Australia

Ramifications of IceTV

Last February, Gordon J ruled that there was no copyright in White Pages subscriber listings and (perhaps more surprisingly) Yellow Pages listings. Now, Stone J has applied IceTV (here and here) to find that copyright did not subsist in medical records held by a range of general practitioners.

Primary Health Care (PHC) is a publicly listed company that has been buying up medical practices. As part of the purchase, the medical practitioner contracted to work at the new practice for a period. The vendor practice’s patient records consisting of (1) consultation notes, (2) prescriptions and (3) referral letters were transferred to the new PHC practice. PHC claimed deductions from its income tax for depreciation of the value of the copyright said to subsist in the patient records and the Commissioner disallowed the claim.

Stone J accepted that copyright subsisted in the sample patient referral letters written by the medical practitioners and one sample consultation note (the so called di Michiel patient 6), but rejected the claim to copyright in all the other sample patient records. Her Honour did note that her ruling was not a finding that copyright could never subsist in any patient records, only that it did not subsist in the particular samples addressed in the case.

The case could easily become a ready instructional tool for students and “new” intellectual property lawyers.

The consultation notes

Each practice maintained a file for each patient. The file usually consisted of a summary sheet which contained information such as the patient’s name, address, age, medicare number and, sometimes, important medical issues. This information was usually taken down by the receptionist or other clerical staff. In addition, there were cards, or sheets of paper, or in some cases electronic records containing a series of notes entered sequentially about each consultation with the patient.

All the notes recorded for di Michiel patient 6 were in fact made by Dr di Michiel himself. In the case of all the other samples tendered in evidence, however, the individual notes were made by different practitioners: sometimes the principal, sometimes an employee, sometimes a locum and sometimes another partner in the practice.

This led to PHC’s first problem.

Stone J held that the consultation notes where the entries were made at different times by different practitioners were not works of joint authorship. Her Honour did accept that that, at least in some cases, the consultation notes for each patient could be seen as a continuous narrative. They were not, however, the fruits of a collaborative effort in which the contributions of each author could not be distinguished. To the contrary, each individual contribution could be simply identified by looking at the different handwriting for each entry. (Hmm. I wonder what would happen if all the entries were made electronically and it was not possible to identify who made them?)

A first consequence of this conclusion was that large swathes of many of the consultation notes fell out of consideration as, following IceTV, (1) the person who had actually written them – the author – had not been identified and (2) nor was it established that those unidentified individual authors were “qualified persons” as defined in s 10(1).

The principals of the sample practices (well, some of them) were able to identify various individual entries in particular consultation notes that they had written. That, however, led to the second problem.

Some entries were simply listings of medical conditions. Three examples particularly relied on by PHC by 3 different doctors for 3 different patients were given in [127]:

(a) Triferne 28 Microgynon 20 C&N
(b) H/T, NIDDM, Asthma
(c) Hypertension, Uterine Fibroids, Pagets D, Lumbar Disc Deg

While these entries conveyed information, her Honour held that such clinical data and the names of particular medications did not originate with the doctor who recorded them.

Some were more developed – 3 further entries for 3 different patients:

7kg – growing well. On fresh milk and vitamins

Now c/o diarrhoea – possibly antibiotic induced …

Last 2/12 notices wheezy breathing if lies flat – associated with dry irritant cough – Says doesn’t feel SOB

These too “were not sufficiently substantial to qualify as works the product of independent intellectual effort directed at expression.” Stone J explained at [133]:

None of this denies the intellectual effort and professional skill needed to form the diagnoses, to select methods of treatment or to understand the significance of clinical data that is recorded, however, copyright protects a form of expression not this underlying expertise.

On the other hand, Dr di Michiel patient 6 record, which did constitute a continuous and single work as a whole, was an original work.

Sample prescriptions

The sample prescriptions [113]-[114] and summary notes were at [135] similarly too insubstantial to qualify “as original literary works embodying independent intellectual effort directed towards expression.”

A problem of assignment

A further problem for PHC was that only one of the sale  agreements included an express assignment of copyright. Stone J refused to infer an intention to assign the copyright, as distinct from the property in the physical record, from the sale of the medical practice as a going concern. It simply wasn’t necessary to infer such a term. The lack of such necessity was supported both by the fact that PHC did not claim copyright in third party documents forming part of the patients’ medical records, such as x-rays and letters from specialist consultants, and a consideration of how the records were in fact used after the sale.

No use of copyright

As to the second point, while PHC claimed that the copyright was used after the sale, most of the evidence was not consistent with this. In one case, her Honour accepted that the records had been transferred into a computerised database (and so the copyright was used) but, in the other cases, the most that could be said was that some information only had been used.

