Australia

Resale royalty right in the EU

In a dispute over which of Salvador Dali’s heirs is entitled to the benefits of the Community Resale Royalty, the ECJ has ruled that this is a matter for national law.

The 1709 blog has a short report here; IPKat waxes lyrical here.

Case C?518/08, Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí and Visual Entidad de Gestión de Artistas Plásticos (VEGAP) v Société des auteurs dans les arts graphiques et plastiques (ADAGP)

CAL was recently appointed to administer the absolutely inalienable artist’s resale royalty scheme under the Australian Act, Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009 (Cth), and Minister Garrett has announced that the scheme will come into force on 9 June 2010.

Section 15 of our Act will specify who the heirs can be – the person or person who satisfy “the succession test”:

Succession test
(1)  An entity satisfies the succession test in relation to resale royalty right on the commercial resale of an artistic work, if the entity satisfies:
(a)  criteria 1 and 2 (in subsections (2) and (3)); or
(b)  criteria 3 and 4 (in subsections (4) and (5)).
Criterion 1
(2)  The entity received its interest in the right by testamentary disposition, or in accordance with the rules of intestate succession, on the death of an individual.
Criterion 2
(3)  The entity is one of the following:
(a)  an individual with a beneficial interest in the right;
(b)  a charity or charitable institution with a beneficial interest in the right;
(c)  a community body with a beneficial interest in the right;
(d)  a person who holds an interest in the right in trust for:
(i)  an individual; or
(ii)  a charity or charitable institution; or
(iii)  a community body.
Criterion 3
(4)  The entity received its interest in the right on the winding up of a charity, charitable institution or a community body.
Criterion 4
(5)  The entity is a charity, charitable institution or a community body formed for substantially the same purposes as the body that was wound up.

Resale royalty right in the EU Read More »

Who can enforce a release

Global Brands is still suing YD Pty Ltd. The trial on quantum for infringement of registered design was almost due to start when YD applied to amend.

After YD admitted it had infringed Global Brands’ registered design, YD discovered, over 9 months earlier, that Global Brands had entered into a settlement agreement with Pegasus/Coastal relating to Global Brands allegations that Pegasus/Coastal had infringed the same registered design. The settlement agreement was in fairly typical terms:

the parties (and any related body corporate as that term is defined in s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Related Bodies Corporate) hereby permanently release and forever discharge each other, their Related Bodies Corporate, directors, customers, servants and agents from and against all and any claim cause of action liability suit or demand which the parties … have or but for this deed may have had against each other…their customers servants or agents prior to the date of this deed for or in respect of or arising out of the subject matter or the conduct of the proceeding and the cross claim.

YD claims that Pegasus/Coastal supplied the infringing products to it and so it was a customer within the terms of the release. Pegasus/Coastal apparently did not want to become embroiled in the litigation. The amendment was to join Pegasus/Coastal as a respondent and to rely on the release.

Dodds-Streeton J has granted leave to amend, finding that YD although not a party to the settlement deed could rely on it as a special exception to the rules on privity, so long as Pegasus/Coastal was joined as a respondent.

Aon Risk Services was distinguished:

In all the unusual circumstances of this case, including:
the existence of the release, its apparent relevance as the basis for an arguable claim; its relatively circumscribed scope; the respondents’ belated knowledge of the deed and their conduct thereafter; the impact of the decision in Airberg only recently appreciated by the respondents’ counsel; the applicants’ preference that the quantum trial should not proceed if the amendments be allowed; the fact that although the proceeding has been long on foot, there has already been one trial and the parties have apparently acquiesced in various stages of non-progression:
in my opinion, weighing all relevant matters, including the nature and importance of the amendment to the respondents, notwithstanding the delay, wasted costs and prejudice to the applicants (which may not be wholly compensable by a costs order) the respondents’ applications to amend and to join Pegasus should be allowed.

Global Brands apparently denies that YD is a “customer” and, in any event, apparently intends seeking rectification to exclude the term as a “mistake”.

All this has led to the vacating of the trial date.

Global Brand Marketing Inc v YD Pty Limited [2010] FCA 323

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Luscious Lips confectionary

Sundberg J has dismissed Nature’s Blend’s action against Nestlé for infringement of its LUSCIOUS LIPS trade mark, passing off and misleading or deceptive conduct by selling Allens RETRO PARTY MIX.

Nature’s Blend, which was principally a supplier of veterinary products registered LUSCIOUS LIPS in respect of confectionery. Initially, at least, it gave chocolates away branded with the trade mark and a device to promote its business.

