Ashley JA would have awarded $27,500 (including $7,500 by way of aggravated damages).
One might think that the availability of such damages for defamation and copyright infringement (e.g. Milpurrurru v Indofurn) admittedly, respectively, legal and statutory wrongs should mean the Court’s conclusion should not ultimately be controversial.
Nonetheless, while it is clearly very, very carefully considered – running to over 500 paragraphs (dealing with several other claims as well) – Mr Procopets represented himself.
In addition, as the Court acknowledged, no Australian court has gone this far before.
The Court also took into account House of Lords and Court of Appeal decisions, recognising that the most directly relevant also involved the application of the European Convention on Human Rights and appear to have assumed the availability of the remedy in these circumstances. Also, the decision bears on territory in which the learned authors of Meagher, Gummow and Lehane have expressed vigorous views, although perhaps more about whether it is ‘damages’ under Lord Cairn’s Act or equitable compensation in the inherent jurisdiction that is being invoked.
Neave JA explained that, if it ever were the case that the Victorian enactment of Lord Cairn’s Act required an injunction to be sought, that had been conclusively changed by the wording adopted in s 38 of the Supreme Court Act 1986.
As to damages for mental distress and embarrasment, her Honour considered:
422 In Smith Kline & French v Secretary, Department of Community Services and Health, Gummow J said the conferring of equitable jurisdiction on a court:
… brings with it, in a case such as the present, the inherent jurisdiction to grant relief by way of monetary compensation for breach of an equitable obligation, whether of trust or confidence.
423 Equitable remedies such as injunctions are available to prevent publication of confidential material because of its private nature. It is unnecessary in such applications to show that, if unrestrained, the breach of confidence will cause financial loss or psychiatric injury. By parity of reasoning there should be no barrier to the making of an order for equitable compensation to compensate a claimant for the embarrassment or distress she has suffered as the result of a breach of an equitable duty of confidence which has already occurred. As Morland J said in Cornelius v De Taranto:
…[I]t would be a hollow protection of [the right to protection of confidential information] if in a particular case in breach of confidence without consent details of the confider’s private and family life were disclosed by the confidant to others and the only remedy that the law of England allowed was nominal damages. In this case an injunction or order for delivery up of all copies of the medico-legal report against the defendant will be of little use to the claimant. The damage has been done. … In cases of commercial or business breach of confidence the powers of the court are not barren. Such remedies as injunction, delivery-up, account of profits and damages may be available… similarly in the case of personal confidences exploited for profit or peddled to the media. … In the present case in my judgment recovery of damages for mental distress caused by breach of confidence, when no other substantial remedy is available, would not be inimical to considerations of policy but indeed to refuse such recovery would illustrate that something was wrong with the law.
424 I respectfully agree with that view. An inability to order equitable compensation to a claimant who has suffered distress would mean that a claimant whose confidence was breached before an injunction could be obtained would have no effective remedy.
and, if damages were to be assessed under Lord Cairn’s Act:
428 Damages under Lord Cairns’ Act are sui generis, and can be awarded in some circumstances where common law damages are not recoverable. In my view, such damages should be available where the essence of the plaintiff’s case is that he or she has been embarrassed by the exposure of private information, rather than that the defendant has profited from the wrongful use of that information. In Talbot v General Television Corporation Pty Ltd, Young CJ treated damages under Lord Cairns’ Act as compensating the plaintiff for what he or she had lost. It is consistent with that approach to compensate Ms Giller for the mental distress suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions.
Her Honour considered that awarding damages was also consistent with the injunctions by Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Gummow JJ in ABC v Lenah Meats on the need for breach of confidence to develop appropriately to protect privacy interests.
Ashley JA considered that it was unnecessary to consider Ms Giller’s claim to a generalised tort of invasion of privacy because breach of confidence was available and adequate to address the situation.
Giller v Procopets  VSCA 236.
Metro Public Transport (Melbourne, Sydney and Perth) a free and paid version for Melbourne
Pocket Weather AU (like the great widget, but you have to pay)
Another 5 another lawyer likes.
The three I mention can be (are) Australian specific information services. These work well because they relate to location specific things which the iPhone can retrieve. Most of the other apps I find useful really need to sync with my computer; first, because it’s easier to enter the data on the computer and, secondly, because you don’t want to be entering things twice or three times or ….
Unfortunately, the way the iPhone is designed to work means that most of these apps – sugarsync, Evernote etc. – work “in the cloud” (Our ABC here). They must be stored on the internet or pass through an internet host. That has potential security and privacy concerns (assuming the technology works).
That feeds into a different concern raised by Jonathan Zittrain in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop it. We are being present with a range of proprietary offerings that are acting a bit like gated communities in which you only get what the provider is willing to offer. Prof. Zittrain contrasts that to his view of the way the Web has worked till now: someone provided the underlying technology and hosts of people came along with hosts of customised solutions that you could choose to use.
Android? Well, it seems potentially to be much more open than the iPhone. Hopefully, it will force a lot more open-ness through competition but, of course, Google has its own “cloud”.