Patent

Compulsory licensing of patents

The Assistant Treasurer has referred the operation of the compulsory licence regime within the Patents Act 1990 to the Productivity Commission for review.

At present, sections 133 to 140 of the Patents Act provide for applications to be made to the Federal Court for a compulsory licence to work a patent where

(i) the applicant has tried for a reasonable period, but without success, to obtain from the patentee an authorisation to work the invention on reasonable terms and conditions;

>(ii) the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied;

(iii) the patentee has given no satisfactory reason for failing to exploit the patent; or

the patentee has contravened the anti-competitive provisions in Part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.

The Terms of Reference require the Productivity Commission to:

  1. Assess whether the current Australian provisions can be invoked efficiently and effectively to deal with circumstances where reasonable requirements of the public are not being met or where the patentee engages in anti-competitive conduct. This includes, but is not limited to, consideration of concerns that gene patents may hinder access to affordable healthcare, including access to medical advice that relies on the identification and use of gene sequences related to human health and disease.
  2. Advise on the frequency, and impact, of the issue of compulsory licences in comparable markets and the common features in such compulsory licenses.
  3. Recommend any measures that may be required to efficiently and effectively exercise these safeguard provisions and invoke their use in a manner consistent with Australia’s international obligations, without limiting access to overseas technologies, technology transfer, research and development investments or substantially reducing the patent incentive for innovation.
  4. Recommend any alternative mechanisms deemed necessary to ensure that the balance between incentives to innovate and access to technology best reflect objectives of ensuring reasonable access to health care solutions, maximising economic growth and growing the Australian manufacturing industry.
  5. Recommend measures to raise awareness of these provisions and their purpose, including the specific challenges of raising awareness among small businesses and the healthcare sector.

The genesis of the reference seems to lie in the uproar resulting from the attempt to charge licence fees for diagnostic kits based on the BRCA 1 patent and, more recently, the smartphone wars.[1]

A number of submissions to the Senate’s Community Affairs committee claimed that there were a range of deficiencies with the present scheme. In addition, IP Australia told the Senate’s Community Affairs committee when it was investigating these (and other matters) that, in the 100+ years our law has had such provision, there had been only 3 applications for the grant of a compulsory licence. The ALRC had also recommended that the scope of ‘reasonable requirements of the public’ be clarified (the recommendation to make the competition test a basis for licensing having been sort of implemented when s 133(2)(b) was inserted in 2006.

The Terms of Reference also note that Australia is a net importer of technology with, for example, only 1,178 (or 8%) of the 14,557 patents granted in 2010 being granted to Australian residents.

The TRIPS Agreement allows us to do something in this sphere. See art. 40 and art. 27.2 even goes so far as to allow us to exclude from patentability things necessary to protect ordre public “including to protect human … life or health”.

Of course, the multi-million dollar question in all of this is what that elastic word “reasonable” might mean?

Do also note paragraph 4 of art. 40, which gives a country that is concerned its nationals are being prejudiced by the exercise of such rights an “opportunity for consultations”. Of course, such a country might just move straight to the dispute resolution processes. I wonder how a more liberal use of compulsory licensing, or the threat of it, would play with those of our trading partners who consider compulsory licences of patents to be anathema?

According to the Productivity Commission’s website:

1 an issues paper will be released in August;
2 initial submissions will be due by 28 September;
3 there will be a draft report released in early December;
4 public hearings will be held in February 2013; and
5 the final report will be delivered to the government on 29 March 2013.


  1. According to the Press Release amongst other things: “Of concern to government is a perception that patents over genetic technologies, or a perceived lack of licences to use these patents in Australia, unreasonably restricts or delays patient access to medical advice based on the latest diagnostic tests. Other areas of sensitivity include climate change mitigation, food security and alternative energy technologies, and technical standards essential patents (for example, in telecommunication technologies).”  ?

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Apple v Samsung in the High Court 2

Apple’s application for special leave to appeal from the Full Federal Court’s decision to discharge the interlocutory injunction granted by Bennett J will be heard on Friday, 9 December 2011 in Sydney.

In granting the stay on the Full Federal Court’s orders, Heydon J pointed out that the fact that 2 experienced patent judges had reached opposition conclusions, in circumstances which his Honour characterised as the appeal court not disturbing Bennett J’s findings of fact, indicated Apple’s case was not without some prospects of success.