Around the same time as Nature’s Blend began marketing products with its trade mark, Nestlé introduced a new product under its ALLENS brand called ‘RETRO PARTY MIX’. This was a box or packet of mixed lollies. The back of the packaging included the following:

That’s right! All your favourites are back, so put on those flares and get ready to party! Up to 7 lolly varieties including…cool Cola Bottles, those radical Racing Cars, yummy Honey flavoured Bears, totally freeeekie Teeth, luscious Lips, partying Pineapples and outrageous Raspberries. [emphasis added]

The “luscious” Lips were a jelly product in the shape of lips.

Sundberg J found that the words used in this setting were not used as a trade mark. First, because the word “luscious” was descriptive and in context consumers would be likely to regard the expression as laudatory and possibly even humorous. Secondly, the effect of the combined expression in context was diluted by the prominence of the Allens, RETRO PARTY MIX and Nestlé trade marks.

Sundberg J would also have found, if necessary, that Nestlé was using the term as a good faith description: Nestlé’s product manager explained the development of the name in terms which made it clear she had been unaware of Nature’s Blend’s trade mark or product.

Interestingly, at [13] Sundberg J also considered it clear that the relevant time for determining liability under s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) is the date when the respondent’s conduct started; the same as for trade mark infringement and passing off. Middleton J did not consider it necessary to decide the point in Playcorp v Bodum [2010] FCA 23 at [58]-[59].

Nature’s Blend Pty Ltd  v Nestle Australia Ltd [2010] FCA 198

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No copyright in telephone directories DownUnder

Gordon J, sitting at first instance, has ruled that copyright does not subsist in Telstra’s White Pages directories or Yellow Pages directories confirming the revolution wrought by IceTV.

There are 347 paragraphs and time does not permit careful analysis at this stage. According to the summary in [5]:

For the reasons that follow, copyright does not subsist in any Work. None is an original literary work. By way of summary:
  1. among the many contributors to each Work, the Applicants have not and cannot identify who provided the necessary authorial contribution to each Work. The Applicants concede there are numerous non-identified persons who “contributed” to each Work (including third party sources);
  2. even if the human or humans who “contributed” to each Work were capable of being identified (and they are not), much of the contribution to each Work:
2.1 was not “independent intellectual effort” (IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [33]) and further or alternatively, “sufficient effort of a literary nature” (IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [99]) for those who made a contribution to be considered an author of the Work within the meaning of the Copyright Act;
2.2 further or alternatively, was anterior to the Work first taking its “material form” (IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [102]);
2.3 was not the result of human authorship but was computer generated;
the Works cannot be considered as “original works” because the creation of each Work did not involve “independent intellectual effort” (IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [33]) and / or the exercise of “sufficient effort of a literary nature”: IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [99]; see also IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [187]- [188].

It may be particularly interesting to see why copyright did not subsist in the Yellow Pages directories, which were classified directories.

At [46], her Honour explained why Desktop Marketing no longer represented the law in Australia following IceTV (here and here):

Before turning to the facts, mention must be made of the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2002] FCAFC 112; (2002) 119 FCR 491 (Desktop Marketing). In that decision, copyright was found to subsist in certain editions of WPDs and YPDs. The Applicants submitted that the resolution of the present case remains governed by the outcome in Desktop Marketing [2002] FCAFC 112; 119 FCR 491 and that the High Court’s comments on copyright subsistence in IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 should be regarded as obiter dicta. I reject that contention. Firstly, IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 is binding authority on the proper interpretation of the Copyright Act. The reasoning of both plurality judgments establishes principles of law beyond copyright infringement. Secondly, the High Court directly warned of the need to treat Desktop Marketing 119 FCR 491 with particular care: see IceTV [2009] HCA 14; 254 ALR 386 at [52], [134], [157] and [188]. Thirdly, Desktop Marketing [2002] FCAFC 112; 119 FCR 491 did not deal directly with the issue of authorship. Rather, all issues in respect of copyright had been conceded other than that of originality. In fact, Finkelstein J (at first instance) questioned the assumptions the parties had made about authorship: Telstra Corporation Ltd v Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd [2001] FCA 612; (2001) 51 IPR 257 at [4]. Finally, the facts of this case are significantly different. The WPDs and YPDs in question are different. Moreover, the Genesis Computer System which stored the relational database and which was used in the production of some of the WPDs and YPDs in issue in these proceedings (after September 2001 in the case of YPDs and late 2003 in the case of WPDs) was not in use in Desktop Marketing [2002] FCAFC 112; 119 FCR 491. (The Genesis Computer System is considered in detail at [60]ff below).