Primary Health Care Limited v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 419

Ramifications of IceTV Read More »

Served by Facebook 2 – updated with link

The press is reporting that a Federal Magistrate has allowed a child support application to be served on a “Mr Howard” by Facebook.

Following service, “Mr Howard” shut down his Facebook and MySpace accounts.

See the Age, Sydney Morning Herald.

The reports say the judgment was published last month; but I haven’t found a link to it yet.

Byrne & Howard [2010] FMCAfam 509

with thanks to David Starkoff (possibly better known as “Inchoate”).

Served by Facebook 2 – updated with link Read More »

DFAT ACTA consultations

DFAT (the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) will be holding “whole of government” consultations on the draft ACTA text on 11 June 2010 in Canberra, commencing at 10.00a.m.

If you’re a stakeholder wanting to be consulted, register by COB 9 June.

For the contact “co-ordinates”, here.

For the draft ACTA text and other interesting ACTA-tidbits, here.

DFAT ACTA consultations Read More »

How much to pay for a music download?

The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has ruled that no royalty is payable for downloads (should that be “streaming”?) of those 30 second previews of music. Apparently, it falls with the fair dealing provisions for “research”. The “1709” blog has the story.

Meanwhile, last year, the Australian Copyright Tribunal accepted that music download services such as iTunes, Bigpond Music, Sony and Universal should pay composers a royalty of:

  • the higher of 9% of retail price or 9 cents per track, for music downloads; and
  • the higher of 8% of retail price or 8 cents per track,

for single track downloads. There is a sliding scale for the track rates where an album, rather than a single track, is downloaded.

As the price on iTunes is typically $1.69 per “song”, I guess the % rate will usually apply for single track downloads.

(This is just what the composers get paid for the transmission and reproduction on the ‘buyer’s’ computer; not what the record companies or performers (will) get.

The composers’ collecting societies, APRA and AMCOS, had started out trying to get 12% but, in the end, the monopolies and the monopsonistic buyer(s) wound up reaching agreement. Even the ACCC, after some twisting and turning seems to have gone along with the deal, perhaps in recognition of the fact that the Copyright Act specifically gives the Copyright Tribunal power to fix these rates.

By way of comparison, the Copyright Tribunal reported that the corresponding rates were:

• United Kingdom – 8%.
• Canada – 11%.
• United States – 9.1 cents.
The rate in the United States is a fixed monetary rate. The vast majority of single track downloads in the United States at present are supplied at a price of 99 cents per download. Thus the monetary rate is equivalent to 9.1% of the sale price.

Australasian Performing Right Association Limited and Australasian Mechanical Copyright Owners Society Limited [2009] ACopyT 2

How much to pay for a music download? Read More »

Fee surcharge for more than 20 claims

Patent Baristas look at rule changes introduced by IP Australia to stop patent applicants  circumventing the $100 surcharge for each claim in a patent in excess of 20 claims.

Read on here with links to IP Australia’s announcement.

Apparently, IP Australia plans that the new arrangements come into force on 1 August 2010. Wonder whether the CoreEconomy guys will be publishing articles about distorting the market for excessive claiming? Still, is it just me, or do Australian applications seem to have more claims in them than the US counterparts?

Fee surcharge for more than 20 claims Read More »

High Court allows appeal in Barefoot case

E & J Gallo owns TM No 787765, BAREFOOT, for “wines” in class 33. It had acquired ownership of the trade mark by assignment in 2005 from a Mr Houlihan.

Lion Nathan introduced a new beer into Australia under the trade mark BAREFOOT RADLER (with a barefoot device):

The Full Federal Court found that Lion’s beer infringed Gallo’s trade mark as goods of the same description, but ordered the trade mark removed because it had not been used for the 3 year statutory period prescribed by s 92(4) – in this case between 7 May 2004 and 7 May 2007.

Neither Gallo nor Mr Houlihan had ever sold, or specifically authorised the sale of, any wine under the BAREFOOT trade mark in Australia. If that were all, it would have been an end to the matter. However, there was a complication. Wine made by Mr Houlihan’s company, Barefoot Cellars, in California had actually found its way into Australia and been offered for sale.

Barefoot Cellars had sold a shipment of 60 cases of its wine to a distributor in Germany in 2001. Some of the consignment to the German distributor was imported into Australia by a liquor wholesaler, Beach Avenue. In the 3 years relevant to the non-use claim, Beach Avenue imported 144 bottles of the wine; at least 41 of which were actually sold during the period (and a further 18 were given away).

Lion Nathan argued, and the Full Federal Court had accepted, that there had been no use of the trade mark as a trade mark because neither of the trade mark owners had intended to project their goods into the Australian market.