Perhaps more interesting at the level of tea leaf reading, Heydon J expressed his personal concern that no expedited final hearing was ordered in this case:

Secondly, to my mind at least, it is deeply troubling that there was no expedited final hearing in this case. Precisely why there was not, on my perhaps limited acquaintance with the materials, is a somewhat murky question. But why it is that no expedited final hearing took place and how the courts below dealt with the fact that no expedited final hearing took place is a matter of some public interest in the sense in which Ms Howard was using that expression and is a matter which may be thought worthy of close investigation on the special leave hearing.

The Full Federal Court appeared to discount Samsung’s resistance to an expedited hearing.

Apple Inc v Samsung [2011] HCATrans 326

Apple v Samsung in the High Court 2 Read More »

Apple and Samsung in the High Court

Apple and Samsung in the High Court Read More »

Samsung gets Oz injunction discharged

The Full Federal Court (Dowsett, Foster and Yates JJ) has allowed Samsung’s appeal from Bennett J’s decision and discharged the interlocutory injunctions against the Galaxy Tab 10.1.

On a first read, it looks like a “close run” thing. It also appears the grant of (interlocutory) injunctions for patent infringement in Australia may well be increasingly influenced in the future by the sorts of issues highlighted by the US Supreme Court in KSR v Teleflex (although that case was not referred to).

A factor which appears to have played high importance in the Full Court’s thinking was the recognition (by both parties) that the awarding of the interlocutory injunction in this case was effectively final relief:

49.   In the present case the parties accept that the orders made below are effectively final in that the commercial viability of the Galaxy Tab 10.1 in the Australian market will be lost. We doubt whether the grant of interlocutory relief in the present case avoids frustration of the Court’s process. When one keeps in mind that the Court must seek to do justice to both parties, such a consequence for Samsung can hardly be described as other than a frustration of the Court’s process. In our view, the task facing her Honour was not simply to grant or refuse an injunction. The task was to protect the Court’s process from frustration, as best as could be done in the circumstances, following the guidelines laid down by the High Court in the cases to which we will refer in the next section of these reasons. An “all or nothing” outcome was unlikely to produce that result.

Followed at [50]:

In this case, given the primary judge’s findings as to the merits of both parties’ cases and the even weighting attributed by her Honour to the relevant factors under consideration in her assessment of the balance of convenience, an arrangement which shared the risk of loss was the best that could be done to avoid frustration of the Court’s process, at least in the absence of any conduct by either party which effectively made it the author of its own misfortune. The question, then, was whether Samsung’s conduct in refusing an early trial on the conditions offered, together with whatever may be made of the “eyes wide open” factor and the fact that Apple relies on two patents rather than one leads to the conclusion that Samsung should be denied a trial on the merits. …. (emphasis supplied)

then [51]:

…. Where the merits and the question of convenience are fairly evenly balanced, there will be no injustice in requiring that the party seeking relief demonstrate good prospects of success before imposing almost certain prejudice on the other side.

The strength of Apple’s case

Apple argued that Samsung’s importation and sale of the Galaxy Tab 10.1 would infringe:

Claim 6 provided:

6. A touch panel having a transparent capacitive sensing medium configured to detect multiple touches or near touches that occur at a same time and at distinct locations in a plane of the touch panel and to produce distinct signals representative of a location of the touches on the plane of the touch panel for each of the multiple touches, the transparent capacitive sensing medium comprising:
a first layer having a plurality of lines that are electrically isolated from one another and formed from a transparent conductive material; and
a second layer spatially separated from the first layer and having a plurality of lines that are electrically isolated from one another and formed from a transparent conductive material, the second conductive lines being positioned transverse to the first conductive lines, the intersection of transverse lines being positioned at different locations in the plane of the touch panel, each of the conductive lines being operatively coupled to capacitive monitoring circuitry,
wherein the first layer and the second layer are disposed on two sides of an optically transmissive member.

On this part of the case, the question was whether or not either or both of 2 layers in the Galaxy Tab 10.1’s screen (described as layer D and layer E) satisfied the requirement of “an optically transmissive member”.