Telstra Corporation Limited v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 44

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Coffee plungers, tea pots, designs and passing off

The Federal Court, Middleton J, has rejected Bodum’s allegations that

  1. the sale of the Baccarat Venice coffee plunger and Euroline’s Classic coffee plunger passed off Bodum’s Chambord coffee plunger or was otherwise misleading or deceptive; or
  2. Baccarat’s Devon teapot passed off Bodum’s Assam Tea Press or was otherwise misleading or deceptive.

Playcorp Group of Companies Pty Ltd v Peter Bodum A/S [2010] FCA 23

The judgment includes depictions of the products and their packaging in the appendices.

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Larrikin Merry As It Can Be

While on the subject of Mars and darkened conference rooms, Men at Work have been found to infringe Larrikin’s copyright in Kookaburra Sits on the Old Gum Tree.

It would seem (from newspaper reports) that 2 bars were a substantial part – shades of the old Colonel Bogey newsreel case.

The video on the Age’s website has the clips of every kid’s favourite folk song and that flute riff.

Richard Acland highlights the crucial comparison in a vacuum:

Even though there was evidence that the pitch, key, rhythm, melodic shape, harmony, musical sentences and context are different, Justice Jacobson found that there was nonetheless a reproduction of a substantial part of Kookaburra in Down Under. This is not to say that Kookaburra amounted to a substantial part of the pop song.

but it all seems rather academic when Jacobson J found at [111]:

Mr Hay also accepted that for a period of about two or three years from around 2002, when he performed Down Under at concerts, he sometimes sang the words of Kookaburra at about the middle of Down Under, at the point at which he reached the flute line.

Looks rather like the crucial battle was last year’s fight over whether or not the Girl Guides or Larrikin owned the copyright in the first place.

Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited [2010] FCA 29

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ISPs, authorisation and copyright DownUnder

In case you have been on Mars, or locked in a conference room writing submissions, you have probably heard that the Federal Court has rejected the music industry’s attempt to impose liability on iiNet, and ISP, for copyright infringement by authorising the infringing activities of users of its network.

Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v iiNet Limited (No. 3) [2010] FCA 24 (636 para judgment) here.

Since I will find myself still locked in aforesaid conference room, I’ll simply quote (at this stage) from the 21 para summary:

 

The first step in making a finding of authorisation was to determine whether certain iiNet users infringed copyright. I have found that they have. However, in reaching that finding, I have found that the number of infringements that have occurred are significantly fewer than the number alleged by the applicants. This follows from my finding that, on the evidence and on a proper interpretation of the law, a person makes each film available online only once through the BitTorrent system and electronically transmits each film only once through that system. This excludes the possible case of a person who might repeatedly download the same file, but no evidence was presented of such unusual and unlikely circumstance. Further, I have found, on the evidence before me, that the iiNet users have made one copy of each film and have not made further copies onto physical media such as DVDs.
The next question was whether iiNet authorised those infringements. While I find that iiNet had knowledge of infringements occurring, and did not act to stop them, such findings do not necessitate a finding of authorisation. I find that iiNet did not authorise the infringements of copyright of the iiNet users. I have reached that conclusion for three primary reasons.
Looks like there will also be interesting obvservations on the operation of the Telecommunications Act and the role of iiNet’s policy vis a vis repeat offenders.

Howard Knopf and Michael Geist look at the decision from Canadian perspectives.

ISPs, authorisation and copyright DownUnder Read More »

Enforcement of PBR in Australia

ACIP has published its final report into the Enforcement of plant breeder’s rights in Australia.

The report is here (pdf) – be warned 138pp, Exec Summary is 10pp.

Some recommendations:

 

Recommendation 1.

A new “purchase” right be added to s.11. This new right would only apply to those taxa that are specifically declared in the regulations. Industry sectors such as wheat breeders would apply to the PBR Office to have particular taxa so declared.

 

Recommendation 2.

The PBR Act be amended to clarify that harvested material that is also propagating material is to be considered as propagating material for the purposes of s.11, even if it is not being used for that purpose.

 

Recommendation 4.

There be no change to the operation of farmer’s privilege under s.17.

However, s.17 should be amended to state in easily understood terms that s.17 does not provide the farmer with the right to perform the acts listed in s.11(a) to (g). For example, the farmer will still require the PBR owner’s authorisation to sell the reproduced propagating material, the harvested material or the product of the harvested material.