There was use in the course of trade

The High Court rejected this argument.

51  The capacity of a trade mark to distinguish a registered owner’s goods from those of others, as required by s 17, does not depend on whether the owner knowingly projects the goods into the Australian market. It depends on the goods being in the course of trade in Australia. Each occasion of trade in Australia, whilst goods sold under the trade mark remain in the course of trade, is a use for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act. A registered owner who has registered a trade mark under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act can be taken, in general terms, to have an intention to use that trade mark on goods in Australia. It is a commonplace of contemporary international trade that prior to consumption goods may be in the course of trade across national boundaries.

52  An overseas manufacturer who has registered a trade mark in Australia and who himself (or through an authorised user) places the trade mark on goods which are then sold to a trader overseas can be said to be a user of the trade mark when those same goods, to which the trade mark is affixed, are in the course of trade, that is, are offered for sale and sold in Australia. This is because the trade mark remains the trade mark of the registered owner (through an authorised user if there is one) whilst the goods are in the course of trade before they are bought for consumption[29]. As affirmed by Gummow J in Wingate Marketing Pty Ltd v Levi Strauss & Co[30],
“whilst a trade mark remains on goods, it functions as an indicator of the person who attached or authorised the initial use of the mark”.
During the trading period, the trade mark functions as an indicator of the origin of the goods, irrespective of the location of the first sale.

That is, what is required is that (1) there be some sign which functions as a trade mark – a badge of origin – and (2) the sign be used in the course of trade in Australia.

The sale in England by the English manufacturer to retailers for resale in Estex was sufficient for this, but awareness that the retail markets in Australia was the intended destination was not necessary.

As the High Court’s references to Champagne Heidsieck v Buxton (a case, if not exactly dear to my heart, certainly engraved on it!) show, any other conclusion would be inconsistent with the cases establishing that parallel imports do not infringe trade marks and which have been enshrined in s 123.

In context, therefore, the last sentence of [50], noting that the goods had been sold to the German trader without any limitation on resale should not be determinative.

Was there enough use?

Lion’s first fall back position was to rely on the insubstantiality of the 144 bottles imported compared to the size of the market for wine in Australia. The High Court rejected this attack:

65  A commercial quantity of wine, some 144 bottles, was imported and offered for sale under the registered trade mark by Beach Avenue during the statutory period. Some 41 sales during that time were proven by reference to invoices and tax paid. There was no suggestion in the evidence that the offering for sale and selling either overseas or in Australia was for any purpose other than making profit and establishing goodwill in the registered trade mark. It was not contended that the use was fictitious or colourable. In all the circumstances the use was genuine and sufficient to establish use in good faith for the purposes of Lion Nathan’s application for removal.

That is, the High Court adopted a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. It is also worth noting the careful reservation that it was not called upon to decide whether or not a single use would suffice.

What trade mark was used?

Lion’s next attack argued that use of BAREFOOT with a representation of a bare footprint on the wine bottle label was not use of the trade mark as registered – BAREFOOT.

The High Court did not reject this argument on the grounds that there was use of BAREFOOT alone.

Rather, at [68] it distinguished the Colorado case (a case from which special leave was refused) on the grounds that the word COLORADO had no inherent capacity to distinguish because of its geographical significance and so the mountain peak device used with the word element was “not a mere descriptor but a distinguishing feature”. In this case, however, at [69] the device element was an addition which did not substantially affect the trade mark’s identity: consumers were likely to identify the mark by reference to the word, the device merely illustrated the word and, except in the case of honest concurrent use, the device alone would not be registrable in the face of the word mark.

An evidential issue about authorised use

Lion’s last attack, arguing that Barefoot Cellars was not an authorised user when it applied the trade mark to the wine, also failed. The potential problem for Gallo here was that neither Mr Houlihan nor anyone else involved in the production of the wine gave evidence about what quality control, if any, Mr Houlihan had exercised. There were 2 strands to this attack.

The first strand was to contend that some assertions of quality control recorded in a consultancy  agreement were not in fact statements of fact. This failed as a matter of interpretation of the document. In a separate concurring judgment, Heydon J explained that the consultancy agreement constituted a “business record” and the statements were therefore admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.

The second argument that there was no quality control by Mr Houlihan because he was only a joint principal in Barefoot Cellars and in addition a third person was the winemaker. This was not, however, sufficient to preclude the exercise of quality control by Mr Houlihan.

E. & J. Gallo Winery v Lion Nathan Australia Pty Limited [2010] HCA 15 (19 May 2010)

Update: should have added links to report on Full Federal Court and first instance (here and here).