While not finally deciding the point, the Full Court considered that Apple’s case on this point was unlikely to succeed:

121.  It is sufficient for us to express the view that, on the present state of the evidence, there is a real and substantial prospect that the importation into and supply in Australia of the Galaxy Tab 10.1 will not infringe claim 6 of the Touch Screen Patent. We have referred to a number of difficulties that confront Apple in making good its case on infringement. It may well be that, on a final hearing, Apple will meet these difficulties. But difficulties they are. Whilst we would not be prepared to say that Apple’s case on infringement is not open to be argued, the difficulties to which we have referred do affect the assessment at the present time of the probability that, if on a final hearing the evidence remains the same, Apple will be found to be entitled to final injunctive relief for infringement of that claim. If Apple has established a prima facie case at all (which we doubt), it is founded upon a construction argument which, if the evidence remains as it is, is unlikely to succeed at trial.

On the other hand, Samsung’s case on the alleged invalidity of claim 6 equally fell short (of course, Samsung would not be liable for infringement if it holds the line on Apple’s positive obligation to prove the infringement):

  1. It is not necessary at this point to resolve the debate between the parties as to whether the reference in the Leeper Article about detecting the presence of “multiple fingers” is to multiple fingers at multiple locations or multiple fingers at a single contact point. It is enough to say that there is some reasonable degree of uncertainty about what the Leeper Article actually discloses in that regard. Moreover, even if one were to assume that the article is referring to the detection of multiple touches or near touches that occur at the same time and at distinct locations in a plane of the touch panel – which on the present state of the evidence would be a generous assumption – there is, importantly, no apparent disclosure in the Leeper Article that the ClearPad is configured to produce distinct signals for each of the multiple touches that are representative of the location of each of those touches.
  2. In our view it follows from that state of affairs that Samsung has not established a prima facie case that the Leeper Article anticipates the touch panel claimed in claim 6 of the Touch Screen Patent.

Samsung’s case on the “Mulligan patent application” was equally suspect: esp. [149] – [150].

The Heuristics patent:

1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:

at a computing device with a touch screen display,
detecting one or more finger contacts with the touch screen display,

applying one or more heuristics to the one or more finger contacts to determine a command for the device; and

processing the command;
wherein the one or more heuristics perform the functions of:

determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a one- dimensional vertical screen scrolling command rather than a two-dimensional screen translation command based on an angle of movement of the one or more finger contacts with respect to the touch screen display; and
determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a two dimensional screen translation command rather than a one-dimensional screen translation command, based on an angle of movement of the one or more finger contacts with respect to the touch screen display.

and

55. A computer-implemented method of any one of claims 1 to 26, wherein
the one or more finger contacts correspond to a finger gesture with an initial movement and a subsequent movement, and wherein
the function of determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a one-dimensional vertical screen scrolling command rather than a two-dimensional screen translation command includes identifying the entire finger gesture as the one-dimensional vertical screen scrolling command and basing the determination on the angle of movement of the initial movement of the finger gesture, and wherein
the function of determining that the one or more finger contacts correspond to a two-dimensional screen translation command rather than a one-dimensional vertical screen scrolling command includes identifying the entire finger gesture as the two-dimensional screen translation command and basing the determination on the angle of movement of the initial movement of the finger gesture.

The issue here is whether or not the Galaxy Tab 10.1 employs gestures based on “the angle of movement”. According to the Full Court, there was no factual dispute between the parties about how gestures worked (or for those familiar with the “other” system, don’t):

155 There seems to be no dispute that, in the Galaxy Tab 10.1, the process for determining the relevant command is as follows. A first user contact on the screen is detected and an X (horizontal) channel and a Y (vertical) channel are generated around the touch point. The touch panel logic then identifies the location of the user’s second touch point at a pre-defined period of time after the first contact is detected. The location of the second touch point is then compared with the locations of the X and Y channels previously generated by the first touch. The software then interprets this as an instruction for screen movement, relevantly a one-dimensional screen scrolling command or a two-dimensional screen translation command, and then processes the command accordingly.

The Full Court considered it was “difficult to discern” Apple’s reading of its claims in this and so concluded that Apple had not established a prima facie case on infringement: [160].

Balance of convenience factors

The factors considered here were

  • whether Samsung had unreasonably refused a proposal for an early trial;
  • whether Samsung’s conduct in entering the market with its “eyes wide open” to the potential for infringement were disentitling; and
  • Apple’s reliance on 2 patents instead of 1.