Recommendation 5.

As part of IP Australia’s education and awareness programs, raise industry awareness of the opportunity under s.17(2) to have specific taxa excluded from the farmer’s privilege exemption.

Recommendation 6.

Encourage PBR owners to make clear to growers the conditions of sale of propagating material and their obligations in relation to future generations of it. This includes making clear that growers require the authorisation of the PBR owner to sell crops grown from farm-saved seed.

 

 

Recommendation 17.
Introduce an Information Notice system into the PBR Act based on the UK Information Notice system.
This would enable PBR owners to obtain information from suspected infringers on the
source of plant material. Where this is not supplied within a reasonable time, legal proceedings may be commenced in which the presumption is made that the plant material was obtained through unauthorised use of propagating material and that the PBR owner did not have a reasonable opportunity to exercise its rights in relation to the material.

Recommendation 14.

The jurisdiction of the second tier of the Federal Court of Australia to include PBR matters.

Appropriately qualified magistrates must be made available and there should be appropriate measures taken to ensure the processes of the second tier are faster and cheaper than in the first tier. Examples include simplifying and standardising procedures for expert evidence and DNA testing through the issuing practice notes, use of alternate dispute resolution where appropriate, and curtailing of the discovery phase.

Recommendation 12.

An on-going Expert Panel be established to provide guidance and opinions on general issues or specific cases concerning the PBR Act and related law. The Panel should comprise appropriate people with expertise in relevant areas who provide their services as required.

Upon request from any person and for a moderate fee, the Panel may provide detailed guidance and opinions on general issues or specific cases concerning the PBR Act and related law. The Panel should focus on the enforcement of granted rights and not provide advice on the registrability of individual applications for PBR. The Panel’s opinions should be made publicly available in a manner that respects commercially sensitive material. The Panel may refer matters to the Government or ACIP as it sees fit.

 

 

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2010 FRANCIS GURRY Lecture

Alison Brimelow, immediate past President of the European Patent Office, will give the 2nd annual Francis Gurry Lecture on 1 March 2010 at Melbourne Uni.

Her topic: “not Seeing the Wood for the Trees: Is the Patent System still fit for purpose?”

Details and registrations via here.

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Customs seizure and trade marks

In two ex parte applications, Greenwood J granted interlocutory injunctions restraining Customs from releasing imported goods which allegedly infringe a trade mark.

The interesting point is that the proceedings for infringement were not brought within the “action period” specified in by s 137 of the Trade Marks Act. Greenwood J reasoned:

Section 136 is headed “Release of Goods to Owner – No Action for Infringement and s 137 is headed “Action for Infringement of Trade Mark”. Some discussion has arisen in earlier authorities, including Jemella v Mackinnon & Another [2008] FCA 1022; 77 IPR 243, in which Logan J had to consider whether non-compliance with these provisions as to commencement and notification within the extension period, might have the effect of depriving the applicant of its standing to maintain infringement proceedings. I am satisfied that ss 136 and 137, taken together, do not deprive the applicant of its standing to maintain proceedings for infringement of the trade mark. Section 137 is not a primary empowering provision conferring rights of action in the applicant. It is permissive in the context in which it appears. Those rights are conferred by s 20 and the provisions of Part 12 of the Trade Marks Act. Section 137 recognises that a trade mark owner may elect to bring proceedings and ss 136 and 137 address what is to occur in the circumstances of those sections in respect of seized goods if the relevant steps are not taken. However, the provisions should be read subject to an order that might be made under s 137(5) to, in effect, preserve the status quo in circumstances where the Court is satisfied that there is a prima facie case of infringement. Nevertheless, a question arises as to whether it is appropriate to make an order directed to the Customs CEO preventing the goods from being released, in all the circumstances, in the exercise of discretion, when s 136 imposes a statutory obligation upon the Customs CEO to release the goods in the circumstances there identified and s 137 imposes time constraints. That directs attention to the merits.

That is, the foundation of the right to be protected by the interlocutory injunction was the right to sue for infringement of the registered trade mark – a right conferred by ss 20 and 120; s 137 merely facilitated that primary right.

Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v Bouobeid [2009] FCA 1567

Jemella Australia Pty Ltd v Daizli [2009] FCA 1566

In the Daizli action there is a further complication that the respondents seem to be out of the jurisdiction for some time. His Honour also refers to products being offered for sale on eBay. But, other than those products being alleged to be infringing, I’m not sure what particular significance that has.

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