Some things the High Court didn’t deal with:

  1. The Full Federal Court’s finding that, notwithstanding the order to remove the trade mark for non-use, Lion still had to pay damages for infringement until the judgment.
  2. Whether or not Gallo’s negotiations with McWilliams Wines to introduce a BAREFOOT wine into Australia constituted use of the trade mark or warranted an exercise of discretion to leave the trade mark on the Register. The negotiations culminated in the grant of a licence to McWilliams and the sale of products under the trade mark in September 2007, some 4 months after the expiry of the relevant 3 year period.
  3. Whether beer and wine are goods of the same description.

The first question, of course, did not arise as a result of the High Court’s principal ruling. The third question was part of the “evaluative findings” which did not raise general questions of public importance. See [72]

High Court allows appeal in Barefoot case Read More »

Recorded music royalties at the gym

The Copyright Tribunal has ordered a very significant increase in the licence fees payable by fitness clubs for the use of recorded music.

At this stage, there seems to be press reports only:

The old fee was 96.8c per person attending the class, capped at $2654 per year. The new fee will be $15 per class or $1 per attendee.

This is just the fee payable to the record company, not the fee for the composition payable to APRA.

Presumably it follows on the striking recalibration effected in the Hotels case.

Recorded music royalties at the gym Read More »

Tobacco and trade marks seminar

IPRIA is hosting a seminar on the Commonwealth Government’s announced intention to ban the use of artwork and logos on cigarette packaging.

Speakers:

  • Prof. Mark Davison
  • Prof. John Freebairn, a professor of economics at Melbourne Uni
  • Ass. Prof. Angela Paladino, who teaches in Marketing at Melbourne Uni (and is a recipient of over $2M in competitive funding)
  • Tim Wilson, the Director of Intellectual Property and Free Trade unit at the Institute of Public Affairs.

They threaten to “consider the economic, legal, ethical and marketing implications of this decision”. Unfortunately, there is no indication that Kev10 will be there to perform his patented double pike with backflip. However, it does seem that the Senate Committee inquiring into the bill is not due to report until 26 August 2010. (although submissions should well and truly be in by now).

Where:

Wednesday, 26 May 2010 at 6pm (Lecture Theatre GO8, Melbourne Law School)

The seminar is free and there are CPD points going.

Details and registration here.

Tobacco and trade marks seminar Read More »

Inventive step standard

Tom Cordiner (from the Victorian Bar and a registered patent attorney) and Beth Webster (from IPRIA) are giving a seminar for IPRIA and IPTA on Raising the Inventive Step: A Look at the Issues:

Brisbane on 18 May 2010

Sydney on 19 May 2010

Melbourne on 21 May 2010

The seminars are free and if you are subject to the continuing education requirements of the Professional Standards Board, the Queensland, Victorian or NSW Bars or the Law Society of NSW garner you one “point”.

Details and registration via here.

Inventive step standard Read More »

The grace period and “reasonable trial”

Mack Innovations lodged a provision patent application for a “cable pulling apparatus for helicopters” on 12 August 2005. The complete application for a standard patent was lodged on 14 August 2006 and a standard patent was subsequently granted (yes, 12 and 13 August 2006 fell on the weekend).

Apparently, Mack Innovations had begun testing parts and subsequently a prototype of the device in public around March 2005; i.e., about 5 months before the provisional application was lodged.

Rotorco, having been sued for infringement, tried to argue that  Mack Innovations’ own actions in March 2005 had rendered the patent “not novel”; contending that the grace period did not apply because the complete application was filed more than 12 months after first public use.

The problem for Rotorco was that its summary judgment application was based on reg. 2.2(2)(d), not 2.2(1A). Reg. 2.2(1A) provides for a grace period where there was a publication or use “within 12 months before the filing date of the complete application”. On the other hand, reg. 2.2(2)(d) applies where:

(d)    the working in public of the invention within the period of 12 months before the priority date of a claim for the invention:
(i)    for the purposes of reasonable trial; and
(ii)    if, because of the nature of the invention, it is reasonably necessary for the working to be in public.

and Tamberlin J, albeit in dicta, had already ruled that filing the provisional application on which the patent was based within the 12 months grace period was sufficient for reliance on this provision.

One might add that, given the difference in wording between reg. 2.2(1A) and 2.2.(2)(d), this conclusion seems consistent with the Full Court’s decision in Mont Adventure Equipment (admittedly dealing with the application of the grace period in the context of a divisional application).

Mack Innovations (Australia) Pty Limited & Anor v Rotorco Pty Limited & Anor [2010] QSC 138 (McMurdo J)

As this was an application for summary judgment, I am not sure whether that means it still remains to be resolved whether or not Mack Innovations’ use was in fact reasonable trial which it was reasonably necessary to conduct in public.

The grace period and “reasonable trial” Read More »

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