As to the proposal for an early trial, the Full Court considered that the various proposals were too shifting, too limited and ultimately too unclear to be operative:

190.  …. Had the offer been of a final hearing on all issues, and had the time for preparation been reasonable, the position may have been otherwise. In the circumstances of this case we cannot see how Samsung’s conduct in refusing the offer of an early trial could properly be weighed in the balance of convenience. In those circumstances we consider that her Honour erred in principle by taking into account that irrelevant consideration.

The Full Court gave careful consideration to the “eyes wide open” contention, but concluded her Honour was right to give it little weight:

196.  …. Finally, in the present case, the most compelling features are the assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective cases and the equality of likely detriment. Other considerations pale into insignificance beside those matters.

The Full Court could not see how asserting 2 patents rather than 1 put Apple in any better position (it might be interpolated: both with the issues identified above).

Samsung Electronics Co. Limited v Apple Inc. [2011] FCAFC 156

Lid dip: Peter Clarke

 

Samsung gets Oz injunction discharged Read More »

De-linking intellectual property from exclusive rights

The videocast of the 3rd Annual Francis Gurry Lecture is now available:

De-linking intellectual property from exclusive rights

by James Love, Director, Knowledge Ecology Limited. The blurb says:

The traditional justification for IP rights-atemporary monopoly to stimulate innovation and inverstment-is increasingly being questioned. If knowledge is more valuable when widely shared, and if freedom to use knowledge is socially and economically important, we need to de-link intellectual property protection from exclusive rights. But how?

I personally found the Q & A session helped crystallise what Mr Love was arguing. Very thought-provoking.

Apparently, the written paper will provide more explanation and amplification in due course. In the meantime, you may get an understanding of how Mr Love’s proposals could work in a pharmaceutical context here and here

Lid dip: Andrew Christie

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EU bans stem cell patents

The European Court of Justice has ruled that human embryonic stems cells are not patentable subject matter in the EU.

Article 6 of the Biotechnology Directive, 98/44/EC, provides:

1. Inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality; however, exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation.

2. On the basis of paragraph 1, the following, in particular, shall be considered unpatentable: (a) processes for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings; (c) uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes; (d) processes for modifying the genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any substantial medical benefit to man or animal, and also animals resulting from such processes.

A Mr Brüstle had a patent in Germany relating to isolated and purified neural precursor cells, processes for their production from embryonic stem cells and the use of neural precursor cells for the treatment of neural defects. It would appear this involved use of isolated and purified precursor cells having neural or glial properties, obtained from embryonic stem cells. That in turn appears to have involved removal of stem cells from the embryo at the blatocyst stage which, in turn, resulted in destruction of the embryo.

Greenpeace sought to invalidate it.

The ECJ had to consider first the meaning of human embryo:

– any human ovum after fertilisation, any non-fertilised human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature human cell has been transplanted and any non-fertilised human ovum whose division and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis constitute a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive;

However:

– it is for the referring court to ascertain, in the light of scientific developments, whether a stem cell obtained from a human embryo at the blastocyst stage constitutes a ‘human embryo’ within the meaning of Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive.

Secondly, the ECJ considered that the use of human embryos in research for patentable subject matter was prohibited by paragraph 6(2)(c), but use for the development of therapeutic or diagnostic purposes applied to human embryos could be patentable if useful.

Thirdly, the ECJ ruled that:

Article 6(2)(c) of the Directive excludes an invention from patentability where the technical teaching which is the subject-matter of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human embryos or their use as base material, whatever the stage at which that takes place and even if the description of the technical teaching claimed does not refer to the use of human embryos.

IPKat here; Scientific American here; Patent Docs here.  Lid dip Ian Pascarl and Penny Smith

S 18(2) of our Act provides:

(2) Human beings, and the biological processes for their generation, are not patentable inventions.

As a result of that prohibition, the Deputy Commissioner has rejected the patentability of

40. Claims 10 to 23 are directed to a method of growing preblastocyst human embryos. It is a method applied to a human embryo. The method has clear advantages in better simulating the natural environment, and reducing apoptosis of cells in the blastocyst, resulting in greater success in implantation, and babies of greater body mass and having fewer complications compared to IVF babies born without the benefit of the method – all of which demonstrates that the process is one that directly relates to the generation of a human being. The process is a biological process – it is a process involving the presence of a chemical such that the in vitro environment better simulates the natural fallopian tube environment. I am satisfied that these claims fall within the ambit of `biological processes for {the generation of human beings}’ as proscribed by s.18(2).

Fertilitescentrum AB and Luminis Pty. Ltd [2004] APO 19. There is presumably some scope to patent embryonic stem cells at least where they do not relate to the biological processes for the generation of human beings. Thus, in H Bion Inc v Commissioner of Patents [2010] FCA 539 a patent application entitled “Embryonic Stem Cell Line and Method of Preparing the Same was accepted. The acceptance was subsequently withdrawn, however, on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation. The decision does not make it clear what the fraud related to.

 

 

 

 

 

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Gene (no)patenting bill going down

The Senate’s Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee has, by majority, recommended that the Senate should not pass the Patent Amendment (Human Genes and Biological Materials) Bill 2010.

The Bill is a private members’ effort and, perhaps not surprisingly, the three of its sponsor still in the Senate dissented.

(At the time of writing, it is proving difficult to get a working link to the text of the Bill itself.) According to the EM it was considered desirable to expand the ban in s 18(2) on patenting human beings and the biological processes for their generation:

The purpose of this Bill is to advance medical and scientific research and the diagnosis, treatment and cure of human illness and disease by enabling doctors, clinicians and medical and scientific researchers to gain free and unfettered access to biological materials, however made, that are identical or substantially identical to such materials as they exist in nature.

These biological materials even if they have been isolated, purified or synthetically made have not been transformed from products of nature into products of humankind.

Thus the Bill (a) reinforces the applicability of the proviso in section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies within the meaning of section 18(1)(a) and section 18(1A)(a), (b) reinforces the applicability of the distinction between discovery and invention and (c) applies that distinction by expressly excluding from patentability, biological materials which are identical or substantially identical to such materials as they exist in nature, however made.

Notwithstanding this, it is rather difficult to find an Australian research institute researching genes etc. which supported the idea.

The ALRC of course had previously recommended leave well enough alone.

The issue doesn’t seem likely to go away. Apart from whatever the Bill’s sponsors and their allies may get up to, the majority concluded:

5.26 Like many of those who gave evidence, the committee prefers the solutions offered in the proposed amendments of the Raising the Bar Bill. However, the committee does not consider that the amendments in the Raising the Bar Bill will resolve all of the issues in the patent system. In the opinion of the committee, serious consideration should also be given to the proposals for legislative enactment of the patentable subject matter test and the general ‘ethical’ exclusion made in the ACIP report on patentable subject matter. Other reforms may also be necessary in the future, particularly in relation to ensuring equitable access to healthcare. In this context, the committee recognises that the Senate Community Affairs References Committee has indicated it will maintain a ‘watching brief’ in relation to the impact of gene patents in Australia.[5] Despite the need for further reform to the patent system, the committee agrees that removing an area of patentable subject matter, as proposed by the Bill, is not an appropriate solution to this complex set of issues. (emphasis and hyperlink supplied)

Gene (no)patenting bill going down Read More »

ACIP reviews innovation patents

On 28 February, the Minister directed ACIP to report on the innovation patent system.

On 17 August, ACIP published an issues paper (pdf) and now seeks your comments by 14 October 2011.

According to the announcement of the issue paper’s release:

In recent years a variety of concerns have been raised about the innovation patent system and whether it is meeting its original objectives. A key concern is that an innovation patent is overly difficult to invalidate and the remedies for infringement are overly generous. Another concern is that innovation patents are being used to obtain a form of quick protection for higher level inventions while a standard patent is being pursued. Also, the innovation patent system has never been reviewed to assess whether it remains effective and appropriate for Australia now and in the future.

Innovation patents (which are not for business schemes) are difficult to invalidate after Dura-Post? The Full Court confirmed that the test of ‘innovative step’ does not involve a sort of obviousness penumbra over common general knowledge. Rather, the patent is innovative unless it can be shown that the difference between the patent and the prior art do not make a substantial contribution to the working of the ‘invention’. This was apparently derived from Griffin v Isaacs. As the trial judge explained with the apparent approval of Kenny and Stone JJ at [70] and [79]:

Be that as it may, the feature of what Dixon J said was the disjunctive nature of the concepts – one was ‘make no substantial contribution to the working of the thing’; the other was ‘involve no ingenuity or inventive step’. The first alternative has been taken by Parliament virtually verbatim from the judgment. The focus is upon working of the invention (as claimed) not to the degree or kind of variation from the kinds of information set out in s 7(5). In other words, the variation from the kinds of information might be slight but, if a substantial contribution is made to the working of the invention, then there is an innovative step. … In my view the provenance of the phrase ‘make no substantial contribution to the working of the invention’ indicates that ‘substantial’ in this context means ‘real’ or ‘of substance’ as contrasted with distinctions without a real difference.

Rather than a modified inventive step test, it is a modified novelty test.

The Issues Paper runs to some 28 pages.

Interestingly, just over 11,000 innovation patents have been granted and 1,790 certified.Over 80% are to Australian inventors and around half are to Australian individuals as opposed to corporations (the proportion of certifications falls to 41%). The proportion of Australian grantees vs foreign appears to be falling over time.

1,011 of the grants are divisionals from applications for standard patents. For the first few years, that was about 5% of all divisional applications, but it has been at least 10% since 2006 with a couple of years getting closer to 14%. This leads to concerns that innovation patents are being used to get ‘quick’ rights.

There are also concerns that the pharmaceutical industry is using the system to ‘evergreen’ its patent portfolios.

The questions (although ACIP would like to take this opportunity to provoke discussion generally):

  1. Effectiveness in stimulating innovation
  2. Does Australia need a utility model?
  3. Does it cost too much?
  4. Is the cost of certification dissuading people from seeking certification?
  5. How do (people in) other jurisdictions jurisdictions perceive the innovation patent?
  6. Are there concerns about the uncertainty arising from the delays in getting certification?
  7. Are the current remedies appropriate?
  8. If the available remedies are reduced (e.g. you couldn’t get an injunction) would costs of (getting) an innovation patent be justified?
  9. How do you think the use of divisionals is working (and why did you do it)?

ACIP announcement

Issues paper (pdf)

ACIP reviews innovation patents Read More »

Raising the bar – some differences between the Exposure draft and the Bill

As noted previously, the Intellectual Property Laws (Raising the Bar) Amendments Bill was introduced earlier this week, following fairly extensive consultations on an exposure draft of the Bill.

Patentology has now looked at some of the differences in the proposed changes to the Patents Act between the exposure draft and the Bill as introduced here. His earlier post looked at the different transitional regime for the new standards for patentability.

Raising the bar – some differences between the Exposure draft and the Bill Read More »

Microsoft v i4i – US Supreme Court decides

Microsoft has lost its appeal to the US Supreme Court.

Microsoft had argued it should have to prove its claim that i4i’s patent was invalid by “a preponderance of the evidence”.

Under the US Patent Act, however, a patent having been granted after examination by the Commissioner is “presumed valid”. The US Supreme Court has ruled that “presumed valid” in this context had a settled common law meaning which Congress was presumed to have adopted. As a result, Microsoft had to make its invalidity case “by clear and convincing evidence”. That is, there is a strong presumption of validity in the USA.

Microsoft Corp v i4i Limited Partnership

Initial commentary by Patently-O.

The case initially attracted international attention as Microsoft was ordered to stop selling versions of Word which had the capability of opening a .XML, .DOCX, or .DOCM file (“an XML file”) containing custom XML. This presumably means that Microsoft will have to pay the US$290 million damages awarded against it for infringement.

Under Australian law, a person alleging a granted patent is invalid has the onus of proof on the usual balance of probabilities standard.

A person opposing the grant of a patent, however, has to establish their case on the clear and convincing or practically certain standard. The exposure draft of the “Raising the Bar” amendment legislation proposes changing that standard, and the standard for acceptance, to the balance of probabilities standard too. (See items 14 and 15 of Sch. 1 (pdf) and pp 26 – 30 of the (draft) EM (pdf).

Patently-O speculates from the voting alignment of the current Court that the US Supreme Court is now shifting “to the right” or “pro-patentee”.

Microsoft v i4i – US Supreme Court decides Read More »

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